Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and
Koontz, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice
VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, ET AL.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 970628 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
February 27, 1998
TRANCE W. WILKINS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Verbena M. Askew, Judge
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether, in the
circumstances of this case, the trial court had jurisdiction to
grant a writ of habeas corpus.
Since April 1980, Trance W. Wilkins has been detained by
the Virginia Department of Corrections pursuant to multiple
convictions, including attempted murder, robbery, and use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony. He is serving a total
sentence of 143 years.
On April 5, 1996, Wilkins filed the present pro se petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging, in claims (a) through
(z), the 1995 decision of the Virginia Parole Board (the Board)
to deny him discretionary parole and defer for two years his
next parole review. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent Wilkins.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkins’ petition, and,
following a hearing, the trial court, by an order entered
January 2, 1997, granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
with prejudice claims (a) through (z). Nevertheless, the court,
sua sponte, granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that
Wilkins “was denied due process when [the Board] deferred his
1996 annual parole review without providing [Wilkins] with a
reason for the deferral.” Accordingly, the court ordered that
Wilkins “be reviewed for parole in 1996 and that, if [the Board]
exercises its discretion to defer [Wilkins’] annual review in
the future, [the Board] provide him with the reason(s) for the
deferral.”
The Board contends, inter alia, that Wilkins’ petition
should be dismissed because the trial court had no habeas corpus
jurisdiction to grant the relief it ordered. We agree.
Under the common law, the purpose and scope of the writ of
habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention.
The writ
is available only where the release of the prisoner
from his immediate detention will follow as a result
of an order in his favor. It is not available to
secure a judicial determination of any question which,
even if determined in the prisoner’s favor, could not
affect the lawfulness of his immediate custody and
detention.[ ∗ ]
∗
The scope of the common-law writ of habeas corpus has been
expanded by Code § 8.01-654(B)(3), which provides that a
petition for the writ “may allege detention without lawful
authority through challenge to a conviction, although the
sentence imposed for such conviction is suspended or is to be
served subsequently to the sentence currently being served by
[the] petitioner.”
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McDorman v. Smyth, 187 Va. 522, 525, 47 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1948);
accord McClenny v. Murray, 246 Va. 132, 134, 431 S.E.2d 330, 331
(1993); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 73, 155 S.E.2d 351, 355-56
(1967); Peyton v. Williams, 206 Va. 595, 601, 145 S.E.2d 147,
151 (1965); Smyth v. Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 730, 101 S.E.2d 575,
578 (1958); Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92, 96-97, 97 S.E.2d 745,
748-49 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958).
The trial court’s determination in the present case does
not affect the lawfulness of Wilkins’ immediate custody and
detention, and Wilkins’ release from his immediate detention
will not follow as a result of the trial court’s order.
Consequently, the trial court did not have habeas corpus
jurisdiction to grant the relief it ordered.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be
reversed, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.
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