Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
DEBRA I. JOHNSON, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
v. Record No. 941482
January 12, 1996
GRACE MARCEL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
John D. Gray, Judge
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs'
amended motion for judgment states a legally cognizable cause of
action.
Plaintiffs Debra I. Johnson and Karlista Brennan initially
sued Grace Marcel, seeking to have her enjoined from threatening
and harassing them and from interfering with their possessory
rights in premises they had leased from Marcel. On November 15,
1993, the trial court entered a temporary injunction, which was
extended for an indefinite period on December 27, 1993.
On January 11, 1994, with leave of court, the plaintiffs
filed an amended motion for judgment against Marcel, alleging
that she had caused them physical harm and emotional distress and
seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Marcel demurred to
the amended motion for judgment, claiming that it was
"insufficient in law in that there is no nexus between the
compensatory and punitive damages sought, and any duty owed by
[Marcel] to . . . the plaintiffs" and that "there has been no
allegation of any causal connection between any specific actions
of [Marcel] and [the] alleged loss, damage, or injury of
plaintiffs."
On May 31, 1994, the trial court sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the action. The plaintiffs appeal.
The facts are those alleged in the amended motion for
judgment, which are summarized as follows. Pursuant to separate
rental agreements, the plaintiffs became co-tenants of a town
house owned by Marcel. Soon thereafter, Marcel began to solicit
Johnson's advice and involvement in prospective business
ventures, but Johnson rebuffed Marcel's efforts to develop a
business relationship. On November 6, 1993, Marcel demanded that
Johnson vacate the town house. Johnson, however, had prepaid
rent through December 20, 1993, and refused to vacate the
premises. Marcel then sought to enlist assistance from Brennan
to evict Johnson, but Brennan declined. On November 13, 1993,
Marcel demanded that Brennan vacate the premises within 24 hours.
On November 15, 1993, the plaintiffs sought the court's
protection from Marcel's continued harassment and efforts to
evict them. The next day, the temporary injunction order was
served on Marcel.
Despite the issuance of the injunction, Marcel continued to
harass the plaintiffs. She telephoned them at home and at work.
She changed the locks on the town house garage, and she entered
the town house without the plaintiffs' permission. She called
Johnson's father in North Carolina and repeatedly told him that
Johnson was "crazy."
On November 18, 1993, about midnight, Marcel pulled the
plaintiffs' downstairs telephone out of the wall socket. Also
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that night, she blocked the plaintiffs' driveway and made
excessive noise by screaming, banging on doors, and threatening
Johnson with arrest.
As a result of Marcel's actions, the plaintiffs, fearful for
their physical and mental well-being, were forced to vacate the
premises before their leases expired. Consequently, they went
into hiding and lost their security deposits and prepaid rents.
They also incurred expenses for temporary housing.
The plaintiffs contend that their allegations in the amended
motion for judgment state a claim of common law trespass. They
also contend that, because the trespass was deliberate and
accompanied by aggravating circumstances, they may claim damages
for emotional distress. We agree.
Although Marcel owned the premises, the plaintiffs, as
tenants, had the right of possession. See Hannan v. Dusch, 154
Va. 356, 360, 153 S.E. 824, 825 (1930). Therefore, under the
circumstances of the present case, Marcel had no right to enter
the premises without the plaintiffs' consent.
According to the allegations in the amended motion for
judgment, however, Marcel entered the premises without the
plaintiffs' consent. Despite the injunction, she also changed
the locks on the plaintiffs' garage, ripped the downstairs
telephone out of the wall socket, blocked the plaintiffs'
driveway, and continually threatened, abused, intimidated, and
harassed the plaintiffs. We think these allegations state a
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claim of common law trespass.
We also think the plaintiffs may claim damages for emotional
distress. Where, as here, the alleged trespass is deliberate and
accompanied by aggravating circumstances, damages for emotional
distress may be recoverable in the absence of physical injury.
Peshine v. Shepperson, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 472, 486 (1867); see
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 354, 297 S.E.2d
647, 653 (1982).
We hold, therefore, that the amended motion for judgment
states a cause of action for deliberate trespass and that the
trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. * T Accordingly, the
trial court's judgment will be reversed and the case will be
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
*
We reject the plaintiffs' other contentions. We conclude
that the amended motion for judgment does not state causes of
action for a private nuisance, for a "generalized intentional
tort," or for recovery under the Virginia Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act, Code § 55-248.2 et seq.
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