Arrington v. Peoples Security Life Insurance

Present: All the Justices

ANGELA DENISE ARRINGTON, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC.

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
June 9, 1995
v. Record No. 941247

PEOPLES SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court

erred in sustaining pleas of the statute of limitations.
In two actions filed on February 15, 1994, Angela Denise

Arrington (Angela), administrator of the Estate of Charles E.

Arrington, deceased (Charles), sued Peoples Security Life

Insurance Company (Peoples Security), alleging breach of contract

and seeking recovery of the proceeds under two insurance policies

issued on Charles' life. Peoples Security filed pleas of the

statute of limitations, and, after conducting an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court sustained the pleas and entered

judgments in favor of Peoples Security. Angela appeals.

The facts relating to the pleas are undisputed. On March

13, 1988, Charles was shot and stabbed to death. At the time of

his death, he was insured by a policy of life insurance in the

amount of $50,000 (Policy No. U00095393) and by another policy in

the amount of $25,000 (Policy No. 0302649180). Both polices had

been issued by Peoples Security. The named beneficiary under

both policies was Delores R. Arrington (Delores), Charles' wife.

Each policy provided that payment of the policy proceeds to the

named beneficiary would be made upon Peoples Security's receipt
of proof of the insured's death.

On March 21, 1988, Delores completed a "Claimant's Statement

For Death Claims" and forwarded it and a copy of Charles' death

certificate to Peoples Security. By letter dated March 30, 1988,

Peoples Security wrote to Delores and acknowledged that it had

received the claims. However, Peoples Security subsequently

refused to pay the insurance proceeds to Delores because she was

a suspect in Charles' murder.
On December 28, 1989, Delores filed an action in the Circuit

Court of the City of Richmond to recover the proceeds under the

$50,000 policy, and, on November 1, 1990, she filed another

action in said circuit court to recover the proceeds under the

$25,000 policy. Delores was awarded a judgment in the amount of

$50,000 in the first action; however, we reversed that judgment

and remanded the case for further proceedings. Peoples Security

Life Ins. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 412 S.E.2d 705 (1992). 1

Thereafter, Delores requested and, by orders entered February 4,

1992, was granted a nonsuit in each action.

On November 19, 1993, Angela qualified as administrator
2
d.b.n. of Charles' estate. By letter dated January 12, 1994,
1
In that action, the trial court had ruled that Delores was
not precluded from recovering the insurance proceeds because she
was not covered by the definition of "slayer" contained in Code §
55-401(1). In reversing the judgment, we ruled that Code § 55-
401(1) did not preclude Peoples Security from attempting to prove
that Delores "procured, participated in or otherwise directed"
Charles' death, in violation of the common law. Arrington, 243
Va. at 92, 412 S.E.2d at 707.
2
The record shows that Delores previously had qualified as

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Angela demanded that the insurance proceeds be paid to the

estate. Peoples Security refused payment, and Angela filed the

present actions.

In sustaining the pleas of the statute of limitations, the

trial court adopted Peoples Security's contention and ruled that

the limitation period was five years from the time the causes of

action accrued, Code § 8.01-246(2), that the causes of action for

breach of contract accrued on the date of the breach, and that

the accrual date was March 13, 1988, the date of Charles' death.

At trial, Angela agreed that the applicable limitation period

was five years and that the causes of action accrued when the

breach of contract occurred. Angela, however, did not agree that

the causes of action accrued on the date of Charles' death. She

advanced several arguments below, as she does on appeal,

regarding when the causes of action accrued.
Angela contends that, with respect to Charles' estate, the

contract was not breached until Peoples Security refused the

estate's demand for payment, made by the estate's letter dated

January 12, 1994. Alternatively, Angela contends that it was not

reasonable for the estate to demand payment until "it became

clear that there was no other beneficiary under the policy, i.e.,

on March 13, 1993, after Peoples Security had refused payment to

Delores . . . and the statute of limitations precluded her from

(..continued)
administrator of Charles' estate. However, she resigned as
administrator, and Angela succeeded to the office.

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pursuing her claim any further." In other words, according to

Angela, the statute of limitations did not begin to run against

the estate until the limitation period had expired as to Delores.

Finally, Angela contends that the statute of limitations was

tolled from the time of the entry of the trial court's judgment

in favor of Delores until this Court's reversal of that judgment,

a period of 14 months. 3

Statutes of limitations are strictly enforced and exceptions

thereto are narrowly construed. Consequently, a statute should

be applied unless the General Assembly clearly creates an

exception, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the

enforcement of the statute. Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps

Unlimited, 237 Va. 543, 547, 379 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1989); Burns v.

Stafford County, 227 Va. 354, 359, 315 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1984).

Code § 8.01-246(2) provides that an action for breach of a

written contract must be filed within five years after the cause

of action accrues. Code § 8.01-230 provides that a cause of

action for breach of contract accrues and the limitation period

commences to run from the date of the alleged breach. With

respect to life insurance policies, we have said that, when a

policy requires a demand for payment and proof of death, the

statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the demand
3
In oral argument before this Court, Angela contended that
Peoples Security never has refused to make payment, and,
therefore, the statute of limitations has not begun to run. This
argument was not advanced at trial. Consequently, we will not
consider it on appeal. Rule 5:25.

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and proof. Page v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 185 Va. 919, 925-

27, 40 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (1947).

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the present

case, we must reject Angela's contentions. We do not agree that

the causes of action accrued at one time for Delores and at a

different time for the estate; nor do we agree that the running

of the statute may be tolled, or an exception applied, in the

absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect.
In the present case, the life insurance policies provide

when a cause of action accrues. The express language of the

policies requires Peoples Security to pay the proceeds when

Peoples Security "receive[s] proof of [the] Insured's death."

The record establishes that Peoples Security acknowledged, in its

letter to Delores dated March 30, 1988, that it had received

proof of Charles' death. Therefore, at that time, at the very

latest, the five-year statute of limitations began to run.

Consequently, Angela's actions filed on February 15, 1994, are

time barred.

Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments.
Affirmed.

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