IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
February 7, 2001 Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EDWARD D. COFFEE
Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Criminal Court for Wilson County
No. 98-0018 J. O. Bond, Judge
No. M1998-00472-SC-R11-CD - Filed August 29, 2001
Edward D. Coffee was indicted for possession of certain controlled substances with intent to sell and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Because the judicial commissioner failed to make and retain an
exact copy of the original search warrant as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c),
the trial court suppressed the evidence recovered in the search and dismissed the indictment. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and we now also affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
Affirmed
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Lucian D.
Geise, Assistant Attorney General, Tom P. Thompson, Jr., District Attorney General, David E.
Durham, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellant, the State of Tennessee.
Hugh Green, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the appellee, Edward D. Coffee.
OPINION
I. Facts and Procedural History
On December 6, 1997, Detective Steven N. Lowery applied for a search warrant from a
Wilson County judicial commissioner. Lowery’s affidavit stated that on the previous day, a
confidential informant had been fitted with an electronic monitoring device and given $70. It further
stated that the informant then purchased marijuana from Edward D. Coffee, the appellee.
The commissioner issued the search warrant, and Lowery and others executed it. From
Coffee’s residence, they confiscated $2,423, $125 in food stamps, and several plastic bags containing
cocaine powder and marijuana.
Coffee filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence, alleging several violations of
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c). The motion included an allegation that “the Judicial
Commissioner issuing the warrant failed to keep an exact copy of the original of said search warrant
as part of his official records as required by Rule 41(c).” The assistant district attorney stipulated
that this allegation was true. The trial court found that the failure to make copies of the warrant
violated one of the mandatory provisions of Rule 41(c) and granted the motion to suppress. Because
no other evidence existed upon which to prosecute Coffee, the trial court dismissed the indictment.
The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted review to determine
whether the judicial commissioner’s failure to make and retain an exact copy of the original search
warrant requires suppression of the evidence seized. We hold that it does, and accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, ‘[q]uestions of credibility of
the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are
matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.’” State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tenn.
2000) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). “[W]hen a trial court’s findings
of fact at a suppression hearing are based on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, a
reviewing court must examine the record de novo without a presumption of correctness.” State v.
Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000). In either case, “‘[t]he application of the law to the facts
. . . is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.’” Carter, 16 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting State
v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)). The question whether Rule 41(c) of the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires suppression of the evidence in this case is a question of law
which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the judgment of the court
below.
III. Analysis
Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a search and seizure of
private property if such property is evidence of the commission of a criminal offense, was obtained
by criminal action, or is intended for use in committing a criminal offense. Subsection (c) provides
in pertinent part,
If the magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the application [for a
search] exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist,
the magistrate shall issue a warrant identifying the property and
naming or describing the person or place to be searched. . . . The
magistrate shall prepare an original and two exact copies of the search
warrant, one of which shall be kept by the magistrate as a part of his
or her official records, and one of which shall be left with person or
persons on whom the search warrant is served. . . . Failure of the
magistrate to make said original and two copies of the search warrant
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or failure to endorse thereon the date and time of issuance and the
name of the officer to whom issued, or the failure of the serving
officer where possible to leave a copy with the person or persons on
whom the search warrant is being served, shall make any search
conducted under said search warrant an illegal search and any seizure
thereunder an illegal seizure.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the rule not only requires probable cause to issue a search warrant, it also
imposes specific procedural safeguards.
These procedural safeguards are intended “to secure the citizen against carelessness and
abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.” Talley v. State, 345 S.W.2d 867, 869
(Tenn. 1961).1
“There is no writ more calculated to be abused in its use than the
search warrant, for with it any home may be entered and the inmates
disturbed, humiliated, and degraded. To prevent such a possibility
from false informants made to officers inspired by overzeal, or acting
from expediency, or obeying the command uttered by a mob impulse,
the provisions of the Constitution and statutes found force and
command observance.”
Id. (quoting Hampton v. State, 252 S.W. 1007, 1008 (Tenn. 1923)). The provision at issue, that a
magistrate prepare and retain a copy of the search warrant, endeavors to prevent improper searches
and facilitate judicial review of whether a search was executed within the scope of the warrant. The
rule achieves its goals in that a written record of the specifics of the search stifles the ever-present
temptation for an officer to conduct a search and justify it later.2 Additionally, the copy of the
warrant enables review of the original boundaries of a search; without an exact copy of the warrant,
review is compromised because the critical facts and details of the warrant cannot be precisely
determined.3 It is for these reasons that it is important to retain an exact copy of the warrant
identifying the property or person to be searched, and it is for these same reasons that this
requirement has been strictly enforced by our courts for many years. See Talley, 345 S.W.2d at 868;
1
When Talley was decided, the requireme nts now found in Rule 41(c) were codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
518 (1959).
2
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977 ) (“Once a lawful
search has begun, it is also far more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial
authorization ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’”)
3
See Wayne R. LaFav e, Search and Seizure, § 4.3 (a) & (b) (3d ed. 199 6); Note, The Constitutionality of the
Use of Unreco rded O ral Testimo ny to Establish Probab le Cause for Search W arrants, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1603, 1610-15
(1984).
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State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 353-54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Steele, 894 S.W.2d 318,
319 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).4
As stated in Talley, “‘Words could not be plainer, and [the procedural safeguards against
abuse] are mandatory.’” 345 S.W.2d at 869 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the judicial
commissioner’s failure to make and retain a copy of the search warrant so that a record of the precise
limits of the search could be maintained requires suppression of the evidence seized.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
should be, and is, hereby, affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the State of Tennessee for
which execution may issue if necessary.
___________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE
4
See also State v. Gambrel, 783 S.W.2d 19 1, 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (upholding the search because the
copy created was found sufficient).
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