State v. Carruthers

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
October 3, 2000 Session at Nashville

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TONY V. CARRUTHERS & JAMES
MONTGOMERY

Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Criminal Court for Shelby County
Nos. 94-02797-99 and 95-1128-29, Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W1997-00097-SC-DDT-DD - Filed December 11, 2000

Tony Carruthers and James Montgomery were each convicted of three counts of first degree
premeditated murder and were sentenced to death on each conviction. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences of both Carruthers and Montgomery. Thereafter,
the cases were docketed in this Court. After carefully reviewing the record and the relevant legal
authorities, we conclude that none of the errors raised by Tony Carruthers require reversal, that the
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s findings of the aggravating circumstances, and that the
sentences of death are not excessive or disproportionate considering the circumstances of the crimes
and the defendant. With respect to James Montgomery, we conclude that the trial court erred in
denying him a severance and that the error resulted in Montgomery being deprived of a fair trial.
Accordingly, we reverse Montgomery’s convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) Automatic Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals Affirmed with respect to Tony V. Carruthers; Judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals Reversed with respect to James Montgomery and Case Remanded for a New Trial

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,
JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined. ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., filed a
concurring/dissenting opinion.

Stephen R. Leffler and Lee A. Filderman, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tony V.
Carruthers.

Robert C. Brooks and Edward W. Chandler, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, James
Montgomery.

Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Amy Tarkington, Senior Counsel; Phillip Gerald Harris;
Assistant District Attorney General; and J. Robert Carter, Jr., Assistant District Attorney General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
 OPINION

The defendants, Tony V. Carruthers and James Montgomery, were each convicted of first
degree murder for killing Marcellos “Cello” Anderson, his mother Delois Anderson, and Frederick
Tucker in Memphis in February of 1994.1 All of the victims disappeared on the night of February
24, 1994. On March 3, 1994, their bodies were found buried together in a pit that had been dug
beneath a casket in a grave in a Memphis cemetery.2

The Guilt Phase
The proof introduced at the guilt phase of the trial showed that one of the victims, Marcellos
Anderson, was heavily involved in the drug trade, along with two other men, Andre “Baby Brother”
Johnson and Terrell Adair.3 Anderson wore expensive jewelry, including a large diamond ring,
carried large sums of money on his person, and kept a considerable amount of cash in the attic of the
home of his mother, victim Delois Anderson. When his body was discovered, Anderson was not
wearing any jewelry and did not have any cash on his person. Anderson was acquainted with both
defendants, and he considered Carruthers to be a trustworthy friend. The proof showed that
Anderson’s trust was misplaced.

In the summer of 1993 Jimmy Lee Maze, Jr., a convicted felon, received two letters from
Carruthers, who was then in prison on an unrelated conviction. In the letters, Carruthers referred to
“a master plan” that was “a winner.” Carruthers wrote of his intention to “make those streets pay
me” and announced, “everything I do from now on will be well organized and extremely violent.”
Later, in the fall of 1993, while incarcerated at the Mark Luttrell Reception Center in Memphis
awaiting his release, Carruthers was assigned to a work detail at a local cemetery, the West
Tennessee Veterans’ Cemetery. At one point, as he helped bury a body, Carruthers remarked to
fellow inmate Charles Ray Smith “that would be a good way, you know, to bury somebody, if you’re
going to kill them. . . . [I]f you ain’t got no body, you don’t have a case.”

Smith also testified that he overheard Carruthers and Montgomery, who also was incarcerated
at the Reception Center, talking about Marcellos Anderson after Anderson had driven Carruthers
back to the Reception Center from a furlough. According to Smith, when Montgomery asked
Carruthers about Anderson, Carruthers told him that both Anderson and “Baby Brother” Johnson
dealt drugs and had a lot of money. Carruthers said he and Montgomery could “rob” and “get”
Anderson and Johnson once they were released from prison.

1
They were also each convicted of three cou nts of especia lly aggravated kidnapp ing and on e count of es pecially
aggravated robbery o f Marcello s Anderso n.
2
James Montgomery’s younger brother Jonathan Montgomery was also cha rged on a ll counts involve d in this
case. Howev er, several mo nths prior to trial, Jonathan M ontgome ry was found hanged in his c ell in the Shelby C ounty
jail.
3
Neither Delois Anderson nor Frederick Tucker were involved in the drug trade.

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 When Carruthers was released from the Department of Correction on November 15, 1993,
he left the Reception Center with Anderson. Carruthers accompanied Anderson to Andre Johnson’s
house, and received a gift of $200 cash from Anderson, Johnson, and Terrell Adair, who was present
at Johnson’s house.

One month later, on December 15, 1993, Smith was released from the Department of
Correction. Upon his release, Smith warned Anderson and Johnson of Carruthers’ and
Montgomery’s plans to “get them.” According to Smith and Johnson, Anderson did not take the
warning or the defendants’ threats seriously.

In mid-December 1993, Maze, his brother and Carruthers were riding around Memphis
together. They came upon Terrell Adair’s red Jeep on the street in front of Delois Anderson’s home
where a drive-by shooting had just occurred. Adair had been injured in the shooting and was in the
hospital. Jonathan “Lulu” Montgomery, James Montgomery’s brother, was at the scene of the
shooting, and he joined Carruthers in the back seat of Maze’s car. According to Maze, Carruthers
remarked to Jonathan that, “it would be the best time to kidnap Marcellos,” and Jonathan asked,
“which one Baby Brother or Marcellos?” Carruthers then nudged Montgomery with his elbow and
said “it” was going to take place after James Montgomery was released from prison. About two
weeks later, on December 31, Maze saw Carruthers loading three antifreeze containers into a car,
and Carruthers indicated to Maze that the containers were filled with gasoline.

On January 11, 1994, James Montgomery was released from prison. After his release,
Montgomery told “Baby Brother” Johnson that he, not Johnson, was in charge of the neighborhood.
Montgomery said, “It was my neighborhood before I left, and now I’m back and its my neighborhood
again.” Montgomery asked Johnson if he wanted to “go to war about this neighborhood.” When
Johnson said, “no,” Montgomery replied “You feeling now like I’m about to blow your motherf-----g
brains out” and “you all need to get in line around here or we’re going to war about this.” Near the
end of January or the first of February 1994, Johnson and Adair saw the defendants sitting together
in an older model grey car down the street from Johnson’s mother’s home. It was late at night,
between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. When the defendants approached Johnson and Adair, Montgomery
asked why they thought he was trying to harm them. Montgomery told them, “Look, I told you, we
ain’t got no problem with nobody in this neighborhood. We already got our man staked out. If we
wanted some trouble or something, we got you right now. We’d kill your whole family.”
Confirming Montgomery’s statement, Carruthers told them, “We already got our man staked out.
You all right. If it’s any problem, we’ll deal with it later.” Montgomery explained that he intended
to take the “man’s” money and drugs, and said, “if the police didn’t have no body, they wouldn’t
have no case.”

On February 23, 1994, Marcellos Anderson borrowed a white Jeep Cherokee from his cousin,
Michael Harris. Around 4:30 on the afternoon of February 24, 1994, witnesses saw Marcellos
Anderson and Frederick Tucker riding in the Jeep Cherokee along with James and Jonathan
Montgomery. About 5 p.m. that day, James and Jonathan Montgomery and Anderson and Tucker
arrived in the Jeep Cherokee at the house of Nakeita Shaw, the Montgomery brothers’ cousin.

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Nakeita Shaw, her four children, and Benton West, also her cousin, were present at the house when
they arrived.

The four men entered the house and went downstairs to the basement. A short time later,
James Montgomery came back upstairs and asked Nakeita Shaw if she could leave for a while so he
could “take care of some business.” Nakeita Shaw told West that she thought “they” were being
kidnapped, and then she left the house with West and her children. West agreed to care for Nakeita
Shaw’s children while she attended a meeting.

When Nakeita Shaw returned home after the meeting, she saw only Carruthers and James
Montgomery. Montgomery asked her to go pick up her children and to “stay gone a little longer.”
Nakeita Shaw returned home with her children before 10 p.m. The Jeep Cherokee was gone, but
James Montgomery and Carruthers were still present at her home. Montgomery told Nakeita Shaw
to put her children to bed upstairs and remain there until he told her he was leaving. Sometime later,
Montgomery called out to Nakeita Shaw that he was leaving. She returned downstairs and saw
James Montgomery, Carruthers, and the two victims, Anderson and Tucker, leave in the Jeep
Cherokee. Prior to trial, Nakeita Shaw told the police that Anderson’s and Tucker’s hands were tied
behind their backs when they left her house. While she admitted making this statement, she testified
at trial that the statement was false and that she had not seen Anderson’s and Tucker’s hands tied
when they left her home.4

In the meantime, around 8 p.m. on February 24, Laventhia Briggs telephoned her aunt, victim
Delois Anderson. When someone picked up the telephone but said nothing, Briggs hung up. Briggs
called “a couple of more times” but received no answer. Briggs was living with Delois Anderson
at the time and arrived at her aunt’s home around 9:00 p.m. Although Delois Anderson was not
home, her purse, car, and keys were there. Food left in Anderson’s bedroom indicated that she had
been interrupted while eating. Briggs went to bed, assuming her aunt would return home soon. A
co-worker, whom Delois Anderson had driven home around 7:15 p.m., was the last person to have
seen her alive.

Chris Hines, who had known the defendants since junior high school, testified that around
8:45 p.m. on February 24, 1994, Jonathan Montgomery “beeped” him. Jonathan said, “Man, a n----r
got them folks.” When Hines asked, “What folks?” Jonathan replied, “Cello and them” and said
something about stealing $200,000. Jonathan then indicated that he could not talk more on the
telephone and arranged to meet Hines in person. Jonathan arrived at Hines’ home at about 9:00 p.m.
and told him, “Man, we got them folks out at the cemetery on Elvis Presley, and we got $200,000.
Man, a n----r had to kill them folks.” At that point, James Montgomery “beeped in” and talked with
Jonathan. When the telephone call ended, Jonathan asked Hines to drive him to the cemetery. Hines

4
Nakeita Shaw had also told the p olice before trial th at she had been afraid for her life and that James
Montgomery had threatened her after the investigation of this case bega n, stating that if he had to die for something he
did not do, then “all of us needed to die.” At trial, on cross-examination, she denied being afraid of James Montgomery
and said it was her involvement in this case that frightened her.

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refused, but he allowed Jonathan to borrow his car, which Jonathan promised to return in an hour.
When the car was not returned, Hines called James Montgomery’s cellular telephone at around 11
p.m. James told Hines that he did not know where Jonathan was, that Jonathan did not have a
driver’s license, and that the car should be returned by 4 a.m. because Jonathan was supposed to
drive James to his girlfriend’s house.

The Jeep Cherokee that Anderson had borrowed was found in Mississippi on February 25
around 2:40 a.m. It had been destroyed by fire. About 3:30 a.m., after he was informed of the
vehicle fire by law enforcement officials, Harris telephoned Delois Anderson’s home, and Laventhia
Briggs then discovered that neither her aunt Delois nor her cousin Marcellos had returned home.
Briggs filed a missing person report with the police later that day.

The Montgomery brothers and Carruthers did not return Hines’ car until approximately 8:30
a.m. on February 25. The car was very muddy. Hines drove James Montgomery and Carruthers to
Montgomery’s mother’s home and then drove away with Jonathan Montgomery. That morning
Jonathan, whom Hines described as acting “paranoid” and “nervous,” repeatedly told Hines that
“they had to kill some people.” About two hours later, James Montgomery and Carruthers came to
Hines’ home looking for Jonathan. Hines advised Carruthers and James Montgomery that he was
celebrating his birthday, and he asked James Montgomery to give him a birthday present. James
agreed to give Hines twenty dollars after he picked up his paycheck, and James also agreed to have
Hines’ car washed immediately as a birthday present.

Hines, the Montgomery brothers, and Carruthers drove to a carwash, and James Montgomery
paid an unidentified elderly man to clean the car. The man cleaned the interior of the car and the
trunk of the car. Neither Carruthers nor James Montgomery supervised the cleaning of the car. After
Jonathan Montgomery abruptly left the carwash, Carruthers and James Montgomery asked Hines
what Jonathan had told him, but Hines did not tell them. Several days later James Montgomery
came to Hines’ home and offered Hines an AK-47 assault rifle because Montgomery said he had
“heard that Hines was into it with some people on the street.” James Montgomery told Hines the
rifle had “blood on it.” Hines testified that he interpreted this statement to mean that someone had
been shot with the weapon.

On March 3, 1994, about one week after a missing person report was filed on Delois and
Marcellos Anderson, Jonathan Montgomery directed Detective Jack Ruby of the Memphis Police
Department to the grave of Dorothy Daniels at the Rose Hill Cemetery on Elvis Presley Boulevard.5
Daniels’ grave was located six plots away from the grave site of the Montgomery brothers’ cousin.
Daniels had been buried on February 25, 1994. Pursuant to a court order, Daniels’ casket was

5
Although the jury did not hear proof about why Jonathan Montgomery directed Detective Ruby to the grave,
the record of pre-trial and jury-out hearings reflects that the investigation had focused upon the Montgomery brothers
because they were seen with two of the victims around 5:00 p.m. on the day of the murders. When the police questioned
Jonathan Montgomery, he gave conflicting statements, but eventually directed Detective Ruby to the grave where the
bodies were buried.

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disinterred, and the authorities discovered the bodies of the three victims buried beneath the casket
under several inches of dirt and a single piece of plywood.

An employee of the cemetery testified that a pressed wood box or vault had been placed in
Daniels’ grave during working hours on February 24 and that it would have taken at least two people
to remove the box. Daniels’ casket had been placed in the grave inside the box on February 25, and,
according to Dr. Hugh Edward Berryman, one of the forensic anthropologists who assisted in the
removal of the bodies from the crime scene, there was no evidence to suggest that Daniels’ casket
had been disturbed after she was buried. Thus, it can be inferred that the bodies of the three victims
were placed in the grave and covered with dirt and a piece of plywood prior to the casket being
placed in the grave.

Dr. O. C. Smith, who helped remove the bodies from the grave and who performed autopsies
on the victims, testified that, when found, the body of Delois Anderson was lying at the bottom of
the grave and the bodies of the two male victims were lying on top of her. The hands of all three
victims were bound behind their backs. Frederick Tucker’s feet were also bound and his neck
showed signs of bruising caused by a ligature. A red sock was found around Delois Anderson’s
neck. Marcellos Anderson was not wearing any jewelry. Dr. Smith testified that Delois Anderson
died from asphyxia caused by several factors: the position of her head against her body, dirt in her
mouth and nose, and trauma from weight on her body. Frederick Tucker had received a gunshot
wound to his chest, which would not have been fatal had he received medical care. He had also
suffered injuries from blunt trauma to his abdomen and head resulting in broken ribs, a fractured
skull, and a ruptured liver. Dr. Smith opined that Tucker was shot and placed in the grave, where
the force of compression from being buried produced the other injuries and, along with the gunshot
wound, caused his death. According to Dr. Smith, Marcellos Anderson had been shot three times:
a contact wound to his forehead that was not severe and two shots to his neck, one of which was also
not serious. However, the gunshot causing the other neck wound had entered Anderson’s windpipe
and severed his spinal cord, paralyzing him from the neck down. This wound was not
instantaneously fatal. Anderson had also suffered blunt trauma to his abdomen from compression
forces. Dr. Smith opined that each victim was alive when buried.

Defendant James Montgomery presented no proof. Carruthers, acting pro se, called several
witnesses to rebut the testimony offered by the State, primarily by attacking the credibility of the
State’s witnesses.

A health administrator at the Mark Luttrell Reception Center testified that, because of an
injury to his arm, Carruthers had been given a job change on October 6, 1993, and had not worked
at the cemetery after that date. Another official at the Reception Center testified that Carruthers was
not released on furlough after Montgomery arrived at the Reception Center on November 4, 1994.
This proof was offered to impeach Smith’s testimony that Montgomery and Carruthers discussed
robbing and getting Marcellos Anderson after Anderson drove Carruthers back to the Reception
Center following a furlough. An investigator appointed to assist Carruthers with his defense testified
that he had interviewed Maze, who admitted he did not know anything about the “master plan” to

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which Carruthers referred in the letters until Carruthers was released from prison. On cross-
examination, the investigator admitted that Maze said that when he was released from prison,
Carruthers had explained that the master plan involved kidnapping Marcellos Anderson. Carruthers’
brother and another witness testified that Jonathan Montgomery was not at the scene of the drive-by
shooting involving Terrell Adair. This proof was offered to impeach Maze’s testimony that
Carruthers and Jonathan Montgomery discussed kidnapping Marcellos on the day that Terrell Adair
was shot. Another witness, Aldolpho Antonio James testified that he and Carruthers had been
visiting a friend between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. the day before these homicides were
first reported on the news. This testimony was offered to provide at least a partial alibi for
Carruthers for the early morning hours of February 25, 1994. However, on cross-examination, James
admitted that he did not know the exact date he and Carruthers had been together.

Carruthers also called Alfredo Shaw as a witness. After seeing a television news report about
these killings in March of 1994, Alfredo Shaw had telephoned CrimeStoppers and given a statement
to the police implicating Carruthers. Alfredo Shaw later testified before the grand jury which
eventually returned the indictments against Carruthers and Montgomery. Prior to trial, however,
several press reports indicated that Alfredo Shaw had recanted his grand jury testimony, professed
that the statement had been fabricated, and intended to formally recant his grand jury testimony when
called as a witness for the defense. Therefore, when Carruthers called Alfredo Shaw to testify, the
prosecution announced that if he took the stand and recanted his prior sworn testimony, he would
be charged with and prosecuted for two counts of aggravated perjury. In light of the prosecution’s
announcement, the trial court summoned Alfredo Shaw’s attorney and allowed Alfredo Shaw to
confer privately with him. Following that private conference, Alfredo Shaw’s attorney advised the
trial court, defense counsel, including Carruthers, and the prosecution, that Alfredo Shaw intended
to testify consistently with his prior statements and grand jury testimony and that any inconsistent
statements Alfredo Shaw had made to the press were motivated by his fear of Carruthers and by
threats he had received from him.

Despite this information, Carruthers called Alfredo Shaw as a witness and as his attorney
advised, Shaw provided testimony consistent with his initial statement to the police and his grand
jury testimony. Specifically, Alfredo Shaw testified that he had been on a three-way call with
Carruthers and either Terry or Jerry Durham, and during this call, Carruthers had asked him to
participate in these murders, saying he had a “sweet plan” and that they would each earn $100,000
and a kilogram of cocaine. Following his arrest for these murders, Carruthers was incarcerated in
the Shelby County Jail along with Alfredo Shaw, who was incarcerated on unrelated charges.
Carruthers and Alfredo Shaw were in the law library when Carruthers told Alfredo Shaw that he and
some other unidentified individuals went to Delois Anderson’s house looking for Marcellos
Anderson and his money. Marcellos was not there when they arrived, but Carruthers told Delois
Anderson to call her son and tell him to come home, “it’s something important.” When Anderson
arrived, the defendants forced Anderson, Tucker, who was with Anderson, and Delois Anderson into
the jeep at gunpoint and drove them to Mississippi, where the defendants shot Marcellos Anderson
and Tucker and burned the jeep. According to Alfredo Shaw, the defendants then drove all three
victims back to Memphis in a stolen vehicle. Alfredo Shaw testified that, after they put Marcellos

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Anderson and Tucker into the grave, Delois Anderson started screaming and one of the defendants
told her to “shut up” or she would die like her son and pushed her into the grave. Carruthers also
told Alfredo Shaw that the bodies would never have been discovered if “the boy wouldn’t have went
and told them folks.” Carruthers told Alfredo Shaw that he was not going to hire an attorney or post
bond because the prosecution would then learn that the murders had been a “hit.” Carruthers told
Alfredo Shaw that Johnson also was supposed to have been “hit” and that Terry and Jerry Durham
were the “main people behind having these individuals killed.” Carruthers said that the Durhams
wanted revenge because Anderson and Johnson had previously stolen from them.

In response to questioning by Carruthers, Alfredo Shaw acknowledged that he had told the
press that his statement to police and his grand jury testimony had been fabricated, but said he had
done so because Carruthers had threatened him and his family. According to Alfredo Shaw, one of
Carruthers’ investigators had arranged for a news reporter to speak with him about recanting his
grand jury testimony.

As impeachment of his own witness, Carruthers called both Jerry and Terry Durham, twin
brothers, as witnesses. The Durhams denied knowing Alfredo Shaw and said they had never been
party to a three-way telephone call involving Alfredo Shaw and Carruthers. Carruthers also called
attorney AC Wharton who testified that he was initially retained by Carruthers’ mother to represent
her son on these murder charges, but was required to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. This
testimony was offered to impeach Alfredo Shaw’s statement that Carruthers had said he was not
going to hire an attorney or post bond. Finally, Carruthers called an administrative assistant from
the Shelby County jail who testified that jail records, indicated that Alfredo Shaw was not in the law
library at the same time as Carruthers in either February or March of 1994. According to jail records,
Alfredo Shaw was in protective custody for much of that time and, as a result, would have been
escorted at all times by a guard. However, on cross-examination, this witness admitted that the jail
records regarding the law library were not always complete or accurate and that Alfredo Shaw had
been housed outside of protective custody from mid-March to early April 1994 which would have
afforded him the opportunity to interact with Carruthers. The record reflects that Alfredo Shaw came
forward and provided a statement to police on March 27, 1994 and that the indictments were
returned on March 29, 1994.

Based upon this proof, the jury found each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
three counts of first degree murder, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count
of especially aggravated robbery.

The Sentencing Phase
The trial proceeded to the sentencing phase. The State relied upon the proof presented
during the guilt phase of the trial and also introduced evidence to show that Carruthers had been
previously convicted of aggravated assault and that James Montgomery had two previous
convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon and one conviction for assault with intent to commit
robbery with a deadly weapon. The proof showed that Montgomery was only seventeen years old

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at the time he committed these previous offenses and that all of these previous convictions arose
from a single criminal episode.

The State also recalled Dr. Smith who testified that none of the victims died instantaneously
and that all suffered as a result of their separate injuries and being buried alive. Although Anderson
was paralyzed below his chest, Dr. Smith testified that he would have felt some of the effects of the
trauma to his airway and particularly his windpipe, which is according to Dr. Smith, a very painful
injury. According to Dr. Smith, the bullet wound to Anderson’s head would not have been fatal had
he received proper medical attention and would not necessarily have caused unconsciousness. In
addition, Anderson would have been able to breathe after the spinal cord wound, but the wound
would have bled into his airway and his lungs, making breathing very difficult. Dr. Smith said that
Anderson literally would have been “drowning on his own blood.”

With respect to Frederick Tucker, Dr. Smith testified that the gunshot wound to his chest
fractured two ribs and pierced his lung, but would not have been fatal had he obtained medical
treatment. Because the wound bled into Tucker’s lungs and abdominal cavity, Dr. Smith testified
that Tucker also was “breathing blood” and “starving for oxygen.” Tucker also had multiple internal
injuries, according to Dr. Smith, that resulted from some weight being placed on his body. However,
Dr. Smith opined that neither the weight of Anderson’s body alone, nor the weight of Anderson’s
body combined with the plywood and dirt would have produced the extensive internal injuries
sustained by Tucker and that some additional weight or force had been applied to his body.

Dr. Smith testified that Delois Anderson also had sustained several injuries, including a scalp
tear on the back of her head inflicted two to six hours before her death, an injury to her forehead
consistent with her position in the grave, and injuries to her neck consistent with manual
strangulation. None of these injuries would have caused death had she been afforded medical
treatment. Dr. Smith testified that Delois Anderson died from asphyxia caused by the position of
her head against her body, dirt in her mouth and nose, and trauma from weight on her body.

As mitigating evidence Montgomery presented the testimony of his cousin, Nakeita Shaw,
that she and Montgomery had a close relationship during their childhood and teenage years, that they
had attended elementary school together, that Montgomery had been her “brother” and “protector,”
and that they had continued their close relationship as adults. Nakeita Shaw said that Montgomery
has other siblings, including a thirty-year-old sister, a twenty-six-year-old brother, and a fourteen-
year-old brother. Nakeita Shaw said that she still loves Montgomery very much, and she asked the
jury to spare his life. Montgomery’s aunt, Mattie Calhoun, also testified on his behalf. Calhoun said
that Montgomery was an average student, that he had a very poor relationship with his father, that
another man had helped to rear Montgomery when his father abandoned him at age five or six, and
that this individual had died in 1986. Calhoun told the jury that the prosecution had the “wrong
people” and begged the jury to spare Montgomery’s life. Lastly, Montgomery testified on his own
behalf about how he and his brothers and sisters were raised by his mother in Memphis and about
how he last saw his father, who was still alive, when he was five years old. He testified that he had
spent slightly over nine years in the penitentiary for previous convictions, that he had a job when he

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was released in January 1994, and that at the time of these crimes his ten-year-old son was living
with him. Montgomery proclaimed his innocence and asked the jury to spare his life.

Carruthers presented the testimony of Bishop Richard L. Fiddler, who had been involved in
prison ministry for twenty years and had visited Carruthers while he was incarcerated awaiting trial.
Fiddler believed that Carruthers was honest and straightforward, was “a person of quality and
worth,” and was very upset about the victims’ deaths. According to Fiddler, Carruthers viewed the
trial as his opportunity to be vindicated. Fiddler asked the jury to spare Carruthers’ life. Carruthers’
sister, Tonya Yvette Miller, a counselor at the Shelby County adult offender center, testified that
their mother raised four children on her own in one of the worst housing projects in Memphis and
that, as the oldest son, Carruthers was the “man of the household.” Miller admitted that her brother
had fallen into bad company and had a hot temper but testified that he never planned to do anything
wrong but acted out of “anguish and anger.” She also stated that her brother had been raised to tell
the truth. Miller told the jury that if she believed her brother had committed these crimes she would
be the first person to say that he deserved the death penalty, but Miller said that Carruthers was
innocent and that, therefore, he “does not deserve the death sentence.” Testifying on his own behalf,
Carruthers asserted that he was innocent of the crimes and did not deserve to die. He said he would
not have killed his friend because he “wasn’t raised like that.”

Jury Findings
Based on this proof, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances as to each
defendant on each of the three murder convictions: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted
of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use
of violence to the person;” (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it
involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” (3) “[t]he murder
was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the
commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing after committing or attempting to
commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aircraft piracy;
or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;” (4) “[t]he defendant
committed mass murder, which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons within the state
of Tennessee within a period of forty-eight (48) months, and perpetrated in a similar fashion in a
common scheme or plan.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(2), (5), (7), and (12) (Supp. 1994).6
Finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury imposed the death sentence as to each defendant for each of the three
murder convictions.7

6
Two of these aggravating circumstances have been slightly amended since this case was tried. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(7 ) and (12 ) (1999 Supp.).
7
Each of the defendants was sentenced as a multiple, Range II offender to forty (40) years on each of the three
conviction s of especially aggravated kidnapping and on the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial judge
ordered that two of the sen tences for esp ecially aggravated kidnapping run concurrent to the death penalty with all other
sentences ru nning conse cutive to the d eath penalty.

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 Appellate Review
On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendants challenged both their
convictions of first degree murder and their death sentences, raising numerous claims of error. After
fully considering the defendants’ claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and
sentences. Pursuant to statute,8 the case was thereafter docketed in this Court.

The defendants raised numerous issues in this Court, and after carefully examining the entire
record and the law, including the thorough opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the briefs
of the defendants and the State, this Court entered an order setting the cause for oral argument and
designating ten issues for oral argument. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.9

After carefully and fully reviewing the record, the briefs of counsel, and the relevant legal
authority, we conclude that none of the assigned errors require reversal of defendant Carruthers’
convictions or sentences. Moreover, with respect to defendant Carruthers, we have determined that
the evidence supports the jury’s findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that the
sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion, and that the sentences of death are not
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature
of the crimes and the defendant. Accordingly, defendant Carruthers’ convictions for first degree
murder and sentences of death are affirmed.

However, we also have determined that defendant Montgomery should have been granted
a severance and that the failure to grant a severance in this case resulted in prejudicial error requiring
a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse Montgomery’s convictions and sentences and remand his case
for a new trial.

Analysis
Dismissal of the Murder Indictments
Defendant Carruthers first contends that the indictments should have been dismissed because
they were based upon what he terms “the admittedly questionable” testimony of Alfredo Shaw before
the grand jury. Carruthers also argues that he was entitled to a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings. We disagree.

8
"Whenever the death penalty is imposed for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in
the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the Court of Criminal Ap peals.
The affirmance o f the conviction and the sente nce of dea th shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court. Upon the affirmance b y the Court o f Criminal Ap peals, the clerk shall docket the case in the Supreme Court and
the case shall proceed in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
206(a)(1).
9
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 provides in pertinent part as follows: “Prior to the setting of oral arg ument,
the Court shall review the record and briefs and consider all errors assigned. The Court may enter an order designating
those issues it wishe s addresse d at oral argu ment.”

-11-
 It has long been the rule in this State that the sufficiency and legality of the evidence
considered by the grand jury is not subject to judicial review.10 Where an indictment is valid on its
face, it is sufficient to require a trial of the charge on the merits to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused, regardless of the sufficiency or legality of the evidence considered by the grand jury.11

As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
361, 76 S. Ct. 406, 408 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956):
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would
be great indeed. The results of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a
defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the
competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.

See also Burton, 214 Tenn. at 16, 377 S.W.2d at 903 (quoting Costello with approval). We decline
to adopt such a rule. Carruthers’ claim that the indictments must be dismissed because Alfredo
Shaw’s testimony before the grand jury was not trustworthy is without merit.12 This matter is not
subject to judicial review.

Also without merit is Carruthers’ claim that he was entitled to a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings. With certain limited exceptions that do not apply in this case general law mandates that
grand jury proceedings remain secret. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 6(k)(1) (stating that such proceedings
are secret); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 6(k)(2) (allowing disclosure of grand jury proceedings to ascertain if
the testimony of a witness before the grand jury is consistent with the testimony of the witness at trial
and allowing disclosure of grand jury testimony of any witness charged with perjury); Tenn. R. Crim.
P. 16(a)(3) (requiring the state to provide as discovery to the defendant any “recorded testimony of

10
Recentl y in State v. Culb reath, __ S.W .3d __(T enn. 200 0), we held th at dismissal of an indictment is
approp riate where a pro secutor’s use of a private attorney who received substantial compensation from a private, special
interest group created a conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety and violated the defendants’ right to due
process under the T ennessee C onstitution. Carruthers does not allege pro secutorial misc onduct, an d the recor d in this
case would not support such an allegation.
11
See Burton v . State, 214 Tenn. 9, 15-18, 377 S.W.2d 900, 902-904 (1964) (refusing to dismiss an indictment
that was based upon inad missible hear say); State v. Dixon. 880 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (refusing
to dismiss an indictment that was based on evidence th at had bee n suppress ed under the Fourth A mendm ent); State v.
Gonzales, 638 S.W.2d 841, 844-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (refusing to dismiss an indictment that was based upon
unsworn testimony to the grand jury); State v. Grady, 619 S.W .2d 139, 14 0 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. 1979) (re fusing to dismiss
an indictment tha t was based upon inad missible hear say testimony); State v. No rthcutt, 568 S.W .2d 636 , 639 ( Tenn.
Crim. App. 1978 ) (refusing to dismiss an indictment because of a question asked of a witness by the foreman of the grand
jury); Gamm on v. State , 506 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973) (refusing to dismiss an indictment that was based
upon inadmissible hearsay testimo ny); Casey v. State, 491 S.W .2d 90, 9 1 (Tenn . Crim. App . 1972) (s ame); State v.
Marks, 464 S.W.2d 326, 327 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 197 0) (same); Parton v. S tate, 455 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1970) (same).
12
The record reflects, however, that Alfredo Shaw’s testimony at trial when called as a witness by defendant
Carruthers apparen tly was consistent w ith his testimony be fore the grand jury.

-12-
the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged”); cf. Tiller v. State, 600
S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn. 1980) (discussing the secrecy requirement that applies to grand jury
proceedings).13

Forfeiture of Counsel
We begin our analysis of this issue by summarizing the events that culminated in Carruthers
being required to represent himself at trial. As previously stated, these crimes occurred on February
24 or 25, 1994. Carruthers’ family initially retained AC Wharton, Jr., to represent him. Wharton
was allowed to withdraw on March 19, 1994, because of a conflict of interest. On May 31, 1994,
the trial court appointed Larry Nance to represent Carruthers. The State filed a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty on July 8, 1994. At a hearing held on July 15, 1994, the trial court scheduled
a pre-trial motions hearing for September 30, 1994 and set the case for trial on February 20, 1995.
Carruthers was present at this hearing and asked the trial court, “I’d like to know why this is being
dragged out like this. I asked Mr. Nance if we can go forward with a motion of discovery and he’s
asking for a reset. And I’d like to know why.” Nance informed the court that he was planning to
visit the prosecutor’s office later in the week to review the discoverable materials and evidence. The
trial judge then advised Carruthers in pertinent part as follows:

[G]iven the fact that the trial isn’t until February, we’re setting the next Court
date in September for the arguing of motions. Between now and September, your
attorney and the attorneys representing your two co-defendants can get with the
prosecutors and can obtain their discovery. They’re all excellent attorneys. And
they’ll all do that. And once they’ve obtained the discovery, they’ll meet with their
clients and they’ll file appropriate motions, which will be heard on September 30th,
which will still be well in advance of the trial date, which will give everyone ample
time to then evaluate the case, after the motions have been heard and ruled on. So
given the fact that we can’t get a three-defendant capital case that’s still in the
arraignment stage to trial any earlier than February, there’s plenty of time for your
attorneys to meet with the prosecutors, get the discovery, meet with the clients, file
motions, argue motions. Just because he hadn’t done it yesterday, because you want
him to have it done yesterday, doesn’t mean that he’s not working on your case
diligently and properly. He’ll have everything done well in advance of the next Court
date. And so, you know, he may not do it the very moment you want it done, but
you’re going to have to work with him on that because there’s ample time for him to
get it done.

13
It appears from the record that Carruthe rs was prov ided with a copy of the transcription of Shaw’s testimony
before the grand jury. Carruthers had left one copy in his cell on the day Shaw testified and was given another copy by
the prosecuto r immediate ly prior to Shaw’s testimony. In addition, the trial court mentioned “the testimony in front of
the grand jury” when he was discussing the “three or four different statements” Carruthers was using dur ing his direct
examination of Alfredo Shaw.

-13-
 On August 12, 1994, the trial court appointed Craig Morton to assist Nance.14 When the pre-
trial motions hearing convened on September 30, 1994, all defense attorneys involved in the case
requested a continuance until November 14, 1994 so that additional pre-trial motions could be filed.
The trial judge agreed to continue the hearing and also indicated that, where appropriate, a pre-trial
motion filed on behalf of one defendant would be applied to all defendants without a specific
request.

Because the trial judge had received “an abundance of correspondence from both Mr.
Montgomery and Mr. Carruthers expressing concern about the pretrial investigation that has been
conducted by their attorneys,” the defendants were brought into open court and advised of the
continuance. The trial judge then asked the attorneys to “state, for the record, the work that they’ve
done and the work they intend to continue doing on behalf of their client.” Each team of defense
lawyers reported to the trial judge on the work that had been completed and on the work they
intended to complete in the following days.

In particular, Nance indicated that he had inspected a majority of the physical evidence, filed
six or seven motions, issued subpoenas for approximately eight witnesses, interviewed several of
the one-hundred witnesses listed by the State,15 met with Carruthers in lock-up at the courtroom on
two separate occasions, met with Carruthers’ family, and spent approximately twenty-five hours on
the case. Nance admitted that “some enmity” had developed between him and Carruthers, but
indicated that he believed the problem could be resolved.

Carruthers also was allowed to voice his complaints about his attorneys on the record, and
his primary complaint was that his attorneys had not met with him as often as he had expected. After
hearing the comments of both Nance and Carruthers, the trial judge concluded as follows:

in my opinion, what has been done thus far in this case, given the fact that there are
still six more weeks before the next motion date, and then a full three months beyond
that before the trial date, is appropriate and well within the standards of proper
representation.

On October 21, 1994, the trial court approved payment for investigative services for
Carruthers and authorized competency evaluations for both defendants. Morton informed the trial

14
As the trial court predicted, the record reflects that both Nance and Morton filed numerous pre-trial motions
on behalf of Carruthers, including motions for discovery, for investigative services, for a mental examination, to exclude
certain evidence, for individual voir dire, for impeachment evidence, for a competency evaluation of prosecution
witnesses, for another mental evaluation of Carruthe rs, to dismiss the ind ictments, to sup press stateme nts of co-defendant
Jonathan Montgomery, for a severance, for expert services, and a notice of an alibi defense.

15
Although the witness list contained the names of one hundred people, the State previously had indicated that
it had no intention of calling one hundred witnesses and was simply providing the name of every person that had been
mentioned in the investigation as a means of giving the defense discovery.

-14-
court that the investigator, Arthur Anderson, had attempted twice to meet with Carruthers at the
Shelby County jail and that Carruthers had refused to meet with him on both occasions.

On November 14, 1994, Carruthers filed his first motion for substitution of counsel. Four
days later, on November 18, Morton asked the trial court to appoint a different investigator who
would take a more aggressive approach. The trial court agreed to appoint a new investigator and
continued the hearing date on the pre-trial motions until December 16, 1994. On November 23,
1994, Morton advised the trial court that he had retained the services of Premier Investigation.

Although the record does not reflect that a hearing was held, the trial court allowed Nance
to withdraw from representing Carruthers on December 9, 1994.16 According to statements made by
the trial court at a later hearing, Nance was allowed to withdraw because of “personal physical
threats” made by Carruthers that escalated to the point that Nance did not “feel comfortable or safe,
personally safe, in continuing to represent Mr. Tony Carruthers.”

Coleman Garrett was appointed to replace Nance and represent Carruthers along with
Morton. The trial judge also authorized James Turner, a third attorney, to assist the defense as an
investigator. Both counsel and Carruthers continued to file pre-trial motions. Some of these motions
were heard on December 16, 1994, and another hearing was scheduled for January 30, 1995. On that
date, Garrett and Morton appeared and presented argument on over seventeen motions. At this
hearing, the trial judge agreed to reschedule the trial from February of 1995 to September 5, 1995.
At a hearing on May 1, 1995, Garrett and Morton presented argument on several more pre-trial
motions including a motion to dismiss the indictments, a motion to sever, and a request for expert
services to analyze an audio-tape of Nakeita Shaw’s statement. On May 5, investigator/attorney
James Turner was allowed to withdraw because he was a solo practitioner and could not maintain
his practice and effectively perform the investigation needed on the case. However, the trial court
appointed another attorney, Glenn Wright, to act as investigator. On June 2, 1995, Garrett again
argued that the indictments should be dismissed due to Shaw’s allegedly false testimony before the
grand jury.

On June 23, 1995, Garrett, Morton, and Wright sought and were granted permission to
withdraw by the trial court. The record reflects that Carruthers also filed a motion for substitution
of counsel. At a hearing on July 27, 1995, the trial court appointed William Massey and Harry Sayle
to represent Carruthers. During this hearing, the trial judge commented as follows:

All right. I understand that these three defendants are on trial for their lives
and that these are the most serious of charges and that they are all concerned that they
are well represented and properly represented, and it’s everyone’s desire to see to it

16
W e note, as did the Cou rt of Crimin al Appe als, that in add ition to his m otion for su bstitution of counse l,
Carruthers filed many pro se motions throughout the time he was represented by Nanc e and Morton. M any of the pro
se filings are similar or identical to the motions filed by counsel for Carruthers or by counsel for co-defendant James
Montgomery.

-15-
that they are well represented and properly represented. And toward that end, efforts
are being made that they are represented by attorneys that have enough experience
to handle this type of case and by attorneys that can establish a rapport with their
clients that would allow them to represent their clients well.

We have gone through several attorneys now in an effort to accommodate the
defendants’ requests in that regard, but at some point–and in my opinion, each of the
attorneys and each of the investigators that has represented these defendants that has
been relieved have been eminently qualified to do the job, but I have allowed them
to be relieved for one reason or another.

I want the record to be perfectly clear at this point because of some
suggestions that have already been raised by some of the correspondence that I have
received from Mr. Carruthers, and all of it, by the way, will be made a part of the
record. But Mr. Carruthers has suggested, in his correspondence, that some of the
previous attorneys have been relieved because they weren’t capable or competent to
do the job. And that is, in my opinion, at least–my humble opinion as the judge in
this case–absolutely and totally an inaccurate statement. The attorneys that have been
relieved thus far have been fully capable and fully competent and had been doing an
outstanding job, but for a variety of reasons, I’ve allowed them to withdraw from the
case.

****

Mr. Carruthers has raised, through his correspondence, and apparently
through direct communication with his previous attorneys, certain matters that are
pretty outrageous suggestions, but because of the nature of the matters that he’s
raised, the attorneys that represented him previously felt that an irreparable breach
had occurred between their ability–between Mr. Carruthers and themselves–effecting
their ability to continue to represent them. And at some point–and that could well
have been the point, but it wasn’t. But at some point these matters that are raised by
the defendants cannot continue to be used to get new counsel because it gets to be a
point where they’re–it’s already well beyond that point, but, obviously, at some point,
gets to the point where they’re manipulating the system and getting what they
want–Mr. Carruthers, sit still, please, or you can sit back there –gets to the point
where they’re manipulating the system and getting trial dates and representation that
they want and are calling the shots. That’s another matter that’s been raised by Mr.
Carruthers in some of his correspondence, that he wants his attorneys to know that
he’s the man calling the shots in this case, and he’s the man to look to.

Well, of course, again, it’s a free country, and he can say whatever he wants,
and he can think whatever he wants, but as far as I’m concerned–and this applies to
all three defendants and any defendants that come through this court that are

-16-
represented by counsel–and this gets back to what Mr. McLin alluded to earlier–the
attorneys are calling the shots in this case. They are trying the case except for certain
areas where the defendant has the exclusive and final say, such as areas of whether
he wants to testify or not and that sort of thing. The attorneys are in here representing
these clients and will do so to the best of their ability. They are the ones who have
been to law school. They are the ones that have been through trial many times
before, and they’re the ones that are here for a reason, and that reason is to represent
these individuals. And, so you know, if there’s a conflict between the attorney and
client with regard to how to proceed in the case, you all resolve it as best you can, but
ultimately the attorney is trying the case. And, you know, we don’t pull people in off
the sidewalk to try these cases, and the reason we don’t is because of certain things
that they need to learn and certain experiences they need to have professionally
before they’re prepared to try these cases. So they’re here for that reason and for that
purpose.

****

So that gets me to the reason for our being here. Because of the matters
raised by Mr. Carruthers, I have granted the request of his previous two attorneys and
investigator reluctantly because, in my opinion, they were doing an outstanding job
of representing Mr. Carruthers and his interests.

****

Because of the most recent rash of allegations raised by Mr. Carruthers in his
many letters that he’s sent me–I assume he’s sent copies of the letters to his counsel
and to others, but I’ve certainly got them, and they will be made a part of the record.
And because of the types of things he alleged in those letters and the position that it
put his previous attorneys in, and their very, very strong feelings about not continuing
to represent Mr. Carruthers under those circumstances, I have reluctantly agreed to
let them withdraw.

And in an effort again to get attorneys who I’m satisfied have the experience
and the willingness to handle a case of this seriousness, I have approached and am
inclined to appoint Mr. Harry Sayle, who is out of town this week and couldn’t be
here today but who indicated he would be willing to take the case on, and Mr. Bill
Massey, to represent Mr. Carruthers.

* ***

And as I have stated, I’m running out of patience with regard to these
different issues–and I use that word advisedly–being raised by the clients with regard
to any objections they have with regard to their attorneys. And as far as I’m

-17-
 concerned, these are the attorneys that will represent these men at trial. It’s going to
have to be one gigantic conflict–one gigantic and real proven, demonstrated conflict
before any of these men will be relieved from representation in this case. There will
be no more perceived conflicts, no more unfounded, wild allegations raised through
correspondence, no more dissatisfaction with how my attorney is handling my case
for anybody to be relieved in this case.

These are the attorneys, gentlemen. You either work with them or don’t. It’s
up to you. But they’re the men that are going to be representing you at trial.

(Emphasis added.) Consistent with prior practice, the trial court approved an initial $1000
expenditure for investigative services for Carruthers’ newly appointed defense team and conditioned
further funding upon a specific showing of necessity by the investigator. Massey indicated that he
preferred to use his own investigator rather than an attorney; therefore, Arthur Anderson, who
previously had been employed on the case, was retained.

The trial court approved additional funding for investigative services on August 11, August
31, and again on September 27, 1995. Also, due to his recent appointment to the case, Massey
requested and was afforded a trial continuance until January 8, 1996. Like previous counsel, Massey
and Sayle filed many pre-trial motions on behalf of Carruthers. By November 17, 1995, Massey
informed the trial court that all necessary and appropriate pre-trial motions had been filed.

However, about a month later, on December 19, 1995, Massey filed a motion requesting
permission to withdraw as counsel. As grounds for the motion, Massey stated that his relationship
with Carruthers had “deteriorated to such a serious degree that [counsel] can not provide effective
assistance as required by state and federal law. . . . Counsel’s professional judgment cannot be
exercised solely for the benefit of Defendant, as counsel fears for his safety and those around him.”
Attached to the motion were several letters Carruthers had sent to Massey, both at his home and at
his office in late November and early December of 1995. In the letters, Carruthers accused Massey
of lying,17 and of being on drugs,18 threatened counsel,19 and expressed overall dissatisfaction with
counsel’s handling of the case.20 Massey made the following statements to the trial court at the
hearing on his motion to withdraw:

17
For example, in a letter dated November 22, 1995, Carruthers said: “You have violated the code of ethics
by lying to me an d my c o-defen dant Jam es Mon tgome ry . . . .”
18
In a letter dated December 15, 1995, Carruthers said, “I don’t know if you are on that COCAINE again but
don’t let the drug alter y ou [sic] ab ility to see the tru th and n o [sic] the tru th.”
19
In a letter dated December 7, 1995, Carruthers said,“All I tell you is to do you [sic] want to do, and I’ll do
what I HA VE T O DO ! Point blank !”
20
In a letter dated December 5, 1995, Carruthers said, “You have violated several ethic co des with your style
and tactics.”

-18-
 I would just say that in 15 years of practicing law, I have never ever made a motion
of this nature. I have never–I’ve never found it difficult to advocate on behalf of a
case. I wouldn’t find it difficult to advocate on behalf of this case. I do at this point,
however, find it very difficult to advocate on behalf of Mr. Carruthers. And that is
simply because he’s made it that way. If I were receiving letters that merely stated
I was incompetent and that I wasn’t handling his case right, and those type of
letters–we all get those time to time–I don’t mind those. Those don’t bother me.
When I have letters that come to me that are threatening, when I have telephone calls
that come to my office that are threatening the safety of me and my staff and those
around me, I have real problems with that. It’s gotten so bad, your Honor, that my
secretary is having nightmares. The last call Mr. Carruthers made is Exhibit E to this
verified motion. She called me in absolute tears crying uncontrollably, hysterically
crying over his antics. That’s the same way he’s been doing me. I just haven’t
broken down and started crying about it. But I do have very, very strong, such strong
personal reservations as I have never experienced before as an advocate. Your honor,
in advocating cases, particularly capital cases, I find the first thing I have to do to be
persuasive is to believe. I have to believe and I have to feel. Because if I don’t
believe and I don’t feel and I’m not sincere, I cannot impart that to a jury. They see
my insincerity. They see just words, a parrott-like proficiency as opposed to feeling.
They don’t act on that. They shut that out. That’s been my experience. And I don’t
believe that that feeling, I know that I can’t advocate. I’ve lost my will to advocate
on this case. I don’t have any doubt about that at this point. I don’t have any doubt.
I’ll tell you as an officer of this court. I don’t have any doubt that would be a major
problem. And despite Mr. Carruthers threats and antics, I care for the integrity of the
system. I care that his rights are protected even when he tries to destroy them
himself and impair them. And I don’t know what the Court’s answer is. I know that
the Court is in a very difficult position here. Obviously, it’s very clear what the ploy
is. It’s very clear that we’re never going to get to trial like this. And if we do, then
there’s going to be a record made for ineffective assistance of counsel. And they
believe, Mr. Carruthers believes, that doing all of these things is going to make him
a record as opposed to doing things from a legal standpoint in the courtroom. There
are motions, objections at trial and through the proper avenues that the courts of
appeals will recognize as a legal basis for a reversal. But we’ve gotten outside the
legal area in this case and we’ve gone into the area of intimidation, threats.

(Emphasis added.) Despite Massey’s argument, the trial judge denied Massey’s motion, stating as
follows:
With regard to Mr. Massey’s concerns, I certainly believe that everything Mr.
Massey has stated in his motion is factually accurate and correct. I don’t have any
reason to doubt that his secretary received the phone call that she says she received
in the memo she prepared, or that any of these other things transpired. But I do think
and I do agree with Mr. Massey’s characterization that these efforts by Mr.

-19-
 Carruthers are a part of an overall ploy on his part to delay the case forever until
something happens that prevents it from being tried.

****
In my opinion, to try to make the record reflect as clearly and accurately as
possible the fact that the system is doing everything it can to make sure that Mr.
Carruthers is properly and thoroughly represented in this case. And Mr. Carruthers
may step out to the back. He just was pointing to Mr. Massey with some sort of
threatening gesture. And he’s going to sit in the back for the remainder of this
hearing. Put him in the back room and keep him back there. Lock the door. Mr.
Montgomery, you will join him in a minute if you choose to conduct yourself in that
manner as well. The system has done all it can, in my opinion, to make sure that Mr.
Tony Carruthers is well represented. And I’ve tried to be as patient as I can be in
listening to the concerns of defense counsel and investigators in making sure that no
conflict existed in the representation of either of these men. The specific reasons, the
narrow specific reasons for the excusal of the previous attorneys and investigators
differ a little bit from those complaints that Mr. Massey has raised today. And so
when Mr. Massey says ‘[t]hat just because I’m the 4th or 5th attorney in line doesn’t
mean that I now have to be stuck, in effect, in representing him just because others
have been relieved and the Court is anxious to get the case tried. My complaints are
as valid as theirs were. And if they were relieved, then I should be relieved as well.’
And I understand that position. But first of all I’ll respond to that by saying their
complaints were a little bit different, and I’m not going to go through them on the
record now. The record is clear in those instances. One envelope is sealed with
several letters that will reveal what those complaints were and the complaints from
attorneys prior to that were a little bit different in nature. Not to minimize the
seriousness of Mr. Massey’s complaints, but those complaints were a little bit
different. And so its not that he just happens to be the 5th attorney in line, and he’s
the one that is going to quote, get stuck, representing Mr. Carruthers. Their
complaints were a little bit different. And factually there are some distinctions that
can be drawn between the complaints that they had and the complaints that you’ve
voiced.

(Emphasis added.) The trial court also emphasized that Carruthers’ ploy had become more apparent
over the course of the proceedings.

With the very first set of attorneys I tried to give Mr. Carruthers the benefit of the
doubt and excused them for reasons similar to yours, but a little bit different. With
the second set of attorneys I tried to give Mr. Carruthers the benefit of the doubt and
excuse them for reasons similar to yours, but a little bit different. Now that we’re in
the third set of attorneys , the ploy is much more apparent than it was with the first
set of attorneys. Although, it was somewhat apparent to any of us who have been
in these courts for many, many years as we all have been. Not wanting to jump to

-20-
 any conclusions or not give him the benefit of the doubt, the first and second sets of
attorneys were excused. But now that we’re into the third set of attorneys the ploy
is much more apparent and, therefore, I’m much less receptive to these sorts of
arguments than I was a year ago when the first set of attorneys came in wanting to be
relieved.

(Emphasis added.)

Finally, in response to counsel’s comment that Carruthers should just go “pro se,” the trial
court concluded that it should refuse “to force a man to go pro se in a capital case if he doesn’t want”
and observed that Carruthers had never asserted his right of self-representation. Although Massey’s
motion to withdraw was denied, the trial judge granted his request for additional funds for further
investigation and for hiring a mitigation specialist.

On January 2, 1996, six days before the trial was scheduled to begin, Massey renewed his
motion to withdraw. Massey informed the trial court that he had continued to receive threatening
letters at his home and was concerned for his daughter’s safety because Carruthers had described the
car she drove. Massey indicated that he cared more about Carruthers’ right to a fair trial than did
Carruthers himself, but given the recent and ongoing threats, Massey declared, “I don’t want to
represent this man. I can’t represent him. I won’t represent him.”

At this hearing, the prosecution took the position that Massey should not be allowed to
withdraw because the defendant was simply manipulating the system in an attempt to delay his trial.
The State pointed out that the case had been pending for almost two years and each time a trial date
drew near Carruthers would increase his letters and efforts to alienate his attorneys either through
written or verbal personal attacks or threats. The State urged the trial court to deny the motion to
withdraw and proceed to trial:

[I]f a defendant, Your Honor, can threaten the system, if he can manipulate the
system by threats, by letters, I’m not sure if that’s what the makers of the constitution
meant when they sat in Philadelphia and they said, look, let’s let every defendant
have a fair trial. Let’s let him have a lawyer. Let’s let a jury be over here. Let’s let
him have a judge; that’s fair. Let’s let no man be accused of a crime, will not go to
trial, unless he receives a fair trial. Let no man be convicted–but the framers of the
constitution, Your Honor, had not met Tony Carruthers.

After considering the comments of counsel, the trial judge briefly recounted the history of
the case and again emphasized that, in his opinion, all of the attorneys appointed for the defendant,
including Massey and Sayle, were excellent trial lawyers who had fully performed their duties with
regard to Carruthers’ defense, including filing all relevant motions and thoroughly pursing the
investigation of the case. The trial court then ruled on Massey’s motion to withdraw, stating as
follows:

-21-
 Now, this is the way that the case is going to proceed on Monday. Mr.
Massey is still on the case. He still represents Mr. Carruthers. If between now and
Monday Mr. Carruthers chooses to discuss with Mr. Massey the case and to
cooperate with Mr. Massey in his preparation of the defense in this case, then I’ll
look to Mr. Massey to go forward in representing Mr. Carruthers. There have been
disputes and conflicts between attorney and client before. This is not the first time
that there has been a problem between attorney and client, and these types of
problems can be repaired oftentimes. And differences can be patched up, and
attorneys can go forward. And I would hope that that would be the case in this case.
And I would hope that Mr. Carruthers would between now and Monday, work with
Mr. Massey and Mr. Sayle in preparation for a trial. If Mr. Carruthers elects not to,
however, he will go forward representing himself. This was raised on the 19th when
Mr. Massey filed his motion to withdraw and we first heard it. At that time, I
rejected the idea. I was reluctant to because I’ve never required an individual to go
forward representing himself when he has not requested that. And I don’t like that
idea, but I’ve given a lot of thought to that suggestion since the 19th. For the record,
Mr. Massey called me shortly after our hearing on the 19th when he received some
letters in the mail from Mr. Carruthers that dealt further–that he felt further
undermined his ability to represent him. And I just want that on the record so there
is no misunderstanding about that. But since the 19th, and after the phone call from
Mr. Massey that I received, after the hearing on the 19th, and after his request today,
I’ve given it a lot of thought to what options were left, what options are still available
in this case. And in my judgment, the only option that is still available if Mr.
Carruthers chooses not to work with Mr. Massey and Mr. Sayle in going forward
with this case next Monday, is for him to represent himself. And I’ll provide him
with a copy of the rules of Tennessee procedure, the rules of evidence. And he can
sit at counsel table and voir dire the jury, and question witnesses, and give an opening
statement, as any lawyer would, and he would be required to comply with all the
rules as any lawyer would, if he chooses to go forward on his own. If he chooses to
say nothing, then that’s his prerogative, and – But that’s what the situation will be
next Monday, Mr. Carruthers. And the choice is yours. Again, the choice is yours.
You have for the third time around an outstanding attorney representing you. And
he’s here, and he’ll be available. If you choose to avail yourself of his services, he
will represent you on Monday. If you choose not to, you can go forward representing
yourself. If you go forward representing yourself, I will require Mr. Massey and Mr.
Sayle to be available as elbow counsel so that at any recess or overnight, you can
seek advice from them, and they can confer with you and advise you in any way that
they deem appropriate. So if you elect not to have him represent you and you go
forward representing yourself, they’ll be in the courtroom observing, and they’ll be
available to offer advice and counsel to you at any recess, lunch break, overnight
break. One of those two scenarios will occur next Monday. And again, it’s up to Mr.
Carruthers because we’ve been through this now for many, many months and at this
point in time, the case needs to go forward. There is no other reason for the case to

-22-
 be reset, no proof problems from one side or the other, no witness problems from one
side or the other. The case is now set for the third time for trial. There is no extrinsic
reason for an additional continuance. And–so Mr. Carruthers is going to have to
decide in which manner he wishes to proceed on Monday, but the case will go
forward on Monday. And I’ll hear back from Mr. Massey Monday morning with
regard to whether he has been able to confer with his client and what the progress of
that has been, and whether he feels that the progress has been such that it would
allow him to go forward in representing Mr. Carruthers.

(Emphasis added.)

The record reflects that at a hearing held the next day, January 3, 1996, Carruthers was
“glaring” at Massey while “gritting his jaw.”21 Upon observing Carruthers’ conduct, the trial court
once again cautioned the defendant as follows:

And again, as I did yesterday, I want to remind Mr. Carruthers that if it is his decision
not to proceed with Mr. Massey and to proceed pro se–just a minute. I’ll let you
speak in a moment–then he needs to understand that he will be held to the same
standard that attorneys are held to during a trial. Rules of evidence, rules of
procedure will apply. And he will need to familiarize himself as best he can with
those procedures and those rules between now and trial date because in proceeding
pro se, he will certainly be held to that same standard. Obviously, he realizes the
charges that are pending and the potential for the imposition of the death penalty
involved in this case. We’ve had numerous hearings and motions over the past
fifteen or eighteen months, and all of those matters should be very apparent to Mr.
Carruthers at this point in time.

Responding to the trial court’s admonition, Carruthers said he did not want Massey representing him
because Massey was on cocaine.

Following this hearing, Massey filed an application for extraordinary appeal22 in the Court
of Criminal Appeals challenging the trial court’s ruling that he remain on the case either as counsel
or as advisory counsel. In an order dated January 8, 1996, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
Massey should be allowed to immediately withdraw from further representation, stating:

This Court is of the opinion that the attorney-client relationship which may
have previously existed, has deteriorated until such a relationship does not exist
between Carruthers and Mr. Massey. Also the circumstances of this case make it

21
The trial judge state d that “since [Carruthers] has been brought in the courtroom, he has in fact been glaring
at Mr. M assey non-stop .”

22
See Tenn. R. App. P. 10.

-23-
 impossible for Mr. Massey to ethically represent Mr. Carruthers. Carruthers has
proclaimed that he will do bodily harm to Massey. He has in essence and in fact
threatened Massey with death. Carruthers, who has a history of violent conduct, is
apparently a member of a gang. All of his correspondence to Massey carries a
drawing of a lidless eye that watches from the top of a pyramid. Moreover, Massey’s
family is filled with fear and anxiety due to the threats made to Massey; and
Massey’s secretary, who has had dealings with Carruthers by telephone, likewise has
fear and anxiety based upon her conversations with Carruthers and the threats made
against Massey. Given these circumstances, Mr. Massey had no alternative but to
seek permission to withdraw as counsel. He is supported in this endeavor by the
Disciplinary Counsel for the Tennessee Supreme Court Office, which advised
Massey that he was ethically required to withdraw as counsel, and, if the motion was
denied he was required to seek relief in the appellate courts.
****
Given these facts and circumstances as well as the relevant provisions of the
Code of Professional Conduct, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the State of
Tennessee, Mr. Massey was entitled to be relieved as counsel of record for Mr.
Carruthers. If there ever was an amicable attorney-client relationship, it was
eradicated by Mr. Carruthers’ conduct in writing the letters aforementioned and
threatening to do bodily harm to Mr. Massey the first time he saw him. Today, Mr.
Massey and Mr. Carruthers are at odds and their differences are irreconcilable.
Furthermore, Mr. Massey, who emphatically denied any misconduct or addiction to
drugs, must attempt to protect his family, secretary, and himself from physical harm
as well as protect himself from further disciplinary complaints.23

(Emphasis added.)

The same day this order was filed, but before the trial judge had received the order, a hearing
was held in the trial court. After learning that Massey had received seven more pieces of certified
mail at his home since the hearing on January 2, and after being advised by Massey that the
difficulties with Carruthers had not improved, the trial judge concluded that Carruthers,

through his actions, through his accusations, and letters, he has forced himself into
a situation where I have no option but to require that he proceed pro se. And so in
deference to your request, I will go forward with my previous statement and that is
that you and Mr. Sayle will remain as elbow counsel. Mr. Carruthers will represent
himself.

The trial court then reiterated, “[f]rom this point forward I’ll give Mr. Carruthers the opportunity to
speak on his own behalf at appropriate times. As I indicated to him last week, he will be expected

23
The reco rd reflects th at Carru th ers had filed a compla int a gains t M assey with the Board of Professional
Respon sibility.

-24-
to comply with all of the rules of procedure and evidence that an attorney would be required to
comply with.”

Upon hearing the trial court’s ruling, Carruthers claimed that he had attempted to reconcile
with Massey and complained that he was not qualified to represent himself. The trial judge
responded:

Well, those are the perils in going forward pro se. And in my judgment, Mr.
Carruthers, as I’ve said on several occasions, and I don’t intend to get back into a
lengthy hearing on this issue at this time, but we’ve had two or three hearings already
on this. In my judgment, and I understand you’re stating now that you don’t feel
capable of going forward and representing yourself. But you need to understand that
in my judgment you have created this problem for yourself. You are the author of
your own predicament by, in my opinion, sabotaging the representation of you by
four previous attorneys. These are now your fifth and sixth attorneys. In my
judgment, because of actions that you’ve taken over the past 18 months, because of
actions that you’ve taken, you are now in this situation. And so it may well be
difficult for you to go forward in representing yourself, but this is the situation that
you’ve created and you’re going to have to do the best you can, because there is
virtually no option left at this point. To reset it again, history would should would
only – would be a futile effort, because at the eleventh hour with the seventh and
eighth attorneys representing you, there would be some other effort, in my opinion,
some other manipulation on your part that would then cause those attorneys to come
in and want to get off your case. And then we’d reset it and appoint the ninth and
tenth attorneys, and the eleventh and twelfth. And there’d be no end to it.

****
And so we’re going forward and you’re going to represent yourself. I
understand you’re not an experienced attorney. I understand you may well have
never gone through a voir dire process before. And that’s unfortunate. I wish you
had cooperated and gotten along with Mr. Nance a year and a half ago. He was an
excellent attorney, has tried many, many cases in these courts, serious difficult cases
and done an excellent job. I wish you had cooperated and gotten along with Coleman
Garrett who, in my opinion, is one of the best trial attorneys in this entire state. He’s
tried many cases in this courtroom and defended individuals remarkably well. I wish
you had cooperated and gotten along with Mr. Craig Morton and Mr. Glenn Wright,
and Mr. Harry Sayle, and Mr. William Massey, because I think it would’ve been in
your best interest to have done so. But it’s been obvious that you have not. And so
for that reason we’re going forward.

****
It’s not easy to make this decision. It’s not a decision that I made lightly or
take lightly. But I tell you what, if the record isn’t complete enough and replete

-25-
 enough with evidence of manipulative conduct and obstructionism, then I can’t
imagine ever there being a record for the appellate courts in Tennessee that would
meet that criteria.

(Emphasis added.)

After the trial court ruled, Carruthers offered to waive any conflict, to allow Massey to
continue representing him, to apologize to Massey, and to testify that the accusations he had made
against Massey were untrue. The trial court refused, finding that Carruthers was merely using
another tactic to delay the proceeding.

The next day, January 9, 1996, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered an addendum to its
previous order and allowed Massey to be completely relieved from further representation or
participation in the case including providing assistance as “elbow counsel.” However, Sayle
continued on the case as elbow or standby counsel.

During voir dire two days later, January 11, 1996, the State requested a continuance of the
trial due to the hospitalization of one of its material witnesses, Nakeita Shaw. The trial court granted
the State’s motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for April 15, 1996. At this point, in
light of the continuance, Carruthers made an oral motion for appointment of new counsel.24 The trial
court denied the motion, stating:

The ruling still stands. The system will not be held hostage by Tony Carruthers, and
to go through another round of attorneys will be doing just that, because history
suggests, as you’ve done in the past, that is if new attorneys were appointed and spent
the time and investigated, the effort to get ready on this case, then at the eleventh
hour something would happen, some allegations would be made that would
undermine their ability to represent you, they’d ask to withdraw, we’d be back in the
same situation that we were in with Mr. Larry Nance, with Mr. Coleman Garrett, with
Mr. Bill Massey, all three of whom are outstanding criminal defense attorneys. All
three of whom were fully capable of representing you, and all three of whom had to
be relieved because of your actions. And in my judgment, enough is enough. And
because of your actions, these attorneys are no longer representing you and, therefore,
you will be representing yourself. You have ample time to prepare. You have access
to legal opinion from Mr. Sayle. You have the file. You have the rules. You have
a jury consultant. You have an investigator. And this is the manner in which we’re
going forward.

On January 16, 1996, the trial court approved Carruthers’ request for funds to obtain an
investigator to assist him and authorized the investigator to contact the trial court directly if

24
One day earlier, when the State mentioned that it might possibly be requesting a continuance, Carruthers had
adam antly obje cted to any continua nce and state d he was rea dy to go to trial.

-26-
additional funds were needed. In February of 1996, Carruthers filed two more written motions for
appointment of counsel which were again denied by the trial court for the same reasons set out
above. In a hearing on February 20, 1996, the trial court considered Carruthers’ pre-trial requests
for funding for expert services, and, at this hearing, again recounted the events that culminated in
Carruthers being required to represent himself. The trial court observed that “it will be apparent to
anyone who objectively views this situation that Carruthers is not being denied the right to counsel.”

Throughout these pre-trial proceedings, the trial court treated Carruthers with respect,
patiently listened to his arguments and requests, and afforded Carruthers and his investigator
considerable latitude in scheduling and arguing motions, even though most of these motions were
similar or identical to motions that had already been filed and argued by counsel who had previously
represented Carruthers. When Carruthers requested ex parte hearings to seek funding for experts,
the prosecution would voluntarily leave the court room. The trial judge granted Carruthers’ request
for funding to obtain a forensic pathologist, but denied his request for funding for an accident
reconstructionist.

In February of 1996, the trial court allowed Sayle to withdraw as elbow counsel because
Carruthers apparently had no confidence or trust in Sayle and because Carruthers was launching
personal, verbal attacks upon Sayle. When Sayle moved for permission to withdraw as elbow
counsel, he stated:
He has expressed the feeling that I am not working for him and that I have not
done anything for him, I’m not going to do anything for him. He suspects – he’s
made it clear that he suspects that I’m working with the state in some capacity. And
frankly none of the advice I give him is followed, and I don’t think there is any
intention of following it. And frankly its just – and the abuse gets extremely
personal. Personal villification over the last couple of meetings, and I see no basis
for being able to continue.

Thereafter, Carruthers twice made oral motions for appointment of counsel, first on March
4, 1996, and then on April 15, 1996, the day jury selection began. Again, the trial court denied these
motions and noted that this was not the first case in which Carruthers had employed such tactics.25
Carruthers therefore represented himself at trial and sentencing, participating in voir dire, presenting
opening statement, questioning witnesses on cross-examination, making objections, presenting
witnesses in his defense, and presenting closing argument. After the jury returned its verdicts as to
guilt and sentencing, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Carruthers on his motion for new
trial and on appeal.

In the Court of Criminal Appeals, Carruthers, by and through counsel, first asserted that he
had been denied due process when the trial court required him to represent himself at trial and
sentencing in this capital case. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his claim and held that,

25
In an earlier aggravated assault case Carruthers had been appointed four attorneys b efore the cas e was finally
tried. See Carruthers v. State, No. 02 C01-95 05-CR -00130 (Tenn. C rim. App., J ackson, A pril 17, 19 96).

-27-
under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was justified in requiring Carruthers to represent
himself, reasoning as follows:

We do not take lightly the result that a defendant has to proceed pro se in any
trial, especially one involving a capital offense. Our judicial system could not
survive if those accused of crimes were literally run over “roughshod.” But while the
individual must be protected by the system, the judicial system must also be protected
from abuses by an individual. A person charged with criminal acts cannot be allowed
to subvert the judicial system.

In this Court, counsel for Carruthers again contend that he was denied his right to due process
when he was required to represent himself during the trial of this capital case. Counsel assert that
Carruthers did not expressly waive his right to counsel, that any implicit waiver was invalid because
the trial court did not advise Carruthers of the possibility of waiver or the dangers of self-
representation, and that his conduct is not egregious enough to justify a finding of forfeiture. In
response, the State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly found that Carruthers
forfeited his right to counsel because Carruthers was using this right in order to manipulate the
judicial system and delay the trial. In the alternative, the State argues that the record in this appeal
supports a finding that Carruthers implicitly waived his right to counsel by his course of conduct and
that the trial court’s warnings to Carruthers were sufficient to inform him that he would be deemed
to have waived his right to counsel if his conduct continued and of the dangers of self-representation.

Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee an indigent criminal defendant
the right to assistance of appointed counsel at trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I,
§ 9; Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 684, 686, 145 L.Ed.2d 597
(2000); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); State v. Small,
988 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Northington, 667 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tenn. 1984); see also
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 44(a). The right of an accused to assistance of counsel, however, does not include
the right to appointment of counsel of choice, or to special rapport, confidence, or even a meaningful
relationship with appointed counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U. S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610,
1617-18, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1988); Siers
v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. Moody, 968 P.2d 578, 579 (Ariz. 1998); Snell v.
State, 723 So.2d 105, 107 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253, 258 (Fla. 1984);
State v. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d 610, 625 (Neb. 1989). The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to
guarantee an effective advocate, not counsel preferred by the defendant. See Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697. 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988).

Ordinarily, waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466-67 (1938);
Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673. Typically, such a waiver occurs only after the trial judge advises a
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and determines that the defendant
“knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942); see also Small, 988 S.W.2d

-28-
at 673; Northington, 667 S.W.2d at 61-62. Many courts, however, have recognized that the right to
counsel is not a license to abuse the dignity of the court or to frustrate orderly proceedings.26
Accordingly, several courts have acknowledged that, like other constitutional rights,27 the right to
counsel can be implicitly waived or forfeited if a defendant manipulates, abuses, or utilizes the right
to delay or disrupt a trial. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding
that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he physically assaulted his attorney); United States
v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097-1101 (3rd Cir. 1995) (discussing the principles of implicit waiver
by conduct and forfeiture, but concluding that defendant had not forfeited his right to counsel);
United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his
right to counsel by exhibiting abusive, threatening, and coercive conduct toward his attorney); United
States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant waived his right to
counsel where, after being warned that he could lose the right if he failed to cooperate, defendant
continued to refuse to cooperate with numerous court-appointed lawyers); United States v. Kelms,
827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant implicitly waived the right to counsel
where, to delay the trial, defendant refused to accept appointed counsel or hire his own attorney);
United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding defendant waived his right
to counsel when, in bad faith and for purpose of delay, he retained counsel known to have a conflict
of interest and failed to retain other counsel); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that defendant’s refusal to allow any public defender, regardless of competence, to
represent him constituted a waiver of the right to counsel); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538,
540 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant’s “persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of
counsel and appointment of new counsel . . . is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of counsel”); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.

26
See United S tates v. Flewitt , 874 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The righ t to self-represen tation is not a
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroo m.”); Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1989) (“A defendant
has no right to manipulate his right to counsel in order to delay or disrupt the trial.”); Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108 (“[R]ight
[to counsel] must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure and deprive courts of the exercise of their inherent power to
control the administration of justice.”); United S tates v. Wh ite, 529 F.2d 13 90, 1393 (8 th Cir. 1976) (“Of co urse, the
right to counsel is a shield, not a swo rd. A defen dant has no right to manipulate his right for the purpose of delaying and
disrupting the trial.”); Brook s v. State, 819 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he constitutional right to counsel
is a shield, not a sword, and . . . a defendant may not manipulate this right for the purpose of delaying the trial or playing
‘cat-and-mouse’ with the court.”) ; Jones, 449 So.2d at 258 (“We consider it implicit . . . that the right to appointed
counsel, like the obverse right to self-representation, is not a license to abuse the dignity of the court or to fru strate
orderly proceed ings. . . .”); State v. Green, 471 N .W.2d 402, 40 7 (Neb . 1991) (“ A defend ant may not utilize his or her
right to counsel to m anipulate or obstruct the o rderly proc edure in the court or to interfere with the fair administration
of justice.”); State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E .2d 66, 6 9 (N.C. C t. App. 20 00) (“[A] n accused may lose his constitutional
right to be represented by counsel of his choice when he perve rts that right to a weapon for the purpo se of obstructing
and delayin g his trial.”); Painter v. Sta te, 762 P.2 d 990, 9 92 (Ok la. Ct. Crim. App. 1992) (“The right to assistance of
counsel may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling with the court.”) ; United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d
181, 183 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The right to assistance of counsel, cherished and fundamental though it be, may not be put
to service as a means of delaying or trifling with the court.”); Cf. Faretta v. Ca lifornia, 422 U .S. 806, 8 34 n.46 , 95 S. Ct.
2525, 2541 n .46, 45 L .Ed.2d 5 62 (197 5) (“The right of self-repres entation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom.”).
27
See, e.g. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (19 70) (holding that by persisting
in disruptive conduct the accused lost his constitutional right to be present throughout the trial).

-29-
Travers, 996 F. Supp. 6, 17 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding forfeiture as a result of the defendant’s
“persistently abusive, threatening and coercive” dealings with his attorney and noting that the
defendant had been repeatedly warned that his failure to cooperate could result in a finding of
forfeiture); United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1442 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that
defendant waived his right to counsel when he physically assaulted his attorney); Siniard v. State,
491 So.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that defendant forfeited the right to
counsel where he was allowed eight months and several continuances to retain counsel but failed to
do so); Brooks, 819 S.W.2d at 290 (recognizing forfeiture, but concluding that forfeiture was not
appropriate because the record did not show that the defendant used his right to manipulate the
judicial system); Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595, 602 (Del. 1988) (stating that a defendant’s dilatory
actions in retaining counsel can justify a forfeiture of the right to counsel); Jones, 449 So.2d at 256
(holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by persistently demanding counsel of his choice
and refusing to cooperate with appointed counsel); Brickert v. State, 673 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by engaging in conduct designed to
frustrate the judicial process and avoid or delay a trial); People v. Sloane, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his “persistent pattern of
threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncooperative” behavior towards four successive appointed
attorneys); People v. Gilchrist, 658 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that defendant
forfeited his right to counsel when he assaulted his fourth appointed attorney); Montgomery, 530
S.E.2d at 69 (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel when, over the course of fifteen
months, he was twice appointed counsel and twice released his appointed counsel); Painter, 762 P.2d
at 992 (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel when he failed to secure counsel or request
appointed counsel so that he could delay his hearing); State v. Boykin, 478 S.E.2d 689, 690 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that a defendant may implicitly waive the right to counsel by
misconduct, but finding no implicit waiver because no warnings had been given the defendant); City
of Tacoma v. Bishop, 920 P.2d 214, 218 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing forfeiture but
concluding that the defendant’s misconduct was not sufficiently egregious to support a finding of
forfeiture); State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418 (Wis. 1996) (holding that defendant had
forfeited his right to counsel where he consistently refused to cooperate and constantly complained
about counsel’s performance to manipulate, disrupt, and delay the proceedings); see generally Wayne
R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure, § 11.3(c) (2nd ed. 1999) (“What these courts have held, in
effect, is that the state’s interest in maintaining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant’s
negligence, indifference, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combined to justify a forfeiture of
defendant’s right to counsel . . . .”).

Some courts have attempted to distinguish the concepts of implicit waiver and forfeiture.
See, e.g., Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099-1100; City of Tacoma, 920 P.2d at 218. These courts hold that
an implicit waiver occurs when, after being warned by the court that counsel will be lost if dilatory,
abusive, or uncooperative misconduct continues, a defendant persists in such behavior. Id. In
contrast, forfeiture results regardless of the defendant’s intent to relinquish the right and irrespective
of the defendant’s knowledge of the right. Id. Accordingly, where a defendant engages in extremely
serious misconduct, a finding of forfeiture is appropriate even though the defendant was not warned

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of the potential consequences of his or her actions or the risks associated with self-representation.
See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102; City of Tacoma, 920 P.2d at 218.

However, many courts considering this issue do not distinguish between the two concepts
and have used the terms implicit waiver and forfeiture interchangeably. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at
1098; Cf. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2, 111 S. Ct.
2641, 2647 n.2, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(“The Court uses the term ‘waive’ instead of ‘forfeit.’ The two are really not the same, although our
cases have so often used them interchangeably that it may be too late to introduce precision. Waiver,
the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, is merely one means
by which a forfeiture may occur. Some rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).

Although this Court has never considered the precise question presented in this appeal, when
discussing a non-indigent defendant who fired his attorney in open court and thereafter repeatedly
protested about going to trial without a lawyer, we recognized that even “[t]hough a defendant has
a right to select his own counsel if he acts expeditiously to do so . . . he may not use this right to play
a ‘cat and mouse’ game with the court . . . .” State v. Chadwick, 224 Tenn. 75, 79, 450 S.W.2d 568,
570 (1970); see also Glasgow v. State, 224 Tenn. 626, 461 S.W.2d 24 (1970); State v. Dubrock, 649
S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that non-indigent defendants waived the right to
counsel because they refused to hire an attorney). The idea that the right to counsel may not be used
to manipulate or toy with the judicial system applies equally to indigent and non-indigent defendants.
Although an indigent criminal defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel, that right
may not be used as a license to manipulate, delay, or disrupt a trial. See footnote 26 supra, citing
cases. Accordingly, we conclude that an indigent criminal defendant may implicitly waive or forfeit
the right to counsel by utilizing that right to manipulate, delay, or disrupt trial proceedings. We also
hold that the distinction between these two concepts is slight and that the record in this case supports
a finding of both implicit waiver and forfeiture.

When Garrett and Morton were allowed to withdraw and Massey and Sayle were appointed,
the trial court advised Carruthers that Massey and Sayle would be the lawyers representing him at
trial and that there would be no further withdrawal and new appointments absent a “gigantic
conflict.” Despite this admonishment, Carruthers once again launched personal attacks and threats
against Massey, threats that eventually extended to Massey’s office staff and family members. When
Massey renewed his motion to withdraw on January 2, 1996, the trial court specifically and clearly
advised Carruthers that he had two choices – cooperate with Massey or represent himself. Carruthers
also was advised that if he chose not to cooperate with Massey and to represent himself, he would
be required to comply with all procedural rules as if he were an attorney. The trial court repeated
his admonishment at a hearing on January 3, 1996. Despite the trial court’s clear warnings, quoted
fully earlier in this opinion, Carruthers persisted with his attitude of hostility toward Massey, as is
evidenced both by his “glaring” at Massey during the hearings and by the letters Massey received
after those hearings. In our view, Carruthers implicitly waived his right to counsel, because, after

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being warned by the trial court that he would lose his attorney if his misconduct continued,
Carruthers persisted in his misconduct.

In so holding, we reject Carruthers’ claim that the warnings given him by the trial court were
not sufficient to support a finding of implied waiver. The cases upon which Carruthers relies in
support of this claim are inapposite because they involve explicit, voluntary waiver cases. See
United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987); Crandell v. Bunnell, 25 F.3d 754
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1989). We decline to
hold that a trial court must provide extensive and detailed warnings when a defendant’s conduct
illustrates that he or she understands the right to counsel and is able to use it to manipulate the
system. We conclude that an implicit waiver may appropriately be found, where, as here, the record
reflects that the trial court advises the defendant the right to counsel will be lost if the misconduct
persists and generally explains the risks associated with self-representation. Cf. Kelm, 827 F.2d at
1322 (considering the record as a whole when determining the sufficiency of the trial court’s
advisements).

Even assuming the warnings given Carruthers were insufficient to support a finding of
implicit waiver, however, we conclude that Carruthers’ conduct was sufficiently egregious to support
a finding that he forfeited his right to counsel. The circumstances culminating in the trial court’s
ruling have been fully summarized. Carruthers repeatedly and unreasonably demanded that his
appointed counsel withdraw and that new counsel be appointed. Carruthers’ demands escalated as
his scheduled trial dates drew near. As the trial court recognized, the “ploy” to delay the trial became
increasingly apparent with each new set of attorneys. In addition, Carruthers’ conduct degenerated
and his outrageous allegations and threats escalated markedly with each new set of attorneys. As the
trial court emphasized, Carruthers was the author of his own predicament and sabotaged his
relationship with each successive attorney with the obvious goal of delaying and disrupting the
orderly trial of the case. Under these circumstances, the trial court was fully justified in concluding
that Carruthers had forfeited his right to counsel. Indeed, in situations such as this one, a trial court
has no other choice but to find that a defendant has forfeited the right to counsel; otherwise, an
intelligent defendant “could theoretically go through tens of court-appointed attorneys and delay his
trial for years.” Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419.

As did the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, we have carefully considered the
ramifications of holding that an indigent criminal defendant in a capital case has implicitly waived
and forfeited his valuable right to counsel.28 We are aware that both implicit waiver and forfeiture
are extreme sanctions. However, Carruthers’ conduct was extreme and egregious. The sanction is
appropriate under the circumstances and commensurate with Carruthers’ misconduct. We reiterate
that a finding of forfeiture is appropriate only where a defendant egregiously manipulates the

28
As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, this appears to be the only capital case in the country in which a
defendant has been held to have implicitly waived or forfeited the right to counsel and has been required to represent
himself at trial and senten cing. Cf. Waterh ouse v. State , 596 So.2d 1008, 1011-15 (Fla. 1992) (requiring the capital
defendan t to make a p ro se argum ent at his capital re -sentencing he aring).

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constitutional right to counsel so as to delay, disrupt, or prevent the orderly administration of justice.
Where the record demonstrates such egregious manipulation a finding of forfeiture should be made
and such a finding will be sustained, even if the defendant is charged with a capital offense. Persons
charged with capital offenses should not be afforded greater latitude to manipulate and misuse
valuable and treasured constitutional rights.

Carruthers also claims that he was denied due process because he was forced to choose
between incompetent counsel and no counsel at all, and he asserts that the trial judge should have
held a hearing to determine the validity of his complaints about his attorneys.

We disagree. There is simply no evidence indicating that any one of the many attorneys
appointed to represent Carruthers was ineffective.29 In fact, the record fully supports the trial court’s
repeated findings that the attorneys were qualified, competent, and highly skilled trial lawyers. The
record demonstrates that the trial court closely supervised the case, inquired about defense counsel’s
progress, allowed Carruthers to voice his concerns about counsel, and conscientiously reviewed and
considered letters from Carruthers containing allegations about his attorneys. Based upon this
information, the trial court repeatedly found the attorneys representing Carruthers to be competent.
Most of Carruthers’ complaints about his attorneys were outrageous personal attacks that had little
or nothing to do with legal representation. Indeed, these allegations were so outrageous that the
letters were sealed at trial and remain a sealed exhibit to the record on appeal. Although we have
reviewed the letters, it is not necessary to reveal the specific nature of the offensive and unfounded
allegations.30 Suffice it to say that, given the nature of the allegations and the trial court’s close and
careful supervision of the case, a formal hearing to determine counsel’s competency was not
necessary.

To the extent that Carruthers is alleging that his pro se representation was ineffective, we
agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusion that when a defendant forfeits or waives the
right to counsel, regardless of whether the waiver is explicit or implicit, he or she also forfeits or
waives the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673; State v. Goodwin,
909 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46, 95 S. Ct. at 2541
n.46(“[W]hatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent

29
Our holding that this record does not support Carruthers’ claim that he was forced to choose between
ineffective counsel or no counsel at all does not p reclude C arruthers from asserting ineffective assistance of co unsel in
a petition for p ost convictio n relief. We have cons idered C arruthers’ asser tion of ineffective c ounsel in this appeal as
a forfeiture argum ent, and we emphasize that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel gen erally are mo re appro priately
raised in a petition for p ost convictio n relief. See State v. Anderson, 835 S.W .2d 600 , 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)
(“Raising issues pertaining to the ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in the appellate court is a practice
fraught with peril.”); cf. State v. Wilson, __ S.W.3d __ (T enn. 2000) (holding that a constitutional challenge to the
validity of a guilty plea sho uld be raised and litigated in a petition for post-conviction relief rather than on direct appeal).
30
As previously stated, after the trial court ruled that Carruthers had forfeited his right to counsel, Carruthers
offered to testify that the allegations he made about Massey were untrue.

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himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of
effective assistance of counsel.”).31

Carruthers also argues that his right to counsel was violated when the trial court allowed
Sayle to withdraw as advisory counsel. We disagree. This Court recently held that “there is no
constitutional right to the appointment of advisory counsel where a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to counsel.” Small, 988 S.W.2d at 675. We also recognized in Small
that trial courts have discretion to appoint advisory counsel, but emphasized that trial court decisions
regarding appointment of advisory counsel will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of
abuse of discretion. Id. Carruthers has cited no authority that would require adoption of a different
rule in this case.

After finding that Carruthers had implicitly waived or forfeited his right to appointed counsel,
the trial court, consistent with preferred practice,32 appointed advisory counsel. Sayle was allowed
to withdraw because Carruthers leveled personal attacks against him. Given Carruthers’ relationship
with his five prior court-appointed attorneys, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by permitting Sayle to withdraw. Indeed, the trial court’s decision was entirely reasonable.
Cf. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419 (upholding the trial court’s refusal to appoint standby counsel
because the defendant had totally refused to cooperate with his previous court-appointed counsel).
This issue is without merit.

Finally, Carruthers argues that the trial court did not treat him fairly because he was forced
to represent himself. Carruthers recites an extensive list of over thirty episodes allegedly supporting
his allegations that his trial was unfair and his treatment unequal. As the Court of Criminal Appeals
found, most of the restrictions about which Carruthers complains resulted from his status as a pro
se litigant and a prisoner subject to strict security measures. In fact, the record reflects that the trial
court was much more lenient with Carruthers than with the other defense attorneys and went to great
lengths to accommodate Carruthers’ requests, even issuing subpoenas for witnesses during trial. The
trial court also liberally approved funds for Carruthers to secure expert and investigative assistance.
The trial court was not required to exempt Carruthers from complying with the rules of evidence and
procedure or to allow Carruthers free reign in the courtroom. The record reveals that Carruthers was
treated fairly by the trial court, and this issue is without merit.

31
W e note, however, that a defendant retains the right to complain of ineffective assistance with respect to any
stage of the proceeding wherein he or she was represented by counsel. Cf. Daughtry v . State, 482 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997) (stating that a criminal defendant will not be heard to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
with respect to any of the stages of the proceedings wherein he was counsel). Therefore, as previously stated, our holding
in this appeal does not pre clude Carruthers from alleging in a p ost conviction petition ineffective assistance of counsel
with respect to a stage of the p roceedin g wherein he was represe nted by co unsel.
32
Moore , 706 F.2d at 540.

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 Denial of Montgomery’s Motion for Severance
Montgomery claims that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his case from that of
Carruthers under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(c)(2).33 Montgomery asked for a severance, before trial,
during trial, and once again in his motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court’s failure to grant
a severance resulted in prejudicial error mandating a new trial.34 In this Court, Montgomery claims
he was unduly prejudiced by a joint trial because of the admission of certain statements made by
Carruthers that would not have been admissible at a separate trial and because of the “grossly
prejudicial fashion” in which Carruthers represented himself at trial. The State responds that the trial
court appropriately denied Montgomery’s requests for a severance and alternatively contends that
any possible error in denying the request was harmless.

Whether a severance should be granted is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it results in
clear prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Tenn. 1994); State
v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tenn.1981); Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 681, 440 S.W.2d
1, 6 (1969); State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). In Woodruff v. State,
164 Tenn. 530, 538-39, 51 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1932), this Court noted that:

The state, as well as the persons accused, is entitled to have its rights protected, and
when several persons are charged jointly with a single crime, we think the state is
entitled to have the fact of guilt determined and punishment assessed in a single trial,
unless to do so would unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants.

(Emphasis added.) Reversal is required only when the record demonstrates that “the defendant was
clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial court’s discretion ended and the granting of [a] severance
became a judicial duty.” Hunter, 222 Tenn. at 682, 440 S.W.2d at 6; see also Burton, 751 S.W.2d
at 447.

No Tennessee court has previously considered the effect of one defendant’s self-
representation on a co-defendant’s right to a severance. Several federal courts have held that, while
“pregnant with the possibility of prejudice,” a trial involving a pro se defendant and a represented

33
Subsection (c)(1) provides for severance where a co-defendant’s out-of-court statement refers to the defendant
but is not adm issible against the d efendant. Su bsection (c )(2) prov ides in relevan t part that:
[t]he court, on motion of the state or on motion of the defendant other than under subdivision (c)(1),
shall grant a severance of defendants if: (i) [b]efore trial . . . it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair
determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants; or (ii) [d]uring trial, with consent
of the defendant to be severed, it is de emed ne cessary to ach ieve a fair dete rmination o f the guilt or
innocence of one or m ore defen dants.
34
Montgomery first requested a severance on Dece mber 16 , 1994, ag ain on Feb ruary 16, 1 996, when it appeared
Carruthers might be required to proceed pro se, on April 19, 1996 during the course of trial as a result of Carruthers’ pro
se representation, and again on April 24, 1996, immediately before Carruthers called Alfredo Shaw to testify as a witness,
when it became clear in a jury-ou t hearing that Alfre do Shaw would testify co nsistently with his grand jury testimony
and implica te Carruther s in the killings.

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co-defendant is not prejudicial per se. United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 138-39 (11th Cir.
1983); see also Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 665 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Oglesby, 764
F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552, 555-56 (2nd Cir. 1977);
State v. Canedo-Astorga, 903 P.2d 500, 504 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Rather than automatically
granting a severance in such cases, these courts have suggested that certain precautionary measures
be employed to minimize the possibility of prejudice, including

appointing standby counsel, warning the pro se defendant that he will be held to the
rules of law and evidence and that he should refrain from speaking in the first person
in his comments on the evidence, and instructing the jury prior to the closing
remarks, during summation and in final instructions, that nothing the lawyer said is
evidence in this case. [T]he district judge should also make clear to the jury at the
outset that anything the pro se defendant says in his ‘lawyer role’ is not evidence and
should instruct the pro se defendant beforehand that he should both avoid reference
to co-defendants in any opening statement or summation without prior permission
of the court and refrain from commenting on matters not in evidence or solely within
his personal knowledge or belief.

Veteto, 701 F.2d at 138-39; Oglesby, 764 F.2d at 1275; Sacco, 563 F.2d at 556-57; Canedo-Astorga,
903 P.2d at 506. These courts have emphasized that such precautionary measures are “suggestions,
not requirements, for preventing the possibility of prejudice from ripening into actuality” in a trial
involving a pro se defendant and a represented co-defendant. Veteto, 701 F.2d at 138. We agree that
these precautionary measures should be employed when a pro se defendant and a represented co-
defendant are tried jointly. However, in rare cases, such as this one, even these protective measures
will not be sufficient to prevent “the possibility of prejudice from ripening into actuality.” Id.

Although the trial court required Carruthers to generally adhere to the rules of evidence and
procedure and cautioned him about making statements to the jury, these measures were not enough
to prevent his pro se representation from prejudicing Montgomery’s right to a fair trial. Indeed,
despite the trial court’s efforts, the record demonstrates that Montgomery was severely prejudiced
by Carruthers’ self-representation, specifically, his offensive mannerisms before the jury,35 his
questioning of witnesses that elicited incriminating evidence,36 and most importantly, his calling

35
The jury sent notes to the trial judge complaining about Carruthers “scratching or pulling aro und his groin
when standing facing the jury. We find this very offensive,” and later asking the trial judge why Carruthers “was
constantly askin g the same q uestion ove r and ove r.”
36
For example, during cross-examination Carruthers asked Terrell Adair if he knew who had shot him and why
he had been shot. A dair responded, “they say you did it.” Again during cross-examination, Carruthers asked Andre
Johnson, “Did you tell me that Reginald Burkes told you that somebody was trying to get you?” Johnson responded,
“Yes sir. And I told you it was you, sir.”

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Alfredo Shaw to testify as a witness. The prejudice to Montgomery was compounded when the State
used and emphasized the incriminating evidence elicited by Carruthers during its closing argument.37

We do not agree with the State’s assertion that any error is harmless because the trial court
instructed the jury “that if evidence applied to one defendant they should only apply it to the one
defendant.” As Montgomery points out, despite this general instruction, at no point did the trial
court instruct the jury that any particular evidence applied only to one defendant and not the other.
Even though Montgomery’s name was not mentioned, Alfredo Shaw’s testimony clearly indicated
that others were involved with Carruthers in committing these crimes, and given the joint trial, the
jury likely inferred that Montgomery was one of the others.38

We recognize that the prejudice resulting to Montgomery from being tried jointly with
Carruthers did not become fully apparent until the trial had concluded. Only at the conclusion of the
trial was it possible for the trial court to comprehend the full effect of Carruthers’ self- representation
upon Montgomery’s right to a fair trial. We realize that the trial court properly attempted to
accommodate the interest of judicial economy, the State’s interest in having guilt determined and
punishment assessed in a single trial, and the defendants’ right to a fair trial. However, by the time
this issue was raised in the motion for new trial, we believe that the record demonstrated that
Montgomery “was clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial court’s discretion ended and the
granting of [a] severance became a judicial duty.” Hunter, 222 Tenn. at 682, 440 S.W.2d at 6; see
also Burton, 751 S.W.2d at 447. We therefore hold that Montgomery’s right to a fair trial was
prejudiced when he was denied a severance and was jointly tried with Carruthers.39 Accordingly,
we reverse Montgomery’s convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial.40

37
For example, in its closing argument, the State reminded the jury that Carruthers had put on a seminar about
drug dealing in Shelby County, highlighted Carruthers’ cross-examination that elicited incriminating evidence, and
emphasized that Carruthers had put on proof through Alfredo Shaw to show “what happened between 11:00 [p.m.] and
5:00 [a.m .]" the day the killings o ccurred .
38
Carruthers generically referred to others when d escribing the even ts to Alfred o Shaw . For example, Shaw
testified that “Tony told me they wen t to Marcellos’ mother’s house, Delois, and told her - - asked her where the money
was.” Again, Shaw testified that “they burned up the truck, bu rned M arcellos’ truc k up, to co ver up th e fingerp rints
up that was ins ide the truc k. Tony Carruthers then stated that they drove the bodies back to Memphis. Marcellos and
Tucke r were I’m assumin g dead.”

39
Even though we have concluded that a severance should have been gran ted, we d o not ag ree with
Montgom ery’s assertions that much of the evidence admitted in the joint trial will be inadm issible in a sep arate trial.
As more fu lly explain ed in the n ext section , hearsay sta tements are admissible under the co-conspirator exception even
if the conspirators are separately tried, and where a conspiracy exists, even if Montgomery was not yet a member, he
is deeme d to hav e adopte d the prev ious acts and dec larations of his fellow c onspirato rs. See Owen s v. State , 84 Tenn.
1, 4 (1885) (“A nd everyo ne entering into a co nspiracy is a party to every act which has before bee n done by the others,
and to every a ct by the o thers afterw ard, in furth erance o f the com mon d esign.”); see also United States v. Brown, 943
F.2d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 1991); 23 C.J.S.2d Criminal Law § 982 (1 989).
40
Becaus e Mon tgomery’s co nvictions are b eing reverse d and his case remanded for a new trial, we need not
(continu ed...)

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 Admissibility of Jonathan Montgomery’s Statements
Carruthers next complains that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s witness Chris
Hines to testify about the statements of Jonathan Montgomery. According to Carruthers, Hines’
testimony about Jonathan’s statements was inadmissible hearsay. The State argues that Hines’
testimony was admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception. See Tenn. R. Evid.
803(1.2)(E).

Specifically, Carruthers complains about Hines’ testimony relating the statements Jonathan
made to him about these murders when Jonathan borrowed Hines’ car the night of the murders and
when Jonathan and Hines were at the carwash the morning after the murders. The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that Jonathan’s first statement to Hines fell within the co-conspirator exception because
at the time Jonathan asked Hines to take him to the cemetery, one could infer that the victims had
not been buried and Jonathan was needed to complete the robbery, kidnappings, and murders. The
Court of Criminal Appeals also held that Jonathan Montgomery’s statements to Hines the next
morning while Hines’ car was being washed were not in furtherance of the conspiracy but were more
akin to “casual conversation” about past events and thus inadmissible. Since the second inadmissible
statement was cumulative of the first admissible statement, the Court of Criminal Appeals found the
error harmless. We agree.

Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c).
Hearsay is not admissible in evidence except as provided by exceptions in the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence or other applicable law. See Tenn. R. Evid. 802. One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
is a statement of a co-conspirator. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E). Under this exception, hearsay
is admissible if it constitutes “a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id.

A conspiracy is defined as a combination between two or more persons to do a criminal or
unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. See State v. Alley, 968 S.W.2d 314, 316
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v.
Houston, 688 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Lequire, 634 S.W.2d 608, 612
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). To be admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception, a statement
must be made “during the course of” a conspiracy. This means that the conspiracy must have been
occurring or ongoing at the time the statement was made. See State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 385

40
(...continued)
address all his claims relating to erroneous admission and improper use of evidence because it is not likely these same
alleged errors will reo ccur. Ho wever, we em phasize that p rior inconsiste nt statements o f Nakeita Shaw, or any other
witness, ordinarily are admissible only for purposes of impeachment and, unless the statement satisfies another hearsay
exception, should no t be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. An instruction to the jury so limiting its
considera tion of any prior inconsistent statement ordinarily is appropriate. If the defense fails to object to admission
of a prior inconsistent statement or fails to request a limiting instruction, the trial court should consider whether a sua
sponte instruction is warranted to foreclose a reversal on appe al for plain erro r. See State v. Smith , 24 S.W.3d 274, 280
(Tenn. 2000).

-38-
(Tenn. 1995); Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d at 554; Neil Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence §
803(1.2)(6) (3d ed. 1995). If the conspiracy had not begun or had already concluded when the
statement was made, the statement will not be admissible under the co-conspirator exception. Id.
The exception also requires that the statement be “in furtherance of” the conspiracy. In short, the
statement must be one that will advance or aid the conspiracy in some way. See State v. Heflin, 15
S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). This has long been the law in Tennessee. See Owens,
84 Tenn. at 4; Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 99, 107-08 (1872). Commentators have explained that:

[a] statement may be in furtherance of the conspiracy in countless ways. Examples
include statements designed to get the scheme started, develop plans, arrange for
things to be done to accomplish the goal, update other conspirators on the progress,
deal with arising problems, and provide information relevant to the project. While
such statements are ordinarily made to other conspirators, Rule 803(1.2)(E) does not
so require. Statements to third parties may qualify if in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 803(1.2). 6, p. 522. Where a conspiracy exists, “everyone entering
into the conspiracy is a party to every act which has before been done by the others and to every act
by the others afterward in furtherance of the common design.” Owens, 84 Tenn. at 4.

Casual conversation between or among co-conspirators is not considered to be in furtherance
of the conspiracy. See Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 170. In addition, where a conspirator is
apprehended and “tells all to the police, it is unlikely the confession is admissible as a conspirator
statement.” Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 386. Under those circumstances, the statement “becomes only
a narrative statement of past conduct between conspirators.” Id.

Applying these principles, we agree that Hines’ testimony about the statements Jonathan
Montgomery made when asking to borrow Hines’ car was properly admitted under the co-
conspirator hearsay exception. As previously stated, Hines testified that Jonathan Montgomery
“beeped” him around 8:45 p.m. on February 24, 1994, and said, “Man, a n----r got them folks.”
When Hines asked, “What folks?” Jonathan replied, “Cello and them” and said something about
stealing $200,000. Jonathan indicated he could not talk more on the telephone and arranged to meet
Hines in person. When Jonathan arrived at Hines’ home around 9:00 p.m., Jonathan told Hines,
“man, we got them folks out at the cemetery on Elvis Presley, and we got $200,000. Man a n----r
had to kill them folks.”41 According to Hines, at this point James Montgomery “beeped in” and
talked with Jonathan, and after this conversation, Jonathan asked Hines to drive him to the cemetery.
Hines refused to drive Jonathan but allowed him to borrow his car.

The record does not support Carruthers’ assertion that the conspiracy had ended by the time
Jonathan Montgomery made these statements. In fact, Nakeita Shaw testified that she saw two of
the victims, Marcellos Anderson and Frederick Tucker, leave her home alive around 10 p.m. with

41
Hines explained that Jonathan Montgomery “was saying – like if I was telling you, Man, I had to kill them
folks.”

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James Montgomery and Carruthers. In addition, the record demonstrates that Marcellos Anderson’s
Jeep Cherokee was burned much later at 2:40 a.m. in Mississippi. Clearly, the conspiracy had not
ended when Jonathan Montgomery made these statements at around 8:45 to 9:30 p.m. In addition,
the record reflects that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Jonathan
contacted Hines and made these statements to obtain transportation to the cemetery so he could assist
his co-conspirators in completing the conspiracy. We therefore hold that the testimony of Chris
Hines about the statements Jonathan Montgomery made to him on the night of the murders, February
24, 1994, was properly admitted pursuant to the co-conspirator hearsay exception to the hearsay rule.

However, as the Court of Criminal Appeals held, the statements Jonathan Montgomery made
to Hines at the car wash on the morning after the murders were not admissible under the co-
conspirator exception. As previously stated, Hines testified that Jonathan repeatedly told him at the
car wash that “they had to kill some people.” These statements were not made while the conspiracy
was ongoing, nor were these statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. These statements are best
described as a narrative “of past conduct between conspirators” and therefore were inadmissible.
See Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 386. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the
erroneous admission of testimony about these statements is harmless error. This testimony is
consistent with and merely cumulative of Hines’ testimony about Jonathan’s statements on the night
of the murders which were properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception.

Finally, we also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that reversal is not required
because the trial court refused to allow Carruthers to question Detective Ruby about the content of
Jonathan Montgomery’s statements to the police. This testimony clearly was not admissible under
the co-conspirator hearsay exception. When a co-conspirator “tells all to the police, it is unlikely the
confession is admissible as a conspirator statement.” Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 386. Even assuming
the statement would have been admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest,42 any error in excluding the evidence was harmless. The statements Jonathan Montgomery
made to the police implicated Carruthers and would have been prejudicial to his defense. This claim
is without merit.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
Both Carruthers and Montgomery challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.
Carruthers argues that the witnesses against him were not credible and that the State relied too
heavily on the testimony of convicted felons. Montgomery complains that had he been tried
separately, the circumstantial evidence admissible against him at a separate trial would have been
insufficient.

42
Since Jonathan placed himself at the scene of the murders, these statements might have been admissible as
statements against pena l interest. See Tenn. R. Evid. 80 4(3). W e note, how ever, that the trial co urt was not ask ed to
admit these sta tements und er Rule 80 4(3) and therefore ne ver consid ered its app licability.

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 The proper inquiry for an appellate court determining the sufficiency of evidence to support
a conviction, is whether, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall, 8
S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial court, accredits
the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s
theory.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the credibility of
witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and this Court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence.
Id. Nor may this Court substitute its inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence for those drawn
by the trier of fact. See Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). The
standard for appellate review is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 111 (Tenn. 1998). A conviction may
be based entirely on circumstantial evidence where the facts are "so clearly interwoven and
connected that the finger of guilt is pointed unerringly at the Defendant and the Defendant alone."
State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67
(Tenn.1985)). A verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a
presumption of guilt, and on appeal the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict rendered by the jury. Id.; see also State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d
913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In contrast, the State on appeal is entitled to the strongest legitimate view
of the trial evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the
evidence. See Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 599; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659.

At the time this offense was committed, first degree murder was defined as an “intentional,
premeditated and deliberate killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1)(1991).43
“Intentional” is defined as the “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(18) (1991). Premeditation, on the other hand, requires
“the exercise of reflection and judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201(b)(2) (1991). Finally,
deliberation requires proof of a “cool purpose” that includes some period of reflection during which
the mind is free from passion and excitement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201(b)(1) (1991).

The elements of premeditation and deliberation are questions of fact to be resolved by the
jury. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. These elements may be established by proof of the
circumstances surrounding the killing. Id.; see also State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 539 (Tenn.
1992). As we stated in Bland, there are several factors which tend to support the existence of these
elements including: the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the particular cruelty of
the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; evidence of procurement of a weapon;
preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime; and calmness immediately after the
killing. See State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 1998); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660; Brown,
836 S.W.2d at 541-42; State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1992).

43
The statute has since been amended and no longer re quires pro of of deliber ation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-202(a)(1) (1999 Supp .) (“(a) First degree murder is: (1) [a] premeditated and intentional killing of another. . . .”).

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 Having reviewed the proof in the light most favorable to the State, as we are required to do,
we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
jury’s verdicts as to each defendant. The trial proof has been thoroughly and fully summarized.
With respect to Carruthers’ challenges to the State’s witnesses, suffice it to say that, through cross-
examination, the jury was made aware that some of the witnesses had prior felony records, that some
of the witnesses admitted to past drug dealing, and that some of the witnesses had given inconsistent
statements to the police regarding the events of February 24 and 25, 1994. However, the jury
resolved these issues of credibility in favor of the State, and an appellate court may not reconsider
the jury’s credibility assessments. Moreover, while we have already resolved the severance issue
in favor of Montgomery, we reject his claim that the circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient.
In our view, the evidence is legally sufficient. See Footnote 37, supra (discussing the applicability
of the co-conspirator hearsay exception).

Issuance of Gag Order
Carruthers next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by issuing a “gag order”
preventing him from speaking to the media.44 The trial court’s order, issued about a month before
the trial began, states:

The Constitutions of the United States and the State of Tennessee guarantee
defendants in all criminal cases due process of law and the right to a fair and
impartial jury. It is the duty of the trial court to see that every defendant is afforded
all his constitutional rights.
\
In order to safeguard those rights, this Court is of the opinion that the
following rule is necessary to constitutionally guarantee an orderly and fair trial by
an impartial jury. Therefore, this Court orders the following:

All lawyers participating in this case, including any defendants proceeding
pro se, the assistants, staff, investigators, and employees of investigators are
forbidden to take part in interviews for publicity and from making extra-judicial
statements about this case from this date until such time as a verdict is returned in
this case in open court.

Because of the gravity of this case, because of the long history of
concerns for the personal safety of attorneys, litigants and witnesses in this case,
because of the potential danger – believed by this Court to be very real and very
present – of undermining the integrity of the judicial system by “trying the case in the

44
The trial court also issued a gag order preventing the media from publishing the names of certain prosecution
witnesses, which was later modified to prevent the publication of only one prosecution witness. The Court of Criminal
Appea ls vacated this order, holding that it was a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Montgomery, 929 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). T he gag ord er prohib iting the attorneys
and Carr uthers from talk ing to the med ia, however , remained in place throu ghout trial.

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 media” and of sullying the jury pool, this Court feels compelled to adopt this
extraordinary pretrial measure.

Carruthers challenges this order as violating his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Carruthers is correct to rely upon the Sixth Amendment. We note, however, that the United States
Supreme Court has stated that a “right to fair trial” claim also implicates the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 LED.2d 674 (1984) (“The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due
Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions
of the Sixth Amendment.”). Nonetheless, numerous courts have referred simply to the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial in this context, and we will do the same. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones
& Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946, 109 S. Ct. 377, 102 L.Ed.2d 365
(1988); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1987).

Carruthers also raises First Amendment concerns, which is understandable given that gag
orders exhibit the characteristics of prior restraints. See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 424
(5th Cir. 2000). But see Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608 (noting a “substantial difference” between a
restraint on the press and a restraint on trial participants). Yet the crux of Carruthers’ argument on
appeal is that his defense was inhibited because he could not respond to the media’s coverage of the
trial; he could do nothing to alter the jurors’ preconceptions about the case gained from their
exposure to news reports. Carruthers also argues that his inability to speak to the press may have
prevented potential witnesses from coming forward to his defense. Properly stated, then, his
argument asserts that the gag order interfered with his right to a fair trial. To the extent Carruthers’
brief raises a First Amendment claim, however, we find it moot. By its own terms, the trial court’s
order ceased to exist upon the return of the verdict, which occurred several years ago. Of course,
since a gag order is by definition a restriction on speech, our review of Carruthers’ Sixth Amendment
claim demands consideration of First Amendment principles. As is clear from the case law,
discussed below, the proper standard governing the validity of gag orders explicitly incorporates
these principles, as do we in our analysis.

The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Carruthers’ arguments and upheld the gag order in
its entirety. As noted in its opinion, the following circumstances were considered by the trial court
as reasons for issuing the gag order: numerous threats to attorneys; the death of one of the co-
defendants; the highly-charged emotional climate of the trial (e.g., the courtroom was guarded by
S.W.A.T. team members); the gunning down of a deputy jailer in his driveway, which the trial judge
thought was related to the case; the fleeing of one witness after reading about the case in the
newspaper; and the statements of two witnesses who had already testified that defendant
Montgomery threatened to kill them if they talked about the case. Also, as the Court of Criminal
Appeals noted, Alfredo Shaw testified that Carruthers threatened him and made arrangements to
have a reporter interview him about recanting his story. Thus, the court held that the trial judge was
properly concerned about the media’s influence on the potential jury pool and the safety of all

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involved in the trial. The court also held that the public was certainly aware of the trial from the
media’s coverage and that Carruthers’ statements to the press would not likely have led to unknown
witnesses coming forward.

We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment that under these circumstances a gag
order was proper. We hold however that under the constitutional standards discussed below, the
scope of that order was too broad. Nevertheless, given the circumstances of this case, the error is
harmless.

Numerous courts have recognized that the correct standard by which to evaluate the
constitutionality of gag orders depends upon who is being restrained: the press or trial participants.
See, e.g., Brown, 842 F.2d at 425; Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. If the gag order is directed to the
press, the constitutional standard is very stringent. See Montgomery, 929 S.W.2d at 414 (discussing
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)). Carruthers’
appeal before this Court, however, concerns the trial court’s gag order directed to him, a defendant,
representing himself at trial.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently determined, the
federal circuit courts are split as to the correct constitutional standard governing gag orders on trial
participants. See Brown, 218 F.3d at 425-28. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that gag orders
on trial participants must meet the exacting “clear and present danger” test for free speech cases
enunciated in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). See Ford, 830
F.2d at 598 (“We see no legitimate reasons for a lower standard for individuals [as compared to the
press].”). Accord Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S. Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1976) (applying a “serious and imminent
threat” test); Levine v. United States District Court, 764 F.2d 590, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1158, 106 S. Ct. 2276, 90 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986) (same). In contrast, the Second,
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits analyze the validity of gag orders on trial participants under the less
stringent standard of whether the participant’s comments present a “reasonable likelihood” of
prejudicing a fair trial. See Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 610; In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S. Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984); United States v. Tijerina, 412
F.2d 661, 666-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990, 90 S. Ct. 478, 24 L.Ed.2d 452 (1969). See
also News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1512-15 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing the case
law authority for the less stringent standard). Without deciding whether to adopt the “reasonable
likelihood” standard, the Fifth Circuit determined that the “clear and present danger” test was not
required, and analyzed the case before it under a “substantial likelihood” test. See Brown, 218 F.3d
at 427-28.

Although this Court has upheld restraints on trial participants, see State v. Hartman, 703
S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1985) (order restraining counsel from talking with the public or media about the
facts of the case), we have never discussed the underlying constitutional issues. We therefore decide
this issue based on our own interpretation of United States Supreme Court precedent and the

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Tennessee Constitution with guidance from the federal circuit courts.45 We note that the Court of
Criminal Appeals’ opinion emphasizes that “[t]he twist in this case, however, is that Carruthers was
representing himself during trial.” Although this fact is relevant in applying the constitutional
standard to determine whether Carruthers’ right to a fair trial was breached, our review of the case
law indicates that the constitutional standard is the same regardless of which trial participant is
restrained.

The Brown court’s decision to follow a “substantial likelihood” test rather than the “clear and
present danger” test rests on its interpretation of Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111
S. Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991). The Brown court determined that Gentile rejected the clear
and present danger test for trial participants and that Gentile is the Supreme Court’s latest discussion
of the issue. See Brown, 218 F.3d at 426-28 (noting that the cases endorsing the more stringent test
predated Gentile). We agree with the Brown court’s holding.

Gentile involved an attorney who held a press conference the day after his client was indicted
on criminal charges. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1063-65, 111 S. Ct. at 2738-40 (discussing the facts).
The attorney proclaimed his client’s innocence, strongly suggested that a police detective was in fact
the perpetrator, and stated that the alleged victims were not credible. Although the trial court
“succeeded in empaneling a jury that had not been affected by the media coverage and [the client]
was acquitted on all charges, the [Nevada] state bar disciplined [the attorney] for his statements.”
Id. at 1064, 111 S. Ct. at 2739. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the state bar’s disciplinary
action, finding that the attorney “knew or reasonably should have known that his comments had a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudication of his client’s case.” Id. at 1065,
111 S. Ct. at 2739. Although the Supreme Court reversed this judgment because it found the Nevada
Supreme Court’s construction of the disciplinary rule “void for vagueness,” id. at 1048-51, 111 S.
Ct. at 2731-32, a majority of the Court held that the “substantial likelihood of prejudice” test struck
the proper constitutional balance between an attorney’s First Amendment rights and the state’s
interest in fair trials. Id. at 1065-76, 111 S. Ct. at 2740-45.46

In so doing, the Court held that the stringent standard governing restraints on the press
articulated in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)
should not apply to restraints on lawyers whose clients are parties to the proceeding. Id. at 1074, 111

45
Though they are p ersuasive authority when in terpreting the United States Con stitution, this Court is not
bound by decisions of the federal district and circuit courts. We are bound only by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. See Strouth v . State, 999 S.W.2d 759, 769 n.9 (Tenn. 1999); State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 450
(Tenn. 1984).
46
In Zimmerm ann v. Bo ard of Pro fessional Respon sibility, 764 S.W .2d 757 (Tenn. 1 989) we upheld
Disciplinary Rule 7-10 7(B) an d (E), which govern ex trajudicial statem ents made by attorneys in criminal cases, under
the Tennessee and United States C onstitutions. The Zimmerman holding was, in part, based on a decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court analyzing the balance between First Amendment rights and the need to ensur e the fair
administration of justice. Zimmermann, 764 S.W .2d at 761 (discussing In Re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d 505
(1982)). Both Zimmerman and In Re Rachmiel, however, were decided before Gentile . In light of Gentile , we have
reconside red the con stitutional issues at stak e under b oth the Te nnessee and United Sta tes Constitution s.

-45-
S. Ct. at 2744. See also News-Journal Corp., 939 F.2d at 1512-13 (noting that the Supreme Court
has suggested restricting trial participants as an alternative to a prior restraint on the media). The
Court quoted with approval from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d
600 (1966) in which the defendant’s conviction was overturned because of prejudicial publicity that
prevented him from receiving a fair trial:

The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under
the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.
Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness
of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and
worthy of disciplinary measures. 384 U.S. at 363, 86 S. Ct. at 1522.

Id. at 1072, 111 S. Ct. at 2743.

As the Brown court held, however, see Brown, 218 F.3d at 426, the Court in Gentile did not
conclude that the “substantial likelihood of prejudice” test was required; it held only that this test
complies with the First Amendment. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075, 111 S. Ct. at 2745 (“We agree
with the majority of the States that [this standard] constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair
trials.”). Moreover, Gentile involved a restraint on an attorney’s speech; in this case, Carruthers was
a party as well as his own attorney. It is necessary, therefore, to decide whether the Gentile rationale
applies to parties.

Although unnecessary to its holding, we find significant evidence in the Gentile opinion that
the clear and present danger test is not required for gag orders restraining parties or other trial
participants. The Court emphasized the distinction between “participants in the litigation and
strangers to it” as recognized by an earlier case, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104
S. Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). Id. at 1072-73, 111 S. Ct. at 2743-44. As characterized by the
Gentile Court, the Court in Seattle Times “unanimously held that a newspaper, which was itself a
defendant in a libel action, could be restrained from publishing material about the plaintiffs and their
supporters to which it had gained access through court-ordered discovery.” Id. at 1073, 111 S. Ct.
at 2744. The Gentile Court then quoted from Seattle Times as follows: “[a]lthough litigants do not
‘surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,’ those rights may be subordinated
to other interests that arise in this setting” (citation omitted); and further, “on several occasions [we
have] approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a
fair trial for a criminal defendant.” Id. The Court also stated that “[f]ew, if any interests under the
Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by ‘impartial’ jurors, and an outcome
affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right.” Id. at 1075, 111 S. Ct.
at 2745 (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350-51, 86 S. Ct. at 1515-16).

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 We conclude that the concerns raised in Gentile and Sheppard are applicable regardless of
whether a party or his or her attorney is being restrained. A prejudicial statement made to the press
by an attorney is not somehow less prejudicial if made by a party. In short, what matters is what is
being said and not who is saying it. See Brown, 218 F.3d at 428 (“As the district court pointed out,
trial participants, like attorneys, are ‘privy to a wealth of information that, if disclosed to the public,
could readily jeopardize the fair trial rights of all parties.’”). If anything, as one court has reasoned,
extrajudicial comments made by trial participants have the potential to be more harmful than
comments made by attorneys:

Gentile involved a state supreme court rule governing the conduct of members of the
bar of that state, while we examine a state trial court’s restrictive order entered in a
particular case and directed to all trial participants. Because of their legal training,
attorneys are knowledgeable regarding which extrajudicial communications are likely
to be prejudicial. The other trial participants encompassed by the restrictive order in
this case did not have such legal discernment and expertise. Given the public
attention generated by this case, defendants, witnesses and law enforcement
personnel were eager to talk with the press concerning their particular views. While
attorneys can be governed by state supreme court or bar rules, other trial participants
do not have these guidelines. News-Journal Corp., 939 F.2d at 1515 n.18.

Thus, we conclude that for purposes of the constitutional right to a fair trial, Gentile’s rationale
applies to all trial participants, meaning that the more stringent clear and present danger test is not
required.

Having decided that the clear and present danger test is not constitutionally mandated, we
must now decide which test to adopt: the “substantial likelihood of prejudice” test or, as some courts
have employed, the “reasonable likelihood” test. As noted, Gentile held only that the substantial
likelihood test was constitutional, not that it was required. See Brown, 218 F.3d at 426-28; News-
Journal Corp., 939 F.2d at 1515 n.18. Nonetheless, we conclude under both the state and federal
constitutions that the substantial likelihood test strikes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the free speech rights of trial participants, the Sixth Amendment right of defendants to a fair
trial, and the State’s interest in a fair trial. Cf. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070, 111 S. Ct. at 2742.
Accordingly, we hold that a trial court may constitutionally restrict extrajudicial comments by trial
participants, including lawyers, parties, and witnesses, when the trial court determines that those
comments pose a substantial likelihood of prejudicing a fair trial.

Under this constitutional standard, we hold that the trial court was justified in imposing a gag
order on Carruthers. At trial, this case garnered a significant amount of media coverage, raising the
concerns expressed in Sheppard. As Carruthers himself notes in his brief:
This trial was charged with emotion from start to finish. There were allegations of
gang affiliations and testimony of large scale narcotics dealings. The courtroom was
guarded by S.W.A.T. team members and by Sheriff’s deputies who were authorized

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 to search those entering the courtroom. Representatives of news organizations were
present daily to record the proceedings.

In addition to its concerns about media coverage, the trial court was presented with the problem of
witness intimidation. The trial judge found that witnesses who had already testified stated that
defendant Montgomery threatened to kill them if they talked. Moreover, Alfredo Shaw testified that
Carruthers had threatened him and made arrangements to have a reporter interview him about
recanting his story. Under these unusual circumstances, the trial court was justified in employing
heightened measures to ensure that a proper jury could be found and to prevent Carruthers from
manipulating the media so as to intimidate witnesses. The trial judge could not ignore these issues.
Indeed, he had a constitutional duty under the state and federal constitutions to ensure a fair trial.

Before a gag order can be entered, however, the case law suggests that a trial court should
consider reasonable alternative measures that would ensure a fair trial without restricting speech.
In the context of restraints on the press, the United States Supreme Court has specifically held that
a trial court should consider such measures. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-64, 96 S. Ct. at
2804-05. These measures include: a change of trial venue; postponement of the trial to allow public
attention to subside; searching questions of prospective jurors; and “emphatic” instructions to the
jurors to decide the case on the evidence. Id. (discussing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357-62, 86 S. Ct.
at 1519-22).

Although it is not clear whether the need to consider alternatives is also necessary in the
context of restraints on trial participants, some federal circuit courts have assumed so, see, e.g.,
Brown, 218 F.3d at 430-31; Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 611-12, and the trial judge considered several
of the alternatives. The trial court found that neither a change of venue nor a continuance was
practical because the case was several years old and one attempt to try the case had already been
made. The court appropriately gave careful attention to voir dire and jury instructions, but
determined that these alternatives alone were insufficient.

Given the extraordinary nature of this case, we hold that the trial court was entitled to make
this judgment. We also note that in addition to and apart from the concerns about pretrial publicity
interfering with the task of finding an unbiased jury, the trial court was concerned about witness
intimidation and Carruthers’ potential manipulation of the press. None of the alternatives mentioned
in Nebraska Press and Sheppard would likely have alleviated these concerns. The trial court
reasonably concluded that only a gag order would be effective. Finally, we note that the alternatives
mentioned above are not free of cost to the judicial system. As the Gentile Court wrote:

Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or
some other device, these measures entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir
dire may not be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and with
increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change of venue may not
suffice to undo the effects of statements such as those made by the petitioner.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.

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 Having decided that the trial court did not err in issuing the gag order, the final issue to
consider is the scope of the order. As discussed above, Carruthers’ argument on appeal is properly
construed as a “right to fair trial” claim rather than a First Amendment claim. Nevertheless, a gag
order by definition restricts speech. In determining whether a gag order is appropriate, therefore, a
court must be mindful that “[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); see also
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (the
limitation on speech “must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved”) (quoted in Brown, 218 F.3d at 429).

On its face, the trial court’s order has no exceptions or limitations: it prohibits the defendants
and their attorneys from making any comments to the press about the case. This gag order is
considerably broader than any upheld in the cases discussed above. Gentile, though not a gag order
case, involved a limitation on attorney speech which prohibited only statements “substantially likely
to prejudice” the adjudication of the case. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1064, 111 S. Ct. at 2739. Brown
involved an order which “left available to the parties various avenues of expression, including
assertions of innocence, general statements about the nature of an allegation or defense, and
statements of matters of public record.” Brown, 218 F.3d at 429-30. The order in Dow Jones was
similar. See Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 606.

Given the history of this trial, we certainly understand why the trial court crafted such a broad
order. Indeed, in certain cases, as where a defendant takes advantage of a limited gag order or fails
to comply with it, an order of such breadth may be justified. Nonetheless, we hold that initial gag
orders on trial participants should ordinarily contain the exceptions found in the Brown order and
allow trial participants to make general statements asserting innocence, commenting on the nature
of an allegation or defense, and discussing matters of public record.

We find the trial court’s failure to include these exceptions in the gag order was harmless
error. We fail to see how limited statements made by Carruthers to the media about his innocence,
allegations or defenses, or matters in the public record would have altered the result of the trial. We
do not think that allowing Carruthers to make such statements would have furthered the goal of
finding an impartial jury, nor do we think it probable that any new witnesses would have come
forward. We also point out that these crimes occurred in 1994, and the gag order was issued only
one month before trial in 1996. In the two years preceding issuance of the gag order, Carruthers had
access to the media. The record shows both that he availed himself of that access and that the media
responded by actively covering the trial and events leading up to the trial. Under these
circumstances, the error below was harmless.

Sentencing: Non-Capital Offenses
Citing state and federal constitutional provisions and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
43, Carruthers next contends that his right to be present at a crucial stage of his criminal proceeding
was violated when the trial judge conducted the sentencing hearing on his convictions for especially

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aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping in his absence. The State responds that
Carruthers waived his right to be present because he was voluntarily absent from the sentencing
hearing. We agree.

The record reflects that immediately after the sentencing verdict was rendered on the capital
offenses, the trial judge announced that the sentencing hearing for the non-capital offenses would
be held on May 20, 1996. Carruthers was present when this announcement was made. The trial
judge was prepared to proceed with the sentencing hearing on that date. Because of a
misunderstanding about which law enforcement agency was responsible for transporting the
defendants from the prison facility outside of Nashville to Memphis, neither Carruthers nor
Montgomery were present in court. The hearing was rescheduled for May 28, 1996, but the trial
judge announced that day that because of security concerns the hearing would be held the next day,
May 29, 1996, at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville where Carruthers and
Montgomery were incarcerated.47 The defendants were not present in court when this announcement
was made, and the record does not indicate that the defendants were personally notified of the change
in date and location of the sentencing hearing. Counsel for Montgomery and the attorneys appointed
to represent Carruthers on the new trial motion and on appeal previously had been advised at a
meeting in chambers of the trial court’s decision to hold the hearing at Riverbend.

When the trial judge convened the hearing at Riverbend the next day, Carruthers and
Montgomery refused to attend or participate although they were present in a holding room
approximately twenty to thirty feet from the hearing room. Warden Ricky Bell informed the trial
court that defendant Carruthers was refusing to participate. Counsel informed the trial judge that
despite a lengthy conference in which he had been advised to appear Montgomery also was refusing
to appear, purportedly because of the presence of media personnel. The trial judge recessed the
hearing to allow counsel to confer with Montgomery and to allow Warden Bell to confer with
Carruthers and to inform him that the restraints would be removed if he decided to participate in the
sentencing hearing.

When the hearing resumed, Warden Bell announced that Carruthers understood his restraints
would be removed, but he was still refusing to attend or participate in the hearing. Carruthers had
provided no explanation for his refusal. Counsel for Montgomery reported that he also was still
refusing to attend or participate and that he was objecting to the hearing because it was not being

47
As the Court o f Criminal Appea ls recognized, the trial judge had the discretion to conduct the sentencing
hearing at Riverbe nd if security was a concern pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-105 (1999 Supp.), which provides
as follows:
[i]f for any cause, in the opinion of the court de emed sufficie nt, it is impracticable or inconvenient for
any court to hold its session at the co urthouse, or place desig nated by law , it shall be lawful for the
court to hold its sessio n, or any par t of its session, at any other ro om within the lim its of the county
seat, or at any other room open to the public within an institution of the department of correction or
the depar tment of childr en’s services if the court deems it necessary, and all its proceedings at such
place, wheth er in civil or crim inal cases, are a s valid as if don e at the courth ouse.
(Emph asis added .)

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held in a public place.48 Warden Bell was sworn and testified about his conversation with
Carruthers, including Carruthers’ refusal to attend despite assurances that his restraints would be
removed. Following Warden Bell’s testimony, the trial judge observed that he had two options:

to drag them out here against their will, kicking and screaming, and strap them
down to a chair and force them to sit here. Or allow them to remain in the holding
room and go forward with the proceedings in their absence. And I think that the
wiser course, the more prudent course, the course that the law would suggest be
taken is the latter. We are going to proceed in their absence, since they have both
voluntarily elected to absent themselves from these proceedings. If an individual
were allowed to delay or disrupt proceedings simply by stating that he did not
want to be present, then the entire judicial system would grind to a halt very
quickly.

Noting that “a full and complete” sentencing hearing had already been held in conjunction with the
murder convictions and that any additional witnesses would likely be “cumulative witnesses to what
has already been testified to at the first sentencing hearing,” the trial judge decided to proceed with
the sentencing hearing.

The State called one witness, an employee of the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk’s
Office, who testified that Carruthers had pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in 1990 and
had been sentenced to ten years and five years on those convictions. The State also relied upon the
evidence adduced at both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial and the pre-sentence report prepared
as to each defendant.

Following the State’s proof, the trial court once again took a recess to allow counsel to confer
with Montgomery to determine if he had decided to participate in the hearing and to enable Warden
Bell to speak with Carruthers and advise him that he could testify if he so desired.

Counsel returned and informed the trial judge that Montgomery was still refusing to
participate or testify in the hearing. They also advised the trial court that they did not intend to
present any proof and that no proof would have been presented had the hearing been held in
Memphis. Warden Bell returned after what was his third conversation with Carruthers and again
advised the trial judge that he still was refusing to attend or participate in the hearing. Following
argument, the trial judge imposed a forty-year sentence on each of the four convictions for each
defendant and ordered that two of the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping run concurrent
to the other sentences and to the death penalty, with all other sentences running consecutive to each
other and to the death penalty.

Initially we acknowledge that the right of a criminal defendant to be present at all critical
stages of a criminal proceeding derives from several sources, including both the federal and state

48
The record reflects that the public was not excluded from the hearing room at Riverbend.

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constitutions. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d
486 (1985) (“The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, . . . but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due
Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or
evidence against him.”); State v. Muse, 967 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tenn. 1998) (“Article I, § 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution provides that ‘the accused hath the right to be heard by himself and his
counsel.’ The ‘right to be heard by himself’ requires the presence of the defendant during the entire
trial.”).

In addition to constitutional protection, the right of a criminal defendant to be present at
critical stages of a criminal proceeding also is protected by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
43(a), which provides:

Unless excused by the court upon defendant’s motion, the defendant shall be present
at arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the
return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided
by this rule.

(Emphasis added.)

Like many other constitutional and statutory rights, however, the right to be present may be
waived by a criminal defendant. See Muse, 967 S.W.2d at 764. Voluntary absence after the trial
has commenced or disruptive in-court behavior may constitute waiver of the right to be present. Id.
at 767. With respect to waiver by voluntary absence, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 43(b) provides in relevant
part:
(b)The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict and
imposition of sentence shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered
to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present:

(1)voluntarily is absent after the trial has commenced (whether or not
he or she has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain
during the trial) . . . .

(2) . . .If a trial proceeds in the voluntary absence of the defendant .
. . he or she must be represented in court by competent counsel . . . .

Construing subsection (b) only seven years after Rule 43 was adopted, the Court of Criminal Appeals
explained that

[a]n accused who has notice of the time and place of the trial and of his right to
attend, and who nonetheless voluntarily absents himself, will be deemed to have
waived his right to be present.

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 [T]he court should indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver. Counsel
should be given a reasonable opportunity to locate his client, and there should be
affirmative evidence that the accused was informed of his trial date. We think it is
wise to take special precautions when a defendant fails to appear on the date set for
trial and to require a high standard of proof that the defendant knew his trial date and
that his absence is voluntary. Trial in his absence is not favored, and proceeding with
trial only to find later that defendant did not know his trial date or did not voluntarily
absent himself would run counter to the purposes expressed in [Tenn. R. Crim. P.]
2. Mere absence at the time the case is called for trial is insufficient to show a waiver
of the right to be present.

State v. Kirk, 699 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); see also Muse, 967 S.W.2d at 767
(quoting and approving of this analysis from Kirk). Applying this analysis, the Court of Criminal
Appeals in Kirk concluded that the defendant had waived his right to be present when he escaped
from custody after he had appeared in court and had been advised of the date on which his trial
would begin. See Kirk, 699 S.W.2d at 819.

Two years ago in Muse this Court applied the Kirk analysis in a case in which the defendant
did not appear for jury selection proceedings because he was not aware that the trial judge had
rescheduled the proceedings at the request of defense counsel. Concluding that Muse had been
deprived of his right to be present at jury selection and that the deprivation constituted prejudice to
the judicial process, this Court reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. See Muse, 967
S.W.2d at 768.

For purposes of this appeal, we have accepted Carruthers’ contention that he had both a
constitutional right to be present and a right to be present under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 43(a), and we have
concluded that Carruthers waived those rights. Carruthers was aware a sentencing hearing would
be held, and he was present when the hearing initially was scheduled. While the hearing did not
occur on the date originally scheduled, the hearing was held on May 29, a delay of only nine days.
The record does not reflect exactly when Carruthers became aware that the hearing would be held
at Riverbend on May 29, but there is no doubt that he was aware a hearing was about to be held
when he was in the holding area near the public hearing room.

This is not a case where waiver was presumed from Carruthers’ mere absence at the time the
sentencing hearing convened. The trial judge made every effort to persuade Carruthers to attend the
hearing. On three separate occasions, the trial judge instructed Warden Bell to confer with
Carruthers and attempt to persuade him to appear. On each of those occasions, the record reflects
that Warden Bell assured Carruthers his restraints would be removed and emphasized his right to
make a statement at the hearing. 49 Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in concluding
that Carruthers waived his right to be present at sentencing.

49
Contrary to Carruthe rs’ assertions on appeal, W arden B ell gave sworn testimony about his co nversations w ith
Carruthers .

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 Finally, pointing to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(2), which provides that “[i]f a trial proceeds in
the voluntary absence of the defendant, . . . he or she must be represented in court by competent
counsel,” the defendant argues that even if he waived his right to be present, he is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing because the trial judge did not appoint competent counsel to represent him.

Without question, the scenario that arose in this case is uncommon. In most instances, a
voluntarily absent criminal defendant will already be represented by counsel and therefore will
continue to be represented by counsel in proceedings that occur in his or her absence. Here, because
the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel, there was no attorney present to represent him in the
sentencing hearing.

In our view, the decision of whether or not to appoint counsel to represent a voluntarily
absent defendant who previously has forfeited his right to counsel should be determined by the trial
court on a case-by-case basis. The trial court is most familiar with the case and is in the best position
to determine if an attorney should be appointed. Appellate courts should defer to the trial court’s
decision on this issue unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. Cf. Small, 988
S.W.2d at 674.

The trial judge concluded that appointment of counsel was unnecessary. The proof presented
by the State was, as the trial judge found, largely cumulative to the proof already presented at the
sentencing hearing on the murder convictions. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
Carruthers had intended to offer any additional proof at the sentencing hearing. Even on appeal,
Carruthers’ attorneys have not pointed to proof that would have been presented had Carruthers been
present or represented by counsel at the hearing. They simply assert that “the trial judge presumed
that Carruthers would have offered the same proof” as that offered at the capital sentencing hearing
and state, “[w]hether or not this is true, we will never know.” Given the circumstances of this case,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to represent
Carruthers when he was voluntarily absent from the sentencing hearing.

Proportionality Review50
Finally, we consider whether Carruthers’ sentence of death is comparatively disproportionate
considering the nature of the crime and the defendant.51 We begin, as always, with the proposition

50
Because of the reversal and remand, we forego statutory review of the proportionality of the death sentences
imposed against M ontgome ry. See State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662, 675 (Tenn. 1 999); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d
797, 817 (Tenn. 1994 ).
51
Initially we note that Carruthers has not cha llenged the proportion ality of his death sentences or the sufficiency
of the evidenc e suppor ting the aggrav ating circumsta nces. As a result, Carruthers has not briefed these issues. The Court
of Criminal A ppeals co rrectly pointed out that:
the State and the defendant in each case m ust fully brief the issue by specifically identifying those
similar cases relevant to the comparative propor tionality inquiry. W hen addr essing prop ortionality
review, the briefs of the parties shall contain a section setting forth the nature and circumstances of
the crimes that are claimed to be similar to that of which the defendant has been convicted, including
(continu ed...)

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that the sentence of death is proportional to the crime of first-degree murder. State v. Hall, 958
S.W.2d 679, 699 (Tenn. 1997). Comparative proportionality review of capital cases is designed to
insure “rationality and consistency in the imposition of the death penalty.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at
665. A death sentence will be considered disproportionate if the case, taken as a whole, is “plainly
lacking in circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has
previously been imposed.” Id. However, a sentence of death is not disproportionate merely because
the circumstances of the offense are similar to those of another offense for which the defendant has
received a life sentence. State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6, 17 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Blanton, 975
S.W.2d 269, 281 (Tenn. 1998); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665. Our role in conducting proportionality
review is not to assure that a sentence “less than death was never imposed in a case with similar
characteristics.” Blanton, 975 S.W.2d at 281; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665. “‘Since the proportionality
requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the [death] penalty, the
isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed
on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of
arbitrariness or caprice.’” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 203,
96 S. Ct. 2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). Instead, our duty in conducting proportionality
review “is to assure that no aberrant death sentence is affirmed.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665.

In performing this duty, we do not utilize a mathematical formula or scientific grid. The test
is not rigid. Id. To conduct proportionality review, we select from the pool of cases in which a
capital sentencing hearing was actually conducted to determine whether the sentence should be life
imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at
666. “‘[B]ecause the aim of proportionality review is to ascertain what other capital sentencing
authorities have done with similar capital murder offenses, the only cases that could be deemed
similar . . . are those in which imposition of the death penalty was properly before the sentencing
authority for determination.’” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 (quoting Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 15-
16 (Md. 1983)).52 In choosing and comparing similar cases, we consider many variables, some of

51
(...continued)
the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury and the evidence of mitigating
circumstances. In addition, the parties shall include in the section a discussion of the character and
record of the defendants involved in the crimes, to the extent ascertainable from the R ule 12 reports,
appellate c ourt decisio ns, or recor ds of the trials and sentencing he arings in those c ases.
958 S.W.2d at 667 (footnote omitted). The Tenness ee CD-R om death penalty datab ase, mention ed in Bland, 958 S.W.2d
at 667 n.18, may b e now obtained from the Administrative Office of the Courts.

52
The pool from which similar cases are drawn has increased substantially since the capital pun ishmen t statute
was enacted in 1977. The first decision to comprehensively discuss comparative proportionality review was State v.
Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1988). How ever, this Court had con scientiously perform ed com parative p roportio nality
in the fifty-seven capital cases preceding Barber. Not only had we considere d those fifty-seven ca pital cases, we also
had reviewed innumerable cases in which a sentence of life imprisonment had been imp osed for first degree murder.
Three years ago in Bland, this Court once again thoroughly explained both the role of comparative proportionality
review and the method by which this review is performed in Tennessee. With the decision in Bland, this Court had
reviewed one hundred and ten capital cases, again, in addition to the innumerable cases involving a sentence of life
imprisonment or life imprisonm ent without the po ssibility of parole. The po ol of capital cases had alm ost double d in
(continu ed...)

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which include (1) the means of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4)
the place of death; (5) the similarity of the victim’s circumstances, including age, physical and
mental conditions, and the victims’ treatment during the killing; (6) the absence or presence of
premeditation; (7) the absence or presence of provocation; (8) the absence or presence of
justification; and (9) the injury to and effects on nondecedent victims. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 667.
When reviewing the characteristics of the defendant, we consider: (1) any prior record or prior
criminal activity; (2) age, race, and gender; (3) mental, emotional or physical condition; (4)
involvement or role in the murder; (5) cooperation with authorities; (6) remorse; (7) knowledge of
the helplessness of the victim; and (8) capacity for rehabilitation. Id.

Considering the circumstances of these murders in light of the relevant comparative factors,
we note that the three victims were kidnapped, bound, shot, and buried alive, in a pit beneath another
person’s grave. The killings apparently were motivated by Carruthers’ desire to rob Marcellos
Anderson, a successful and wealthy drug dealer. These murders were committed in a particularly
cruel manner, and the proof indicates that the victims were maliciously mistreated before they were
buried alive. The medical testimony indicated that the victims were bound and abused for sometime
before being shot and buried alive. The murders clearly were premeditated, and there was no
provocation or justification for the killings.

Carruthers, who was twenty-six-years old when these crimes were committed, had an
extensive prior criminal record. There is no evidence that Carruthers was mentally or emotionally
impaired at the time these crimes occurred, and the record reflects that Carruthers was instrumental
in planning these killings and suggesting a location to bury the bodies. Carruthers did not cooperate
with the authorities at all, nor has he shown any remorse for the killings. In addition, given his
extensive criminal record, it is unlikely that Carruthers has a capacity for rehabilitation. Considering
the nature of these crimes and the character of Carruthers, we conclude that these murders place
Carruthers into the class of defendants for whom the death penalty is an appropriate punishment.
Based upon our review, we conclude that the following cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed have many similarities with this case. See State v. Farris Morris, __ S.W.3d__ (Tenn.
2000) (brutal killing of innocent family members occurred during a robbery to obtain drugs and the
jury found similar aggravating circumstances); State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1998) (killing
of woman in her home by a young male defendant who told others the killing was a “hit”and the jury
found similar aggravating circumstances ) State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1998) (killing of
other young males during a robbery by a young male defendant); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561
(Tenn. 1993) (brutal killing of three victims involving similar aggravating circumstances); State v.
Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1990) (brutal drug-related killing in which the victim was stabbed to
death after being bound, gagged, and blindfolded with duct tape; similar aggravating circumstances);
State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1985) (killing in a drug deal involving similar aggravating

52
(...continued)
the nine years from Barber to Bland. Since Bland, this Court has reviewed approximately twenty m ore capital cases.
If the size of the comp arison po ol was ev er a conc ern, it is a conc ern no lo nger. Th e pool fro m wh ich similar c ases is
drawn clearly is large enoug h to enab le an effectiv e comp arative rev iew,

-56-
circumstances). Other similar death penalty cases are State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.
1994)(murder of victim to obtain life insurance proceeds as part of a conspiracy among a group of
men); State v. Edward Leroy Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. 1992)(double murder of hotel clerk and
security guard during robbery involving multiple defendants and similar aggravating circumstances);
State v. Groseclose and Rickman, 615 S.W2d 142 (Tenn. 1981)(murder resulted from an elaborate
plan to kill the wife of one of the defendants in a particularly cruel way and involved two similar
aggravating circumstances).53

Review of the above cases, and many others, reveals that the death sentences imposed by the
jury for Carruthers’ first degree murder convictions are proportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases.

In accordance with the mandate of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c) and the principles
adopted in prior decisions, we have considered the entire record and conclude that the sentences of
death imposed for Carruthers’ three convictions of first degree murder were not imposed arbitrarily,
that the evidence supports the jury’s findings of the statutory aggravating circumstances, that the
evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate.

Conclusion
With respect to Carruthers, we conclude that none of the alleged errors require reversal.
Accordingly, we affirm Carruthers’ convictions and sentences and direct that the sentences of death
be carried out as provided by law on the 11th day of April, 2001, unless otherwise ordered by this
Court or proper authority.

With respect to Montgomery, we conclude that a severance should have been granted when
he raised the issue in his motion for new trial and that the failure to grant a severance in this case
resulted in prejudicial error requiring a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse Montgomery’s
convictions and remand for a new trial.

53
Although lesser sentence s have bee n imposed in some similar first degree mu rder cases, m any of these
sentences resulted from plea agree ments and th erefore are not relevant fo r purpose s of comp arative pro portionality
review. See, e.g. State v. Te rrance B . Burnett , Lauderd ale County N o. 6484 (in an attack on a rival gang member,
defendant and co-defendants killed a woman and child, and as the result of a plea, received a sentence of life without
parole); State v. Michael Brian Cardenas, Chester Co unty No. 99 -001 (de fendant and co-defend ant persuad ed victim
to bring them narcotics, then kidnapped victim, shot victim in the face, and dumped the victim’s car and body in the river,
but received life sentence as a result of a plea agreement). In other similar cases, the jury imposed a sentence less than
death. See, e.g. State v. Eric Chambers, Shelby County No. 97-03036-38(defendant and three co-defendants kidnapped
and murdered three victims after stealing drugs from them; state sought death penalty, but the jury imposed a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole.); State v. Dewayne Jordan co-defend ant of Eric C hambers , supra. (the State
sought the death pe nalty, but the jury im posed a sentence of life without the po ssibility of parole ); State v. Kevin Wilkins,
Shelby County No. 97-13179 ( defendant was the leader in a gang kidnapping, torture, and execution of victim. State
sought death penalty, but the jury imposed a sentence of life w ithout the pos sibility of parole.). However, a sentence of
death is not disproportionate merely because the circumstances of the offense are similar to those of another offense for
which the de fendant has re ceived a less er sentence fro m a jury.

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 With respect to issues not addressed in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals authored by Judge Thomas T. Woodall and joined by Presiding Judge Gary R.
Wade and Judge Joseph M. Tipton. Relevant portions of that opinion are attached hereto as an
appendix.

Costs of this appeal are taxed to the State.

_________________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, JUSTICE

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