IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
May 2000 Session Heard at Nashville
JEAN CAROLYN DOTSON v. AMANDA B. BLAKE, ET AL.
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals, Western Section
Circuit Court for Weakley County
No. 2661 William B. Acree, Jr., Judge
No. W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV - Filed October 4, 2000
JANICE M. HOLDER , J., concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence.
In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted a modified system of
comparative fault in which parties contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries were to be held liable only
to the extent of their relative percentages of fault. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79
(Tenn. 1996), highlighted the problems inherent in the application of McIntyre to workers who
sustained employment-related injuries and who filed tort actions against persons other than their
employers. These workers found themselves in a unique situation. They were subject to both the
tort system’s doctrine of comparative fault adopted by this Court and the workers’ compensation
system’s doctrine of no-fault recovery created by the legislature.
A strict application of both of these doctrines would effect a double reduction of the
plaintiff’s tort damages that would not occur in any other area of the law. The first reduction,
resulting from an application of McIntyre, would decrease the plaintiff’s damages by the amount of
fault attributable to (and therefore uncollectible against) the employer. The second reduction would
occur when the employer exercised its statutory right of subrogation to collect the workers’
compensation benefits paid to the employee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c)(1).1
1
What was at the time of Ridings a potential second reduction was eventually confirmed as a certainty by our
decision in Castleman v. Ross Eng’g, Inc., 958 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1997), in which we held that an employee need not
be made whole before an employer could exercise its statutory right of subrogation.
Our solution of the issue in Ridings was to preclude juries from considering the employer’s
fault. That holding ensures that workers will not suffer a double reduction of their awards.
Precluding any mention of the employer by the manufacturer, however, could leave the manufacturer
without the ability to explain events that occurred after the product left its control. In some cases,
it would leave a manufacturer without any defense. In Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955
S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1997), we attempted to cure that inequity by allowing a jury to consider the fault
of the employer. We permitted the defendant to attempt to refute the plaintiff’s contention that the
defendant’s product was the cause-in-fact of his injury.2 The Snyder solution creates its own
problems, however. We permit juries to hear evidence about an employer’s fault but preclude those
same juries from apportioning fault between the employer and the manufacturer. Instead, we permit
the defendant to point to the employer as the “cause-in-fact” of the injury and to argue that the
manufacturer should be absolved from all liability. This is an imperfect solution to a thorny
problem.
Unfortunately, the rationale used in Ridings is so broad as to exclude from consideration of
fault any person who could not be joined as a party. See Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 81-82 (“The
rationale of McIntyre postulates that fault may be attributed only to those persons against whom the
plaintiff has a cause of action . . . . Consequently, only a non-party against whom the plaintiff has
a cause of action can be made a party.”). The solutions required by Ridings and Snyder, however,
are not required outside the non-workers’ compensation context. I therefore agree that the extension
of the rules announced in those cases to other “immune” non-parties was totally unwarranted. In no
other type of case are we faced with the clash of two distinct systems of recovery. In no other type
of case does the plaintiff face the potential of a double reduction caused by both uncollectibility and
subrogation. Extending Ridings and Snyder to cases involving other “immune” non-parties would
be to apply an imperfect solution to a problem that simply does not exist.
The dissent characterizes the result in this case as a departure from our recently decided
precedent and claims that we have thereby violated the doctrine of stare decisis. See also Carroll v.
Whitney, __ S.W.3d __ (Tenn. 2000) (Anderson, C.J., dissenting on same grounds). I cannot agree.
As stated above, the rules in Ridings and Snyder remedied specific problems arising from a clash
between comparative fault and workers’ compensation law. Those problems do not exist in this
case.
We have long held that stare decisis “only applies with reference to decisions directly upon
the point in controversy” and “only arises in respect of decisions directly upon the points in issue.”
State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 154 S.W. 1151, 1155 (Tenn. 1913) (quoting Pollack
2
W e permit a m anufactu rer to exp lain that the em ployer’s a ctions sho uld abso lve the m anufactu rer of all fault.
The defense is therefore “all or nothing” since the manufacturer is not permitted to plead tha t the emp loyer’s fau lt should
be apportioned. Interestingly, that defense apparently is unavailable in tort cases involving third parties who are not
“imm une.” We he ld in George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996), that a defendant who wishes to introduce
evidence that a person other than the defen dant cau sed the pla intiff’s injury must affirmatively plead comp arative fau lt
as a defense. See id. at 521. Simply defending on groun ds that the defendant was not a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s inju ries does n ot entitle the d efendan t to shift blam e to a non -party. See id.
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v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)). Ridings and Snyder decided issues that arose
in a specific context not applicable to this case. The doctrine of stare decisis is therefore not
implicated, and Ridings and Snyder may properly be limited to their respective facts. See Carroll
v. Whitney, __ S.W.3d __ (Tenn. 2000) (so limiting Ridings and Snyder).
Indeed, the equally important doctrine of judicial restraint should compel us from deciding
issues not before us. See, e.g., Staten v. State, 232 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tenn. 1950) (noting that
Tennessee Supreme Court does not “render advisory opinions on questions which are premature and
contingent and may never arise in the future”). It would not have been appropriate in either
Ridings or Snyder for us to forecast our rulings in all cases involving comparative fault and
“immune” non-parties. Accordingly, today’s decision in no way departs from the rules announced
in those cases. For these reasons, I join the majority’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals.
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JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
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