IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
(HEARD IN KNOXVILLE)
WILLIAM J. SNYDER, ) FOR PUBLICATION
) Filed: September 2, 1997
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Certified Question of Law from the
) United States
) District Court for the Eastern
v. ) District of Tennessee, Northeastern
) Division
LTG LUFTTECHNISCHE GmbH; )
LTG TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; and )
HSM PRESSEN-GmbH, ) No. 01-S-01-9607-FD-00143
)
Defendants/Petitioners, )
) Hon. Dennis H. Inman, Magistrate
THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE )
COMPANY,
Intervenor.
)
)
)
FILED
September 2, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
For Plaintiff-Respondent: For Defendants/Petitioners:
Earl R. Booze John A. McReynolds, Jr.
Herrin, Booze & Rambo
Baker, McReynolds, Byrne,
Johnson City, Tennessee O’Kane, Shea & Townsend
Knoxville, Tennessee
Bill Hampton Thomas F. Mink, II
Hampton & Street Mink & Blair
Elizabethton, Tennessee Nashville, Tennessee
For the Intervenor:
J. Paul Coleman
Herndon, Coleman, Brading &
McKee
Johnson City, Tennessee
DROWOTA, J.
QUESTIONS CERTIFIED
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee,1 this Court has accepted two questions certified to us by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The questions are as
follows:
1. Whether products liability defendants in a suit for personal
injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may
introduce evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change,
improper maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendants’ product proximately
caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.
2. If “no,” of what effect is Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-
28-108?
1
"The Supreme Court may, at its discretion, ans wer questio ns of law certified to it by the Supreme Court
of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a District Court of the United States in Tennessee,
or a United States Bankruptcy Court in Tennessee. This rule may be invoked when the certifying court
determines that, in a proceeding before it, there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of
the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying cou rt there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” Sup. Ct. R. 23, Sec. 1.
2
As explained below, the answer to the first certified question is that
products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based on allegations
of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce relevant evidence at trial
that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper maintenance, or
abnormal use of the defendants’ product was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s
injuries. The jury may consider all evidence relevant to the actions of the
employer with respect to the defendants’ product in assessing whether the
plaintiff has met his burden of establishing the elements necessary to recover
against the defendants. However, in making that determination, the jury may
not assess fault against the employer. Our answer to the first question makes it
unnecessary to reach the second one.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this products liability action, the plaintiff, William Snyder, was
employed by Sara Lee Knit Products as a technician at its plant in Mountain
City. Sara Lee used presses in its plant to compress cotton into bales. These
presses, called “cotton balers,” collected cotton in the top portion of the
machine, which then vertically compressed the cotton into the lower half of the
machine. A ram would then move horizontally forward to press the cotton into
a bale.
3
On February 1, 1992, the plaintiff was working on a cotton baler
in his employer’s plant that had stopped in mid-cycle. Without first
disconnecting power to the baler, the plaintiff stuck his arm into the machine to
remove loose cotton covering a protective switch. The plaintiff’s arm was
inserted into the machine through an opening where a metal panel or barrier
would have normally been bolted. While the plaintiff’s arm was inside the
machine, the machine engaged, causing injury to the plaintiff’s arm. According
to the plaintiff, he had not removed the metal panel and did not know who had.
However, he admits to removing and replacing it on previous occasions.
On December 3, 1992, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit
against LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, a German corporation, and LTG
Technologies, Inc., a South Carolina corporation. Plaintiff alleged that these
defendants were the manufacturers and sellers of the baler that injured him. In
turn, these defendants named HSM Pressen GmbH, a German corporation, as a
party, claiming that it was the manufacturer of the baler at issue. The Travelers
Insurance Company intervened to assert its subrogation claim for the amount
paid to the plaintiff as the workers’ compensation carrier for the plaintiff’s
employer, Sara Lee. 2
2
The extent, if any, to which an employer’s subrogation interest in recovering workers’ compensation
benefits paid to an injured employee who brings a tort claim against a third party is affected by Tennessee’s
adoption of comparative fault will be dealt with in our forthcoming opinion in Castleman v. Ross Engineering
Inc., S.W.2d (Tenn. 1997).
4
The plaintiff’s suit seeks recovery for personal injury based upon
strict liability in tort, negligence and breach of warranty. Plaintiff claims that
the defendants negligently designed and manufactured the baler, negligently
failed to warn of the machine’s dangers, and are liable for breach of warranties.
In response, the defendants insist that the cotton baler in question
was state of the art and that it was neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous
when it left their control.3 They also claim that the machine was not defectively
designed. Rather, the defendants assert that the plaintiff’s employer altered or
failed to maintain the machine by removing the bolted metal panel through
which the plaintiff stuck his arm, thereby constituting a subsequent intervening
act of negligence that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, according to the
defendants, it was the plaintiff’s employer’s conduct that rendered the baler
defective or unreasonably dangerous. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-108 (“If a
product is not unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves the control of the
manufacturer or seller but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent
unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or abnormal use, the
manufacturer or seller is not liable.”). The defendants further maintain that
3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105 provides that a “manufacturer or seller of a p roduct sha ll not be liable
for any injury to person or property caused by the product unless the product is determined to be in a defective
condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller. In making this
determination, the state of scientific and technological knowledge available to the manufacturer or seller at the
time the product was placed on the market . . . is applicable.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a), (b).
5
removing the protective panel from the machine and attempting maintenance
and repairs without first disconnecting the power violated safety provisions of
the machine’s operating and maintenance instructions.
An order certifying to this Court the two questions set forth above
was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee at Greenville. The district judge opined that this Court’s decision in
Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996) could be
construed to preclude the defendants from presenting proof that the cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries was the acts or omissions of his employer. We entered an
order accepting certification of the questions posed and set this cause for oral
argument.
ANALYSIS
In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted
a system of modified comparative fault. In describing this system, we stated that
“so long as a plaintiff’s negligence remains less than the defendant’s negligence,
the plaintiff may recover; in such a case, the plaintiff’s damages are to be
reduced in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the
plaintiff.” McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57. At the time we decided McIntyre, we
recognized that the decision would have far reaching implications and that
6
working through the many affected principles would take time. McIntyre, 833
S.W.2d at 57 (“We recognize that today’s decision affects numerous legal
principles surrounding tort litigation. For the most part, harmonizing these
principles with comparative fault must await another day.”).
Four years after McIntyre was decided, the case of Ridings v. Ralph
M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), a case similar to the present one,
provided us with our first opportunity to decide whether under Tennessee’s
modified comparative fault system a defendant in a products liability case could
assert that the plaintiff’s immune employer caused or contributed to the
plaintiff’s injuries.4 In Ridings, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a
ladder during the course and scope of his employment. Id. at 80. He filed a
third-party tort action against the manufacturer and distributor of the ladder,
alleging negligence and strict liability. Id. As in the present case, the
defendants in Ridings sought to present proof that the plaintiff’s employer
caused or contributed to his injuries.5 Thus, the issue in Ridings was “whether
the defendants . . . [could] assert as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff’s
4
Employers are immune from tort liability due to the exclusive remedy provision o f the workers’
compensation law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a).
5
In McIntyre, we stated that “defendants called upon to answer allegations [of] negligence be permitted
to allege, as an affirm ative defense, th at a non-party caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought. In case s where such a defense is ra ised, the trial cou rt shall instruct the jury to assign this non-
party the percentage of the total negligence for which he is responsible.” McIntyre, 833 S.W .2d at 58.
7
employer caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries and damages,
notwithstanding that the injuries alleged were sustained in the course and scope
of the plaintiff’s employment which was covered by the workers’ compensation
law of Tennessee.” Id. In other words, could the employer, who was immune
from tort liability by virtue of the workers’ compensation law, be included in the
apportionment of fault in the employee’s third-party tort action.
The defendants in Ridings argued that fault could be apportioned
to the plaintiff’s employer and that their liability could be decreased
accordingly, without the imposition of legal liability upon the employer. Id. at
81. The defendants also claimed that excluding the plaintiff’s employer from
those persons to whom fault could be attributed violated the principle stated in
McIntyre that a party be held liable only for the percentage of the plaintiff’s
damages caused by that party. See McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57. In response, the
plaintiff in Ridings argued that “allowing the jury to attribute fault to the
plaintiff’s employer, against whom the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for
damages, violates the McIntyre principle that the ‘plaintiff’s damages are to be
reduced in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the
plaintiff.’” Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 80 (quoting McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57).
Thus, both parties in Ridings presented arguments based upon notions of
8
fairness consistent with their interpretation of Tennessee’s system of
comparative fault.
This Court rejected the defendants’ position in Ridings, stating that
it was “not consistent with the Tennessee doctrine of comparative fault.”
Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 81. We did so after carefully considering the policy
underlying the workers’ compensation system (i.e., liability imposed upon the
employer without regard to the employer’s negligence in exchange for a limit
on damages and tort immunity) and after examining how other jurisdictions have
dealt with the same issue. See Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 81-82. We determined
that the fairness concerns underlying McIntyre compelled the result that fault be
apportioned only to those persons against whom the plaintiff had a cause of
action in tort. Specifically, we held that “[s]ince the plaintiff’s employer cannot
be made a party to the plaintiff’s tort action for personal injuries sustained in the
course and scope of his employment, the rationale of McIntyre . . . will not
permit fault to be attributed to the plaintiff’s employer.” Id. at 82. Thus, we
concluded that “the plaintiff’s right to recover on allegations of negligence and
strict liability [must be] determined without reference to the employer’s
conduct.” Id. at 84.
9
In the present case, the defendants maintain that Ridings was
wrongly decided and should be reversed. They claim that Ridings is not
consistent with McIntyre’s objective of fairness because they will have to bear
whatever percentage of fault the jury would have accessed against the plaintiff’s
employer. We carefully considered and rejected this same argument in Ridings,
stating that
[t]he rationale of McIntyre postulates that fault may
be attributed only to the persons against whom the
plaintiff has a cause of action in tort. . . . Since the
plaintiff’s employer cannot be made a party to the
plaintiff’s tort action for personal injuries sustained in
the course and scope of his employment, the rationale
of McIntyre, both as to principle and procedure, will
not permit fault to be attributed to the plaintiff’s
employer.
***
Limiting the parties to whom fault may be
attributed to those subject to liability, accomplishes
the policy objective of fairness and efficiency.
Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 81-83. See also, Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915
S.W.2d 420, 428 (Tenn. 1996) (“[T]he doctrine of comparative fault
contemplates that the apportionment of fault is limited to those against which
the plaintiff has a cause of action.”).
1 0
There is no question that the Court in Ridings considered the
“fairness” arguments advanced here by the defendants and made a policy
decision to leave immune employers out of the assessment of fault. We thus
decline the defendants’ invitation to reverse Ridings or otherwise depart from
the rule adopted in that decision.
However, before leaving Ridings, we are inclined to add that our
decision in that case can best be understood when considered in the analytical
context in which the case came to the Court. The defendants in Ridings, like the
defendants here, wanted the jury to assess fault against the employer by arguing
that the employer’s actions were the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries. Of course, the employer cannot be found to be the proximate, or legal,
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries because the employer is immune from tort
liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a). By enacting Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-108(a), the legislature has already determined that for policy reasons the
employer may not be the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
This is not to say, however, that the employer cannot be found by
the trier of fact to have been the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries.6 If the
6
The distinction between cause in fac t and prox imate, or lega l, cause is not me rely an exercise in
semantics. The term s are not interc hangeab le. Although both cause in fact and proximate, or legal, cause are
elements of negligence that the plaintiff must p rove, they are very different co ncepts. Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 83;
Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 , 598 (Tenn. 1993). Cause in fact refers to the cause and effect relationship
between the defendan t’s tortious cond uct and the p laintiff’s injury or loss. T hus, cause in fac t deals with the “but
for” consequences of an act. The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred
1 1
rule were otherwise, the defendants would effectively be precluded from
presenting a defense. A defense that the product was not defective or
unreasonably dangerous when it left the defendants’ control would not be
credible unless the defendants were permitted to introduce evidence as to what
actually happened to the product leading up to the incident that injured the
plaintiff. Excising the employer from that discussion would be tantamount to
drawing a line which would make discussion of the case to be tried difficult, if
not impossible.7 The end result would be that the jury would not hear evidence
of the true facts surrounding the product that caused the plaintiff’s injuries but,
nonetheless, be asked to determine fault and hence liability for damages.
Prohibiting the introduction of such evidence could result in a defendant, who
was not the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries, being required to pay for the
harm anyway.
CONCLUSION
but for that cond uct. Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 598. In c ontrast, proximate cause, or legal ca use, concerns a
determination of whether leg al liability should b e imposed where caus e in fact has bee n established . Id.
Proxima te or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or the courts to deny liability for otherwise
actionable conduct based o n considerations of logic, com mon sense, policy, preced ent and “our more o r less
inadequa tely expressed ideas of wha t justice dema nds or of wh at is administrative ly possible and convenien t.”
Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W .2d 618 , 625 (T enn. 199 7); George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 , 521 (Tenn. 1996);
Kilpatrick, 868 S.W .2d at 598 ; Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W .2d 738 , 749 (T enn. 198 7).
7
For example, in the present ca se, the defend ants would be restricted from presenting evidence that the
plaintiff’s employer altered, changed, or improperly maintained the cotton bailer that injured the plaintiff by
removing the metal pan el that covere d the area into which the plain tiff stuck his arm.
1 2
In light of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the first certified
question is that products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based
on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce relevant
evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper
maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendant’s product was the cause in fact
of the plaintiff’s injuries. Put another way, the jury may consider all evidence
relevant to the event leading up to the incident that injured the plaintiff. The
defendants may not, however, ask the jury to assign fault to the employer. That
is, the defendants may not take the legal position that the employer’s actions
were the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury should be instructed that
it may consider the actions of the employer only in assessing whether the
plaintiff has met his burden of establishing the elements necessary to recover
against the defendants. Also, the jury should be instructed that it may not, in
making that determination, assess fault against the employer. Finally, the trial
judge should give an instruction that lets the jury know that the employer’s legal
responsibility will be determined at a later time or has already been determined
in another forum.
The clerk will transmit this opinion in accordance with Rule 23,
Section 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The costs in this Court will be
taxed to the defendants.
1 3
__________________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III,
JUSTICE
Concur:
Anderson, C.J.,
Reid, Birch, Holder, J.J.
1 4