State v. Daniel

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICATION 31, 2000
January
(
Plaintiff-Appellee, ( Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Filed: January 31, 2000
( Appellate Court Clerk
(
v. ( Knox Criminal
(
( Hon. Richard Baumgartner,
BRIAN DANIEL, ( Judge
(
Defendant-Appellant. ( No. E1997-00142-SC-R11-CD

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
Paul G. Summers Mark E. Stephens
Attorney General & Reporter District Public Defender

Michael E. Moore Paula R. Voss
Solicitor General Assistant Public Defender

Todd R. Kelley Jamie Niland
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Public Defender
Nashville, Tennessee (Trial Only)
Randall E. Nichols
District Attorney General
Sixth Judicial District

Scott Green
Assistant District Attorney General
Knoxville, Tennessee

OPINION

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AND
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CONVICTION VACATED;
CHARGE DISMISSED. DROWOTA, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a “seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution occurred when a police officer
approached the defendant, Brian Daniel, in the parking lot of a convenience store,

asked Daniel to produce some identification, and retained Daniel’s identification to

run a computer check for outstanding warrants.

The trial court found that no seizure took place prior to the time the officer

placed Daniel under arrest on an outstanding warrant which was revealed by the
computer check of Daniel’s identification. Accordingly, the trial court denied

Daniel’s motion to suppress the marijuana which was discovered while the officer

was searching Daniel’s person incident to the arrest. Thereafter, Daniel pled
guilty to possession of marijuana, but reserved the right to seek appellate review

pursuant to Tennessee Rule Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). 1 The Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the defendant was seized

when the police officer retained his identification to run a computer check for

outstanding warrants. Because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the

seizure,2 the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s
denial of the motion to suppress is reversed; the defendant’s conviction is

vacated, and the charge is dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The only witness to testify at the
suppression hearing was Deputy Jim Wright of the Knox County Sheriff’s

1
Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tennessee Rule Criminal Procedure, provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal
proceeding where the law provides for such appeal, and from any
judg me nt of c onvic tion: (2 ) Upo n a ple a of g uilty or n olo
contendere if: (i) Defendant entered into a plea agreement under
Rule 11(e) but explicitly reserved with the consent of the state and
of the cour t the rig ht to a ppe al a ce rtified ques tion o f law th at is
dispositive of the ca se. . . .
2
The State concedes, and we accept for purposes of this decision, that the officer lacked the
reasonable suspicion required to justify a seizure, and that, if a seizure took place, the drugs found
in Daniel’s pocket must be su ppressed as tainted “fruit of a poisonous tree.” See W ong Su n v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (19 63).

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Department. Deputy Wright stated that while on patrol at approximately 9:00 p.m.

on August 16, 1995, he observed an automobile parked in an unlighted area

beside Bengie’s Market in Knox County. Four men were standing around the
outside of the vehicle. The sun was setting and it was “dusky dark” outside.

Deputy Wright drove up to the men in his patrol car “to see what the
individuals were doing” because he thought it was peculiar for four young men to

be standing around an automobile in the dark. Deputy Wright asked the men

what was going on and requested that they provide some identification. The men
complied. Deputy Wright examined the identification and retained the

identification to run a computer check for outstanding warrants. While waiting for

the computer check, two of the young men asked for and received permission
from Deputy Wright to go inside the market to use the restroom and buy a soft

drink.

After the computer check revealed an outstanding warrant for Daniel’s

arrest, Deputy Wright handcuffed Daniel and placed him under arrest. Before

conducting a search of Daniel incident to the arrest, Deputy Wright asked if Daniel

had anything sharp in his pockets. Daniel replied that he had a bag of marijuana

in his pocket.

Daniel was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, and he

moved to suppress the marijuana. In support of his motion, Daniel argued that the
evidence had been discovered as a result of an unlawful seizure and was thereby

tainted. Daniel asserted that the initial police questioning constituted an illegal

seizure because he was not violating any law when the officer initiated the
questioning, and the officer had no reasonable suspicion to believe that he had

violated the law or was about to violate the law.

The trial court denied Daniel’s motion, finding that no seizure took place.

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Daniel pled guilty to the charged offense,3 but was permitted, with the consent of
the District Attorney General, to preserve the suppression issue as a certified

question of law for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule Criminal Procedure
37(b)(2)(i). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the

motion to suppress. Thereafter, this Court granted Daniel’s application for

permission to appeal. For the reasons that follow, the judgments of the lower
courts are reversed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard by which an appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of

fact on suppression issues is as follows:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value
of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are
matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party
prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view
of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports
the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other
words, a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be
upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the

facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court
reviews de novo. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); Beare v.

Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). In this case,

the trial court heard the testimony of only one witness. The facts are not disputed.
As a result, the trial court’s conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion

of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case.

Therefore, in determining whether the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, we apply de novo review.

Id.; see also State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 303 (Drowota, J. , dissenting).

ANALYSIS

3
Daniel was given a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the conviction with the
entire sentence suspended upon payment of a $250 fine.

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 The Fourth Amendment4 to the United States Constitution provides that the
people shall “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Similarly, Article 1, section 7 of the
Constitution of Tennessee guarantees “that the people shall be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and

seizures. . . .” However, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, section 7
limit all contact between police and citizens. Instead these constitutional

provisions are designed “to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference with the

privacy and personal security of individuals.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216,

104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) (quoting United States v.

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S. Ct.3074, 3081, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116

(1976)); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629; State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106
(Tenn. 1997) (“[A]rticle I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the

Fourth Amendment.”). Thus, these constitutional protections are implicated only

when a police officer’s interaction with a citizen impermissibly intrudes upon the

privacy or personal security of the citizen. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave,

Search & Seizure, § 9.3 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999) (hereafter LaFave § __ at

__.)

In construing the demands of the Fourth Amendment, courts have
recognized three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) a full scale arrest

which must be supported by probable cause, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,

95 S. Ct.2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); (2) a brief investigatory detention which
must be supported by reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 S.

Ct.1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); and (3) brief police-citizen encounters which

require no objective justification, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111
S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). See, e.g., Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at

300; United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the three

types of police-citizen interactions). While arrests and investigatory detentions

4
The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the F ourteen th Am endm ent. Mapp
v. Oh io, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 10 81 (1961).

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implicate varying degrees of constitutional protection, “not all personal intercourse

between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the

officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct.1868, at 1879 n.16; Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at

300; State v. Moore, 776 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn. 1989). 5

Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that even when police have no basis

for suspecting that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime, the
officer may approach an individual in a public place and ask questions without

implicating constitutional protections. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct.2386;

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct.1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1983) (plurality opinion); Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300; State v. Pulley, 863

S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993); Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 938; State v. Butler, 795

S.W.2d 680, 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The rule has been further explained

as follows:

law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering
in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such
questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a
police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
requiring some level of objective justification. The person
approached, however, need not answer any question put to him;
indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go
on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen
or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.

5
The concurring opinion ass erts that under Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2639, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 357 (1979) and Hugh es v. State , 588 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979) a seizure occurs whenever
an officer approaches a citizen and requests identification. In Brown, the officer failed to rec ognize
that a citizen has a right to refuse to produce identification, and the seizure occurred when the
officer arr ested the citizen beca use the citizen refus ed to pro duce ide ntification. See Brown, 443
U.S. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at 2640 (“W hen the officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him
to identify him self, they per form ed a se izure of his p erson s ubject to th e require men ts of the F ourth
Amendment.”) (Emphasis added.) In Hughes, the officers located the defendant as he drove up an
interstate a pproac h ram p. Obvio usly, the defe ndant w as stop ped in so me m anner a nd directe d to
drive back to the Country Store by the officers even though the opinion states that “Hugh es drove
voluntarily to the Country Store and parked in front.” Hughes, 588 S.W.2d at 300. Therefore, the
seizure occurred at any one of the following times (1) when the officers in some manner stopped
Hugh es as h e drove up the inter state app roach ra mp; (2 ) when th e officers directed H ughes to
drive bac k to the s tore; or (3) w hen the o fficers dire cted Hu ghes to roll down h is window . The fac ts
in both Brown and Hughes are clearly distinguishable from the initial approach in this case which
involved only a request for identification.

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Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S. Ct. at 1324; see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434,

111 S. Ct. at 2386; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17, 104 S. Ct. at 1762-63; Brown v.

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-53, 99 S. Ct. 2639, 2640-42, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979);

Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 938.

Accordingly, a “seizure” implicating constitutional concerns occurs only if,

in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person

would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 437, 111 S. Ct. at 2387; Michigan v. Chesternut, 1486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S.

Ct.1975, 1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215, 104 S. Ct. at

1762; Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S. Ct. at 1326-27; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 937; State v. Wilhoit, 962 S.W.2d

482, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v.Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 243 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1995); State v. Darnell, 905 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995);

LaFave § 5.1(a). “In order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes

a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter

to determine whether police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable

person that the person was not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise

terminate the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440, 111 S. Ct. at 2389; see also

Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 1977.

Application of this objective standard ensures that the scope of these
constitutional protections does not vary depending upon the subjective state of

mind of the particular citizen being approached. Id. Under this analysis police-

citizen encounters do not become “seizures” simply because citizens may feel an
inherent social pressure to cooperate with police. People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68,

72 (Colo. 1998). “While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that

people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly

eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104
S. Ct. at 1762. Some of the factors which are relevant and should be considered

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by courts when applying this totality of the circumstances test include the time,

place and purpose of the encounter; the words used by the officer; the officer’s

tone of voice and general demeanor; the officer’s statements to others who were
present during the encounter; the threatening presence of several officers; the

display of a weapon by an officer; and the physical touching of the person of the

citizen. See generally Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575, 108 S. Ct. at 1980;

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d

1348 (Colo. 1982); LaFave § 5.1(a).

This test is “necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the

coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on

particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a
restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will

vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting

in which the conduct occurs.” Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 1979;

Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 937. However, under the analysis delineated above, courts

have consistently held that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and no

seizure occurs when police approach an individual, in a public place, or in a

parked car,6 ask questions, and request to search, so long as police do not convey

6
Altho ugh police need not h ave r eas ona ble su spic ion of illegal a ctivity to appr oac h a ve hicle
stoppe d in a pub lic place an d ask th e occu pant que stions, see Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 30, when
police stop a moving vehicle, a seizure implicating the protection of both the state and federal
constitution s has o ccurre d. See Yeargan, 958 S.W .2d at 630 ; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 , 99 S . Ct. 1 391 , 139 6, 59 L. Ed . 2d 6 60 (1 979 ). As p revio usly re cog nized , to be cons titution ally
perm issible, the s eizure m ust be s upporte d by reaso nable su spicion. Id.

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a message that compliance with their requests is required.7 On the other hand,
courts have typically held that an encounter becomes a “seizure” if an officer: (1)

pursues an individual who has attempted to terminate the contact by departing; (2)
continues to interrogate a person who has clearly expressed a desire not to

cooperate; (3) renews interrogation of a person who has earlier responded fully to

police inquiries; (4) verbally orders a citizen to stop and answer questions; (5)
retains a citizen’s identification or other property; (6) physically restrains a citizen

or blocks the citizen’s path; (7) displays a weapon during the encounter. See

generally LaFave § 9.3(a), at 104 (collecting cases).

Applying these governing principles to the facts in this case, we must

determine whether the interaction between Officer Wright and Daniel constituted a
seizure prior to the time Officer Wright arrested Daniel pursuant to the outstanding

warrant. The State concedes that if a seizure occurred prior to the arrest, the

evidence must be suppressed because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to

justify the seizure.

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Officer Wright’s

conduct in merely approaching the defendant, inquiring what was going on, and

asking to see Daniel’s identification did not constitute a seizure as that term is

7
See Bostick, 502 U.S. at 435, 111 S. Ct.at 2386; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S. Ct.at 1762;
Royer, 460 U.S . at 501, 10 3 S. Ct.at 1 326; Men den hall, 446 U.S . at 556, 10 0 S. Ct.at 1 878; Pulley,
863 S.W .2d at 30; Moore , 776 S.W .2d at 938 ; W ilhoit, 962 S.W .2d at 486 ; Butler, 795 S.W.2d at
685; see also Ham mon s v. State , 940 S.W .2d 424, 4 28 (Ark . 1997); Thom pson v. S tate, 724 So. 2d
62, 64 (A la. Crim . App. 199 8); People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73 (C olo. 1998 ); Cham bers v. S tate,
700 So .2d 68 (F la. Dist. Ct. Ap p. 1997) ; Quinn v. State , 485 S.E .2d 483, 4 85 (Ga . 1997); People v.
Evans, 689 N.E .2d 142, 1 48 (Ill. App. C t. 1997); State v. Baacke, 932 P.2d 396, 407 (Kan. 19 97);
People v. Taylor, 564 N.W .2d 24, 28 (Mich. 19 97); State v. Ha rris, 590 N.W .2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999);
State v. West , 459 S.E .2d 55, 57 (N.C. C t. App. 199 5); State v. Konewko, 529 N.W.2d 861, 863
(N.D. 19 95); State v. Pierce, 709 N.E .2d 203, 2 06 (Oh io Ct. App . 1998); State v. Kirkpatrick, 462
S.E.2d 8 84, 888 ( S.C. Ct. A pp. 1995 ); Sm ith v. State , 944 S.W .2d 453, 458 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997 );
Richard s v. Com mon wealth , 383 S.E .2d 268, 2 70 (Va. C t. App. 198 9); State v. Arm enta , 948 P.2d
1280, 12 85 (W ash. 19 97). See gen erally LaFave § 9.3(a), at 102-03.

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defined in the constitutional context.7 Although the evidence in the record is
minimal, it appears that the initial encounter was not accompanied by physical

force or a show of authority. There was no evidence that Officer Wright either
drew a weapon, ordered Daniel to stop and answer questions, or demanded that

Daniel produce identification. Moreover, there was no evidence that Wright

physically restrained Daniel, instructed him not to walk away, or blocked his path.
The encounter did not become a seizure simply because Daniel may have felt

inherent social pressure to cooperate with Officer Wright. Delgado, 466 U.S. at

216, 104 S. Ct. at 1762; Paynter, 955 P.2d at 72.

However, what begins as a consensual police-citizen encounter may

mature into a seizure of the person. While many of the circumstances in this case
point in the direction of a consensual police-citizen encounter, one circumstance

reflects a distinct departure from the typical consensual encounter — Officer

Wright’s retention of Daniel’s identification to run a computer warrants check.

Without his identification, Daniel was effectively immobilized. Abandoning one’s

identification is simply not a practical or realistic option for a reasonable person in

modern society. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-02, 103 S. Ct. at 1326; United States v.

Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Contrary to the State’s assertion,

when an officer retains a person’s identification for the purpose of running a
computer check for outstanding warrants, no reasonable person would believe

that he or she could simply terminate the encounter by asking the officer to return

the identification. Accordingly, we hold that a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, section 7 occurred when Officer Wright retained

Daniel’s identification to run a computer warrants check. See Butler, 795 S.W.2d

7
Despite the concurring opinion’s assertions, we stress that we are not holding that an officer
may properly approach any citizen at any time, regardless of the circumstances, and ask or
demand that the citizen show identification. Indeed, such a rule could easily be abused if either
adopte d as a m atter of co urse or u sed arb itrarily, selectively, or for the purpos e of hara ssm ent.
Thus, a request or dem and for identification must be evaluated along with the other relevant factors
set out above in determining whether there was a show of authority such that a reasonable person
would ha ve believe d that com pliance w as requ ired or that h e or she could de cline and walk aw ay.

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at 685 (“When the officer conveyed an intent to detain Riggins until everything

‘checked out,’ the defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment”); Cf. Royer, (holding that when officers took Royer to a small room,
while retaining his ticket and identification, this show of authority was sufficient to

transform the initial consensual encounter into a Fourth Amendment seizure);

United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that

defendant was seized when officer obtained and failed to return defendant’s

driver’s license and registration); United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068

(10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when law enforcement officials retain an individual’s
driver’s license in the course of questioning him, that individual, as a general rule

will not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter”); United States v. Glover,

957 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that the officer’s failure to return
identification papers together with failure to tell defendant he was free to leave

constituted seizure); Jordan, 958 F.2d at 1088 (holding that “what began as a

consensual encounter . . . graduated into a seizure when the officer asked [the

defendant’s] consent to a search of his bag after he had taken and still retained

[the defendant’s] driver’s license”); United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216

(6th Cir. 1990) (holding that seizure occurred when officer retained defendant’s

keys, driver’s license, and automobile registration); United States v. Low, 887 F.2d

232, 235 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that retention of airline ticket longer than
necessary for a brief scrutiny constituted a seizure); United States v. Battista, 876

F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that “once the identification is handed over

to police and they have had a reasonable opportunity to review it, if the
identification is not returned to the detainee we find it difficult to imagine that any

reasonable person would feel free to leave without it”); United States v. Cordell,

723 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that encounter became a detention
when officer obtained defendant’s driver’s license and airline ticket, handed them

to another officer, and told defendant they were conducting a narcotics

investigation); United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 1983)

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(holding that police officer’s retention of identification is indicative of a Fourth

Amendment seizure); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir.

1979) (holding that seizure occurred when DEA agent carried defendant’s airline
ticket to the airline counter); Rogers v. State, 426 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ga. Ct. App.

1992) (expressing agreement “with appellant that when [the officer] retained

appellant’s license, the encounter matured into an investigative stop protected by
the Fourth Amendment”); State v. Frost, 374 So.2d 593, 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1979) (holding that seizure occurred when officers retained possession of the

defendant’s airline ticket and driver’s license); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 454
(Idaho 1992) (holding that seizure occurred when officer retained defendant’s

driver’s license and told defendant to remain in the vehicle); State v. Holmes, 569

N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 1997) (holding that seizure occurred when officer retained
possession of the defendant’s college student identification card); State v. Painter,

676 P.2d 309, 311 (Or. 1984) (holding that seizure occurred where officer retained

defendant’s license and credit card while making a radio check); Richmond v.

Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding “that what

began as a consensual encounter quickly became an investigative detention once

the [officer] received [appellant’s] driver’s license and did not return it to him”);

State v. Thomas, 955 P.2d 420, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that “[o]nce

an officer retains the suspect’s identification or driver’s license and takes it with
him to conduct a warrants check, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment has occurred”). See generally, LaFave, § 9.3, at 103 n.74 (collecting

cases where courts have held that retention of a person’s identification papers or
other property constitutes a seizure).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we conclude that Daniel was

seized when Officer Wright retained his identification to run a computer check for

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outstanding warrants. The State concedes, and we accept for purposes of this

decision, that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the

seizure, and that the drugs discovered as a result of the illegal seizure must be
suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”8 since no intervening event or other
attenuating circumstance purged the taint of the initial illegal seizure. Accordingly,

we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals which upheld the trial
court’s denial of the motion to suppress, vacate the defendant’s conviction, and

dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance. Costs of this appeal

are taxed against the State of Tennessee.

_______________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III
JUSTICE

Concur:
Anderson, C.J.
Barker, J.

Concurring/Dissenting With Separate Opinion
Byers, Sp. J. joined by Birch, J.

8
Wong Sun , 371 U.S. at 388, 83 S. Ct.at 417.

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