IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
LAMAR FLETCHER, )
)
FOR PUBLICATION FILED
Claimant / Appellant, ) FILED: ___________________ 1999
December 20,
)
v. ) TENNESSEE CLAIMS
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) COMMISSION Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) No. W1998-00120-SC-R11-RL
Defendant / Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Lamar Fletcher, pro se John Knox Walkup
Henning, Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Elena J. Xoinis
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMED BARKER, J.
In this appeal we address two primary issues: (1) whether an indigent party is
liable for payment of outstanding litigation taxes levied under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 67-4-602 (1998), and (2) whether the Tennessee Department of
Correction had authority to withdraw money from an inmate’s trust account to pay a
distress warrant. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that indigent parties become
liable for litigation taxes when taxed by the court and that the Tennessee Department
of Correction has the authority to deduct money from an inmate trust fund to satisfy a
distress warrant. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
The appellant, Lamar Fletcher, is an inmate in the Cold Creek Correctional
Facility in Henning, Tennessee. In October of 1996, the appellant filed a lawsuit in the
Davidson County Chancery Court, and a litigation tax in the amount of $23.75 was
assessed against him. Due to the indigence of the appellant, the chancellor allowed
the appellant to proceed in forma pauperis, and the appellant never paid the litigation
tax.1
Upon the appellant’s failure to pay the litigation tax, the Clerk and Master of the
Davidson County Chancery Court issued a distress warrant pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated section 67-4-215 for collection of the tax. On July 15, 1997, the local
sheriff presented the accountant clerk at the Cold Creek Correctional Facility with the
distress warrant, and the clerk deducted $44.90 from the appellant’s inmate trust fund
account to satisfy the warrant.2
1
Although not relevant to decide the issues presented in this appeal, the record gives no
indication of the nature, claim, or final disposition of the chancery court case.
2
The total amount listed in the distress warrant included (1) the litigation tax of $23.75; (2) a
pen alty in the a mou nt of $ 5.94 ; (3) in teres t amo untin g to $ 3.31 ; and (4) a c ollect ion fe e for th e she riff in
2
The appellant then filed a claim against the State of Tennessee with the
Tennessee Claims Commission alleging that officers of the Department of Correction
(TDOC) abused their authority and misapplied state law by removing the litigation tax
and other monies from his trust account. The State filed a motion for summary
judgment with the Claims Commission alleging that no genuine issue of material fact
existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Claims
Commission granted the State’s motion finding that the appellant was liable for the
litigation taxes and that the withdrawal of the money from the account was authorized
by statute.
The appellant then sought review in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. The appellant now appeals to this
Court arguing that indigent litigants are not liable for litigation taxes under Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 29 and that the officers from the Department of Correction lacked
authority to remove the money from his inmate trust account. We disagree and affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
ANALYSIS
The appellant argues that Supreme Court Rule 29 relieves indigent litigants
from the responsibility of paying litigation taxes. Rule 29 states in relevant part that
Pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-12-127(a), any civil action may be commenced by
a resident of this state without giving security as required by law for costs
and without the payment of litigation taxes due by filing the oath of poverty
set out in the statute and by filing an affidavit of indigency as prescribed by
court rule.
the amount of $12.00.
3
We note that neither the plain language of this Rule, nor the plain language of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-127(a) (Supp. 1999),3 contemplates that
indigent litigants are permanently relieved from their responsibility to pay litigation
taxes. Rather, Rule 29 and section 20-12-127(a) only contemplate that an indigent
litigant will not be denied access to the courts to commence a civil action solely
because of an inability to pay litigation taxes.
The appellant has overlooked Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-
127(b), which strips away any merit to his argument on this point. This section states
that “[t]he filing of a civil action without paying the costs or taxes or giving security for
the costs or taxes does not relieve the person filing the action from responsibility for
the costs or taxes but suspends their collection until taxed by the court.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-12-127(b) (Supp. 1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court is not at liberty to apply a construction apart from the words
of the statute. See Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997).
We cannot conceive of any statute that could be more clear or unambiguous, and
according to the plain language of the statute, an indigent litigant is never permanently
relieved from the duty of paying litigation taxes, although such payment may be
deferred. Consequently, the appellant’s argument is without merit.
The appellant also contends that because of his indigence, the TDOC was
without authority to withdraw funds from his inmate trust account to pay the distress
warrant. We disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-144(a) (1994)
states that the clerk of the court to whom a litigation tax is owed “may retain an agent
to collect or institute proceedings to collect such cost or taxes, or both.” One method
3
Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-127(a) (Supp. 1999) states that “[a]ny civil action
may be commenced by a resident of this state without giving security as required by law for costs and
without the payment of litigation taxes . . . .”
4
by which a clerk may collect outstanding litigation taxes is through issuance of a
distress warrant that is addressed and delivered to the sheriff or constable of the
county in which “property of such taxpayer may be found.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §
67-1-1201(b) (1998). Once the sheriff or constable receives the distress warrant, that
officer may “execute it by distraint and sale of personal property belonging to the
taxpayer.” See id. § 67-1-1202(a) (1998).
No exception is made in either of these statutes that would exempt indigent
persons from execution of a distress warrant. Indeed, to imply such an exception in
the statute would have the effect of relieving indigent persons from responsibility for
payment of litigation taxes, and the General Assembly has clearly indicated that no
person is permanently relieved from payment of court costs or litigation taxes. See
id. § 20-12-127(b). Although a different case may be presented if the distress warrant
were facially invalid or otherwise illegal, the appellant’s argument that his indigence
alone affects the validity of the warrant has no merit. Because the appellant is not
relieved from the responsibility of paying the litigation taxes, we simply fail to see any
reason why the TDOC would lack authority in this case to deduct litigation taxes from
the appellant’s inmate trust fund upon receipt of the distress warrant.
The Court of Appeals relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-
603(b)(1) to hold that the TDOC had the authority to satisfy the distress warrant from
the funds of the inmate trust account. The plain language of this statute, however,
seems to restrict its applicability to collection of litigation taxes from a “defendant in a
criminal action.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-603(b)(1) (1998). Because the
appellant is not challenging litigation taxes assessed against him originating from his
original criminal conviction, section 67-4-603(b)(1) has no bearing on the resolution of
this issue.
5
CONCLUSION
We hold that neither of the appellant’s claims has any merit. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 20-12-127(b) clearly states that indigence does not relieve a litigant
from the responsibility of paying all applicable litigation taxes. We further hold that the
TDOC acted within its authority in deducting the taxes from the inmate’s trust fund
upon receiving the distress warrant. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Lamar Fletcher, for which
execution shall issue if necessary.
________________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUSTICE
CONCUR:
ANDERSON, C.J.,
DROWOTA, BIRCH, HOLDER, JJ.
6