IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
FOR PUBLICATION
September 27, 1999
Filed: September 27, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
MICHELE P. MUHLHEIM, )
)
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ) Knox Chancery No. 137765-1
)
v. ) Hon. Frederick D. McDonald,
) Chancellor
KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, )
)
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. )
)
AND ) NO. 03S01-9808-CH-00089
)
JOANNE I. HAYDEN, A Citizen and )
Resident of Knox County, Tennessee, )
)
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, )
)
v. ) Knox Chancery No. 131939-1
)
KNOX COUNTY, A Political ) Hon. Frederick D. McDonald,
Subdivision of the State of Tennessee, ) Chancellor
)
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. )
FOR APPELLANT MUHLHEIM: FOR APPELLANT HAYDEN:
WILLIAM C. CREMINS J. ANTHONY FARMER
Knoxville Knoxville
FOR APPELLEE:
WENDELL K. HALL
Knoxville
OPINION
REVERSED HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this consolidated interlocutory appeal to determine whether a
school board, which is initially exempted by statute from providing workers’
compensation coverage, may divide its employees along professional and
nonprofessional lines, providing workers’ compensation benefits for
nonprofessional, nonunion employees while excluding certified teachers who are
represented by a union. We conclude that the Board made a valid division of its
workforce pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-106(5) (1991) (current version
found at Supp. 1998). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motions for summary judgment.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 17, 1996, Joanne I. Hayden, a certified teacher, filed suit
seeking workers' compensation benefits for an alleged work-related injury she
sustained in May 1996 while employed by the Knox County Board of Education
(“the Board”). On March 12, 1998, Michele P. Muhlheim, also a certified teacher,
filed suit seeking workers' compensation benefits for an alleged work-related
injury she sustained in October 1997 while employed by the Board.
In both cases, the Board moved for summary judgment claiming that
because both plaintiffs are certified teachers they are not eligible for workers’
compensation under a collective bargaining agreement between the Board and
the Knox County Education Association (KCEA), the union representing the
teachers.
2
In support of its motion, the Board provided an affidavit from its former
chief negotiator, Bob Chambers, stating that workers’ compensation benefits
were “on the table” for negotiations in 1980, 1982, 1985, and 1990. In each
case, the benefits were rejected and were not included in the agreement
between the Board and the KCEA. Chambers stated that during the 1990-91
negotiations, the Board offered workers’ compensation benefits that the KCEA
rejected. Instead, the union bargained for monetary and financial benefits.
Chambers stated that the Board has provided “Accident Protection Insurance” to
teachers since 1982; a 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between the Board
and the KCEA confirms this coverage. The Memorandum of Agreement was in
effect when the two teachers were injured.
The Board also presented evidence that in 1987 it elected to provide
workers' compensation benefits to a group of nonprofessional, nonunion
employees. According to a letter to the Tennessee Department of Labor,
Division of Workers Compensation, the coverage applied to food service
employees, maintenance employees, custodians, clerks, teachers' aides,
secretaries, and substitute teachers. The supervisors for the food service and
maintenance departments were not covered.
In response, Hayden and Muhlheim both argued that the Board could not
provide workers’ compensation to certain employees within the department and
not provide coverage to all employees within the department. When the Board
elected to provide coverage for some employees in 1987, the effect was to elect
to provide coverage for all employees. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, all the
employees are currently covered by the Act, and the 1995 Memorandum violates
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 (1991) (current version found at Supp. 1998), which
prohibits employers from making contracts relieving them of their obligations
3
under the Act. The plaintiffs also contend that the Education Professional
Negotiations Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-601, et seq., does not allow workers'
compensation to be a negotiable term in the bargaining process.
The trial court denied the Board’s motions for summary judgment in both
cases. Thereafter, the Chancellor granted the petitions of Muhlheim and the
Board seeking interlocutory appellate review in both cases pursuant to Rule 9,
Tenn. R. App. P. This Court granted the interlocutory appeals and consolidated
the cases. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court and hold that
the defendant is entitled to summary judgment in both cases.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant can show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The non-movant is entitled
to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and is entitled to all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, discarding all countervailing
evidence. Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Byrd v.
Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn. 1993)).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate in the case now
before us, we must consider whether the undisputed facts establish that the
election statute allows a governmental entity, such as the Board, to elect
coverage for nonunion employees while excluding the certified teachers who are
union members.
4
A provision of the Tennessee’s Workers Compensation Act that
addresses governmental entities states:
[T]he state, any county or municipal corporation may
accept the provisions of this chapter by filing written
notice thereof with the division under the
commissioner of labor, at least thirty (30) days before
the happening of any accident or death, and may at
any time withdraw the acceptance by giving like
notice of the withdrawal. The state, any county or
municipal corporation may accept the provisions of
this chapter as to any department or division of the
state, county or municipal corporation by filing written
notice thereof with the division under the
commissioner of labor at least thirty (30) days before
the happening of any accident or death and may, at
any time, withdraw acceptance for the division or
department by giving like notice of the withdrawal,
and such acceptance by the state, county or
municipal corporation for any department or division
thereof, shall have effect only of making the
department or division designated subject to the
terms of this chapter;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-106(5) (1991) (emphasis added).
The issue now before us is whether a school board, which is initially
exempted by statute from providing workers’ compensation coverage, may divide
employees along professional and nonprofessional lines and may elect to
provide workers' compensation benefits for nonprofessional, nonunion
employees while excluding professional, certified teachers who are represented
by a union. This issue is one of first impression, and there is scant case law in
Tennessee interpreting the election provision set forth in Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-106(5). See generally Finister v. Humbolt General Hosp., 970 S.W.2d
435, 439 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that a hospital is exempt as a subsidiary of an
exempt hospital district); Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tenn. 1993)
(holding that the filing of a notice of election under the act is directory; substantial
compliance is sufficient).
5
While we have looked to other jurisdictions for guidance, we have found
little or no guidance, as apparently only Tennessee and Delaware have workers'
compensation provisions allowing public employers to choose whether to provide
workers' compensation coverage for public employees. Delaware has not
addressed the issue now before us, and the remaining jurisdictions generally
mandate some form of compulsory coverage.1 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson,
The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 56.10 (1999).
Tennessee’s election statute allows an exempted entity to opt-in and to
provide workers' compensation coverage for public employees. The opt-in
provision also provides a public employer with the latitude to provide coverage
for segments or portions of its workforce. This latitude, however, is curtailed to
the extent that a public employer may only delineate by "departments" or
"divisions" when providing coverage to portions of its workforce.
While the Act permits an employer to delineate "departments" and
"divisions," the Act does not define either term. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“division” as an “operating or administrative unit of government, court, business
or school system.” Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (6th ed. 1990). Accordingly, the
Act allows a governmental entity to provide workers' compensation benefits to an
operating or administrative unit of its workforce. The Act further permits an
employer to exclude operating or administrative units when electing to provide
coverage under the Act.
1
Thirty-nine states cover public employees generally. Six states cover employees but not
officials. Te xas co vers co unty em ployees a nd spe cified highw ay and sta te college a nd unive rsity
workers; it permits cities, towns, and villages to provide compensation. Georgia requires
covera ge whe n the pub lic emp loyer is either an instrum entality of the sta te or a cor poration. 4
Arthur La rson & L ex K. La rson, The Law of Workm en's Compensation § 56.10 (1999).
6
In the case now before us, the school board is a governmental entity and
is exempt from providing workers’ compensation coverage to its employees. The
Board, however, can elect to provide coverage under the Act. In 1987, the
Board elected to provide coverage for the Board’s nonprofessional employees.
The Board, therefore, generally divided its employees into units of
nonprofessional, nonunion workers and professional, certified teachers who are
represented by a union. The Board did not elect to provide workers'
compensation benefits to the certified teachers or professional employees
because the teachers, represented by their union, had repeatedly rejected the
workers' compensation benefits during negotiations. The teachers have been
covered by Accident Protection Insurance since 1982. They are professional
employees required to maintain a license pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 49-5-101 (1991) and are members of a union. The teachers represent a unit
of employees that is separate and apart from the nonprofessional employees of
the school board. We hold that the Board made a valid division of its workforce
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-106(5).
CONCLUSION
We hold that a school board, which is initially exempted by statute from
providing workers’ compensation coverage, may divide employees along
professional and nonprofessional lines and may elect to provide workers'
compensation benefits for its nonprofessional, nonunion employees while
excluding professional, certified teachers who are members of a bargaining unit.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and grant summary judgment to the
defendant in both cases. The costs of this appeal shall be taxed equally against
the plaintiffs for which execution shall issue if necessary.
7
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
Concurring:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Birch, and Barker, J.J.
8