Parks v. Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
FILED
June 15, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
FOR PUBLICATION

JIM PARKS, )
) Filed: June 15, 1998
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
)
)
Vs. )
)
TENNESSEE MUNICIPAL LEAGUE ) HAYWOOD CHANCERY
RISK MANAGEMENT POOL, and )
)
Defendant/Appellee, )
) HON. GEORGE R. ELLIS,
LARRY BRINTON, DIRECTOR, ) JUDGE
DIVISION OF WORKERS’ )
COMPENSATION, TENNESSEE )
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SECOND )
INJURY FUND, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. ) No. 02S01-9603-CH-00025

For Appellant: For Appellee, Jim Parks:
John Knox Walkup T. J. Emison
Attorney General and Reporter Alamo, Tennessee

Dianne Stamey Dycus For Appellee, Tennessee Municipal
Senior Counsel League Risk Management PooL:
Attorney General’s Office W. Timothy Hayes, Jr.
Nashville, Tennessee Memphis, Tennessee

OPINION

TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AND
SPECIAL WORKERS COMP APPEALS
PANEL AFFIRMED, AS MODIFIED ANDERSON, C.J.
 We granted the motion for review filed by the Tennessee Department of

Labor’s Second Injury Fund to determine whether an employee who previously

received workers’ compensation permanent partial disability benefits is entitled to

permanent partial disability benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1)(Supp.

1997) for a later work injury based on his total medical impairment rating for all work

injuries or the medical impairment rating solely attributable to his most recent work

injury.

The trial court applied the applicable statutory multiplier of 2.5 to the

employee’s total medical impairment rating for all work injuries of 15 percent, rather

than the medical impairment rating for the most recent injury of 2 percent. The result

was an award of 37.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.1

The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, reasoning that an

“employer takes the employee with all pre-existing conditions and cannot escape

liability where the employee, upon suffering a work-related injury, incurs disability far

greater than if he had not had the pre-existing condition.”

After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we conclude that an

employee who has previously been awarded workers’ compensation benefits based

on a percentage of disability to the body as a whole and then suffers a subsequent

injury, “shall be paid compensation for the period of temporary total disability and

only for the degree of permanent disability that results from the subsequent injury.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207 (3)(F)(1991 & Supp. 1997)(emphasis added). As a

result, the statutory multiplier of 2.5 applies only to the medical impairment rating for

the most recent injury, in this case 2 percent. We therefore modify the judgment to

reflect an award of 5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.

1
“For all injuries arising on or after August 1, 1992, in cases where an injured employee
is eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, pursuant to § 50-6-207(3)(A)(i) and
(F), and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or
greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of injury, the maximum perm anent
partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one-half (2½) times the medical
impairmen t rating . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6 -241(a)(1)(Supp. 1997).

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 BACKGROUND

The employee, Jim Parks, age 46, worked as a police officer with the City of

Brownsville, Tennessee. Parks had sustained three compensable injuries to his

back, but returned to work after each injury. These workers’ compensation awards

totaled 135 percent to the body as a whole.

In May of 1993, Parks injured his back for a fourth time while placing a

prisoner in the back seat of a patrol car. An orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Jones,

testified that Parks’ total medical impairment for all of his back injuries was 15

percent. Of this total medical impairment, 2 percent was attributable to the May

1993 injury.

After finding that Parks had returned to work at the same or higher wage, the

trial court applied the statutory multiplier of 2.5 to the total medical impairment rating

of 15 percent, and awarded 37.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as

a whole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1)(Supp. 1997). The Special Workers’

Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed.

The Second Injury Fund filed a motion to review the decision of the Panel,

arguing that the Panel erred in applying the statutory multiplier to the employee’s

medical impairment rating for all of his work injuries rather than just his medical

impairment rating for the most recent work injury. We granted the motion to review.

ANALYSIS

Appellate review in a workers’ compensation case is de novo upon the record

with a presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-6-225(e)(2)(1991 & Supp. 1997). Where a question of law is presented, as in

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this case, appellate review is de novo without a presumption of correctness. Presley

v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tenn. 1993).

We begin our review by observing that an employee’s prior disabling

condition does not prevent a workers’ compensation award where a work-related

injury aggravates the pre-existing condition. White v. Werthan Indus., 824 S.W.2d

158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). Instead, an employer essentially assumes the risk that an

employee may have a weakened condition that is aggravated by a work injury which

might not affect a person without the pre-existing condition. Fink v. Caudle, 856

S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. 1993).

The question of whether a prior workers’ compensation award for permanent

disability to the body as a whole is considered in determining the amount of

compensation for a later work injury is addressed by a specific section of the

workers’ compensation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(F). It specifically

provides that where

an employee has previously sustained an injury
compensable under this section for which a court of
competent jurisdiction has awarded benefits based on
percentage of disability to the body as a whole and
suffers a subsequent injury not enumerated above, the
injured employee shall be paid compensation for the
period of temporary total disability and only for the
degree of permanent disability that results from the
subsequent injury.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207 (3)(F)(Supp. 1997)(emphasis added).

A basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding the intended scope of a

statute. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). This means the Court

must examine the language of a statute and, if unambiguous, apply its ordinary and

plain meaning. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 54 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

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444, 139 L.Ed.2d 380 (1997). If the language is ambiguous, the Court must look to

the statutory scheme as a whole, as well as legislative history, to discern its

meaning. Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926.

We believe the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(F) is

unambiguous and that its meaning and its intended effect is clear. An employee

who has received compensation for prior injuries based on a percentage of disability

to the body as a whole and is later injured shall be paid “only for the degree of

permanent disability that results from the subsequent injury.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-6-207(3)(F)(1991 & Supp. 1997). Accordingly, under the statutory formula,

compensation is not based on the statutory multiplier times the total medical

impairment rating, but rather, the statutory multiplier times the medical impairment

rating for the later injury. Parks contends that this interpretation of the statute, in

effect, abolishes the notion of rehabilitation. We disagree. As the Second Injury

Fund observes, the limitation in the statute merely prevents an injured employee

from receiving dual compensation for the same work-related injury.

Parks also argues, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel found,

that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(F) was inapplicable as it refers to “disability”

and not “impairment.” Although disability and impairment indeed have separate

meanings, the distinction, in the context of the argument made is inapplicable, in

that the statutory scheme calculates the percentage of disability based on an

arithmetic formula which includes medical impairment. Specifically, depending on

which statutory multiplier is applicable, “the maximum permanent partial disability”

award that an employee may receive is either 2.5 or 6 times “the medical

impairment rating determined pursuant to the provisions of the American Medical

Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (American Medical

Association), the Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical

Impairment (American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons), or in cases not covered

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by either of these, an impairment rating by any appropriate method used and

accepted by the medical community.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) &

(b)(Supp. 1997)(emphasis added). Therefore, the statutory scheme as a whole

refutes Parks’ contention.

Accordingly, we find that the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel erred in

this case by applying the statutory multiplier of 2.5 to Parks’ total medical

impairment of 15 percent. In view of the plain statutory language of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(F), the appropriate compensation for Parks’ injury must be

based on the medical impairment rating for his most recent injury, i.e., 2 percent. As

a result, after application of the statutory multiplier, the award is 5 percent

permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court and the Special Workers’ Compensation

Appeals Panel erred in determining Parks’ workers’ compensation award based on

his total medical impairment rating of 15 percent. Because of Parks’ prior

compensated work-related injuries, he was entitled to compensation only for the

degree of permanent disability resulting from his most recent injury pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(F). We therefore modify the judgment to reflect an

award of 5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Costs of the

appeal are taxed to the plaintiff/appellee, Jim Parks, for which execution shall issue

if necessary.

_______________________________
RILEY ANDERSON, Chief Justice

CONCUR:

Drowota and Holder, JJ.

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Tomlin, Sp.J.
Reid, Sp.J., not participating

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