State v. Simpson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICATION
(
Plaintiff-Appellee, ( Filed: February 23, 1998
(
(
v. ( McNairy County
(
( Hon. Joe H. Walker,
GRAPEL SIMPSON, ( Judge
(
Defendant-Appellant. ( No. 02S01-9702-CC-00010

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:

John Knox Walkup Lloyd R. Tatum
Attorney General & Reporter Tatum & Tatum
Nashville, Tennessee Tatum Building
Henderson, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Nashville, Tennessee FILED
Kenneth W. Rucker
Assistant Attorney General February 23, 1998
Nashville, Tennessee
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Elizabeth T. Rice Appellate C ourt Clerk
District Attorney General
Twenty-Fifth Judicial District
Somerville, Tennessee

Ed McDaniel
Assistant District Attorney General
Selmer, Tennessee

OPINION

AFFIRMED DROWOTA, J.
 Based on a confidential informant’s tip, police stopped the defendant’s

vehicle. A consensual search of her person revealed drugs. The issue in this

appeal is whether the tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited

sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the two-pronged1 constitutional test of

reliability and provide reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

We hold that it did and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal

Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Testifying at the suppression hearing in this case, Officer Rodney Weaver

of the McNairy County Sheriff’s Department and Drug Task Force said that he

received a call from a confidential informant at approximately 3:30 p.m. on

December 30, 1994, that the defendant, Grapel Simpson, and another person,

Jimmy Brumley,2 were transporting 100 dilaudid pills from Memphis to McNairy

County. The informant related that the defendant and Brumley were traveling

from Memphis on Highway 64 in a two-door, cream or beige colored Oldsmobile

and would arrive in Selmer “any minute.” The informant did not state which of the

two would be driving the vehicle. Though he did not explicitly say that the

informant previously had given information resulting in arrests and convictions,

Officer Weaver said he knew the informant “through previous contacts as a

1
State v. Jac um in, 778 S.W .2d 430 ( Tenn . 1989).

2
Brum ley wa s a co defe nda nt in th is cas e in the trial co urt bu t is no t a pa rty to th is app eal.

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confidential informant.” Officer Weaver acknowledged that the informant

previously had been convicted of a felony, but said that he considered the

information reliable, related it to McNairy County Sheriff Paul Ervin, and

proceeded to Highway 64.

Sheriff Ervin arrived first at Highway 64 and identified Brumley and the

defendant coming in from the west in the vehicle described by the informant.

Based upon the tip and his corroboration of it, Sheriff Ervin stopped the vehicle.

Officer Weaver arrived about three minutes thereafter and questioned separately

the defendant and her companion. Each claimed that they were returning from

Memphis, but they gave inconsistent responses about the purpose of the trip. The

defendant told Officer W eaver that they had taken her niece back to Memphis,

while Brumley said they had driven to Memphis alone. Officer Weaver then told

the defendant that they had information she was transporting illegal drugs, to

which the defendant replied, “Well, you can look. You can search. I don’t have

anything.” Brumley, who had been driving the car, also consented to the search.

The officers proceeded to search the car, but the search revealed nothing.

Officer Weaver then asked the defendant if she had any drugs on her

person. Simpson responded, “No. You can look all you want.” Officer Weaver

replied “Well, you don’t mind us looking then, if you hadn’t got anything to hide,”

and the defendant replied “Yeah, sure.” Ruth Travis, a female dispatcher, who

previously had been summoned to the scene arrived less than five minutes later.

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Travis, the director and dispatcher of E-911, previously had been employed by the

Sheriff’s Department and had conducted body searches on other occasions.

Travis escorted the defendant to an area behind a patrol car which had been

parked on the opposite side of the highway. The defendant removed her coat and

Travis placed it in the seat of the patrol car. Travis proceeded to search the

defendant`s person. Eventually, claiming that she was cold, the defendant

reached for her coat. When Travis told the defendant that she would first have to

search the coat before the defendant could put it on, the defendant told Travis that

there were drugs in the pocket of the coat. The defendant offered to pay Travis if

she would not tell the other officers about the drugs. Travis seized the coat and

called for Officer Weaver. One hundred dilaudid pills were discovered in the

defendant’s coat pocket.

The defendant also testified at the suppression hearing and denied giving

the officers permission to search either her car3 or her person. She also denied

offering to pay Travis to keep quiet about the drugs, and said the reason she had

told Travis about the drugs was to avoid having to remove her clothing while

standing alongside the highway on a cold day with four or five male officers on the

other side of the road.

Based upon the proof summarized above, the trial court denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress finding “that sufficient probable cause supported

3
The car was registered in the name of the defendant’s son who was deceased.

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the initial stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger.” By

denying the motion to suppress, the trial court implicitly rejected the defendant’s

claim that she did not consent to the search of her person or vehicle.4 Upon the

trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, the defendant pled guilty to

possession of dilaudid, a Schedule II drug, with intent to deliver and sell, but

reserved the right to appeal as a certified question of law the denial of her motion

to suppress.5 See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2).

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion

to suppress, finding the confidential informant’s tip, along with the police

corroboration, sufficiently reliable to satisfy the two-pronged test and establish

reasonable suspicion to render the stop valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeals

found that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of both her vehicle

and her person. Thereafter, we granted the defendant permission to appeal, and

for the reasons that follow, now affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal

Appeals.

4
The trial court explicitly found “that exigent circumstances existed for an immediate search
of the veh icle and of the defe ndant.”

5
Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tenn. R. Crim. P., provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal
proceeding where the law provides for such appeal, and from any
judg me nt of c onvic tion: (2 ) Upo n a ple a of g uilty or n olo
contendere if: (i) Defendant entered into a plea agreement under
Rule 11(e) but explicitly reserved with the consent of the state and
of the cour t the rig ht to a ppe al a ce rtified ques tion o f law th at is
dispositive of the ca se. . . .
The defe nda nt als o res erve d for appe al the denia l of he r mo tion to dism iss fo r viola tion o f dou ble
jeopard y. Howeve r, that claim is not at issu e in this Co urt.

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 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In resolving the issues in this appeal, we review the trial court’s findings as

follows:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the
evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters
entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in
the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports
the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other
words, a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be
upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the

facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court

reviews de novo. State v. Yeargan, ___ S.W.2d ___, ___ (Tenn. 1997).

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STOP

A. Informant’s Tip/Reasonable Suspicion

In this Court, the defendant contends that the confidential informant’s tip

did not demonstrate the informant’s veracity or basis of knowledge as required by

this Court’s decisions in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989) and

State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993). The defendant also contends that

because the reliability of the tip was not sufficiently established, the tip did not give

rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop. The State responds

that given the specificity of the information provided by the confidential informant,

the timing of the tip, and the independent police corroboration, the tip was

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sufficiently reliable to give the officers reasonable suspicion to initiate the

investigatory stop.

We begin our analysis of this issue with the text of the Fourth Amendment 6

to the United States Constitution which provides:

Unreasonable searches and seizures. - The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

Similarly, Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees

that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that
general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search
suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize
any person or persons not named, whose offences are not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to
liberty and ought not to be granted.

The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under

the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). “[A]rticle I,

section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” State v.

Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997), quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn.

6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968).

6
The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the F ourteen th Am endm ent.
Map p v. O hio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1 081 (1961).

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 Consequently, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 demonstrate

a “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Under

both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is

presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to

suppression unless the State demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence

that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined

exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Watkins, 827

S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992).

The protections embodied in both the Fourth Amendment and Article I,

Section 7 apply to seizures of the person, including the stop of the defendant’s

vehicle in this case. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769,

1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct.

1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.

221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister, 449

U.S. 1, 4 n. 3, 101 S. Ct. 42, 44 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (When an officer turns

on his blue lights, he or she has clearly initiated a stop). Because the stop in this

case was not conducted pursuant to a warrant, it was presumptively

unreasonable. However, the lower courts appropriately denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress because the evidence demonstrates that the seizure was

effected pursuant to a narrowly defined exception to the warrant requirement.

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 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968), the United States Supreme Court considered whether the law

enforcement practice of “stop and frisk” violated the proscriptions of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that case, a police officer

became suspicious of two men who separately and repeatedly walked up and

down a street peering into a store window. After each trek, the men talked to a

third man up the street. The officer, after observing this conduct for a short time,

followed the suspects, stopped and frisked them, and discovered that two of them

were carrying pistols. Charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon,

Terry moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the stop and frisk were

unconstitutional. The Court held that an investigatory stop is constitutionally

permissible if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and

articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. A

frisk is warranted under Terry if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion

supported by specific and articulable facts that the suspect is armed. Id., 392 U.S.

at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883; Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 294. Police also may

constitutionally initiate an investigative stop of an automobile if the police have

reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the

occupants of the vehicle have committed a criminal offense or are about to

commit a criminal offense. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66

L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; Yeargan, __

S.W.2d at __; Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 294.

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 The facts forming the basis for an officer’s reasonable suspicion need not

rest upon the personal knowledge or observation of the officer. Indeed, in Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the

Court rejected the argument “that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only

be based on the officer’s personal observation,”7 and sustained a Terry

investigative stop and frisk undertaken on the basis of a tip given in person by a

known informant who had provided information in the past. In that case, a single

police officer was on patrol duty in a high crime area, when, at approximately 2:15

a.m., a person known to the officer approached his cruiser with information that an

individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his

waist. The officer called for assistance and then approached the vehicle to

investigate the informant’s report. The officer walked up to the parked car, tapped

on the window, and asked the occupant to open the door. When Williams, the

occupant, rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and

removed a loaded revolver from Williams’ waistband. The gun was not in plain

view, but it was located where the informant had indicated. Williams was arrested

for unlawful possession of a handgun, and a search incident to the arrest revealed

substantial quantities of heroin and other contraband. The Court upheld the

constitutionality of the investigative stop and seizure and concluded that while the

unverified tip may have been insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant,

7
Id., 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923.

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the information carried sufficient “indicia of reliability” 8 to justify an investigative

stop. Id. 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1924.

Likewise, in Pulley, this Court upheld the constitutionality of an investigatory

stop of a motor vehicle where the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop was

derived from anonymous tips. Id., 863 S.W.2d at 29. There, the officer received

a radio report that Terry Pulley was driving a yellow Ford L.T.D. in the Village

Green Trailer Park, was armed with a shotgun, and was “supposed to shoot

someone.” On his way to the trailer park, the officer received another similar,

urgent report. The officer arrived at the trailer park within ten to twelve minutes of

the first report and did not find Pulley, with whom he was acquainted, to be there.

The officer drove to a gas station about an eighth of a mile away and found Pulley

parked in a yellow Ford. The officer stopped the vehicle, approached it, and

asked Pulley to get out of the car. At that point, the officer, saw a shotgun lying on

the front floorboard. Pulley was arrested for driving on a revoked license, for

second offense driving under the influence of alcohol, and for possessing a

loaded weapon, a hunting knife, and a billy club with the intent to go armed.

Pulley filed a motion to suppress which was granted by the trial court upon a

finding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant

had or would commit a crime. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s judgment. We granted permission to appeal and reversed, finding that the

8
At the time of the decision in A da m s, the two-pronged veracity and basis of knowledge test
was the standard employed by federal courts to analyze the reliability of an informant’s tip. The
federa l courts did not adop t the “totality of the c ircum stance s” test un til 1983. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U .S. 213, 10 2 S.Ct. 23 17, 76 L.E d.2d 527 (1983).

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officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.

In so holding, we recognized the inherent danger of false reports, through

police fabrication or from vindictive or unreliable informants, which is present when

an investigative stop is based upon the tip of an informant.” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at

31. We emphasized, however, that the federal and state courts have developed

tests for assessing the reliability of informants’ tips to guard against those

dangers. In the context of evaluating the reliability of an informant’s tip for

probable cause determinations, we observed that Tennessee law requires a

showing of both the informant’s veracity or credibility and his or her basis of

knowledge. Id.; see also, Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436. While independent

police corroboration can make up deficiencies, “each prong represents an

independently important consideration that must be separately considered and

satisfied in some way.”9 Id.

We concluded that the Jacumin factors of credibility and basis of

knowledge are helpful in determining whether a tip is sufficiently reliable to support

a finding of reasonable suspicion. However, in so holding, we emphasized that

[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content
than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense

9
We observed that the two-pronged test had been abandoned by the federal courts in favor
of a “totality of the circumstances” approach which requires “[s]ome showing of veracity and some
showing of basis of knowledge,” but which allows for a “deficiency in one [prong] to be
compe nsated for . . . by a strong showing as to the other.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 223, 103 S.Ct. at
2329.

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 that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct.

2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (emphasis added). In other words, we

recognized that the two-pronged test of reliability need not be as strictly applied if

the informant’s tip is being used to establish reasonable suspicion rather than

probable cause. We emphasized that the circumstances in which a tip is given

may sufficiently relate the informant’s basis of knowledge, even in the absence of

an explicit statement by the informant. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32. We observed

that if an informant reports an incident at or near the time of its occurrence, “a

court can often assume that the report is first-hand, and hence reliable.” Id.

Moreover, if a call is contemporaneous with the police corroboration of the tip, it is

reasonable to infer eyewitness reliability of the informant. Id. Police corroboration

of several details of the informant’s report may also satisfy unknowns about the

informant’s credibility. Id. Finally, we stated that the content, quality, and quantity

of the information possessed by police must be assessed in determining whether

it is sufficiently reliable to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id.

Applying the foregoing analysis to the facts in Pulley, we concluded that

“[t]he timely nature of the report indicated an eye-witness basis of knowledge, and

the corroboration of many of the informant’s details, although not all, provided

some basis to believe that the informant was credible.” Id. at 34. Although the tip

in Pulley could not have established probable cause to search or arrest, and

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would not necessarily furnish reasonable suspicion under all circumstances, we

concluded that, “given the threat of violence, the police had ‘specific and

articulable facts’ to warrant the investigatory stop” in that case. Id.

We must apply the analysis outlined in Pulley to determine first whether the

informant’s tip was sufficiently reliable under Tennessee law and second whether

the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. We first

consider whether the credibility of the informant was sufficiently established.

Unlike Pulley, the informant in this case was not anonymous. Officer Weaver

knew the confidential informant and was aware that he or she was a convicted

felon. Officer Weaver testified, however, that he had personally “interview[ed]” the

informant on prior occasions and had previous contacts with the person as “a

confidential informant.” Though there is no explicit statement in the record that

the informant had provided reliable information in the past, Officer Weaver

testified that he considered the tip to be credible. In addition, several of the facts

supplied by the informant, such as the location and direction of travel, the time of

arrival, and the description of the car were corroborated by police before the stop

was initiated and support the credibility of the informant. A showing that the

informant’s data is reliable may satisfy the credibility prong. State v. Ballard, 836

S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1992). Moreover, the informant’s statement predicted the

defendant’s future behavior. W hen significant aspects of an informant’s

predictions about future behavior are verified, there is reason to believe that the

informant is honest and well informed. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417.

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The preexisting relationship between Officer Weaver and the confidential

informant, as well as the independent police corroboration of the facts predicting

the defendant’s future behavior given by the informant, sufficiently satisfy the

credibility prong of the Jacumin test.

With respect to the second prong, we note that the informant in this case

made no explicit statement conveying his or her basis of knowledge. However, as

in Pulley, the circumstances under which the tip was given indicate that the

informant was an eye-witness. Here, the confidential informant told Officer

Weaver that the car in which the defendant was traveling was due to arrive in

Selmer “any minute.” The officers drove immediately to Highway 64 and found

the vehicle described by the informant, occupied by the defendant and Brumley,

thus confirming the content of the tip. The circumstances surrounding the tip,

including the police corroboration of the facts supporting an eye-witness basis of

knowledge, are sufficient to establish the informant’s basis of knowledge under

Jacumin.10

As the United States Supreme Court recently has recognized,

[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable
cause’ mean is not possible. They are common sense, nontechnical
conceptions that deal with the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.

10
The defendant’s reliance upon State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1989), is misplaced. There, the informant previously had been arrested on other charges, but
explicitly had never been utilized as an informant in any prior police investigations. In addition, the
information was given to the officer two days before the alleged transaction was to occur, and the
inform ant provid ed no ex plicit statem ent relating h is basis o f know ledge.

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Ornelas, ___ U.S. at __, 116 S.Ct. at 1661. In evaluating whether a police officer

has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, a court

must consider the totality of the circumstances. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294;

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695. Circumstances relevant to the

evaluation include, but are not limited to, the officer’s personal objective

observations, information obtained from other police officers or agencies,

information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain

offenders. A court must also consider the rational inferences and deductions that

a trained officer may draw from the facts and circumstances known to him--

inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. Watkins,

827 S.W.2d at 294; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695; Terry, 392 U.S. at

21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more
than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. The
Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

Evaluating the totality of the circumstances of this case in light of the well-

settled principles of law set forth above, we conclude that the stop of the

defendant’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion. Having established

the informant’s credibility and basis of knowledge, the information provided by the

informant was that the defendant was transporting illegal drugs. Based upon that

information, police had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal offense was

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being committed by the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, the initial stop was

constitutionally valid.

B. Validity of Defendant’s Consent to Search

The defendant next argues that the motion to suppress should have been

granted because her detention during the subsequent search of her car and her

person was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of a valid Terry stop, thereby

rendering her consent to these searches involuntary. The State asserts the

investigative detention was reasonable, and the search of her person and

automobile were constitutional because based upon consent. We agree.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that when assessing whether

a detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, the proper inquiry is

whether during the detention, the police diligently pursued a means of

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605

(1985). Applying that standard to the facts in this case, it is clear the detention

was not excessive. When Officer Weaver was given conflicting stories by the

defendant and Brumley about the purpose of their trip to Memphis, he immediately

informed them that the police had information that they were transporting illegal

drugs. This exchange occurred less than five minutes after the stop was initiated.

The defendant, at that point responded, “Well, you can look. You can search. I

don’t have anything.” After the search of the car revealed nothing, Officer Weaver

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immediately asked the defendant if she had anything on her person. At this point,

the stop had been in progress for approximately ten minutes. Again, the

defendant responded, “No. You can look all you want.” Officer Weaver detained

the defendant until Travis arrived less than five minutes later to conduct the body

search. The contraband was discovered during this search. Clearly, the police

diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their

suspicions quickly. The detention was not unreasonable.11

Having so concluded, we also reject the defendant’s claim that her

consent12 was involuntary. “To pass constitutional muster, consent to search must

be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by duress or

coercion.” State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992). The defendant’s

unelicited statements of consent clearly meet this standard.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the confidential informant’s

tip as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of

reliability to satisfy the two-pronged constitutional test of reliability, and provided

11
The defendant’s reliance upon State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1992) is misplaced. In that case, the officer merely stopped the defendant for speeding and had no
inform ation that the defend ant was com mitting an y other crim inal offens e. Desp ite the com plete
lack of an objective basis for suspicion, the officer detained the defendant in his patrol car until she
consented to a search of the passenger compartment of her car, and continued to detain the
defe nda nt, he r siste r, and her n iece s and neph ews , des pite th eir rep eate d req ues ts to le ave, w hile
he conducted a m ore extensive search with a drug dog . The circumstanc es clearly are
distinguish able.

12
The defendant also argues that her consent was involuntary because the trial court found
she was in custody when it was given. The defendant fails to recognize that the trial court also
explicitly found that the defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation.

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reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The ensuing search which

resulted in the seizure of contraband was based upon the defendant’s voluntary

consent and therefore was constitutionally valid. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion to suppress.

______________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA III,
JUSTICE

Concur:

Anderson, C.J.,
Birch, Holder, JJ
Reid, J. - Dissenting by Separate Opinion

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 1 F O R P U B L I C A T I O N
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3 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T E N N E S S E E
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5
6
7
A T J A C K S O N
FILED
8 February 23, 1998
9
10 S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E , ( Cecil Crowson, Jr.
11 ( Appellate C ourt Clerk
12 P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l e e , (
13 (
14 ( M c N a i r y C o u n t y
15 (
16 v . ( H o n . J o e H . W a l k e r ,
17 ( J u d g e
18 (
19 ( N o . 0 2 S 0 1 - 9 7 0 2 - C C - 0 0 0 1 0
20 G R A P E L S I M P S O N , (
21 (
22 D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . (
23
24
25
26
27 D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N
28
29
30
31 I d i s s e n t b e c a u s e t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s d e c i s i o n

32 r e p r e s e n t s a f u r t h e r e r o s i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n

33 a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s . I w o u l d f i n d

34 t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t o p i n t h i s c a s e v i o l a t e s t h e F o u r t h

35 A m e n d m e n t t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d

36 A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 7 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f T e n n e s s e e , a n d

37 r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n .

38

39 I n S t a t e v . P u l l e y , 8 6 3 S . W . 2 d 2 9 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 3 ) ,
 1 t h i s C o u r t , f o l l o w i n g S t a t e v . T e r r y , 3 9 2 U . S . 1 , 8 8 S . C t .

2 1 8 6 8 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , f o u n d t h a t a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t o p b y p o l i c e

3 o f f i c e r s w a s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r c e r t a i n

4 l i m i t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e C o u r t i n P u l l e y h e l d : “ T h u s , t h e

5 F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t p e r m i t s a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t o p b a s e d o n t h e

6 c o r r o b o r a t e d t i p o f a n i n f o r m a n t i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n v o l v i n g

7 a n i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t o f d a n g e r . ” S t a t e v . P u l l e y , 8 6 3 S . W . 2 d

8 a t 3 1 . T h e C o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d : “ T h e w h o l e [ U n i t e d S t a t e s

9 S u p r e m e ] C o u r t t h u s r e c o g n i z e d [ i n T e r r y ] t h a t t h e

10 s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e c r i m i n a l t h r e a t i s a n i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n

11 d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f a p o l i c e r e s p o n s e a n d t h e

12 r e l i a b i l i t y r e q u i r e d o f a n i n f o r m a n t ’ s t i p . I d . a t 3 3 .

13 A f t e r r e v i e w i n g d e c i s i o n s f r o m o t h e r s t a t e s w h i c h h a d a p p l i e d

14 t h e T e r r y h o l d i n g , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d f u r t h e r : “ T h e s e c a s e s

15 s h o w t h a t t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e p e r c e i v e d h a r m i s a c r u c i a l

16 e l e m e n t i n a s s e s s i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e

17 T e r r y s t o p . ” I d . B e c a u s e t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s t i p i n t h i s c a s e

18 c o n t a i n s n o t h r e a t o f i m m i n e n t d a n g e r o r o t h e r e x i g e n t

19 c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r i n g i m m e d i a t e a c t i o n b y t h e p o l i c e

20 o f f i c e r , i t d o e s n o t j u s t i f y a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t o p u n d e r

21 T e r r y a n d P u l l e y . T h e r e f o r e , I w o u l d h o l d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e

22 s t o p w a s n o t j u s t i f i e d . S e e S t a t e v . Y e a r g a n , _ _ _ _ _ S . W . 2 d

23 _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ ( T e n n . 1 9 9 7 ) ( R e i d , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) [ s l i p o p . a t

24 2 5 - 2 7 ] ; S t a t e v . B r i d g e s , _ _ _ _ _ S . W . 2 d _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ ( T e n n .

- 2 1 -
 1 1 9 9 7 ) ( R e i d , J . , c o n c u r r i n g a n d d i s s e n t i n g ) [ s l i p o p . a t 1 0 -

2 1 2 ] .

3

4 E v e n i f w e a s s u m e t h a t Y e a r g a n a n d B r i d g e s , a n d n o w

5 t h e d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e , p e r m i t a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t o p w h e r e

6 t h e r e i s r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t h a t a n o f f e n s e n o t i n v o l v i n g

7 a n i m m i n e n t d a n g e r o r o t h e r e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e i s b e i n g

8 c o m m i t t e d , t h e s t o p i n t h i s c a s e v i o l a t e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

9 p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s . W h e r e , a s i n

10 t h i s c a s e , t h e s u s p i c i o n i s b a s e d o n a n i n f o r m a n t ’ s t i p ,

11 t h e r e m u s t b e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y

12 a n d c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s b a s i s o f k n o w l e d g e .

13 S t a t e v . P u l l e y , 8 6 3 S . W . 2 d a t 3 1 ; m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n a t _ _ _ _ _

14 [ s l i p o p . a t 1 2 ] . T h e m a j o r i t y ’ s s t r u g g l e t o f i n d a n y

15 c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s t i p i n t h i s c a s e w a s

16 p a t e n t l y u n s u c c e s s f u l .

17

18 T h e m a j o r i t y f i n d s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y

19 w a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e o f f i c e r ’ s “ p r e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p ”

20 w i t h t h e i n f o r m a n t a n d “ i n d e p e n d e n t p o l i c e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f

21 t h e f a c t s p r e d i c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s f u t u r e b e h a v i o r . ”

22 M a j o r i t y o p i n i o n a t _ _ _ _ _ [ s l i p o p . a t 1 5 ] . T h e r e c o r d d o e s

23 n o t s h o w t h e n a t u r e o r e x t e n t o f t h e p r e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p

24 b e t w e e n t h e o f f i c e r a n d t h e i n f o r m a n t . I t d o e s n o t s h o w t h a t

- 2 2 -
 1 t h e i n f o r m a n t p r e v i o u s l y h a d s u p p l i e d r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t o

2 t h e o f f i c e r . I t s h o w s o n l y t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t w a s , i n t h e

3 o f f i c e r ’ s c o n c l u s i v e l a n g u a g e , a “ c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t . ”

4 T h e r e i s i n t h e r e c o r d n o o b j e c t i v e f a c t i n d i c a t i n g

5 c r e d i b i l i t y . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t w a s a c o n v i c t e d

6 f e l o n m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t a f i n d i n g t h a t h e w a s a r e l i a b l e

7 i n f o r m a n t .

8

9 T h e m a j o r i t y ’ s f i n d i n g o f i n d e p e n d e n t p o l i c e

10 c o r r o b o r a t i o n i s e q u a l l y i l l u s o r y . T h e “ c o r r o b o r a t i o n ”

11 r e l i e d u p o n w a s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e v e h i c l e i n w h i c h t h e

12 d e f e n d a n t w a s t r a v e l l i n g , t h a t t h e v e h i c l e w a s t r a v e l l i n g o n

13 H i g h w a y 6 4 t o w a r d s S e l m e r a n d t h a t i t w o u l d a r r i v e a t S e l m e r

14 “ a n y m i n u t e . ” F r o m t h i s , t h e m a j o r i t y f i n d s t h a t “ t h e

15 i n f o r m a n t ’ s s t a t e m e n t p r e d i c t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s f u t u r e

16 b e h a v i o r . ” O n t h i s p o i n t , t h e m a j o r i t y r e l i e s u p o n A l a b a m a

17 v . W h i t e , 4 9 6 U . S . 3 2 5 , 1 1 0 S . C t . 2 4 1 2 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , w h i c h d o e s

18 n o t s u p p o r t t h e i r p o s i t i o n . I n t h a t c a s e a n o f f i c e r o f t h e

19 M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t r e c e i v e d a t e l e p h o n e

20 t i p t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t W h i t e w o u l d b e l e a v i n g a p a r t i c u l a r

21 a d d r e s s a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e i n a p a r t i c u l a r v e h i c l e a n d

22 w o u l d a r r i v e a t a p a r t i c u l a r d e s t i n a t i o n . T h e i n f o r m a n t t o l d

23 t h e o f f i c e r t h a t W h i t e w o u l d b e i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a n o u n c e o f

24 c o c a i n e i n a b r o w n a t t a c h e c a s e . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e o f f i c e r s

- 2 3 -
 1 p r o c e e d e d t o t h e d e p a r t u r e a d d r e s s w h e r e t h e y o b s e r v e d t h e

2 d e s c r i b e d v e h i c l e i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t . T h e y o b s e r v e d W h i t e

3 l e a v e t h e b u i l d i n g , g e t i n t h e v e h i c l e , a n d d r i v e t h e m o s t

4 d i r e c t r o u t e t o w a r d s t h e d e s t i n a t i o n t h e i n f o r m a n t h a d

5 s t a t e d . W h e n s t o p p e d s h o r t o f t h a t d e s t i n a t i o n , s h e

6 c o n s e n t e d t o a s e a r c h . T h e o f f i c e r s f o u n d m a r i j u a n a i n t h e

7 d e s c r i b e d b r o w n a t t a c h e c a s e , a n d , w h i l e b e i n g p r o c e s s e d a t

8 t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n a f t e r h e r a r r e s t , t h e o f f i c e r s f o u n d t h r e e

9 m i l l i g r a m s o f c o c a i n e i n h e r p u r s e . T h e c o u r t u p h e l d t h e

10 s t o p a n d s u b s e q u e n t s e a r c h i n t h a t c a s e , b a s e d o n t h e

11 i n d e p e n d e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n b y t h e p o l i c e o f s i g n i f i c a n t

12 a s p e c t s o f t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s p r e d i c t i o n s . C o n c e d i n g t h a t i t

13 w a s a c l o s e c a s e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e t i p

14 “ c o n t a i n e d a r a n g e o f d e t a i l s r e l a t i n g n o t j u s t t o e a s i l y

15 o b t a i n e d f a c t s a n d c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e

16 t i p , b u t t o f u t u r e a c t i o n s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s o r d i n a r i l y n o t

17 e a s i l y p r e d i c t e d . ” I d . a t 3 3 2 , 1 1 0 S . C t . a t 2 4 1 7 ( q u o t i n g

18 I l l i n o i s v . G a t e s , 4 6 2 U . S . 2 1 3 , 2 4 5 , 1 0 3 S . C t . 2 3 1 7 , 2 3 3 5 -

19 3 6 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ) . T h e c o u r t i n W h i t e p l a c e d s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e

20 o n t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s a b i l i t y t o p r e d i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s f u t u r e

21 b e h a v i o r .

22

23 [ I ] t d e m o n s t r a t e d i n s i d e i n f o r m a t i o n - a
24 s p e c i a l f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h r e s p o n d e n t ’ s
25 a f f a i r s . T h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c w o u l d h a v e
26 h a d n o w a y o f k n o w i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t

- 2 4 -
 1 w o u l d s h o r t l y l e a v e t h e b u i l d i n g , g e t i n
2 t h e d e s c r i b e d c a r , a n d d r i v e t h e m o s t
3 d i r e c t r o u t e t o D o b e y ’ s M o t e l . B e c a u s e
4 o n l y a s m a l l n u m b e r o f p e o p l e a r e
5 g e n e r a l l y p r i v y t o a n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s
6 i t i n e r a r y , i t i s r e a s o n a b l e f o r p o l i c e t o
7 b e l i e v e t h a t a p e r s o n w i t h a c c e s s t o s u c h
8 i n f o r m a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o a l s o h a v e a c c e s s
9 t o r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h a t
10 i n d i v i d u a l ’ s i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s . . . .
11 W h e n s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t s o f t h e c a l l e r ’ s
12 p r e d i c t i o n s w e r e v e r i f i e d , t h e r e w a s
13 r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e
14 c a l l e r w a s h o n e s t , b u t a l s o t h a t h e w a s
15 w e l l i n f o r m e d , a t l e a s t w e l l e n o u g h t o
16 j u s t i f y t h e s t o p .
17
18
19
20 I d .

21

22 T h e t i p r e l i e d u p o n i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e

23 d e m o n s t r a t e d n o “ i n s i d e i n f o r m a t i o n ” a n d g a v e n o i n d i c a t i o n

24 t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t w a s h o n e s t o r w e l l i n f o r m e d a b o u t t h e

25 d e f e n d a n t ’ s a f f a i r s . T h e f a c t s r e l i e d u p o n , a n i d e n t i f i e d

26 a u t o m o b i l e p r o c e e d i n g a l o n g H i g h w a y 6 4 a p p r o a c h i n g S e l m e r ,

27 d e m o n s t r a t e s n o k n o w l e d g e n o t e q u a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o d o z e n s o f

28 o t h e r p e r s o n s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t p r o v i d e s n o s u p p o r t f o r t h e

29 m a j o r i t y ’ s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t w a s c r e d i b l e .

30

31 T h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s n o e v i d e n c e f o r t h e f i n d i n g

32 t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t ’ s i n f o r m a t i o n w a s r e l i a b l e , t h e s e c o n d

33 p r o n g o f t h e t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e o f f i c e r h a d r e a s o n a b l e

34 s u s p i c i o n . T h e m a j o r i t y a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t d i d

- 2 5 -
 1 n o t d i s c l o s e t o t h e o f f i c e r t h e b a s i s o f h i s t i p , b u t t h e

2 m a j o r i t y , s o m e w h a t i n c r e d i b l y , f i n d s t h a t t h e t i p t h a t t h e

3 a u t o m o b i l e i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s r i d i n g w o u l d a r r i v e i n

4 S e l m e r “ a n y m i n u t e ” a n d t h a t t h e a u t o m o b i l e d i d i n f a c t

5 a r r i v e i n S e l m e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a n t w a s a n

6 “ e y e w i t n e s s . ” A n e y e w i t n e s s t o w h a t ? T h a t t h e a u t o m o b i l e

7 w a s l e g a l l y p r e c e d i n g a l o n g H i g h w a y 6 4 ? C e r t a i n l y . T h a t t h e

8 d e f e n d a n t w a s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f i l l e g a l d r u g s ? H a r d l y ! A

9 b a s i s o f k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e c o r r o b o r a t i o n

10 o f f a c t s r e l a t e d o n l y t o i n n o c e n t a c t i v i t y o r m a t t e r s o p e n

11 a n d o b v i o u s t o a n y o n e . S t a t e v . B r i d g e s , _ _ _ _ _ S . W . 2 d a t

12 _ _ _ _ _ ( R e i d , J . , c o n c u r r i n g a n d d i s s e n t i n g ) [ s l i p o p . a t 9 ] .

13

14 T h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l t h o s e i n

15 S t a t e v . C o l e m a n , 7 9 1 S . W . 2 d 5 0 4 ( T e n n . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) , i n

16 w h i c h t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s f o u n d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e

17 s t o p w a s i l l e g a l . I n C o l e m a n , a n o f f i c e r o f t h e R o b e r t s o n

18 C o u n t y D r u g T a s k F o r c e r e c e i v e d a t i p f r o m a n i n f o r m a n t w h o m

19 h e h a d p r e v i o u s l y a r r e s t e d a n d f r o m w h o m h e h a d n e v e r

20 o b t a i n e d c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n a n y p o l i c e

21 i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h e i n f o r m a n t t o l d t h e o f f i c e r t h a t b e t w e e n 2

22 p . m . a n d 2 : 3 0 p . m . o n A u g u s t 1 0 , 1 9 8 8 , a w h i t e f e m a l e , 2 5 t o

23 3 5 y e a r s o l d , w i t h t h e f i r s t n a m e o f “ C a r l a , ” w o u l d b e

24 d r i v i n g a n o l d e r m o d e l b l a c k M o n t e C a r l o t r a v e l l i n g f r o m

- 2 6 -
 1 D a v i d s o n C o u n t y t o R o b e r t s o n C o u n t y o n H i g h w a y 4 3 1 S o u t h a n d

2 t h a t s h e w o u l d p r o c e e d t o a l o c a t i o n o n W a s h i n g t o n R o a d .

3 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n f o r m a n t , “ C a r l a ” w a s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f

4 s e v e r a l p o u n d s o f m a r i j u a n a . T h e r e w a s n o v e r i f i c a t i o n o f

5 t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e i n f o r m a n t o r t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e

6 i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d . T h e o n l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d

7 f a c t w a s t h a t t h e c a r w a s r e g i s t e r e d t o C a r l a C o l e m a n , w h i c h

8 t h e C o u r t f o u n d w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e s t o p . I n

9 P u l l e y , t h i s C o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p r o v e d t h e h o l d i n g i n

10 C o l e m a n t h a t ,

11

12 w h i l e f u r t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n
13 m a y g e n e r a l l y m a k e u p a n y d e f i c i e n c i e s i n
14 a n i n f o r m a n t ’ s t i p , n e i t h e r t h e
15 i n f o r m a n t ’ s r e l i a b i l i t y n o r h i s b a s i s f o r
16 k n o w l e d g e w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d
17 i n t h i s c a s e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e n e c e s s a r y
18 “ r e a s o n a b l e a n d a r t i c u l a b l e s u s p i c i o n ”
19 r e q u i r e d b y o u r s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n .
20
21
22
23 S t a t e v . P u l l e y , 8 6 3 S . W . 2 d a t 3 1 - 3 2 ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v .

24 C o l e m a n , 7 9 1 S . W . 2 d a t 5 0 7 ) .

25

26 S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , a t i p f r o m

27 a n i n f o r m a n t o f u n p r o v e d r e l i a b i l i t y t h a t a w o m a n n a m e d

28 G r a p e l S i m p s o n w o u l d b e d r i v i n g a c r e a m c o l o r e d O l d s m o b i l e o n

29 H i g h w a y 6 4 f r o m M e m p h i s t o S e l m e r a r e n o t g r o u n d s f o r

30 r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t h a t a n o f f e n s e w a s b e i n g c o m m i t t e d .

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1

2 T h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s f u r t h e r t h a t e v e n i f t h e

3 s t o p w a s j u s t i f i e d , t h e r e w a s n o l e g a l b a s i s f o r t h e s e a r c h

4 w h i c h d i s c l o s e d p o s s e s s i o n o f i l l e g a l d r u g s . N e c e s s a r y

5 d e f e r e n c e t o t h e f i n d e r o f f a c t f o r e c l o s e s r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f

6 t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n s e n t e d t o t h e s e a r c h .

7 T e n n . R . A p p . P . 1 3 ( e ) . H o w e v e r , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s

8 c a s e d r a m a t i c a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e t h e “ d a n g e r o f f a l s e r e p o r t s ,

9 t h r o u g h p o l i c e f a b r i c a t i o n o r f r o m v i n d i c t i v e o r u n r e l i a b l e

10 i n f o r m a n t s . ” S e e S t a t e v . P u l l e y , 8 6 3 S . W . 2 d a t 3 1 . T h e

11 m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n p e r m i t s t h e b o d y s e a r c h o f a n i n n o c e n t

12 c i t i z e n o n t h e s i d e o f a m a j o r h i g h w a y i n f u l l v i e w o f t h e

13 t r a v e l l i n g p u b l i c u p o n t h e u n c o r r o b o r a t e d s n i t c h o f a

14 c o n v i c t e d f e l o n . S u r e l y , t h e d e c i s i o n i s i n i m i c a l t o A r t i c l e

15 I , S e c t i o n 7 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f T e n n e s s e e , w h i c h d e c l a r e s

16 “ t h e p e o p l e s h a l l b e s e c u r e i n t h e i r p e r s o n s , h o u s e s , p a p e r s ,

17 a n d p o s s e s s i o n s , f r o m u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s . ”

18

19 I w o u l d h o l d t h e s t o p i n v a l i d a n d r e v e r s e t h e

20 c o n v i c t i o n .

21

22
23 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
24 R e i d , J .

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