IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
October 20, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
FOR PUBLICATION
Appe llate Court C lerk
JAMES DAVID CARTER, ) Filed: October 20, 1997
)
Appellant, ) Hon. James E. Beckner
) Judge
Vs. )
) GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) Supreme Court
Appellee. ) No. 03-S01-9612-CR-00119
)
APPELLANT FOR APPELLEE:
Gary C. Shockley, Esq. John Knox Walkup
Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell Attorney General & Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Kathy Morante
Deputy Attorney General
John P. Cauley
450 James Robertson Pkwy.
Nashville, Tennessee
C. Berkeley Bell
District Attorney General
Eric Christiansen
Assistant District Attorney General
OPINION
TRIAL COURT AND
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. DROWOTA, J.
We granted the petitioner, James David Carter, permission to appeal to
consider whether the lower courts erred by dismissing Carter’s petition for post-
conviction relief upon the grounds that his claims alleging violations of State v.
Middlebrooks 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992) (Drowota, J. and O’Brien, J.,
dissenting), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963), have been previously determined by the federal district court, and that his
claim challenging the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction given at
his trial, is without merit.
We agree with the lower courts that the reasonable doubt jury instruction
given at Carter’s trial did not violate Cage v. Louisiana, 489 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct.
328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) and its progeny and that the Brady claim was
previously determined by the federal district court. Moreover, even though
Carter’s Middlebrooks claim was not previously determined since the federal
district court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” to resolve the state law
issue, we hold that in the context of this case, Middlebrooks does not preclude
reliance upon the felony murder aggravating circumstance as a basis for
imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of Carter’s petition is
affirmed as modified.
BACKGROUND
The petitioner, James David Carter, was tried on a one count indictment
charging both premeditated and felony first degree murder. The jury returned a
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general verdict of first degree murder and sentenced Carter to death by
electrocution upon finding that there were two statutory aggravating
circumstances,1 and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.2 On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed by this
Court. State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1046,
107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). Carter then filed his first post-conviction
petition, which was unsuccessful. James David Carter, No. 304 Greene County,
(Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, filed Sept. 14, 1989). Following a second
unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief, Carter v. State, 802 S.W.2d 223
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1991), this Court granted the
State’s motion to set an execution date and designated April 3, 1991.
Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, Carter filed his original petition seeking a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court of middle Tennessee. That court
issued a stay of execution, appointed counsel, and subsequently transferred the
case to the federal district court in east Tennessee. After the transfer, the petition
for habeas corpus was amended. In the federal action Carter claimed that when a
defendant has been convicted of felony murder, the use of the felony murder
aggravating circumstance to support the sentence of death is unconstitutional.
1
The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a
lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant and was committed while the defendant was engaged
in comm itting larceny and kidn aping. Te nn. Cod e Ann. § 39-2-20 3(i) (6) & (7) (1982 R epl.)
(repeale d), now codified at T enn. Co de Ann . § 39-13 -204(I)(6 ) & (7) (19 91 Re pl. & 1996 Supp.).
2
The 1982 statute required only a showing that there were no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-
203(g)(2) (1982 Repl.) The statute now requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(f) & (g) (1991
Repl).
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When the habeas corpus petition was filed in 1991, Middlebrooks had not been
rendered. In that case, a majority of this Court specifically held that “when the
defendant is convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder,”
use of the felony murder aggravating circumstance is not permissible because it
“does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense.” Id., 840 S.W.2d at
346. The decision in Middlebrooks was considered to be based on federal
constitutional law3 until this Court’s subsequent decision in State v. Howell, 868
S.W.2d 238, 259, n. 7 (Tenn. 1993), clarified that the Middlebrooks holding was
independently based on Article 1, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Despite the independent state constitutional basis for the decision in
Middlebrooks, the federal district court considered the claim in the habeas corpus
action while ruling on the State’s motion for summary judgment. By orders
entered in November and December of 1994, the district court concluded that
since the jury returned a general verdict of first degree murder, Middlebrooks does
not apply to Carter’s case because he was not convicted “solely on the basis of
felony murder.” The federal district court also granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment on Carter’s alleged Brady violations.
3
Certiorari was granted in Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 507 U.S. 1028, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123
L.Ed.2d 466 (19 93), and a motion to dismiss on the ba sis that ad equate and inde pende nt state
ground s supp orted this C ourt’s dec ision was denied. Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S.
805,114 S.Ct. 48, 126 L.Ed.2d 19 (1993). The case was argued and subsequently, before the
United States Supreme Court had rendered its decision, this Court’s opinion in How ell was
release d. There after, certiora ri was dis misse d as imp roviden tly granted . Tennessee v.
Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S.Ct. 651, 126 L.Ed.2d 5 55 (1993).
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Following this disposition in federal court, Carter filed his third petition for
post-conviction relief in state court on January 30, 1995. As grounds for relief,
Carter alleged that the trial court instructions on reasonable doubt at his trial
violated Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990),
that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady and that
his sentence of death violated Middlebrooks. The trial court dismissed Carter’s
post-conviction petition, finding that the asserted violations of Middlebrooks and
Brady had been previously determined by the federal district court and that the
alleged error in the reasonable doubt jury instructions was without merit. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, and also found, as
did the federal district court, that Middlebrooks does not apply unless the
defendant is convicted of first degree murder “solely on the basis of felony
murder.” Id., 840 S.W.2d at 346. Thereafter, we granted Carter’s application for
permission to appeal and now affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED
A. Court of Competent Jurisdiction - Middlebrooks
The statutory provision relevant to the defense of previous determination
provides that “[a] ground for relief is ‘previously determined’ if a court of competent
jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a full and fair hearing.”4 In this Court,
4
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-112(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994)(Repealed). By a law effective May
10, 1995 , the Pos t-Conv iction Proc edure A ct was comp letely rewr itten. 1995 P ublic Cha pter 207 , §
1. Th e pet ition fo r pos t-con victio n relie f whic h is th e sub ject o f this a ppe al wa s dism isse d on A pril
12, 1995, prior to the effective date of the law as amended. However, the new law also provides
that “[a] ground for relief is previously determined if a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on
the merits after a full and fair hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(h) (1996 Supp.). Therefore,
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Carter argues that the jurisdiction of federal district courts in habeas corpus
proceedings does not extend to questions of state law. Since the federal district
court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction,” to consider his Middlebrooks
claim, Carter argues that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred
by concluding that the claim was previously determined. The State responds that
the federal district court necessarily and appropriately considered the state
constitutional issue when it decided the federal constitutional question. In
addition, the State says that Carter chose to assert his Middlebrooks claim in the
federal forum and should be bound by that court’s decision on the claim.
It is well-settled that federal courts have the power under Article III of the
United States Constitution to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130,
1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). However, Gibbs delineated only the constitutional
boundaries of federal judicial power. The jurisdiction of federal courts over a
particular controversy may be limited by federal statutes. Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 13-14, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2419-20, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court described the jurisdictional hierarchy as follows:
It is apparent that Gibbs delineated the constitutional limits of
federal judicial power. . . . Constitutional power is merely the first
hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal court has
jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of
federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III . . . but
also by Acts of Congress.
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-72, 98 S.Ct. 2396,
our holding in this case applies with equal force to the new law since the statutory provisions are
ident ical.
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