COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges McClanahan, Haley and Senior Judge Willis
ARISTOTELIS PRAMAGIOULIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1437-10-2 PER CURIAM
JANUARY 25, 2011
CYNTHIA L. PRAMAGIOULIS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Gary A. Hicks, Judge
(Christopher H. Macturk; Brandy M. Poss; Barnes & Diehl, PC, on
briefs), for appellant.
(Larry A. Pochucha; Bowen, Champlin, Foreman & Rockecharlie,
on brief), for appellee.
Aristotelis Pramagioulis (husband) appeals from a final decree of divorce. Husband argues
that the trial court erred by (1) granting Cynthia L. Pramagioulis’ (wife) motion to rescind the
parties’ property settlement agreement dated February 25, 2008 (PSA); (2) finding wife’s testimony
concerning the signing of the PSA unrebutted; (3) finding wife was unwittingly agreeable to signing
away her rights because she relied to her detriment on what husband and his prior attorney told her;
(4) finding that there was no clear understanding of the nature and consequences of wife signing the
PSA; (5) finding husband was equitably estopped by his conduct and statements to wife causing
wife to rely on them to her detriment; (6) finding that the PSA did not provide a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property or financial obligations to wife in violation of Code § 20-151; (7) finding
wife was dutiful, loyal, and committed to the marital relationship in making its award of spousal
support and not considering ample evidence to the contrary in determining whether to award
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
spousal support pursuant to Code § 20-107.1(E); (8) awarding rehabilitative spousal support to wife;
(9) awarding rehabilitative spousal support in the amount of $900 per month; (10) awarding
rehabilitative spousal support to wife for twenty years; and (11) denying husband’s motion to
reconsider spousal support and the relief requested therein. Upon reviewing the record and briefs
of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm
the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.”
Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 834 (2003) (citations omitted).
The parties married on June 15, 1999, separated on May 31, 2007, and divorced on June
9, 2010. On February 25, 2008, the parties signed the PSA, which was prepared by husband’s
attorney. Wife was not represented by an attorney at the time. Wife thought that the sole
purpose in signing the PSA was for husband to acquire a bond for his company, Empire Painting.
Under the terms of the PSA, wife received no marital property and waived her right to spousal
support. When the agreement was signed, husband and his attorney told wife that husband
would provide for her, but husband stopped supporting her several months after the PSA was
signed.
On May 21, 2008, wife filed a complaint for divorce and asked the trial court to rescind
the PSA. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim. After a hearing on the matter, the trial
court rescinded the PSA, over husband’s objections, and scheduled a final hearing to resolve the
issues of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney’s fees. The parties presented
evidence and argument at the final hearing, and on April 14, 2010, the trial court issued its letter
opinion, in which it awarded wife $900 per month for twenty years in rehabilitative spousal
-2-
support, and divided the parties’ marital property, including husband’s business. Husband filed a
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. The trial court entered the final decree on
June 9, 2010. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Issues 1 – 6: Rescission of PSA
A.
Husband argued that the trial court erred in granting wife’s motion to rescind the PSA.
“Marital property settlements entered into by competent parties
upon valid consideration for lawful purposes are favored in the law
and such will be enforced unless their illegality is clear and
certain.” Cooley v. Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 752, 263 S.E.2d 49, 52
(1980) (citation omitted); Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 25, 378
S.E.2d 74, 77 (1989). Therefore, in this case, wife “had the burden
at trial to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
alleged to void or rescind the agreement.” Drewry v. Drewry, 8
Va. App. 460, 463, 383 S.E.2d 12, 12 (1989).
Galloway v. Galloway, 47 Va. App. 83, 91, 622 S.E.2d 267, 271 (2005).
The evidence proved that wife suffers from anxiety-panic disorder with agoraphobia,
major depression with severe psychotic features, and bipolar disorder. Wife has been under
psychiatric and psychological care since she was a teenager. Because of her mental condition,
she gives more credibility to others than she does herself and can be very gullible. Her counselor
testified that “because she thinks so highly of what other people think of her, she is more
concerned about how they feel towards her and doubts herself than making the correct decision
that is good and healthy for her.” Since approximately 2003, she has been on permanent
disability from work. At the time of the trial, wife was forty-five years old and had a ninth grade
education.
Husband started a painting business in 2004. At the time of the trial, husband was
thirty-eight years old and in good physical and mental condition.
-3-
In March 2007, husband became enraged at wife and destroyed several household items.
He told her to leave the marital residence, and she later did. She left with her dog and her
clothing. Since she left the home until February 2008, the parties continued to see each other on
a daily basis. Wife helped husband with his business, and they continued to have sexual
relations. She hoped that they would reconcile and live together again.
In early 2008, husband’s business needed a bonding agreement in order to be eligible for
additional lucrative work. Wife initially refused to sign a bonding agreement for the company.
As a result, they determined that husband’s business could obtain the bonding agreement if they
had a property settlement agreement. Wife testified that husband told her that if she “didn’t sign
the separation papers, he wouldn’t continue to help [her] with [her] monthly bills but that if [she]
signed the separation papers, he would continue to help [her].” Husband contacted his attorney,
Theodore Galanides, and asked him to draft a property settlement agreement. On February 25,
2008, the parties went to Galanides’ office to sign the PSA. Galanides explained to wife that he
represented husband only. Wife was not represented by counsel. The parties had not discussed
the division of property, and wife was not provided with an itemized list of property or debts.
The meeting at Galanides’ office was the first opportunity for wife to see the agreement.
Galanides read the majority of the agreement to the parties and asked if they understood it. Wife
testified that when she was at Galanides’ office, she was “under the assumption that [she] was
signing separation papers for [her] husband to be able to be bonded.” Wife asked about spousal
support. Galanides and husband told wife that husband would support her, even though it was
not in the agreement. Relying on their assurances that husband would continue to support her,
wife signed the PSA on February 25, 2008. On February 26, 2008, wife discovered that husband
had a girlfriend, and she stopped seeing husband and helping him with his business. Husband
paid support to wife for several months after signing the PSA, but then stopped doing so.
-4-
During the course of the litigation, wife challenged the validity of the PSA, and the trial
court granted her motion to rescind the PSA. Husband now argues that the trial court erred in
granting her motion. Husband contends the PSA was not unconscionable.
There is a two-step test that courts must apply in determining whether an agreement is
unconscionable: “1) a gross disparity existed in the division of assets and 2) overreaching or
oppressive influences.” Id. at 92, 622 S.E.2d at 271 (citations omitted).
The PSA did not provide any award of marital property to wife, nor did she receive any
spousal support, despite her physical and mental condition. On the other hand, husband received
the marital assets, including his painting business and his Corvette. Accordingly, there was a
gross disparity in the division of the assets.
In issuing its ruling, the trial court focused on wife’s “fragile medical and mental
condition” and her reliance on Galanides’ and husband’s statements that husband would support
her. The trial court ruled, “While there were no overt threats, the signing was ‘compromised’ by
[wife] relying on the statements of Mr. Galanides and [husband] to her detriment that she would
continue to get assistance (despite the fact that no specific amount was mentioned).”
“When the accompanying incidents are inequitable and show bad
faith, such as concealments, misrepresentations, undue advantage,
oppression on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or
ignorance, weakness of mind, sickness, old age, incapacity,
pecuniary necessities, and the like, on the part of the other, these
circumstances, combined with inadequacy of price, may easily
induce a court to grant relief, defensive or affirmative.”
Derby, 8 Va. App. at 28-29, 378 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 928 (5th
ed. 1941)).
Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that wife was “unwittingly agreeable”
to signing the PSA to her detriment. Her counselor explained that she was easily influenced by
others. Wife’s main concern was support, and husband and Galanides assured her that husband
-5-
would support her, which was not the case. Husband told wife to go to Galanides’ office to sign
the agreement. Wife was not provided a copy of the agreement prior to the meeting, nor was she
represented by counsel. She and husband did not discuss the division of property. Given her
mental condition, she did not understand the legal ramifications of the agreement, especially
when husband said that he would support her but did not provide for spousal support in the
agreement. Husband’s statements and actions were overreaching influences on wife.
Husband also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that wife did not have a clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of the PSA. Again, the evidence supports the trial
court’s finding because wife asked several questions about support prior to signing the PSA. She
did not understand that the PSA did not provide for support and husband would be under no
obligation to support her. She relied on the statements that husband would support her, and her
mental condition left her subject to others’ control over her. The trial court quoted the
counselor’s statement, “‘that last influence will be the strongest for her.’” Husband was aware of
her mental condition, and made promises to her that he would not keep so that she would sign
the PSA.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rescinding the PSA given the gross disparity in
the division of the assets and the overreaching influences used to ensure that wife signed the
PSA.
B.
Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding wife’s testimony concerning the
signing of the PSA unrebutted.
Husband did not comply with Rule 5A:20(e) because his opening brief does not contain
any principles of law or citation to legal authorities to fully develop his argument. Unsupported
assertions of error “do not merit appellate consideration.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App.
-6-
53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). We find that husband’s failure to comply with Rule
5A:20(e) is significant, so we will not consider this issue. See Fadness v. Fadness, 52 Va. App.
833, 851, 667 S.E.2d 857, 866 (2008) (“If the parties believed that the circuit court erred, it was
their duty to present that error to us with legal authority to support their contention.”).
C.
Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was equitably estopped by his
conduct and statements to wife causing her to rely on them to her detriment.
Estoppel is the doctrine by which a “party is prevented by his own
acts from claiming a right to [the] detriment of [the] other party
who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted
accordingly.” Black’s Law Dictionary 551 (6th ed. 1990); see also
American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 145 Va. 391, 407,
135 S.E. 21, 25 (1926). “The elements necessary to establish
equitable estoppel are (1) a representation, (2) reliance, (3) change
of position, and (4) detriment, and the party who relies upon
estoppel must prove each element by clear, precise, and
unequivocal evidence. Because the doctrine of estoppel prevents
the showing of the truth, it is applied rarely and only from
necessity.” Princess Anne Hills v. Susan Constant Real Estate,
243 Va. 53, 59, 413 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1992) (citations omitted).
Webb v. Webb, 16 Va. App. 486, 494-95, 431 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1993).
Wife thought that the purpose of the PSA was to enable husband to receive a bonding
agreement for his business. Wife was concerned about support, since she could not work and did
not have sufficient funds to meet her basic expenses, including rent, food, and medicine. She
relied on husband to help her with her monthly bills. Husband promised that he would continue
to support her, and Galanides told wife that she could rely on husband’s word. Wife relied on
these statements and signed the PSA. A few months after the PSA was signed, husband stopped
paying support and said that he could not afford it. Therefore, wife proved the elements of
estoppel, and the trial court did not err.
-7-
D.
Husband also contends the trial court erred in finding that the PSA did not provide a fair
and reasonable disclosure of the property in violation of Code § 20-151.
Pursuant to the Premarital Agreement Act, a premarital agreement
is not enforceable if, in addition to being found unconscionable
when it was executed, the individual challenging its enforceability
establishes either (1) she did not execute the agreement voluntarily,
or (2) she was not provided “a fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property or financial obligations of the other party; and did not
voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure
of the property.” Code § 20-151(A).
Chaplain v. Chaplain, 54 Va. App. 762, 776, 682 S.E.2d 108, 115 (2009). 1
Wife did not waive her right to disclosure of the property. The PSA does not include a
waiver to disclosure; instead, the PSA states, “Each party assures the other that full disclosure
has been made to the other of any assets he or she has any interest in now or at the time of this
separation in lieu of formal discovery.” However, the evidence proved that husband did not
provide a disclosure of the parties’ assets or obligations to wife.
Husband argues that wife had access to the parties’ financial information because she
helped husband with his business. Her assistance with his business does not negate husband’s
responsibility to disclose the assets.
The trial court did not err in finding that there was no disclosure of the assets in violation
of Code § 20-151.
Issues 7 – 11: Rehabilitative Spousal Support
A.
Husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative spousal support to
wife in the amount of $900 per month for twenty years.
1
Pursuant to Code § 20-155, the Premarital Agreement Act applies to postnuptial
agreements as well as premarital agreements.
-8-
A trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support, and its ruling will not be
overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. Brooks v. Brooks, 27 Va. App. 314, 317, 498
S.E.2d 461, 463 (1998) (citations omitted).
The trial court considered the factors in Code § 20-107.1(E) in determining its spousal
support award. The trial court noted the parties’ contributions to the marriage, including their
work together at Empire Painting and wife’s assistance with the business’ paperwork while
husband was on jobs. Wife continued in this role after husband asked her to leave the marital
residence. The trial court mentioned the fact that wife is disabled. The trial court also
commented on the fact that wife had grown accustomed to the parties’ standard of living during
the marriage.
Husband contends the trial court’s award of $900 per month exceeds the amount that he
is able to pay because he actually has a monthly deficit. The trial court had the opportunity to
consider husband’s income and expense statement, which included expenses for his newborn
child and his girlfriend.
The trial court also considered wife’s income and expenses. Wife’s only source of
income was her social security disability payment. She relied on her brother to help her meet her
living expenses. Despite her modest lifestyle, her income and expense statement showed a
deficit of $1,210 per month.
The trial court found that husband had the ability to pay support and wife had the need
for support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife $900 per month.
Husband also contends the trial court erred in awarding wife support for twenty years, or
more than twice the length of the marriage. Husband asserts that the purpose of rehabilitative
spousal support was to enable a spouse to increase her earning capacity, and wife has the
capability of doing office work since she helped with husband’s business. See Peter N. Swisher,
-9-
Lawrence D. Diehl, and James R. Cottrell, Family Law: Theory, Practice, and Forms § 9.7, at
301 (2009). Wife, though, is permanently disabled and unable to work. Given wife’s mental
condition and earning capacity, the trial court did not err in setting the duration for the spousal
support at twenty years.
B.
In issuing its spousal support ruling, the trial court found wife’s testimony to be credible
and found her to be “dutiful, loyal and committed to the marital relationship.” Husband contends
the trial court erred in making this finding. Husband argues that there was evidence to show that
wife’s behavior contributed to the dissolution of the marriage.
“It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the
weight to be given to their testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the
witness’ testimony.” Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) (en
banc).
The trial court accepted wife’s testimony as credible, and there was evidence to support
its conclusion that wife was “dutiful, loyal and committed to the marital relationship.” Wife
assisted husband with his painting business, even after he forced her out of the marital residence.
She continued to hope for reconciliation until she discovered, after she signed the PSA, that
husband had a girlfriend. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in stating that wife was “dutiful,
loyal and committed to the marital relationship.”
C.
Husband argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider spousal
support and the relief requested therein. Rule 5A:20(e) mandates that appellant’s opening brief
include “[t]he standard of review and the argument (including principles of law and authorities)
relating to each assignment of error.” Husband failed to comply with Rule 5A:20(e) because he
- 10 -
did not cite to any legal authorities to support his argument. This Court “will not search the
record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a
brief.” Buchanan, 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. We find that husband’s failure to
comply with Rule 5A:20(e) is significant, so we will not consider this issue. See Parks v. Parks,
52 Va. App. 663, 664, 666 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2008).
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Both parties have requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. See
O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). Having reviewed
and considered the entire record in this case, we hold that wife is entitled to a reasonable amount
of attorney’s fees and costs, and we remand for the trial court to set a reasonable award of
attorney’s fees and costs incurred by wife in this appeal.
Since wife prevailed in this appeal, we deny husband’s request for attorney’s fees and
costs. Rogers v. Rogers, 51 Va. App. 261, 274, 656 S.E.2d 436, 442 (2008).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27.
We remand this case to the trial court for determination and award of the appropriate appellate
attorney’s fees and costs.
Affirmed and remanded.
- 11 -