Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Haley and Beales
Argued by teleconference

MIHAI GHEORGHIU
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0801-07-4 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
AUGUST 25, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Joanne F. Alper, Judge

Jonathan Shapiro; J. Frederick Sinclair for appellant.

Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

An Arlington County jury convicted Mihai Gheorghiu (appellant) of thirty-six counts of

credit card theft, in violation of Code § 18.2-192 (case numbers CR05-1231 through CR05-1240,

CR06-453 through CR06-469, and CR06-752 through CR06-760); eight counts of credit card

forgery, in violation of Code § 18.2-193 (case numbers CR06-441 through CR06-448); five

counts of identity theft, in violation of Code § 18.2-186.3 (case numbers CR05-1241 through

CR05-1243, CR05-1247, and CR05-1248); three counts of credit card fraud, in violation of Code

§ 18.2-195 (case numbers CR06-449, CR06-451, and CR06-452); and one count of possession of

burglarious tools, in violation of Code § 18.2-94 (case number CR06-440). Appellant challenges

these convictions on several grounds addressed below. For the following reasons, we affirm in

part and reverse in part. 1

1
Previously, after earlier argument in this case, we dismissed appellant’s appeal with
respect to several convictions where he failed to list the case numbers corresponding to these
convictions on his notice of appeal. However, we since granted appellant’s petition for rehearing
 I. BACKGROUND

“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App.

438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)); see Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330, 601

S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004) (viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

“as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial court”).

So viewed, the evidence proved that appellant and his cousin traveled in a Chevrolet

Trailblazer from New York City to the Northern Virginia area on September 20, 2005. Using his

own credit card, appellant paid for a meal in Arlington County and for a hotel room in the City of

Alexandria on the night of September 20. Appellant and his cousin checked out of the hotel

before noon on the morning of September 21, 2005.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on September 21, appellant accessed a program file on his

laptop computer, interfacing the computer with a “remagger,” a device that enables a person to

read and write data to the magnetic strip on the back of a plastic card. It is unknown where

appellant was when he accessed this program file. Throughout the day, appellant attempted to

use stolen credit card numbers to purchase goods and services in Alexandria, Arlington, and

Fairfax County, and some of these attempts were successful.

After 4:00 p.m. on September 21, appellant was stopped for speeding in Arlington

County. The police officer discovered that appellant had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey

and took appellant into custody. Appellant’s cousin was permitted to leave on foot. A search of

the Trailblazer yielded appellant’s laptop, a thumb drive, and five compact discs, all of which

and his motion for delayed appeal, and so we withdrew our prior opinion in this case. Therefore,
appellant’s appeal of all convictions is presently before us.

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contained stolen credit card information. In total, appellant possessed approximately 100 stolen

credit card names and numbers. In addition, twelve credit cards were found in the vehicle,

eleven with appellant’s name on them, but only three cards had numbers encoded on the

magnetic strip that matched the engraved number on the front of the credit card.

During appellant’s pre-trial detention, the authorities recorded several phone

conversations, mostly in Romanian, apparently discussing credit card fraud and credit card theft.

Concerned about ongoing criminal activity, the authorities searched appellant’s jail cell and

retrieved “foreign language stuff” and credit card sheets. The authorities attempted to avoid

disturbing papers with the letterhead of appellant’s attorneys, but appellant claimed that the

seized materials written in Romanian related to an ongoing federal investigation. Appellant

claimed that he sought to negotiate a “global settlement” through his assistance with that

investigation. Appellant acknowledged that this information was “not specific to the charges in

Arlington County.” After a hearing, the trial court rejected appellant’s claims of Fourth and

Sixth Amendment violations with respect to the warrantless jail cell search and seizure.

At trial, appellant argued that venue was improper on a number of charges, that the

possession of burglarious tools charge should have been stricken, and that the Commonwealth

presented insufficient proof that appellant, rather than his cousin, was the perpetrator of the

offenses. 2 The trial court rejected these arguments, and the jury convicted appellant of the

aforementioned offenses.

2
Appellant does not pursue this sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal.
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 II. ANALYSIS

A. VENUE

1. IDENTITY THEFT (CASE NUMBER CR05-1243)

Appellant argues that venue was improper in Arlington County for the prosecution of an

indictment for identity theft listing Iris Keltz as the victim. Appellant attempted to make a

purchase using Ms. Keltz’s credit card number at a store in Alexandria. He contends that Meeks

v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 651 S.E.2d 637 (2007), controls here and precludes prosecution

in the Arlington County courts. We find venue was proper in this case.

“When venue is challenged on appeal, we determine ‘whether the evidence, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to support the [trial court’s] venue

findings.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 459, 464-65, 658 S.E.2d 708, 710-11 (2008)

(quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)). The evidence

in relation to venue proved appellant was arrested in Arlington County while he was in

possession of Ms. Keltz’s credit card number. Ms. Keltz was a resident of the State of New

York and had not visited Arlington County. No evidence established that appellant newly

accessed this number or newly used it in any particular manner while he was in Arlington

County, but he continued to possess not only the stolen number while in Arlington but also the

remagging device that he utilized to effect these offenses.

“Venue depends on the ‘nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts

constituting it.’” Id. at 464, 658 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699,

703 (1946)). For most crimes, venue is proper in the jurisdiction where all the elements of the

completed crime were committed. See Green v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 438, 448, 528

S.E.2d 187, 192 (2000) (finding the Commonwealth must generally establish venue with

evidence that supports a strong presumption that all elements of the offense occurred within the

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selected venue). For prosecution of identity theft, however, the General Assembly enacted a

special venue statute, which provides that “the crime shall be considered to have been committed

in any locality where the person whose identifying information was appropriated resides, or in

which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually

in such locality.” Code § 18.2-186.3(D) (emphasis added). Therefore, to satisfy Code

§ 18.2-186.3(D), the Commonwealth here needed to establish a “strong presumption” that any

part of the offense took place in Arlington County. See Green, 32 Va. App. at 448, 528 S.E.2d at

192 (noting that, under the general venue statute, the Commonwealth must establish a “strong

presumption” that all elements of the offense occurred within the selected venue); see also

Meeks, 274 Va. at 803, 651 S.E.2d at 639 (construing Code § 18.2-198.1(i), the credit card theft

venue statute, as requiring that the evidence establish a “strong presumption” that an “act in

furtherance” of credit card theft occurred within the selected venue).

To consider whether any part of the crime of identity theft occurred in Arlington County,

we must look to its elements and the nature of the crime. Appellant was charged in case number

CR05-1243 of committing identity theft pursuant to Code § 18.2-186.3, which provides in

pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person, without the authorization or
permission of the person or persons who are the subjects of the
identifying information, with the intent to defraud, for his own use
or the use of a third person, to:

1. Obtain, record or access identifying information 3 which is not
available to the general public that would assist in accessing
financial resources, obtaining identification documents, or
obtaining benefits of such other person; [or]

2. Obtain goods or services through the use of identifying
information of such other person . . . .

3
Under Code § 18.2-186.3(C)(vi), a credit card number qualifies as identifying
information.
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Code § 18.2-186.3(A). 4 If any part of this offense occurred in Arlington County, then venue was

proper there.

Although the Virginia appellate courts have not previously addressed the venue provision

in Code § 18.2-186.3, the Supreme Court has addressed a somewhat similar venue provision

enacted for credit card theft. In Meeks, the Supreme Court considered Code § 18.2-198.1, which

creates a specific exception to the general venue statute for the crime of credit card theft. The

Court considered the elements of credit card theft and found such thefts are “completed where

the card or number is unlawfully taken from its rightful owner or is received with knowledge that

it has been taken and with the intent to use it, sell it, or transfer it.” Meeks, 274 Va. at 803, 651

S.E.2d at 640. The Court concluded that venue did not lie in Alexandria, where Meeks retained

the credit card after she had stolen it elsewhere, as the act of taking the card (and thus the crime

itself) was completed before she arrived in Alexandria. Id. at 803-04, 651 S.E.2d at 640. The

Supreme Court overruled its prior opinion in Cheatham v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 286, 208

S.E.2d 760 (1974), to the extent that Cheatham “wrongly added the element of retention to credit

card theft.” Meeks, 274 Va. at 803, 651 S.E.2d at 639; see Cheatham, 215 Va. at 290, 208

S.E.2d at 763 (holding that the word “withhold,” as used in the context of the credit card theft

statute, “import[s] something more than mere retention”).

Appellant argues that Meeks controls in this case and, therefore, the trial court erred in

finding venue in Arlington County. Meeks does provide guidance for the issue considered here.

In a manner similar to the approach used by the Supreme Court in that case, we must also

determine whether the identity theft had concluded prior to appellant’s arrest in Arlington

County. If the crime of identity theft concluded with the taking of the information, then no “part

4
The indictment in case number CR05-1243 substantially followed this language, with
the addition that such conviction would constitute a second or subsequent conviction under Code
§ 18.2-186.3.
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of the offense” could take place after that taking. See Meeks, 274 Va. at 803, 651 S.E.2d at

639-40. In such a situation, appellant’s possession of the information in Arlington County would

be after the completion of the crime, and so venue would not be proper in that county. However,

if identity theft is a continuing offense such that parts of the offense can occur after the taking,

then venue in Arlington County would be appropriate. Cf. id. at 803, 651 S.E.2d at 640 (finding

Meeks completed the credit card theft in Fairfax County; therefore, venue for that crime did not

lie in Alexandria where she used the card and was then arrested).

a. THE CONTINUING NATURE OF AN IDENTITY THEFT OFFENSE

Although Meeks does illustrate how an appellate court should approach this issue, its

conclusion is not controlling on the significantly different facts and different statute involved

here. Identity theft is not credit card theft. Despite its name, the completion of the crime of

identity theft is not limited to a discrete moment in time marked by the unlawful taking or

receiving of an individual’s identifying information. Rather, identity theft can be committed by

recording or accessing an individual’s identifying information, actions that continue after the

initial obtaining of the information, or by obtaining goods through the use of the illegally

obtained identifying information. Code § 18.2-186.3(A).

Indeed, the very nature of identity theft is that, once an individual’s identifying

information is stolen, the individual’s identity remains stolen by the perpetrator as long as the

perpetrator possesses that information with the intent to defraud the victim for his own benefit or

for the benefit of another unauthorized individual. The General Assembly, in enacting the

identity theft statute, was aware of the extensive and often continuing harm done to a victim’s

finances – and financial reputation – resulting from identity theft. Cf. Code § 18.2-186.3(E)

(providing that a defendant convicted of identity theft may be held responsible for restitution

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including the cost of correcting errors or inaccuracies in the victim’s credit report or other

identifying information).

Therefore, we find that, although credit card theft is completed when the card is taken,

identity theft continues after the identity is illegally taken from its lawful owner. As the

Supreme Court of Washington explained in State v. Leyda, 138 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2006), when

discussing units of prosecution, “[O]nce the accused has engaged in any one of the statutorily

proscribed acts against a particular victim, and thereby committed the crime of identity theft, the

unit of prosecution includes any subsequent proscribed conduct, such as using the victim’s

information to purchase goods after first unlawfully obtaining such information.” Id. at 616.

Essentially, the Washington court classified identity theft as a continuing offense. See id. at 618.

Although not controlling, of course, the rationale expressed in Leyda resonates persuasively.

The Washington court’s description of the continuing nature of identity theft fits nicely with our

description of a continuing offense as “‘a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by

a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.’”

Morris, 51 Va. App. at 467, 658 S.E.2d at 712 (quoting United States v. Midstate Horticultural

Company, 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).

The Virginia appellate courts have not specifically addressed the question of whether

identity theft under Code § 18.2-186.3(A) constitutes a continuing offense, but an Alabama case,

Ex parte Egbuonu, 911 So. 2d 748 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), is instructive. There, the Alabama

court considered a statute nearly identical to the Virginia identity theft statute 5 and held that

5
Ala. Code § 13A-8-192(a), which prohibits identity theft, provides:

A person commits the crime of identity theft if, without the
authorization, consent, or permission of the victim, and with the
intent to defraud for his or her own benefit or the benefit of a third
person, he or she does any of the following:
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“[i]dentity theft, by its definition, is a continuing offense that in most instances will occur in

more than one county or even more than one state.” Id. at 753. The view of the Washington and

Alabama courts that classifies identity theft as a continuing offense comports with the holdings

of numerous other state appellate courts that have addressed the issue. See State v. Meza, 165

P.3d 298 (Kan. App. 2007); State v. Mayze, 622 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. 2005); State v. Ramirez, 633

N.W.2d 656 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). We hold that Code § 18.2-186.3 likewise provides for a

continuing offense rather than an offense that terminates with the taking of the identifying

information. 6

Accordingly, we hold that appellant’s theft of Ms. Keltz’s identity in case number

CR05-1243 commenced with his unlawful obtaining of Ms. Keltz’s credit card number, included

the act of recording and accessing the number, and continued beyond his attempted use of the

credit card number at the store in Alexandria, until he was apprehended in Arlington still

(1) Obtains, records, or accesses identifying information that
would assist in accessing financial resources, obtaining
identification documents, or obtaining benefits of the victim [or]

(2) Obtains goods or services through the use of identifying
information of the victim.

(3) Obtains information documents in the victim’s name.
6
The dissent states that identity theft cannot be classified as a continuing offense,
because, whereas asportation is an element of the crime of larceny that can cause a larceny to be
a continuing offense, no asportation generally occurs with identity theft so that asportation is not,
and really cannot generally be, an element of identity theft. It is true that identity theft does not
involve the taking of physical property from place to place. Rather, identity theft is the theft not
of goods, but of one’s own identity, in the form of certain qualifying personal identifying
information. An individual such as Ms. Keltz is deprived of exclusive possession of her own
identity from the moment the identifying information is illegally obtained with intent to defraud
by the perpetrator until the perpetrator relinquishes the information or the victim is otherwise
notified of the identity theft. As other state appellate courts holding that identity theft is a
continuing offense have remarked, the unusual and highly sophisticated nature of the offense
does not easily lend itself to familiar concepts involving the theft of mere chattel. See Meza, 165
P.3d at 302 (commenting that identity theft “hardly qualifies as garden-variety theft” as it is “the
product of the Information Age”).
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possessing the victim’s identifying information. Our holding here recognizes that identity theft,

by its very nature, is a continuing offense against the victim. Once an individual’s identifying

information is stolen, and the perpetrator possesses the victim’s identifying information, the

offense cannot conclude until the information is returned to the victim (in such a way that the

perpetrator no longer retains it) or the perpetrator’s fraudulent intent to use the identifying

information no longer exists. 7 In case number CR05-1243, appellant committed several

prohibited acts under Code § 18.2-186.3(A), which comprised one continuing offense of identity

theft against Ms. Keltz.

b. WHETHER “ANY PART” OF THE CONTINUING OFFENSE OCCURRED IN ARLINGTON

Pursuant to Code § 18.2-186.3(D), we still must determine whether there existed a strong

presumption that “any part” of the continuing offense of identity theft occurred in Arlington

County. Appellant argues that, even assuming identity theft is a continuing offense, the

Commonwealth failed to establish the required strong presumption with respect to Arlington,

because the Commonwealth proved only that he attempted to obtain goods or services with

Ms. Keltz’s identifying information in Alexandria, rather than Arlington. Appellant contends

that Code § 18.2-186.3(D) required the Commonwealth to establish the strong presumption that

he committed an act proscribed under Code § 18.2-186.3(A) – obtaining, recording, or accessing

Ms. Keltz’s identifying information, or obtaining goods and services through her identifying

information – while in Arlington. Without such a showing, appellant claims, no “part” of the

7
To illustrate the offense’s pervasive and continuing nature, Ms. Keltz testified that she
was surprised when the Arlington police notified her that the security of the particular credit card
number at issue here – as well as other credit card numbers illegally obtained by appellant – had
been compromised, because the physical credit card itself was in her wallet; furthermore,
Ms. Keltz did not even realize her debit card number had also perhaps been compromised until
the day she testified at trial.

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offense took place in Arlington under Code § 18.2-186.3(D). We disagree with appellant’s

analysis.

We recognize, as the trial court recognized below, that the General Assembly enacted a

“very broad” special venue provision for identity theft offenses. Code § 18.2-186.3(D) contrasts

with, and is a notable exception to, the general venue statute providing that “the prosecution of a

criminal case shall be had in the county or city in which the offense was committed.” Code

§ 19.2-244 (emphasis added). Green illustrates the vast difference between the general venue

provision in Code § 19.2-244 and the special identity theft venue provision in Code

§ 18.2-186.3(D) at issue here. This Court’s opinion in Green is the only previously published

appellate opinion in Virginia to mention the phrase “any part of the offense” – which is included

in Code § 18.2-186.3(D), but does not appear in Code § 19.2-244 – in the context of venue.

In Green, the defendant was convicted of several drug offenses in the City of Suffolk,

including transporting one ounce or more of cocaine into the Commonwealth with the intent to

distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01. Green, 32 Va. App. at 441, 448, 528 S.E.2d at

188-89, 192. The evidence established that a package containing more than an ounce of cocaine

entered Virginia, but was intercepted by a drug task force agent in the City of Newport News; by

the time the defendant signed for the package in Suffolk, the authorities had removed all but one

gram of cocaine. Id. at 442-43, 528 S.E.2d at 189. The defendant argued that venue for the

Code § 18.2-248.01 offense was improper in Suffolk because the package did not contain at least

one ounce of cocaine when it reached that city. Id. at 446-47, 528 S.E.2d at 191. The

Commonwealth contended that venue was proper in Suffolk, because it was a place where “any

part of the offense was committed” or, as applied to Code § 18.2-248.01, a jurisdiction where it

could be shown that at least some of the drugs intended to be transported into Virginia had been

passed. Id. at 447, 528 S.E.2d at 191. This Court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention,

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holding that venue in Code § 18.2-248.01 prosecutions (governed by the general venue statute,

Code § 19.2-244) is proper only in jurisdictions “where the required elements of the offense have

been established.” Id. at 449, 528 S.E.2d at 192. We concluded that venue was improper in

Suffolk on the Code § 18.2-248.01 charge because no evidence established that the completed

transportation of one ounce or more of cocaine occurred in that jurisdiction. Id. at 449, 528

S.E.2d at 192-93.

Here, unlike in Green, the Commonwealth was permitted by Code § 18.2-186.3(D) to

demonstrate Arlington was an appropriate venue by establishing the strong presumption that

“any part of the [identity theft] offense” of Ms. Keltz occurred in that county. (Emphasis

added). This distinction is greatly significant here. Had Code § 18.2-186.3(D) not existed, and

had venue in this case instead been controlled by the general venue statute, the Commonwealth

would have been required to establish the strong presumption of a completed offense in

Arlington. See Code § 19.2-244. Because Ms. Keltz was not an Arlington resident, the

Commonwealth would have been required to establish the strong presumption that, with the

intent to defraud, appellant obtained, recorded, or accessed Ms. Keltz’s identifying information,

see Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(1), or obtained goods or services through her identifying information,

see Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2), while in Arlington. Any one act of obtaining, or recording, or

accessing the identifying information, or obtaining goods or services through the identifying

information, with the requisite intent to defraud, could potentially have constituted a completed

offense of identity theft, but to obtain venue in Arlington under Code § 19.2-244, the

Commonwealth would have been required to demonstrate that this completed offense occurred in

Arlington. 8

8
Otherwise, the Commonwealth would have been required to demonstrate that the victim
resided in Arlington, which the parties agree was not the case here.

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 This is appellant’s position, except for his recognition of a clause in Code

§ 18.2-186.3(D) that the defendant need not ever have been physically present in a locality for

venue to be proper there. Appellant devotes much attention to this clause in his supplemental

brief. He asserts that this one clause underscores the General Assembly’s purpose for enacting

the special venue provision for identity theft offenses, which, he claims, was to facilitate

prosecutions of computer hackers with remote access to a victim’s computer and, therefore,

access to a victim’s identifying information. Otherwise, appellant contends, the general venue

standard of Code § 19.2-244 is essentially unchanged for identity theft offenses.

However, the General Assembly enacted Code § 18.2-186.3(D) specifically for identity

theft offenses, and that statute uses precisely the same “any part of the offense” language that

was asserted by the Commonwealth in Green, but was rejected there because that was a case

where venue actually was governed under Code § 19.2-244. Unlike in Green, the

Commonwealth here was not required to establish the strong presumption that a completed

identity theft occurred in Arlington in order to demonstrate Arlington was an appropriate venue

under Code § 18.2-186.3(D). If the General Assembly had intended to require such a showing,

Code § 18.2-186.3(D) would have specified that venue for identity theft offenses is proper in any

locality “where the person whose identifying information was appropriated resides, or the

locality in which [the offense] took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually

in such locality.” To require this demonstration under the actual language of Code

§ 18.2-186.3(D) would essentially impose the requirements of Code § 19.2-244 on an identity

theft proceeding and would, in effect, excise the “any part of the offense” language from Code

§ 18.2-186.3(D) – which we, as an appellate court, of course, are not permitted to do. See

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 630, 634, 652 S.E.2d 111, 113 (2007) (“This Court is not

free to ignore language contained in a statute.”).

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 Instead, Code § 18.2-186.3(D) required the Commonwealth here to establish the strong

presumption that any part of the offense of obtaining, or recording, or accessing the identifying

information, or obtaining of goods or services using that identifying information, occurred in

Arlington – whether or not appellant was ever physically in Arlington. Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in

the trial court, the required strong presumption that any part of the identity theft offense against

Ms. Keltz in case number CR05-1243 occurred in Arlington was established here.

Appellant’s argument to the contrary, 9 the possession of a victim’s identifying

information with the intent to defraud the victim is a part of the continuing offense of identity

theft. Meeks is again instructive. That case involved the credit card theft statute, which, like the

identity theft statute, does not expressly prohibit the defendant from “possessing” the victim’s

credit card or credit card number. See Code § 18.2-192 (prohibiting, in pertinent part, the taking,

obtaining, or withholding of a credit card or credit card number “from the person, possession,

custody or control of another without the cardholder’s consent” (emphasis added)). The

9
Appellant insists that his possession of Ms. Keltz’s identifying information in Arlington
cannot constitute a “part” of the offense under Code § 18.2-186.3(D) if he did not commit a
statutorily prescribed act there while possessing the identifying information. It bears repeating
that a “part” of the offense for the purpose of Code § 18.2-186.3(D) need not be the actual
obtaining, recording, or accessing of a victim’s identifying information, or the obtaining of goods
or services using such information, since any one of these acts could constitute a complete
offense when done with the intent to defraud. “[W]e must assume that the General Assembly
chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute,” Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l
Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001), and, here, it is apparent that the General
Assembly carefully inserted the words “any part of the offense” in Code § 18.2-186.3(D) so as to
distinguish venue in identity theft cases from venue generally. Otherwise, prosecutions under
Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(1), for instance, could be rendered futile for lack of an appropriate venue
if no evidence established the precise locality where a victim’s identifying information was
obtained, recorded, or accessed by an identity thief equipped with remote computer access or
otherwise on the move. The General Assembly, in its wisdom, enacted Code § 18.2-186.3(D) to
grant the Commonwealth necessary latitude in prosecuting a sophisticated identity theft crime
such as appellant committed here.

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Supreme Court observed in Meeks that, under its prior opinion in Cheatham, which Meeks

overruled, “a person could be charged with credit card theft in every jurisdiction entered while

still in possession of the stolen credit card or number with the intent to use it.” Meeks, 274 Va.

at 803, 651 S.E.2d at 640 (emphasis added). The overruling of Cheatham was necessary

because, as discussed above, the crime of credit card theft concludes with the unlawful taking of

an individual’s credit card or credit card number.

In contrast, unlike credit card theft, which is completed in the locality where the card or

number is unlawfully taken from its rightful owner or is received with knowledge that it has been

taken and with the intent to use it, identity theft is a continuing offense, as discussed supra. The

offense necessarily continues for as long as the perpetrator is in unlawful possession of the

victim’s identifying information with the intent to use the victim’s identity in a fraudulent

manner, and, therefore, possession of the identifying information with the intent to defraud must

be considered a “part” of the offense.

In denying appellant’s motion to strike on venue grounds, the trial court properly found

that appellant possessed Ms. Keltz’s identifying information (together with the equipment to

record and access this information) while in Arlington County, up to and including the moment

he was stopped for speeding in that county. Appellant clearly committed a part of the identity

theft, the unlawful possession of Ms. Keltz’s identifying information, in Arlington. In addition,

the trial court also found that appellant had the intent to defraud Ms. Keltz. The evidence

established a strong inference that appellant intended to use Ms. Keltz’s information to commit

fraud when he possessed it in Arlington County on September 21, 2005, as illustrated by his

attempted use of her credit card number earlier that same day, his continuing course of conduct

on that day, and his retention of Ms. Keltz’s information after his unsuccessful attempt to use

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it. 10 Code § 18.2-186.3(A) includes the intent to defraud as an element of the crime of identity

theft, and we find the evidence was also sufficient to infer appellant had that intent while he was

in Arlington County.

Because appellant unlawfully possessed Ms. Keltz’s identifying information and had the

intent to defraud her while in Arlington County, we find the evidence sufficiently strong to

presume that appellant committed a part of the offense of identity theft while in Arlington

County. Accordingly, we conclude there was a strong presumption established that venue was

proper in Arlington for the prosecution of case number CR05-1243.

2. CREDIT CARD FRAUD (CASE NUMBER CR06-449)

Appellant also argues that venue was improper in Arlington County for the prosecution

of an indictment for credit card fraud listing Gerald Kent as the victim. The credit card fraud

offense occurred when Mr. Kent’s credit card number was used to obtain a laptop computer at a

Fairfax County computer store. 11 Appellant contends that venue was improper in Arlington

because the offense in case number CR06-449 was completed in Fairfax, and, he claims, there

was no evidence that any act in furtherance of this particular offense occurred in Arlington.

10
The dissent states that an appropriate analogy to this case would be an instance where a
thief “happen[s] to drive through” a county while still possessing the intent to deprive the victim
of property, but while the stolen property is not in that county. In such a circumstance, the
dissent notes, venue would not be proper in that county. Here, however, appellant both
possessed Ms. Keltz’s identifying information and had the intent to commit fraud while in
Arlington County. Furthermore, the stricter standard for establishing that venue is appropriate in
a larceny prosecution is not at issue here, given the enactment by the General Assembly of a
venue statute applicable specifically to identity theft. As discussed above, the Commonwealth
was required to establish only that any part of the offense of identity theft occurred in Arlington
in order to establish that venue in Arlington was indeed proper.
11
After the fraudulent transaction at the Fairfax computer store, appellant purchased
another laptop with Mr. Kent’s credit card number, this time at a computer store in Arlington.
Appellant was convicted of credit card fraud for the Arlington offense in case number
CR06-452, and he does not challenge venue for that conviction on appeal.

- 16 -
 At the time of the offense in case number CR06-449, the special venue statute concerning

credit card offenses read, “Notwithstanding the provisions of § 19.2-244, a prosecution for a

violation of this article may be had in any county or city in which (i) any act in furtherance of the

crime was committed or (ii) an issuer or acquirer, or an agent of either, sustained a financial loss

as a result of the offense.” Code § 18.2-198.1 (emphasis added). 12 The trial court, in

considering the “expansive” venue statute here, accepted the Commonwealth’s contention that

appellant’s possession of Mr. Kent’s credit card number while in Arlington prior to the offense

was “an act in furtherance of” the credit card fraud against Mr. Kent that occurred in Fairfax.

See Code § 18.2-198.1(i). Therefore, the trial court found that venue was proper in Arlington.

We must determine on appeal whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the party that prevailed below, is sufficient to support the

trial court’s venue findings. Morris, 51 Va. App. at 464-65, 658 S.E.2d at 710-11. The

Commonwealth was required to establish a strong presumption under Code § 18.2-198.1(i) that

an act in furtherance of the credit card fraud offense against Mr. Kent in case number CR06-449

occurred in Arlington. See Meeks, 274 Va. at 803, 651 S.E.2d at 639.

Code § 18.2-195 lists the various means by which a defendant commits credit card fraud.

Tracking the language of Code § 18.2-195(1)(a), the indictment in case number CR06-449

alleged that appellant used Mr. Kent’s credit card number for the purpose of obtaining money,

goods, or services and that appellant knew the card had been obtained in violation of Code

§ 18.2-192 (the credit card theft statute) or was expired or revoked. Although the evidence

proved that Mr. Kent’s credit card number was unlawfully and fraudulently used to obtain goods

12
Code § 18.2-198.1 was amended in 2008, and a sentence was added providing, “A
prosecution for a violation of § 18.2-192 may be had in any county or city where a credit card
number is used, is attempted to be used, or is possessed with intent to violate [Code] § 18.2-193,
18.2-195, or 18.2-197.”

- 17 -
in Fairfax, venue here is not limited to the locality where the crime was completed, in the manner

that venue is limited when Code § 19.2-244 applies. Instead, the special venue statute for credit

card offenses was enacted “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the general venue statute.” Code

§ 18.2-198.1. Pursuant to that special venue statute, we must determine whether there is a strong

presumption that any act in furtherance of the charged credit card fraud offense here occurred in

Arlington.

The phrase “any act in furtherance of the crime” has not yet been interpreted by

Virginia’s appellate courts in relation to a completed credit card fraud offense, but many cases

have discussed acts in furtherance of an offense in other contexts. 13 An act in furtherance of the

offense is a direct act toward the commission of an offense, see Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 2

Va. App. 491, 496, 346 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1986), and need not in itself even be criminal or

unlawful, see Hodge v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 351, 356, 374 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1988). Under

the facts before us here, we find that appellant’s possession of Mr. Kent’s credit card number in

Arlington prior to the credit card fraud offense was an act in furtherance of crime. In order to

“use” Mr. Kent’s credit card number in a fraudulent manner, see Code § 18.2-195(1)(a), it is

axiomatic that he was required to possess the credit card number. Appellant’s possession of

Mr. Kent’s credit card number while in Arlington, therefore, was a direct act toward his

subsequent commission of the credit card offense in case number CR06-449.

13
In order to convict a defendant as a principal in the second degree, for instance, it must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared in the criminal intent or
committed some overt act in furtherance of the offense. See Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226
Va. 120, 124, 306 S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983). Code § 18.2-198.1 requires a different analysis, as
“‘venue is not a substantive element of the crime.’” Morris, 51 Va. App. at 469, 658 S.E.2d at
713 (quoting United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1987)). Instead, we must
determine whether there was a strong presumption that any act in furtherance of the offense
occurred in Arlington.

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 This finding is made clearer still by considering other means by which the

Commonwealth may prove a defendant committed credit card fraud. Under Code

§ 18.2-195(1)(b), a defendant commits credit card fraud when he or she

[o]btains money, goods, services or anything else of value by
representing (i) without the consent of the cardholder that he is the
holder of a specified card or credit card number or (ii) that he is the
holder of a card or credit card number and such card or credit card
number has not in fact been issued.

(Emphasis added). In Saponaro v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 149, 152, 655 S.E.2d 49, 50

(2008), we defined “holder” in the context of Code § 18.2-195(1)(b) as “one in possession of the

cardholder’s credit card.” (Emphasis added). Because the credit card fraud statute concerns both

credit cards and credit card numbers, a defendant can also “hold” a credit card number under

Code § 18.2-195 by possessing the cardholder’s credit card number, for instance, by inserting the

credit card number in an electronic device that is in his possession. By possessing the credit card

or credit card number, a defendant commits an act in furtherance of the offense of credit card

fraud.

Although appellant was charged and convicted under Code § 18.2-195(1)(a), rather than

Code § 18.2-195(1)(b), the nature of the offense is similar under both subsections. Rather than

obtaining goods by fraudulently representing that he was the holder of the credit card, see Code

§ 18.2-195(1)(b), appellant fraudulently used Mr. Kent’s credit card number to obtain goods, see

Code § 18.2-195(1)(a). Without possessing Mr. Kent’s credit card number, he could not have

used the credit card number in violation of Code § 18.2-195. Appellant’s possession of

Mr. Kent’s credit card number, therefore, was an act in furtherance of the credit card fraud

offense.

Furthermore, appellant’s possession of many stolen credit card numbers (including

Mr. Kent’s) must be viewed in the full context of his activities while he was in Virginia. Not

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only did appellant possess these credit card numbers, but, as the prosecutor argued in the trial

court, he had also assembled a “re-encoding shop” inside his truck. Appellant held these stolen

credit card numbers on his laptop, and he readily possessed the means to encode these credit card

numbers on fabricated credit cards in order to make the fraudulent purchases. It was through

these sophisticated means that appellant – already in possession of Mr. Kent’s credit card

number – fraudulently used the credit card number in violation of Code § 18.2-195. Appellant’s

possession of the stolen credit card number while in Arlington was clearly an act in furtherance

of this crime.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since

it was the prevailing party below, we agree with the trial court that appellant’s possession of

Mr. Kent’s credit card number in Arlington created the requisite strong presumption that an act

in furtherance of this particular credit card fraud offense occurred in Arlington, as required by

Code § 18.2-198.1(i). Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s credit card fraud conviction in case

number CR06-449.

3. CREDIT CARD THEFT (CASE NUMBERS CR05-1231 THROUGH CR05-1240,
CR06-453 THROUGH CR06-469, AND CR06-752 THROUGH CR06-760)

Appellant belatedly argues that venue for all credit card theft charges did not lie in

Arlington County. He did not raise the issue of venue in relation to the credit card theft charges

at trial. See Code § 19.2-244 (requiring that questions of venue be raised prior to the verdict).

He did not raise this issue in relation to the credit card theft convictions in his petition for appeal.

See Rule 5A:12(c) (“Only questions presented in the petition for appeal will be noticed by the

Court of Appeals.”). No exception applies to these requirements in Code § 19.2-244 or in Rule

5A:12; therefore, appellant’s argument, made for the first time after the appeal was granted, is

too late to permit review by this Court.

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 B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (CASE NUMBERS CR05-1241, CR06-452, CR05-1242, AND CR06-451)

Appellant argues that his simultaneous convictions for identity theft (case number

CR05-1241) and credit card fraud (case number CR06-452) were improper because the

convictions punished him for the same act/offense twice in a single proceeding, in violation of

the principles underlying double jeopardy protections. Appellant also argues that another set of

simultaneous convictions, identity theft (case number CR05-1242) and credit card fraud (case

number CR06-451), were improper for the same reason. We hold no violation of double

jeopardy principles occurred here.

The test devised in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), governs our

analysis. Under this test, appellate courts must determine “‘whether each [offense charged]

requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 261

Va. 196, 200, 539 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2001) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304) (brackets in

original). If each offense requires, in the abstract, proof of an additional element, then double

jeopardy protections do not apply and both convictions will stand. Id.

Here, it is clear that each charge constituted a separate crime, and neither conviction

punished a lesser-included offense of the other. Stated broadly, the credit card fraud statute

criminalizes the act of “obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value” through the

fraudulent use of a credit card or credit card number that was acquired either by means of credit

card theft under Code § 18.2-192 or by other fraudulent means. See Code § 18.2-195. Identity

theft, by contrast, involves the compromised security of several types of identifying information,

including credit card numbers. See Code § 18.2-186.3(C). Credit card fraud is committed by

obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value, see Code § 18.2-195, whereas

identity theft can be committed by obtaining, recording, or accessing an individual’s identifying

information, or by obtaining goods or services through the use of the identifying information, see

- 21 -
Code § 18.2-186.3(A). Furthermore, the amount of loss associated with credit card fraud is

limited to the value of “all goods, services, and anything else of value actually furnished,” see

Code § 18.2-195(3), whereas the amount of loss associated with identity theft is not necessarily

limited by the value of goods or services fraudulently obtained, see Code § 18.2-186.3(D).

Therefore, several factors distinguish the two offenses.

Although appellant accurately notes that he committed the respective crimes in a similar

manner, this fact does not render the convictions improper. Under the Blockburger test, we

examine “‘the offenses charged in the abstract, without referring to the particular facts of the

case under review.’” Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 407, 441, 611 S.E.2d 631, 648

(2005) (quoting Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734). Viewed in the abstract, identity

theft and credit card fraud are separate offenses punishable in a single criminal proceeding.

Accordingly, appellant’s convictions for identity theft and for credit card fraud were proper.

C. POSSESSION OF BURGLARIOUS TOOLS (CASE NUMBER CR06-440)

Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to strike a charge

of possession of burglarious tools, in violation of Code § 18.2-94. The charge related to

appellant’s possession of electronic devices, such as the laptop and the remagging device, that he

used to record and encode the victims’ identifying information on the fabricated credit cards.

Appellant contends that Code § 18.2-94 is not applicable to statutory offenses involving the

credit card crimes for which he was convicted. Therefore, appellant contends that his conviction

under Code § 18.2-94 was improper. 14

“If any person have in his possession any tools, implements or outfit, with intent to

commit burglary, robbery or larceny, upon conviction thereof he shall be guilty of a Class 5

14
Appellant suggests that the Commonwealth might more appropriately have charged
him with possession of credit card forgery devices, in violation of Code § 18.2-196.

- 22 -
felony.” Code § 18.2-94. Therefore, Code § 18.2-94 prohibits the possession of a tool,

implement or outfit “with the requisite intent” to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny. Edwards

v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 402, 408-09, 672 S.E.2d 894, 897 (2009) (en banc). If the

Commonwealth failed to demonstrate this requisite intent to commit burglary, robbery, or

larceny, then it would logically follow that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that appellant committed an offense under Code § 18.2-94.

The Commonwealth did not charge appellant with burglary, robbery, or larceny;

however, the Commonwealth contends the evidence proved that appellant possessed the laptop

and remagger device “with a larcenous intent to steal.” Ample evidence established the

inference that appellant intended to defraud his victims, but whether appellant intended to

commit larceny is a separate matter. Larceny, a common law crime, is “the wrongful or

fraudulent taking of another’s property without his permission and with the intent to permanently

deprive the owner of that property.” Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 574, 667 S.E.2d 763,

765 (2008). At no time during appellant’s trial did the Commonwealth establish that he intended

to commit common law larceny.

In Scott v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 276, 281, 549 S.E.2d 624, 626 (2001), we

considered whether two counts of credit card theft should have been merged with one count of

petit larceny under the single larceny doctrine. In holding that the trial court appropriately

declined to merge the three counts into a single larceny, we reviewed the common law rule that

only a credit card itself – and not the line of credit it represented – could be the subject of

larceny. Id. at 281, 549 S.E.2d at 626. We held that the General Assembly enacted the credit

card theft statute, Code § 18.2-192, with the intent to create “a very distinct offense, different

from and in abrogation of, the common law offense of larceny.” Id. Furthermore, we held that

petit larceny is not a lesser-included offense of credit card theft. Id. at 282, 549 S.E.2d at

- 23 -
626-27. It is clear under Scott, therefore, that credit card theft is a different offense than

common law larceny. Thus, in proving appellant had the intent to commit credit card fraud, the

Commonwealth did not also prove that he intended to commit common law larceny.

While appellant fraudulently obtained (or attempted to obtain) goods or services using

stolen credit card numbers, these statutorily enacted offenses constituted different crimes than

common law larceny. These offenses are also unlike the crime of obtaining money by false

pretenses. A person who obtains money by false pretenses is deemed guilty of larceny, see Code

§ 18.2-178, and multiple charges of obtaining money by false pretenses are appropriately merged

under the single larceny doctrine, see Millard v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 202, 206, 539

S.E.2d 84, 86 (2000). Here, the Commonwealth provides no real basis for its contention that

appellant actually intended to commit common law larceny – as opposed to the crime for which

he was charged – other than its claim that appellant vaguely intended “to steal.”

Therefore, the Commonwealth failed to establish that appellant possessed the laptop and

remagging device with the intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny. 15 Consequently, we

reverse appellant’s conviction for possession of burglarious tools and dismiss the charge.

D. DUPLICITY AND JURY UNANIMITY (CASE NUMBERS CR05-1241 AND CR05-1242)

Appellant next argues that the indictments charging identity theft in case numbers

CR05-1241 (involving Gerald Kent) and CR05-1242 (involving Iris Keltz) were duplicitous

because the two indictments both alleged violations of both subsections of Code

§ 18.2-186.3(A), which appellant claims created two separate and unrelated offenses.

Furthermore, appellant contends that, because the trial court did not compel the Commonwealth

to elect one subsection of Code § 18.2-186.3(A) upon which to proceed, and because Jury

15
Because we hold that the Commonwealth failed to establish the requisite intent under
Code § 18.2-94 to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny, we need not consider whether the laptop
and remagging device constituted tools, implements, or outfits under Code § 18.2-94.
- 24 -
Instruction 10 pertaining to these charges did not cure the alleged error, it was impossible to

determine if the jury unanimously found him guilty using the same specific identity theft offense

subsection.

Turning first to appellant’s argument with respect to Jury Instruction 10 and jury

unanimity, the Commonwealth correctly points out that appellant failed to preserve the issue for

appeal. Appellant never raised a jury unanimity contention in the trial court with respect to Jury

Instruction 10, relating to identity theft. Although he did raise the issue of duplicity, and “[jury]

unanimity is closely related to the issue of duplicity,” United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d

1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 1993), the same objection or argument must be made at trial as the one

presented on appeal. See, e.g., Chase v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 194, 197, 555 S.E.2d 422,

424 (2001). Therefore, appellant’s jury unanimity argument is defaulted under Rule 5A:18.

Moreover, we find no basis upon which to conclude that Code § 18.2-186.3(A) is

susceptible to duplicitous prosecutions here. An indictment “may contain any number of counts

charging the commission of a single offense, stated in different ways so as to meet the varying

phases of proof that might be offered.” King v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 850, 853, 183 S.E. 173,

174 (1936). Therefore, although Code § 18.2-186.3(A) may be violated in different ways, the

Commonwealth may allege and prove any one or all of those methods in its attempt to establish a

defendant’s guilt. Because identity theft is a continuing offense, the thefts here were related, not

unrelated. See Bragg v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 607, 615, 593 S.E.2d 558, 562 (2004).

We find that the crimes described in Code § 18.2-186.3(A) stem from the same act of

identity theft that appellant committed against the victim. 16 Accordingly, we reject appellant’s

duplicity argument.

16
In an opinion subsequent to Ex parte Egbuonu, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals, interpreting an identity theft statute nearly identical to our own Code § 18.2-186.3(A),
- 25 -
 E. WARRANTLESS JAIL CELL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Appellant argues lastly that the prison officials’ pre-trial, warrantless search of his jail

cell, and the resulting seizure of the Romanian-language documents that he claims were prepared

to assist in an unrelated federal matter, violated his Fourth Amendment protection against

unlawful search and seizures and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We disagree.

The United States Supreme Court has held that “society is not prepared to recognize as

legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and

that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not

apply within the confines of the prison cell.” Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 535, 551

S.E.2d 638, 641 (2001) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). Citing United

States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986), appellant attempts to differentiate Megel and

Hudson by arguing that those cases apply only to post-trial prisoners rather than to pre-trial

detainees. However, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the United States Supreme Court

upheld a room search rule against a Fourth Amendment challenge by pre-trial detainees. The

Court in that case “simply assumed, arguendo, that a pretrial detainee retained at least a

‘diminished expectation of privacy.’” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525 n.6 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at

557).

We see no need to address the distinction between pre-trial detainees and post-trial

prisoners made by the Second Circuit in Cohen, because the documents under dispute here were

never placed before the jury. The Commonwealth never even attempted to introduce any of

these documents into evidence. Therefore, even assuming without deciding that the trial court’s

denial of appellant’s Fourth Amendment motion was error, any such error was, consequently,

reached the same conclusion. See Egbuonu v. State, 993 So.2d 35, 42-45 (Ala. Crim. App.
2007).

- 26 -
“harmless, and thus excusable,” because it “appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25

Va. App. 702, 719, 492 S.E.2d 470, 479 (1997) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)); see Code § 8.01-678.

Appellant also argues that his right to an attorney-client privilege under the Sixth

Amendment was violated by the search and seizure of papers from his jail cell and that,

therefore, this alleged violation requires dismissal of all his convictions. We again disagree with

appellant, who essentially argues that the per se dismissal rule applies to his case and requires

this result. “The per se [dismissal] rule represents a moral as well as a legal condemnation of

such egregious and unequivocal conduct for which sanctions are imposed against the

Government as punishment regardless of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Gartner, 518

F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975).

Here, we disagree with appellant’s basic premise on his Sixth Amendment argument.

Dismissal is rarely the appropriate remedy when faced with a violation of the right to counsel.

See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981). “Cases involving Sixth Amendment

deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered

from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.”

Id. at 364. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained, “[T]he remedy

characteristically imposed is not to dismiss the indictment but to suppress the evidence or to

order a new trial if the evidence has been wrongfully admitted and the defendant [has been]

convicted.” Id. at 365. “More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat

thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have

been deliberate.” Id. Dismissal may only be appropriate where there is “continuing prejudice”

which cannot “be remedied by a new trial or suppression of evidence.” Id. at 366 n.2. Logic

- 27 -
would seem to dictate that dismissal would be even less appropriate as a sanction when, as here,

the alleged misconduct related to an entirely different case, being prosecuted by a different

sovereign – the government of the United States.

Here, furthermore, the Commonwealth’s seizure of the materials relating to the federal

case – assuming, arguendo, that it even implicated the Sixth Amendment – was not the result of

egregious conduct and certainly did not prejudice appellant’s defense. The trial court found the

seized materials had no connection to these charges in Arlington, were not materials appellant

intended to provide to his counsel in this case, and were in fact written with the intent to give to

federal authorities. Given that the trial court’s findings here were certainly not plainly wrong,

dismissal of appellant’s convictions, as he requests, simply is not warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and dismiss appellant’s conviction for possession

of burglarious tools in case number CR06-440, and we otherwise affirm the trial court.

Affirmed in part,
and reversed and
dismissed in part.

- 28 -
Humphreys, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.

I join entirely in the analysis and holding of the majority in regard to all issues presented,

except for the questions raised by Gheorghiu regarding venue.17 I disagree with the analysis and

judgment of the majority that venue was proper in case number CR05-1243, charging Gheorghiu

with identity theft, or case number CR06-449, charging Gheorghiu with credit card fraud.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent on those two issues.

I. Identity Theft

I cannot join the majority’s opinion affirming Gheorghiu’s conviction for identity theft

pursuant to case number CR05-1243 because I believe that the Commonwealth failed to prove

that Arlington County was the proper venue for prosecution of that offense.

“In deciding whether venue in a particular jurisdiction was proved, a court must

determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

17
With respect to the issue presented regarding Gheorghiu’s conviction for possession of
burglarious tools, as the majority notes, the Attorney General offered no serious argument that,
given our holdings in Edwards v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 402, 408-09, 672 S.E.2d 894,
897 (2009) (en banc); Scott v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 276, 549 S.E.2d 624 (2001); and
Millard v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 202, 539 S.E.2d 84 (2000), the laptop and remagger
could constitute “implements, tools or an outfit” to facilitate commission of the offense of
larceny, as opposed to other possible statutory offenses, except to repeatedly assert that two of
the statutory offenses Gheorghiu was charged with used the word “theft” in their title and
conceded that prosecution might have been more appropriate under Code § 18.2-196(1)(b) for
criminal possession of credit card forgery devices (prohibiting the possession “with knowledge
of its character, machinery, plates or any other contrivance designed to reproduce instruments
purporting to be credit cards . . .”).
I agree entirely with the analysis and judgment of the majority in holding that the
evidence presented was insufficient given the offense charged in the indictment. I am well aware
that the Attorney General bears no responsibility for the charging decision in most criminal
cases. However, I digress to emphasize this point because it aptly illustrates what this Court has
observed with increasing frequency - either an inexcusable lack of awareness by many
prosecutors of the existence of statutes that the General Assembly has seen fit to tailor to specific
conduct or the failure of many of the Commonwealth’s prosecutors to effectively review the
appropriateness of the charges before presenting indictments to a grand jury. See, e.g., Clark v.
Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 120, 141 n.11, 676 S.E.2d 332, 343 n.11 (2009) (en banc)
(Humphreys, J., dissenting).

- 29 -
gave rise to a ‘strong presumption’ that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the

court.’” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (quoting

Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)). “This may be

accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. Normally, “venue is appropriate

in any jurisdiction where the required elements of the offense have been established.” Green v.

Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 438, 449, 528 S.E.2d 187, 192 (2000). In cases involving

violations of Code § 18.2-186.3, the General Assembly has specifically determined where venue

is proper. Code § 18.2-186.3(D) provides that, in such cases, “[t]he crime shall be considered to

have been committed [1] in any locality where the person whose identifying information was

appropriated resides, or [2] in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the

defendant was ever actually in such locality.”

The victim in this case, Iris Keltz (“Keltz”), did not reside in Arlington County at the

time of the offense. Thus, in order to prove venue, the Commonwealth must have presented

evidence creating a strong presumption that some “part of the offense” took place in Arlington.

Code § 18.2-186.3 defines the offense of identity theft as follows:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the authorization or
permission of the person or persons who are the subjects of the
identifying information, with the intent to defraud, for his own use
or the use of a third person, to:

1. Obtain, record or access identifying information which is not
available to the general public that would assist in accessing
financial resources, obtaining identification documents, or
obtaining benefits of such other person.

2. Obtain goods or services through the use of identifying
information of such other person . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

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 Therefore, for prosecution to be proper in Arlington County, the Commonwealth must

show that Gheorghiu either (1) obtained, recorded or accessed Keltz’s information in Arlington,

or (2) that he used Keltz’s information to obtain goods or services in Arlington. As the majority

concedes, there is no evidence supporting either conclusion. Given that Ms. Keltz does not live

in Arlington, the majority’s concession would seem to be dispositive of the issue but, instead, the

majority presents two alternative and quite novel reasons why venue was proper in Arlington.

The majority’s first approach to finding venue to have been proper in Arlington is that

Gheorghiu “clearly committed a part of the identity theft, the unlawful possession of Ms. Keltz’s

identifying information” in Arlington. Its secondary theory is that identity theft is a continuing

offense and he possessed the credit card information while in Arlington.

Insofar as the majority’s first holding is concerned, in my view the word “part” as used in

Code § 18.2-186.3(D) is simply a synonym for the term “element” and, in context, it seems

obvious to me that the General Assembly intended for venue to lie in any jurisdiction where it

could be established that an act constituting an element of the offense occurred. Possession,

though, is not an element of identity theft. Although possession is certainly incidental to the

statutory elements, as it is with any number of offenses, possession is not itself an element of the

offense. Had the General Assembly wished to punish the mere possession of someone else’s

identifying information, it certainly could have done so. However, it chose only to criminalize

the acts of obtaining, recording, accessing, and using such information or obtaining goods or

services through the use of such information. “Where the General Assembly has expressed its

intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the

statute or alter its plain meaning.” Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608

S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005). In the case of identity theft, the General Assembly has required that

some “part of the offense” occur in a locality in order for that locality to have jurisdiction.

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Because possession of the identifying information of another is not an element of identity theft, it

is not “part” of that offense and cannot, standing alone, provide a basis for venue.

Furthermore, and contrary to the holding of the majority, neither is identity theft a

continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any jurisdiction where the offender travels while

possessing stolen credit card information. Over a century ago, our Supreme Court explained the

continuing offense doctrine:

It has been a settled principle of the common law, from an early
day, in England, that where property is stolen in one county, and
the thief has been found, with the stolen property in his possession,
in another county, he may be tried in either. This practice
prevailed notwithstanding the general rule that every prosecution
for a criminal cause must be in the county where the crime was
committed. The exception to the general rule grew out of a fiction
of the law, that, where property has been feloniously taken, every
act of removal or change of possession by the thief constituted a
new taking and asportation . . . .

Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 789, 791, 22 S.E. 852, 852 (1895) (citing Cousins’s Case,

29 Va. (2 Leigh) 708 (1830)) (emphasis added). Thus, in the case of a larceny, the continuing

offense doctrine is predicated on the legal fiction that a new larceny occurs every time a thief

moves stolen property. That legal fiction is appropriate because asportation is an element of

larceny. By contrast, asportation is not an element of identity theft. There is no legal principle,

fictional or not, that dictates that every movement by an identity thief constitutes a new offense

of identity theft. Identity theft only occurs where and when someone fraudulently obtains,

accesses, records or uses another person’s identifying information. See Code § 18.2-186.3.

While possession is necessarily incident to obtaining, accessing, recording or using identifying

information, the crime is not complete upon the mere possession of the information because the

elements of this particular crime require activity by the perpetrator that is active in nature rather

than passive. Put another way, while possession of identifying information may be a

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consequence of, or a predicate to, several of the required elements, standing alone it is not

sufficient to constitute any of them.

Here, in contrast to the continuing offense of common law larceny, none of the acts that

constitute the statutory elements of the crime occurred in Arlington County, and the fact that

Gheorghiu possessed Keltz’s credit card information in Arlington does not change that. 18

Moreover, even if identity theft were a continuing offense, venue would still be improper in

Arlington. The general rule of venue is that “venue is appropriate in any jurisdiction where the

required elements of the offense have been established.” Green, 32 Va. App. at 449, 528 S.E.2d

at 192 (emphasis added). A thief can be prosecuted in every county in which he carries the

stolen property because every time he moves the stolen goods to a different jurisdiction, he

commits all of the required elements of larceny – taking and asportation with the intent to

permanently deprive the lawful owner thereof. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518, 506

S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998) (listing the elements of larceny). That larceny is a continuing offense

does not mean that venue lies wherever a thief travels. Rather, venue is only proper where the

thief travels and commits larceny, i.e., wherever he commits a new taking by continued

asportation of the stolen goods to the detriment of the owner’s right to possession. 19 Under Code

18
The majority cites to the Supreme Court of Washington in support of its claim that
identity theft is a continuing offense. However, even under that court’s analysis, Arlington
would not be a proper venue for this crime. In the case the majority cites, the court specifically
held that, in the case of identity theft, the “unit of prosecution” only includes “subsequent
proscribed conduct.” State v. Leyda, 138 P.3d 610, 616 (Wash. 2006). As previously noted,
possession is not proscribed conduct under Code § 18.2-186.3.
19
The majority responds to this analogy by noting that Gheorghiu was not charged with
larceny but rather with identity theft which “does not involve the taking of physical property” but
rather “of one’s own identity.” Whether this metaphysical approach to statutory construction is
appropriate is a debate for another day. My point is simply that while a new larceny occurs
when stolen property is carried from place to place, the same is not true of identity theft. The
crime of identity theft was complete when Gheorghiu obtained Ms. Keltz’s identifying
information. Though he would have committed a new offense of identity theft each time he
accessed that information or obtained goods or services using it, the plain language of the statute
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§ 18.2-186.3, venue is proper only where Gheorghiu committed any “part of the offense.” Here,

Gheorghiu traveled through Arlington, but there is no evidence of any nexus whatever between

any of the statutory elements of identity theft and Arlington County.

The majority’s remaining basis for holding that venue was appropriate in Arlington

County is that Gheorghiu traveled through Arlington while possessing the intent to “commit

fraud.” Code § 18.2-186.3. Assuming without agreeing that the evidence proved that Gheorghiu

possessed that intent while speeding through Arlington, merely having the intent to commit a

crime is likewise insufficient to create venue for prosecution. Generally, in order for venue to lie

in a particular place, “the required elements of the offense” must occur in that place. Green, 32

Va. App. at 449, 528 S.E.2d at 192 (emphasis added). While intent to defraud must certainly be

proven, a particular mens rea is not the gravamen of the crime of identity fraud. Thus, the nature

of any continuing offense is that all of the required elements have occurred in each place where

prosecution is sought. Even in light of the more relaxed standard for venue found in Code

§ 18.2-186.3, to hold that venue is proper wherever Gheorghiu intended to commit fraud, without

more, would be akin to holding that venue is proper for possession with intent to distribute drugs

wherever a person intends to distribute drugs, regardless of whether that person ever actually

possessed drugs in that locale. See United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1982)

(holding that venue for possession with intent to distribute is improper in Georgia because the

defendant never actually or constructively possessed the drugs in Georgia, despite evidence that

the defendant possessed the intent to distribute the drugs while he was in Georgia).

For example, in a larceny prosecution, venue is proper in any locale where “the thief has

been found, with the stolen property in his possession.” Strouther, 92 Va. at 791, 22 S.E. at 852

makes it clear that the offense of identity theft is not committed continuously simply by virtue of
the continued possession of identifying information, whether it was stored on a computer or
simply committed to memory.
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(emphasis added). That is so, because every time a thief moves the stolen goods, a new larceny

occurs. If the thief were to steal a television in Arlington and then take it to his home in

Alexandria, venue would be proper in both locations because the elements of larceny occurred in

both locations. However, if the thief left the television in Alexandria and drove to Fairfax, he

could not be prosecuted in Fairfax, even though he still had the intent to permanently deprive the

rightful owner of the television. Fairfax would not be the proper venue because no larceny took

place there. It is irrelevant that the thief happened to drive through Fairfax with a larcenous

intent. To hold otherwise would be to conclude that a thief can be tried for larceny in any county

or city in which he travels regardless of whether he committed a larceny in that jurisdiction.

Today, the majority holds that Gheorghiu can be prosecuted for identity theft in Arlington even

though he did not commit any “part of the offense” in Arlington. Because such a holding would

largely render meaningless the basic concept that the proper location for a criminal prosecution is

the jurisdiction where the crime actually occurred, that is a holding in which I cannot join.

Simply put, the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that Gheorghiu committed any

element of this particular offense of identity theft in Arlington County. Therefore, I would hold

that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Arlington County was the proper venue for this

charge and reverse the conviction on case number CR05-1243 and remand for a new trial in a

proper venue if the Commonwealth be so advised.

II. Credit Card Fraud

Furthermore, though for different reasons, I cannot join the majority’s opinion affirming

Gheorghiu’s conviction for credit card fraud pursuant to case number CR06-449, because I

believe that the Commonwealth failed to establish venue by proving that Gheorghiu committed

an “act in furtherance” of that crime in Arlington County.

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 At the time of Gheorghiu’s offense, Code § 18.2-198.1 provided that a prosecution for

credit card fraud “may be had in any county or city in which (i) any act in furtherance of the

crime was committed or (ii) an issuer or acquirer, or an agent of either, sustained a financial loss

as a result of the offense.” The majority holds that, by possessing Gerald Kent’s (“Kent”) credit

card information in Arlington County, Gheorghiu committed an act in furtherance of the crime of

credit card fraud. I disagree.

The phrase “act in furtherance of the crime” has never been defined with respect to

Code § 18.2-198.1. However, as the General Assembly was surely aware when they included

those words in the statute, this phrase is a common term of art in the Commonwealth’s

jurisprudence relating to the crime of attempt. An attempt occurs when a person intends to

commit a crime and commits “‘any slight act done in furtherance of this intent.’” Parsons v.

Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 576, 583, 529 S.E.2d 810, 813 (2000) (quoting Siquina v.

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694, 701, 508 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1998)). Under the law of attempt,

the act in furtherance of the crime “need not be the last proximate act toward completion, but ‘it

must go beyond mere preparation and be done to produce the intended result.’” Id. (quoting

Siquina, 28 Va. App. at 701, 508 S.E.2d at 353). Thus, to constitute an act in furtherance,

“[t]here must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, it must be in such progress

that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of the

attempter, and the act must not be equivocal in nature.” Id. (quoting Siquina, 28 Va. App. at

701, 508 S.E.2d at 353). “The distinction is that preparation ‘consists in devising or arranging

the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense and [] the attempt is a direct

movement towards the commission after the preparations are made.’” Ashford v.

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 676, 682, 626 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2006) (quoting Martin v.

Commonwealth, 195 Va. 1107, 1111, 81 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1954)).

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 Here, Gheorghiu was charged with using Kent’s credit card number for the purpose of

obtaining money, goods, or services, in violation of Code § 18.2-195. It is undisputed that

Gheorghiu did not use Kent’s credit card number while in Arlington County. The evidence

proved that, while in Arlington County, Gheorghiu did nothing more than possess Kent’s credit

card number. Although I agree with the majority that, without possessing Kent’s credit card or

credit card number, Gheorghiu could not have committed that crime, based upon the substantial

body of precedent that construes the phrase “act in furtherance of the crime,” I do not believe the

General Assembly intended a different meaning in the context of Code § 18.2-198.1 and, thus,

mere possession cannot be sufficient to establish venue in Arlington. In my view, merely

holding the card in his possession is nothing more than “devising or arranging the means or

measures necessary for the commission of the offense.” Id. As such, possessing credit card

information is merely a preparatory step and is not sufficient to constitute an act in furtherance of

the crime. Adding strength to this analysis, as the majority notes, in 2008 the General Assembly

expanded Code § 18.2-198.1 to allow for venue in any locality where a credit card number is

“possessed with intent to” commit credit card fraud. That addition to the venue statute is yet

another clear indication that the General Assembly did not intend for possession to be sufficient

to establish venue under the original statute in effect at the time of Gheorghiu’s trial. Had the

original statute allowed prosecution in any venue in which the accused merely possessed a stolen

credit card number as the majority holds today, the 2008 amendment would have been entirely

unnecessary. 20

20
I recognize that the 2008 amendment would arguably permit Gheorghiu to be retried
for credit card fraud in Arlington County since statutory amendments that are procedural in
nature are prospective from their enactment and not from the date of the offense. See Code
§ 1-239. Nonetheless, at the time of the trial in the case before us, Arlington County was not the
proper venue and I see no principled reason to adopt a “no harm, no foul” approach to the
analysis of this issue.

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 For the reasons stated, I join in the analysis and judgment of the majority on all issues

presented except for those venue issues properly preserved for appeal which relate to identity

theft, case number CR05-1243 and credit card fraud, case number CR06-449. I would reverse

Gheorghiu’s convictions for those offenses and remand those indictments for a new trial in an

appropriate venue if the Commonwealth be so advised.

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