COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judge Humphreys and Senior Judge Clements
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RODNEY LEE RODIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0162-09-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
MAY 11, 2010
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY
Timothy K. Sanner, Judge
John R. Maus for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rodney Lee Rodis was convicted of ten counts of embezzlement in violation of Code
§ 18.2-111. Prior to the state prosecution on these charges, Rodis entered guilty pleas to federal
charges of mail fraud and money laundering. On appeal, he contends the state prosecutions were
barred under Code § 19.2-294 because the same acts constituted the bases for both prosecutions.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court and Rodis’ convictions.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of
this appeal.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
BACKGROUND
“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App.
438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)).
Rodis was a Roman Catholic priest who served as pastor of two parishes in Louisa
County from 1993 until 2006. In September 2002, Rodis began soliciting funds for various
church purposes, which he converted to his own use.
Rodis was indicted in federal court in August 2007 on eight counts of mail fraud, two
counts of wire fraud, and three counts of money laundering. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rodis
pled guilty to one count of mail fraud and one count of money laundering, by order dated
October 26, 2007.
In May 2008, Rodis was indicted in circuit court on thirteen counts of embezzlement.
Three counts were nolle prosequied before trial, and appellant was convicted of ten counts of
embezzlement.
Rodis contends his embezzlement convictions were barred by Code § 19.2-294 because
the bases for the successive prosecutions were the same acts upon which his federal convictions
had been based. He concludes, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial plea in
bar moving the trial court to dismiss the indictments against him. We disagree.
ANAYLSIS
Code § 19.2-294 provides in pertinent part:
If the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, . . .
conviction under one of such statutes . . . shall be a bar to a
prosecution or proceeding under the other or others. Furthermore,
if the same act be a violation of both a state and a federal statute, a
prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution
under the state statute.
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The record reveals appellant was prosecuted under the federal statutes prior to the
beginning of the state prosecution.
[U]nlike the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy, which is dependent on “the identity of the offense, and
not the act,” Epps [v. Commonwealth], 216 Va. [150], 153-54, 216
S.E.2d [64,] 68 [(1975)], the prohibition of Code § 19.2-294 “is
dependent upon ‘the identity of the act,’” rather than the identity of
the offense, Lash v. County of Henrico, 14 Va. App. 926, 930, 421
S.E.2d 851, 853 (1992) (en banc) (quoting Jones v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 760, 240 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1978)).
In other words, Code § 19.2-294 “speaks to ‘acts’ of the accused,
not elements of the offense.” Wade v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App.
359, 365, 388 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1990).
Londono v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 377, 393, 579 S.E.2d 641, 648-49 (2003).
“[A] conviction of one statutory offense does not bar conviction under another statutory
offense if each offense could have been proved without the necessity of proving the other.”
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 625, 628, 401 S.E.2d 208, 210, aff’d on reh’g en
banc, 13 Va. App. 281, 411 S.E.2d 228 (1991). “The test of whether there are separate acts
sustaining several offenses ‘is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them.’” Treu v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 996, 997, 406 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1991) (quoting Estes v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 23, 24, 181 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1971)). “In applying the same evidence
test, ‘the particular criminal transaction must be examined to determine whether the acts are the
same in terms of time, situs, victim, and the nature of the act itself.’” Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 137, 146, 562 S.E.2d 341, 345 (2002) (quoting Hall v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 898, 421 S.E.2d 455, 459 (1992) (en banc)).
To convict Rodis of “[m]ail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341,” the government had to prove
“(1) the existence of a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the
scheme.” United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
To convict Rodis of money laundering, the federal government needed to prove that
(1) he conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) the transaction involved the
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proceeds of a specified illegal activity; (3) he knew at the time of the transaction that the
property involved proceeds of an unlawful activity; and (4) he intended to conceal the nature or
source of the funds. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
“To establish the crime of embezzlement under Code § 18.2-111, the Commonwealth
must prove that the accused wrongfully appropriated to his or her own use or benefit, with the
intent to deprive the owner thereof, the property entrusted or delivered to the accused.” Zoretic
v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 241, 243, 409 S.E.2d 832, 833-34 (1991).
The statement of facts stipulating the facts in the federal prosecution indicates Rodis
opened an unauthorized bank account in September 1995, maintained sole control of a post
office box beginning in 1998, and during the period from September 2002 through August 2006,
he engaged in a scheme to defraud his parishioners by soliciting funds and depositing those
funds in the account he maintained. Rodis also admitted diverting the funds to his personal use
by wiring them to a personal bank account out of state.
In the state prosecution, Rodis was convicted for ten counts of embezzlement covering
ten different times periods. The earliest period began April 1, 2003 and the latest ended January
31, 2006.
Rodis pled guilty to two charges in federal court. Under Code § 19.2-294, “a prosecution
under a federal statute shall be deemed to be commenced once jeopardy has attached.” In
Virginia, “[w]here there is no trial at all, but rather a plea of guilty, as in the case at bar, jeopardy
attaches when the court accepts the defendant’s plea.” Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App.
389, 395, 363 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1987). Consequently, the only charges for which jeopardy
attached in the federal proceedings are the two charges to which Rodis pled guilty.
The first charge, count one of the federal indictment, alleged that on March 4, 2005,
Rodis engaged in mail fraud. The indictment on this count lists a single check. The second
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charge, count eleven of the federal indictment, alleged that on November 29, 2004, Rodis
engaged in laundering money in the amount of $9,000. Of the ten state counts of embezzlement,
only counts four and seven covered time periods which included the two dates covered by the
federal charges to which Rodis pled guilty. Necessarily, the acts supporting the remaining state
charges are distinct from the acts supporting Rodis’ two federal convictions.
State count four alleged Rodis embezzled funds between June 1, 2004 and November 30,
2004, thus including the date cited in the federal money laundering charge. State count seven
charged Rodis with embezzling funds between March 1, 2005 and March 24, 2005 and included
the date of the single federal mail fraud conviction.
Rodis asserts that the various crimes were “all part of that course of conduct from August
2002 until 2006.” Although Rodis did engage in the illegal conduct for several years, the acts
involved in the on-going scheme were distinct and separate. Even for the two time periods
which overlap among the various charges, the embezzlement of the various funds was a different
act than the acts of laundering the money and sending the funds through the mail.
In Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 361, 369, 597 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2004), this
Court concluded that while Jefferson’s possession of a single handgun “was conduct common to
the prosecution of both [carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon], the attendant acts and legal disabilities necessary to sustain the two prosecutions were
decidedly different.” Similarly, in Johnson, 38 Va. App. at 147, 562 S.E.2d at 346, this Court
found that Johnson’s single act of operating a vehicle supported his separate convictions for
driving after having been declared an habitual offender and driving with a suspended license
because “the legal disability upon defendant that attended and was integral to the respective acts
was significantly different.” In both cases this Court held that because the same evidence would
not produce a conviction for both offenses, Code § 19.2-294 did not bar the separate
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prosecutions. The same reasoning applies in this case. Although the federal charges required a
showing that Rodis illegally obtained the money, the evidence necessary to prove the federal
offenses was different from that required to prove the state offenses. Therefore, the acts
involved in embezzling the funds were not the same as the acts of laundering the money and
engaging in mail fraud.
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the plea in bar. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court and Rodis’ convictions.
Affirmed.
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