Kyer v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder, Frank, Humphreys, Clements,
Felton, Kelsey and McClanahan
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JOSHUA DAVIS KYER
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2200-03-2 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
MAY 3, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

UPON REHEARING EN BANC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Michael C. Allen, Judge

James R. Cooke, Jr., for appellant.

John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (Steven D. Benjamin; Betty Layne DesPortes, on brief),
for appellant.

Joshua Davis Kyer challenges on appeal his burglary and larceny convictions, claiming

police unlawfully entered his mother’s apartment where he lived and obtained incriminating

evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree with Kyer that no warrant exception

justified the police entry into the apartment. But we also agree with the trial court that, once

inside, the police searched the apartment only after receiving permission from Kyer’s mother to

do so. This consent, the trial court correctly held, was “sufficiently an act of free will to purge

the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).

I.

“On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we must review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.”

Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 103, 582 S.E.2d 448, 449 (2003).
 At about 2:00 a.m. on August 26, 2002, Officer B.E. Davis and Detective Brent Story

responded to a burglar alarm at the Southside Speedway. They saw two suspects running from

the scene. They caught one, but the other got away. With a tip from the detained suspect, the

officers’ investigation led them to the Kyer apartment.

The officers arrived at the apartment at approximately 4:00 a.m. The front door of the

apartment was open wide enough for an individual to “walk through it without touching the

door.” There were no lights on. In this particular area, Detective Story observed, “it was not

uncommon for this situation to occur.” “Every time it does,” he testified, “we make entry to

make sure everything inside is okay.” They knocked on the door several times, waited a couple

of minutes, and then went inside with weapons drawn and flashlights on. Fearing someone had

“forced entry or broken into the home,” the officers conducted a two to three minute “cursory”

protective sweep looking for any possible intruders.

After completing the protective sweep, Officer Davis awoke Kyer’s mother, who was still

asleep in her bedroom. Davis identified himself, inquired about her well-being, and asked if

anyone else was “supposed to be in the house.” She told him she lived there alone with her two

sons. When asked if “she was okay,” she replied “she was fine.” During this conversation,

Detective Story waited in the living room. Officer Davis left her bedroom to permit her to “get

herself together.” He went back into the living room and waited with Detective Story. Kyer’s

mother came out and then “excused herself to go back into her bedroom” before again

reappearing to speak with the officers about ten minutes later. By this time, Kyer’s brother had

joined the officers in the living room after being awoken by them. No one else was in the

apartment.

Detective Story sat down in a chair across from Kyer’s mother and explained “what was

going on and why [they] had been there originally and also explained to her why [they] came in

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in the first place so she would understand that.” She told the officers “everything was okay” and

that she had been asleep. The officers also advised her about the Southside Speedway incident

and the suggestion that her son may have been involved. She said she thought he was home all

night and was still there.

After she had been briefed on the situation, Officer Davis then asked Kyer’s mother for

permission to search for “anything that was stolen from the Southside Speedway.” She

consented to the search. In the loft where Kyer normally slept, Officer Davis found several items

stolen during the burglary of the Southside Speedway.

Kyer was charged with three counts of statutory burglary and three counts of petit

larceny. Kyer moved to suppress the inculpatory evidence found in his bedroom, arguing that

the officers’ initial entry into the apartment was unlawful. That warrantless entry, Kyer argued,

nullified the subsequent consent to search given by his mother. The trial court rejected both

arguments.

The initial entry, the court held, fell within the “community caretaker doctrine and/or

exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement. The court found the officers’

subjective intent in entering the apartment was motivated by their good faith desire to ensure an

intruder had not come through the opened front door. Finding the officers’ testimony credible,

the court found they were not “acting under a pretext” to gain entry into the apartment to

continue their investigation of the Southside Speedway burglary.

The trial court also held that, even if the initial entry fell outside the community caretaker

or emergency exceptions, Kyer’s mother voluntarily consented to the search and “the totality of

the circumstances are not sufficient to have vitiated her consent.” “So, on that ground,

irrespective of what decision the Court might reach on the question of exigent circumstances or

exercising community caretaker function, the consent was valid.”

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 Following the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion, Kyer stipulated that the

evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt on all charges. Upon being convicted, Kyer appealed

to us challenging the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. A panel of our Court held the

community caretaker doctrine authorized the initial entry into the apartment, thereby mooting

any need to examine the legal efficacy of the later consent to search. Kyer v. Commonwealth, 43

Va. App. 603, 601 S.E.2d 6 (2004).

Having reconsidered the matter en banc, we hold the initial entry cannot be justified

under the emergency or community caretaker doctrines and thus the consent issue must be

decided. And, on that point, we agree with the trial court that the consent was not nullified by

the earlier unlawful entry.

II.

“Though the ultimate question whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment

triggers de novo scrutiny, we defer to the trial court’s findings of ‘historical fact’ and give ‘due

weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement

officers.’” Slayton, 41 Va. App. at 105, 582 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting Barkley v. Commonwealth,

39 Va. App. 682, 689-90, 576 S.E.2d 234, 237-38 (2003)). Thus, we must give “deference to the

factual findings of the trial court” and “independently determine” whether those findings satisfy

the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 358, 361, 576

S.E.2d 463, 464 (2003).

To prevail on appeal, “the defendant must show that the trial court’s denial of his

suppression motion, when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, was reversible error.” Id. In other words, on appeal, the “burden to establish that

the denial of the motion to suppress constituted reversible error rests with the defendant.” King

v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306, 308, 572 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2002) (citation omitted).

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 A. THE INITIAL ENTRY

Among the many interests served by the Fourth Amendment, the privacy interest in one’s

home has few equals. “At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to

retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Kyllo v.

United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is

axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the

Fourth Amendment is directed.’” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (citation

omitted). But even on this topic the Fourth Amendment’s text endorses no absolutes. It instead

condemns only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

One concession to reasonableness, the emergency exception, recognizes the “right of the

police to enter and investigate” when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely

threatened. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437, 388 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1990)

(citation omitted); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). It rests on the

commonsense rationale that “preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy”

protected by the Fourth Amendment. Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (citation

omitted). This concern parallels one of the applications of the community caretaker exception,

which recognizes that “police owe ‘duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in

danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventive

measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’” Id. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 663.1

1
Under proper circumstances, both doctrines apply not only to the protection of human
life or to avoid serious injury, but also to the protection of property interests. See, e.g., Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (concluding the need to protect property may justify a
warrantless entry of premises); see also United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993)
(finding warrantless entry into house reasonable to “prevent the loss or destruction of the
owner’s property” where kitchen window was broken and neighbor reported burglary in
progress); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding initial warrantless
entry of warehouse where locks sawed off and doors forced open).
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 In this case, however, we need not engage in any extended analysis of the emergency or

community caretaker exceptions. Nor need we elaborate on their various formulations. We

believe the facts would not justify an objectively reasonable officer to think either exception

applied.2 Stripped of its immaterial aspects, the fact pattern in this case includes only one

arguably suspicious circumstance: an open door on an August night.

There were no signs of forced entry ⎯ such as pry marks, mangled locks, broken hinges,

or disfigured door jams.3 No one called out for help. No sounds or observations suggested panic

or danger within the apartment. There were no reports from neighbors about any unique medical

concerns or other vulnerabilities of the apartment’s occupants. Nor did any of Kyer’s neighbors

report any suspicious circumstances suggesting foul play. Cf. Hill v. Commonwealth, 18

Va. App. 1, 4, 441 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1994) (finding exigent circumstances existed when a neighbor

reported that the homeowner “had been out of town for two days” prior to the police discovery of

an open front door, leading the neighbor to fear “the house had been burglarized”).

The mere discovery of an “open door” of a residence ⎯ absent some other reason for

concern ⎯ “is not, in and of itself, a circumstance that could give rise to a reasonable belief that

entry is necessary to prevent harm to persons or property.” State v. Christenson, 45 P.3d 511,

513 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added). “It is simply too common an event to create a

concern of harm in the absence of other signs of trouble, such as evidence of a forced entry or a

2
We acknowledge, as the trial court found, that the officers did not act “under a pretext”
and truly believed the circumstances justified a warrantless entry. As a general rule, however, an
“officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant” to the Fourth
Amendment inquiry. Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593 (2004); Slayton, 41 Va. App. at
109, 582 S.E.2d at 451.
3
The Commonwealth also conceded at trial that, under the facts of this case, neither
officer could reasonably assume Kyer returned home to commit “a crime in his own residence.”
As the prosecutor put it: “I don’t think that’s the assumption that they made. . . . I think

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medical emergency; here, there were no such indications.” Id.4 In short, when the “only

evidence of an emergency was a door left open late on a summer night,” we agree with other

courts that “regardless of what the officers may subjectively have thought, a reasonable person

would not believe an emergency existed.” State v. Swenson, 799 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1990); see also State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1047 (N.M. 2005) (noting that, under the

emergency assistance doctrine, an “open door ought not be viewed as a general invitation to

enter”). The police had no legal right, therefore, to enter the Kyer apartment uninvited. The trial

court erred in concluding otherwise.

B. THE CONSENT TO SEARCH

As a general rule, “a search authorized by consent is wholly valid.” Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Consent loses its validity only if it is involuntary, Ohio

v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996), or the product of a manipulative “exploitation” by the

police of an earlier unconstitutional search or seizure. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Warlick v.

Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 266, 208 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1974).

Consent following an unconstitutional act, however, can still be valid if it is “sufficiently

an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 597 (1975)

(citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486). This attenuation principle should not be confused with a

certainly they’re not looking at it as Mr. Kyer broke into his own residence, but that some other
person or some other harm has befallen whoever is remaining inside.”
4
The tenuousness of the open door inference in Christenson disqualified it from
satisfying a statutory “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement, Christenson,
45 P.3d at 512-14, as well as an analogous emergency exception recognized by the Oregon
constitution, id. at 514-15. Even so, the Fourth Amendment relevance of Christenson (cf. post at
18-20) appears at the heart of its analysis: “We have held that an open front door does not justify
entry into a house under the emergency aid doctrine or the community caretaking exceptions to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution under more
suspicious circumstances than those that existed here.” Id. at 513 (citing State v. Bramson, 765
P.2d 824 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Apodaca, 735 P.2d 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)).

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mere “but for” standard of causation ⎯ which, if used for this purpose, would suppress evidence

“simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.” Wong

Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. Instead, “a finding with respect to attenuation . . . can only be made after

consideration of all the circumstances of the case.” United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 554

(9th Cir. 1981). This necessarily requires a “careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances

of each case.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233. There being no fixed formula, courts consider the

amount of time between the illegal action and the acquisition of the evidence, the presence of

intervening circumstances (like consent), and the purpose and flagrancy of the official

misconduct. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 548 (4th Cir. 1998).

Consistent with these principles, voluntary consent ⎯ when sufficiently an act of free

will to dissipate the taint ⎯ can provide an independent basis for admitting evidence despite an

earlier unlawful entry by police. See, e.g., Seidman, 156 F.3d at 549 n.10 (“We see no reason

why [consent] could not also sever the connection between an unlawful act and the acquisition of

additional evidence. Indeed, voluntary consent is the quintessential act of free will.”); United

States v. Dickson, 64 F.3d 409, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant’s voluntary

consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search); United States v. Valencia,

913 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Even assuming the initial entry was illegal, we agree with

the district court that that entry did not taint Valencia’s subsequent consent.”); United States v.

Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant’s voluntary consent to

search his car dissipated taint of officer’s illegal entry); State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202, 1207

(La. 1984) (holding that consent was valid despite “close temporal proximity between the illegal

entry and Evans’ consent” because Evans had “knowledge of the purpose of the entry and the

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manner in which it was made” and thus the “official misconduct had an insignificant effect on

the subsequent consent”).5

On the other hand, the purgation of free will may not suffice in all cases of consent. It

may be insufficient, for example, when the evidence has already been discovered before the

consent during the prior illegal search. See, e.g., Wood v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 21,

30-32, 497 S.E.2d 484, 488-89 (1998); Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 757-58, 407

S.E.2d 681, 689-90 (1991). It may be equally insufficient if given after the consenter has been

illegally detained, Davis v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 433-35, 559 S.E.2d 374, 379-80

(2002), or after the police make an illegal entry for the “very purpose” of obtaining consent,

Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 655, 347 S.E.2d 175, 184 (1986). Absent such

exploitive circumstances, however, a consensual encounter following an “illegal entry” can still

be “sufficiently independent of the unlawful invasion to purge any taint arising from the initial

entry.” Seidman, 156 F.3d at 547.

In this case, Kyer does not contend on appeal that his mother’s consent was involuntary.

He argues only that, even if her “consent was voluntary,” it still was not “sufficiently an act of

free will to purge the primary taint” of the unlawful entry. We disagree. Before she consented to

the search, Kyer’s mother had been fully briefed by the police about “what was going on” and

why they entered her apartment in the first place. The conversation took place in her living

room, after she had about ten minutes to compose herself. At no time prior to the consent did the

police recover any incriminating evidence. Nor did they in any way imply she was the subject of

5
For similar reasons, a voluntary confession can be an act of free will sufficient to purge
the taint of an earlier illegal arrest. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990). Voluntary
statements made after an unlawful roadblock likewise need not be suppressed. Burns v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 324 n.11, 541 S.E.2d 872, 884 n.11 (2001). So, too, an illegal
entry into a home does not negate the lawfulness of the later search if it did not rely on

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a criminal investigation. They did not detain her, place her in custody, threaten her with arrest,

or restrict her freedom of movement in any way.

In these respects, our case parallels the situation addressed in Valencia, 913 F.2d at 382,

where the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the police

did not exploit the initial entry. The police found no evidence as a
result of that entry, and discovered no information that they used
(or could use) to influence Valencia to consent to a search.
Valencia points to the allegedly coercive effect of the officers’
mere presence in his apartment. However, as we have seen, the
district court found Valencia’s consent to be free and voluntary.
Implicit in this finding is the conclusion that the officers’ presence
did not coerce Valencia’s consent. Indeed, the district court
explicitly found no evidence of any nexus between the initial entry
and the consent.

Id. (emphasis added). “Given all these factors,” the Seventh Circuit held in Valencia, “we

conclude that Valencia’s consent was sufficiently independent of the allegedly illegal initial

entry that the two events were ‘so attenuated as to dissipate [any] taint’ from the entry.” Id.

(quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984)).

We acknowledge that seeing two police officers, with weapons drawn, conduct a

protective search of one’s home would no doubt be an intimidating sight. But Kyer’s mother

saw none of that. She was asleep until awoken by Officer Davis. As the trial court found, this

“was not a situation where they had guns drawn pointed at her head, asking her for consent.”

Nor is this a case where the officers entered for the “very purpose” of obtaining consent. Walls,

2 Va. App. at 655, 347 S.E.2d at 184. They entered because they believed the open door implied

danger to those inside. Having weighed their credibility, the trial court found their explanation

truthful and rejected the argument that the officers used this story as a mere pretext to gain entry

into the house to investigate the Southside Speedway burglary. Bound by this factual finding,

information obtained during the prior illegal entry. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
815-16 (1984).
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we see no reason to conclude the “purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct,” Wood, 27

Va. App. at 30, 497 S.E.2d at 488, should invalidate the voluntary consent to search given by

Kyer’s mother.

The main circumstance disfavoring this conclusion is the relatively short duration

between the entry and consent. We think two observations answer that legitimate concern.

First, the specific length of time was all but irrelevant from the perspective of Kyer’s

mother. She was asleep when the police entered the apartment. She remained asleep as they

conducted a protective search. When Officer Davis awoke her, she did not know whether the

police had been there for a few minutes or a few hours. Her concededly voluntary consent did

not depend in any way on the duration of the officers’ presence in her apartment. That is,

nothing about the situation suggests that Kyer’s mother would have been more readily inclined to

consent had she known the officers had been in her apartment longer than they in fact were. Cf.

State v. Quinn, 623 P.2d 630, 638 (Or. 1981) (finding defendant’s consent was unaffected by

prior illegal search because, as defendant was unaware of the illegal search, his consent was

“uninfluenced and untainted by the earlier unlawful act”).

Second, as for the ten minutes or so between being awakened and providing consent,

Kyer’s mother took that time to compose herself and to listen to the officers explain why they

came to her apartment and why they entered it uninvited. By itself, however, this brief duration

does not put the attenuation inquiry to an end. It is just one of several considerations. Even a

very short duration need not negate the efficacy of a voluntary consent. See, e.g., Seidman, 156

F.3d at 548 (finding a few minute period between entry and consent insufficient to negate

consent); Sheppard, 901 F.2d at 1235 (“Even though the time span between the challenged

conduct and Sheppard’s consent was short, we cannot find that the second search resulted from

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the exploitation of the challenged conduct.”); Owen, 453 So. 2d at 1207 (holding that consent

was valid despite “close temporal proximity” between the illegal entry and consent).

III.

In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in finding the initial police entry into the

apartment could be justified under the emergency or community caretaker exceptions. We find

no fault, however, with the court’s alternative finding that the voluntary consent to search given

by Kyer’s mother was “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” Wong Sun,

371 U.S. at 486. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied Kyer’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

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Humphreys, J., concurring in the result.

I agree that the trial court correctly denied Kyer’s motion to suppress. However, I

continue to believe that the officers’ initial entry into the Kyer residence was proper under the

community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. And, because the warrantless entry

was reasonable, the officers properly searched the residence after obtaining the voluntary consent

of Kyer’s mother. Thus, although I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, I concur only in

the result reached by the majority.

I.

The officers arrived at Kyer’s home at approximately 4:00 in the morning. At that time,

the front door was open “wide enough for [Officer Davis] to walk through it without touching

the door.” It was dark and raining. There were no exterior lights on, and no lights were on

inside the home. Because of these circumstances, Officer Davis and Detective Story believed

that “[s]omeone had forced entry or broken into the home.” Accordingly, the officers “made

a . . . plan,” discussing how they would respond if they “encounter[ed] any opposition.” The

officers then “knocked on the door several times,” announcing their presence. There was no

response. After waiting for “a couple” of minutes, the officers drew their firearms and

flashlights and proceeded inside the home and up the stairs, “continuing to announce [their]

presence” in “loud voice[s].”

Based on these facts, the trial court explicitly found that “it was appropriate for the

officers to enter the residence,” reasoning that “the community caretaker doctrine and/or exigent

circumstances permitted their entry into the residence.” In particular, the court found that the

officers’ “initial contact or investigation was objectively reasonable,” also concluding that the

“police officers in this case were [not] acting under a pretext.”

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 II.

As recognized by the majority, “[i]t is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is

the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” Welsh v.

Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407

U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment protects people only from

“unreasonable” searches and seizures. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960);

Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985). For that reason, the

United States Supreme Court has carved out a few delineated exceptions to the warrant

requirement. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318.

For example, according to the “emergency doctrine,” a warrantless entry into a private

residence is valid if there is a “reasonably perceived ‘emergency’ requiring immediate entry as

an incident to the service and protective functions of the police as opposed to, or as a

complement to, their law enforcement functions.” United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th

Cir. 1992); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9

Va. App. 430, 436-37, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663-64 (1990). That is, because

[t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency is
inherent in the very nature of their duties as police officers[,] [a]
warrantless search during an emergency situation is “justified, if
not required, by the fact that ‘the preservation of human life is
paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure
laws and constitutional guaranties [sic].’”

Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 761

(Ariz. 1984)) (other citations omitted).6

6
Although the “emergency doctrine” is often equated to the “exigent circumstances”
exception to the warrant requirement, the two differ slightly. When officers conduct an
emergency entry for purposes of investigating a crime, the emergency is considered an
“exigency” for purposes of the exigent circumstances exception, and the officers must have
probable cause before they can enter the residence. See Commonwealth v. Thornton, 24
Va. App. 478, 484, 483 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1997) (recognizing that, “[a]mong the circumstances
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 Similarly, the “community caretaker doctrine” authorizes a warrantless search conducted

pursuant to an officer’s “community caretaking functions,” as long as the search is “totally

divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a

criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 436-37, 441 (1973) (affirming the

warrantless search of the trunk of a car that had been towed to a garage pursuant to the “standard

procedure” of a local police department). Although this Court has yet to apply the community

caretaker exception to validate the warrantless search of a home, little distinction has been made

between the circumstances governing the application of the community caretaker doctrine and

those governing the application of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, which

unquestionably authorizes a warrantless entry into a private residence. Compare Commonwealth

v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285, 288-91, 456 S.E.2d 527, 529-30 (1996), and Barrett v.

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 773, 776-79, 447 S.E.2d 243, 245-46 (1994), rev’d on other

grounds, 250 Va. 243, 462 S.E.2d 109 (1995), with Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436-37, 388 S.E.2d

at 663-64, and Shannon v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 31, 34-35, 441 S.E.2d 225, 226-27,

aff’d on reh’g en banc, 19 Va. App. 145, 449 S.E.2d 584 (1994).7 Indeed, the non-exigent form

accepted as providing ‘exigent circumstances’ for a warrantless search, are those where a true
‘emergency’ exists”). If, however, the officers effectuate an emergency entry for a purpose
unrelated to the investigation of a crime—for example, to provide emergency aid to an injured
resident—then the entry is valid as long as the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that
their help was needed. In this latter sense, the emergency exception is functionally equivalent to,
and sometimes deemed a subset of, the community caretaker doctrine.
7
As this Court recognized in Wood v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 21, 28, 497 S.E.2d
484, 487 (1998), the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a warrantless
intrusion into an individual’s home may be supported pursuant to the community caretaker
exception. Nevertheless, we have applied the exception to uphold warrantless searches in the
context of a search of an automobile. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731,
594 S.E.2d 305, 309 (2004); Barrett, 18 Va. App. at 778, 447 S.E.2d at 246. We have also
extended this doctrine to permit warrantless searches of pedestrians or citizens that an officer
reasonably believes are in distress or in need of assistance. See Terry v. Commonwealth, 23
Va. App. 87, 91, 474 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1996); Waters, 20 Va. App. at 289-90, 456 S.E.2d at
529-30.
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of the emergency exception, also called the “emergency aid doctrine,” is often deemed a subset

of the community caretaker doctrine.8

Nevertheless, the community caretaker doctrine, like the emergency exception, is

premised on the concept that police officers owe “‘duties to the public, such as rendering aid to

individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and

other preventive measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’” Barrett, 18

Va. App. at 778, 447 S.E.2d at 246 (quoting Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 663

(citation omitted)); see also Wood v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 21, 33, 497 S.E.2d 484, 490

(1998) (Annunziata, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is far from illogical to expect that police officers,

as a necessary function of their profession, do much more than simply “investigate” crimes or

wrongs that have already occurred or that have unfolded in their presence. To the contrary,

[p]olice have “complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to
identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal
offenses;” by design or default, the police are also expected to
“reduce the opportunities for the commission of some crimes
through preventive patrol and other measures,” “aid individuals
who are in danger of physical harm,” “assist those who cannot care
for themselves,” “resolve conflict,” “create and maintain a feeling
of security in the community,” and “provide other services on an
emergency basis.”

3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6, at 389-90 (1996); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 33, 497

S.E.2d at 490 (Annunziata, J., dissenting). Thus, “police [often] have occasion to enter premises

without a warrant for a variety of . . . purposes,” including fulfillment of their community

caretaking duties. Wood, 27 Va. App. at 33, 497 S.E.2d at 490 (Annunziata, J., dissenting)

(internal quotations omitted).

Accordingly, I would hold that the community caretaker exception, in its narrowest

sense, must logically extend to the warrantless entry of homes, as long as the officer conducting

8
See note 1, supra.
- 16 -
the search is acting appropriately within the doctrine and independent of his criminal

investigatory duties.9

III.

The majority does not seriously contest the applicability of the community caretaker

exception to a private residence, concluding instead that, under the circumstances of this case,

“the facts would not justify an objectively reasonable officer to think [the] exception applied.”

The majority reasons that, considering the lack of signs of forced entry and the absence of cries

for help, the entry was objectively unreasonable. I disagree.

A.

The appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual

scenario is determined by whether, based upon the totality of the circumstances, it was

reasonable for the officer to believe that his or her actions were necessary for: (1) the protection

of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) the protection of police against

claims or disputes concerning lost or stolen property; or (3) protection of the public and the

police from physical danger. Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 730, 594 S.E.2d

305, 309 (2004) (citing Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 1039, 265 S.E.2d 746, 749

9
We have consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant to either the
community caretaker exception or the emergency exception, must be factually unrelated to an
intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. See Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at
664 (applying the emergency exception and noting that “[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed]
that the [officers’] entry into appellants’ house . . . was a pretext to search for contraband or
illegal activity rather than to look for possible victims and to secure the property,” and finding
that the officers “act[ed] in good faith under the circumstances and according to their
responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); see also Williams, 42 Va. App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d
at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment of a vehicle and corresponding
community caretaking functions, “must not be a pretextual surrogate for an improper
investigatory motive”); Waters, 20 Va. App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community
caretaker exception in the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that “[t]he
appropriateness of applying the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is
determined by,” among other things, “whether . . . the officer is not investigating criminal
conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function”).
- 17 -
(1980); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373-76 (1976); Cady, 413 U.S. at 442-48).

Specific factors to be considered include: (1) whether the officer’s initial contact or investigation

is reasonable; (2) whether the intrusion is limited; and (3) whether the officer is investigating

criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker duties. Waters, 20

Va. App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530. Overall, “[o]bjective reasonableness remains the linchpin of

determining the validity of [the] action.” Id.; cf. Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 388 S.E.2d at 663-

64 (applying objective reasonableness test to emergency exception to warrant requirement).

Under the circumstances of this case, I would hold that the officers’ warrantless entry

into the home was justified pursuant to the community caretaker exception. The officers arrived

at Kyer’s home at 4:00 a.m. It was dark and raining outside. No lights were on inside or outside

the home. Yet, the front door to Kyer’s home stood open—wide enough that the officers could

walk through it without touching the door. The officers announced their presence loudly, several

times, and, after receiving no answer, they entered the home to determine whether anyone was in

the home and whether those persons were in need of assistance. The officers made a limited

“protective sweep,” motivated only by the safety and well-being of the residents. Moreover, as

expressly found by the trial court, the officers did not enter the home under the pretext of

searching for evidence of criminal activity.

Considering the totality of these circumstances, I would hold that the officers, acting out

of “concern for the safety of the general public,” Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, reasonably believed that

“there [might be] a difficulty requiring [their] general assistance.” Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d

854, 861 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, I would affirm the trial

court’s determination that the officers’ limited entry was objectively reasonable and, as a result,

constitutionally permissible pursuant to the community caretaker exception to the warrant

requirement. Indeed, because the officers reasonably believed that “foul play” might have

- 18 -
occurred, I am of the opinion that the officers “would have been derelict in their duty” had they

not entered the residence. State v. Hetzko, 283 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).

B.

The majority, however, citing State v. Christenson, 45 P.3d 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2002),

concludes that “an open door on a summer morning is not, in and of itself, a circumstance that

could give rise to a reasonable belief that entry is necessary to prevent harm to persons or

property.” Id. at 513 (emphasis added). Because Christenson is distinguishable from the present

case in several key respects, I do not believe that its holding is persuasive under the

circumstances of this case.

First, in Christenson, the investigating officers encountered an open door at 9:20 a.m., on

a “summer morning.” Here, it was 4:00 a.m., dark, and raining. There is a significant difference

between encountering an open door at 9:20 a.m. and encountering an open door at 4:00 a.m.

That is, although it would not be particularly unusual to leave the front door ajar at 9:20 on a

“summer morning,” it is markedly more suspicious to encounter an open door at 4:00 a.m., when

it is still dark outside, it is raining, and the residents of the home are much more likely to be

asleep.

Second, in Christenson, the issue before the court was not whether the officers’ conduct

violated the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Rather, the Christenson court was interpreting a provision of the Oregon “community caretaker”

statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.033, which, inter alia, gives “officers of [that] state” the permission

to enter “the premises of another” so as to “[p]revent serious harm to any person or property.”

Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.033(2)(a)(A). Although the court noted that the “community caretaking

function is subject to the limitations on warrantless searches contained in Article I, section 9, of

the Oregon Constitution,” 45 P.3d at 513, the Christenson court did not rule that the officers’

- 19 -
conduct, in addition to exceeding the scope of their statutory authority, also violated the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rather, the court held only that the officers’

conduct could not be validated under the state constitution, reasoning that “[t]here is no

community caretaking exception under the Oregon Constitution.” Id. at 514 (emphasis added).

Third, in Christenson, the lower court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress,

holding that “the officers had no basis in fact for having [the belief that someone inside the house

was injured] other than that the door was open and the dogs were running around.” Id. at 513.

The appellate court acknowledged that it was “bound by . . . [this] finding[] of historical fact.”

Id. Here, in contrast, the trial court found that the initial investigation was “objectively

reasonable,” and denied the motion to suppress. We have held that “[t]he reasonableness of a

police officer’s response in a given situation is a question of fact for the trial court[,] and its

ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear and manifest error.” Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at

437, 388 S.E.2d at 664; see also Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d

309, 311 (1996) (noting that this Court gives due weight to “a trial court’s finding that [an]

officer was credible and [that the officer’s] inference was reasonable” (internal quotations

omitted)). Accordingly, we, too, are “bound by . . . [this] finding[] of historical fact,”

Christenson, 45 P.3d at 513, specifically, that the warrantless entry was objectively reasonable.

Thus, I believe the significant disparities between the circumstances of the present case

and those presented in Christenson render that case unsuitable to justify the majority’s legal

position.

C.

Moreover, the majority’s underlying rationale—that the officers needed some “additional

fact” to justify a warrantless entry under the circumstances of this case—demonstrates confusion

or a decided lack of understanding of the community caretaker exception to the warrant

- 20 -
requirement. Citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 1, 441 S.E.2d 50 (1994), a case in

which a panel of this Court authorized a warrantless entry premised on the exigent circumstances

exception to the warrant requirement, the majority concludes that “something more” was needed

here.

In Hill, the police department received a call from a neighbor, requesting that the police

“send somebody out to check to see whether [Hill’s] house had been broken into.” Id. at 2, 441

S.E.2d at 50. The neighbor informed the police that Hill was out of town, that he had not been

seen for two days, and that the front door to the house was open. See id. The officers went to

the house to investigate. Upon their arrival, they noted that the front door “was open about

twelve to fifteen inches,” and they rang the doorbell and knocked on the door. Id. After

receiving no response, the officers “entered the home to investigate the possibility of a burglary.”

Id. (emphasis added). While searching the home “in places where a burglar might hide,” the

officers discovered marijuana and various drug paraphernalia. Id. at 2-3, 441 S.E.2d at 50-51.

On appeal, we held that the trial court properly denied Hill’s motion to suppress,

reasoning that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied. See id. at

3, 441 S.E.2d at 51. We noted that, “[w]hen probable cause exists, exigent circumstances

excuse the requirement of obtaining a warrant,” and concluded that, under the circumstances of

that case, the officers had “probable cause to believe that Hill’s house had been unlawfully

entered.” Id. at 4, 441 S.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added).

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when, inter alia,

“there is a clear showing of probable case at the time of entry,” and “the officers have strong

reason to believe the suspects are present in the premises,” or that evidence will be destroyed

absent an immediate entry. Id. at 3, 441 S.E.2d at 51 (citing Verez, 230 Va. 405, 337 S.E.2d

749). Thus, this exception is properly applied where, as in Hill, there is probable cause to

- 21 -
believe that a crime has been or is being committed, and the officers enter the premises for the

purpose of investigating that crime. See id.

The community caretaker exception, however, does not require a showing of probable

cause. Rather, it requires an objectively reasonable belief that the officers’ conduct is necessary

to provide aid or to protect members of the public from physical harm. See Williams, 42

Va. App. at 730, 594 S.E.2d at 309; Waters, 20 Va. App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530. Moreover,

unlike the exigent circumstances exception, the warrantless entry must be “totally divorced”

from a criminal investigation. Cady, 413 U.S. at 436-37. That is, the police officers must be

acting in a protective, rather than crime-fighting, capacity.

Because the warrantless entry must be “totally divorced” from a criminal investigation,

proof that a crime has been or is being committed adds nothing to a community caretaker

analysis. But here, by opining that some “additional fact” would have justified the officers’

warrantless entry, the majority, in essence, seems to be requiring a showing of probable cause as

a prerequisite for application of the community caretaker doctrine. That is, the majority implies

that, in order to have an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is in need of assistance,

the officers must also have probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being

committed. In practical effect, then, the majority is subsuming the community caretaker doctrine

into the exigent circumstances exception. I simply cannot join in this result. See generally

Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860-61 (discussing the distinction between the community caretaker

doctrine and the exigent circumstances exception); Mary Elisabeth Naumann, Note, “The

Community Caretaking Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception,” 26 Am. J. Crim.

L. 325, 332 (1999) (“[T]he reasoning behind the community caretaker doctrine precludes an

equation . . . [with the] exigent circumstances [exception] because the latter necessarily involves

criminal considerations.”).

- 22 -
 IV.

For these reasons, I would hold that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified pursuant

to the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. Had these officers’ worst

fears been justified and had hindsight disclosed a resident either deceased or in desperate need of

medical assistance, I doubt that either the resident, assuming he or she survived, or the general

public would accept the majority’s reasoning that it would not be “objectively reasonable” for

police to investigate such suspicious circumstances. Thus, although I agree that the trial court

did not err in denying Kyer’s motion to suppress, I disagree with the analysis of the majority and,

consequently, concur only in the result.

- 23 -
Fitzpatrick, C.J., with whom Benton, and Elder, JJ., join, concurring, in part, and dissenting, in
part.

I concur in the majority’s ruling that the community caretaker exemption to the Fourth

Amendment warrant requirement did not justify the police entry into appellant’s apartment.

However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that

appellant’s mother’s later consent to search was “sufficiently an act of free will” to purge the

originally illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). Thus, I would

reverse the convictions.

Having determined that the initial entry into Kyer’s home was made in violation of the

Fourth Amendment and that Kyer’s mother gave consent to the police to search the home, it is

necessary to analyze whether this consent was obtained as the result of the illegal entry. I

believe that the facts of this case glaringly fail to establish that the consent given by Kyer’s

mother was sufficiently attenuated from the earlier unlawful police entry to provide an

independent basis for admitting the seized contraband.

The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into
evidence of tangible and testimonial evidence acquired during an
unlawful search, while also prohibiting the introduction of
derivative evidence “that is the product of the primary evidence, or
that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful
search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful
search becomes ‘so attenuated as too dissipate the taint.’” The
exclusionary rule’s prohibition of derivative evidence is the
essence of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 754, 407 S.E.2d 681, 687-88 (1991) (citations

omitted).

The remaining question to be resolved is whether the later acquired evidence is tainted

and was “come at by exploitation of the initial illegality or instead by means sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-05

(1984). As stated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the fact that
- 24 -
the consent ultimately given may have been voluntary, does not mean that the primary taint has

been purged. Id. at 599. Factors that must be considered include the temporal proximity of the

illegal entry, whether Kyer’s mother was informed that she could withhold her consent, any

additional intervening circumstances between the entry and the consent, and the purpose and

flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at 603-04. See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 37

Va. App. 421, 433-35, 559 S.E.2d 374, 379-80 (2002); Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.

639, 654, 347 S.E.2d 175, 183 (1986).

In the instant case, the facts establish that the police entered Kyer’s home at 4:00 a.m.

after failing to awaken the sleeping occupants. They went into Ms. Kyer’s bedroom with their

flashlights shining and their guns drawn. They identified themselves as police and after allowing

her time to “get herself together,” but within ten minutes of the original contact, began to

question her about her son’s possible involvement in the theft they were investigating when they

first came to her home. At that point she consented to the search. Ten minutes is hardly a

reasonable period of time in which to recover from the police entry into a private home with

guns drawn. Thus, there was no significant passage of time and the temporal intervention

requirement was unmet. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982) (six hours between

illegal arrest and confession); Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 (two hours between arrest and confession).

Next, Ms. Kyer was never informed that she could refuse to consent to the police search.

There were no other intervening circumstances between the police entry and their questioning of

Ms. Kyer which led to her consent. The only Brown factor favorable to the Commonwealth’s

position is that the trial court found that the initial entry was not pretextural. While I agree with

the majority that no single factor controls and a “careful sifting of the unique facts and

circumstances of each case” is required, the facts of this case do not establish the requisite break

in the causal connection between the illegal entry and the later consent to search. This evidence

- 25 -
was “‘come at by exploitation of that illegality . . . instead of by means sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (citation

omitted). Thus I would reverse the convictions.

- 26 -
 Tuesday 21st

September, 2004.

Joshua Davis Kyer, Appellant,

against Record No. 2200-03-2
Circuit Court Nos. CJ03F00020-01 through CJ03F00020-03
and CJ03M00021-01 through CJ03M00021-03

Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing En Banc

Before Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder, Annunziata, Bumgardner,
Frank, Humphreys, Clements, Felton, Kelsey and McClanahan

On August 31, 2004 came Joshia Davis Kyer, the appellant, by court-appointed counsel, and

filed a petition praying that the Court set aside the judgment rendered herein on August 17, 2004, and

grant a rehearing en banc thereof.

On consideration whereof, the petition for rehearing en banc is granted, the mandate entered

herein on August 17, 2004 is stayed pending the decision of the Court en banc, and the appeal is

reinstated on the docket of this Court.

The parties shall file briefs in compliance with Rule 5A:35. The appellant shall attach as an

addendum to the opening brief upon rehearing en banc a copy of the opinion previously rendered by the

Court in this matter. It is further ordered that the appellant shall file with the clerk of this Court twelve

additional copies of the appendix previously filed in this case.

A Copy,

Teste:
Cynthia L. McCoy, Clerk

By:
Deputy Clerk
 COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JOSHUA DAVIS KYER
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2200-03-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
AUGUST 17, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Michael C. Allen, Judge

James R. Cooke, Jr., for appellant.

John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Joshua Davis Kyer appeals his convictions, after a bench trial, for three counts of

statutory burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91 and three counts of petit larceny, in violation

of Code § 18.2-96. Kyer argues the trial court erred in refusing to suppress certain evidence,

which he alleges was “obtained as a result of an illegal, warrantless search and seizure.” For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background

As the parties conceded below, the facts in this case are essentially “uncontroverted.” On

August 26, 2002, Officer B.E. Davis and Detective Brent Story, of the Chesterfield County

Police Department, responded to an “ACTF” alarm that had been activated at Southside

Speedway. It was approximately 2:00 a.m. Officer Davis was in uniform; Detective Story was

wearing “a shirt and tie.” As they arrived on the scene, they observed two individuals running
from the establishment.1 The officers were able to apprehend only one of the individuals. That

individual subsequently implicated a “Mr. Able” in the burglary.2 The officers immediately

went to Mr. Able’s home and questioned him. Mr. Able implicated Kyer in the burglary and

agreed to take the officers to Kyer’s home.

The officers arrived at Kyer’s home at approximately 4:00 a.m. that morning. As they

approached the front door, they observed that the door was open “wide enough for [Officer

Davis] to walk through it without touching the door.” It was dark and raining, and “[t]here were

no exterior lights” on, nor lights on inside the home.

Because of the circumstances, Officer Davis and Detective Story believed that

“[s]omeone had forced entry or broken into the home.” Accordingly, they “made a . . . plan,”

discussing how they would respond if they “encounter[ed] any opposition.” The officers then

“knocked on the door several times,” announcing their presence. After “a couple” of minutes,

and after hearing no response from inside the home, the officers drew their firearms and

flashlights and proceeded inside the home and up the stairs, “continuing to announce [their]

presence” in “loud voice[s].”

While conducting a “protect[ive] sweep” of all of the rooms of the home, Officer Davis

found that two people were in the home, “asleep in their beds.” “Less than two minutes” later,

while Detective Story waited in the “living room” of the home, Officer Davis awoke one of the

1
Upon investigating the alarm, officers found that “six or so” doors had been “forcibly
entered” and “several items” had been taken. This same location had been burglarized on two
other occasions, within the past 60 days.
2
According to the record, “Mr. Able” was a third individual who was involved in the
burglary. Police had observed “Mr. Able” near the scene. However, “Mr. Able” was in a car
and, although the officers suspected he had been involved in the burglary, they did not have
sufficient information “to hold him” at that time.
-2-
sleeping individuals by shining his flashlight “on her.” The officers later learned that individual

was Kyer’s mother. When she awoke, Officer Davis identified himself, inquired as to her

well-being, and asked if anyone else was “supposed to be in the house.” Kyer’s mother

responded that “her sons were.” The officers then woke up Kyer’s brother, the only other person

they had observed sleeping in the home.

After Kyer’s mother “g[ot] herself together,” approximately ten minutes after Officer

Davis woke her up, Officer Davis and Detective Story met with her and Kyer’s brother in the

“common area” of the home. Detective Story “sat down in a chair across from her, explained

. . . what was going on and why [they] had been there originally and also explained to her why

[they] came in in the first place so she would understand that.” Officer Davis then asked Kyer’s

mother if they could “check[] the house for anything that was stolen from the Southside

Speedway.” Kyer’s mother agreed. Officer Davis subsequently found several of the missing

items in Kyer’s bedroom.

Kyer was charged with three counts of statutory burglary and three counts of petit

larceny. Because Kyer was a minor, he was tried and convicted of the charges in the juvenile

and domestic relations district court. Kyer appealed his convictions to the circuit court and prior

to his trial de novo, filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, arguing the officers’

search was “conducted without a warrant and was not within any exception to the warrant

requirement.”

During the hearing on Kyer’s motion to suppress, Detective Story testified that he had

“worked the midnight shift for over nine years in patrol” and that it was not “uncommon” to

approach homes and find doors standing open. He stated, “[e]very time [this occurs], we make

entry to make sure everything inside is okay.”

-3-
 Kyer’s counsel subsequently argued that the officers did not enter the home because of an

“exigent circumstance,” but agreed that if the officers were exercising their “community

caretaker function” in entering the home, their entry would be a “justifiable exception[] to the

prohibition against a warrantless search.” Nevertheless, Kyer’s counsel contended that the

evidence demonstrated they entered the home, not for purposes of exercising their community

caretaker function, but for the pretextual purpose of investigating Kyer’s “criminal activity.”

Kyer’s counsel argued further:

The other issue, Your Honor, that I think is important to consider is
that, you know, this is a residence. This isn’t a car. This isn’t
some sort of thing where we have a lesser expectation of privacy.
This is someone’s home. I heard the officer testify that they have a
practice of entering homes. However, I mean, in my experience,
I’ve not known police to enter homes just simply because a door is
ajar.
* * * * * * *

The only remaining issue, Your Honor, would be whether or not
any consent obtained thereafter would be acceptable or
valid[.] . . . I think another issue here, Judge, is whether or not
under those circumstances a person can give a voluntary,
uncoerced kind of consent.

The trial court ruled as follows, in relevant part:

I find that . . . it was appropriate for the officers to enter the
residence, although they certainly arrived there initially as part of
the conduct of the criminal investigation, I do think that the
community caretaker doctrine and/or exigent circumstances
permitted their entry into the residence. Particularly, I find that
their initial contact or investigation was objectively reasonable, but
the intrusion was limited and I do not find that the police officers
in this case were acting under a pretext. . . . I also find that even in
the absence of evidence that [Kyer’s mother] was expressly
advised that she had the right to withhold consent, the totality of
the circumstances are not sufficient to have vitiated her consent.
So, on that ground, irrespective of what decision the Court might
reach on the question of exigent circumstances or exercising
community caretaker function [sic], the consent was valid.
Therefore, I’m going to overrule the motion to suppress . . . .

-4-
Kyer subsequently pled “Not Guilty” to the charges, but conceded that the evidence summarized

by the Commonwealth would be sufficient to support convictions. After noting that Kyer

“preserve[d] [his] objection on the 4th Amendment issue,” the trial court found Kyer guilty of

the charged offenses.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Kyer argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because: 1) the “community caretaker exception,” as applied in the Commonwealth, does not

extend to homes; 2) even were the “community caretaker exception” to apply, the officers lacked

a “reasonable basis” upon which to believe that entry into the home was warranted; and 3)

Kyer’s mother’s consent was “vitiated as a result of the illegal, warrantless entry.” For the

reasons that follow, we disagree.

We note first, that “[t]he burden to establish that the denial of the motion to suppress

constituted reversible error rests with the defendant.” King v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 306,

308, 572 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2002) (citations omitted).

At a hearing on a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
defendant has the burden of establishing standing by proving that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the relevant
searches or seizures did not violate the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.

Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 1, 10, 497 S.E.2d 474, 478 (1998) (citations omitted).

Further, “[w]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or

without evidence to support them[,] and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those

facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25

Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). “However, we review de novo the trial court’s application of defined

-5-
legal standards such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion to the particular facts of the

case.” Hayes v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 647, 652, 514 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1999).

It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions
into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the
Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter
the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). It is not surprising, therefore,
that the [United States Supreme] Court has recognized, as “a ‘basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]’ that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
[Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)].

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984). Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment

protects people only from “unreasonable” searches and seizures. See Elkins v. United States,

364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752

(1985). For that reason, the United States Supreme Court has carved out a few delineated

exceptions to the warrant requirement. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318.

One such exception, recognized by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by the

courts of this Commonwealth, is known as the “emergency doctrine.” See Reynolds v.

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 436-37, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663-64 (1990); see also Mincey v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). This exception is described as a “reasonably perceived

‘emergency’ requiring immediate entry as an incident to the service and protective functions of

the police as opposed to, or as a complement to, their law enforcement functions.” United States

v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Thus, because

[t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency is
inherent in the very nature of their duties as police officers[,] [a]
warrantless search during an emergency situation is “justified, if
not required, by the fact that ‘the preservation of human life is
paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure
laws and constitutional guaranties [sic].’”

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Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 437, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 761

(Ariz. 1984)) (other citations omitted) (applying emergency doctrine as type of exigent

circumstance permitting entry of residence in course of investigating burglary and confirming

safety of residents where police had already apprehended burglar who admitted prior entry into

residence and noting “[a]mong the circumstances accepted as providing ‘exigent circumstances’

for a warrantless search are those where a true ‘emergency’ exists”).

Another exception to the warrant requirement is very similar to the emergency doctrine.

That exception has become known as the “community caretaker doctrine.” Cady v. Dombroski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a

trunk of a car that had been towed to a garage after an accident. 413 U.S. at 436-37. The Court

noted that towing the car to the garage was “standard procedure” in that particular police

department. Id. In affirming the reasonableness of the search, the Court recognized that:

Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic,
and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can
become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways,
the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office.
Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the
operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be
of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers,
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term,
may be described as community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

Id. at 441 (emphasis added).

As this Court recognized in Wood v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 21, 28, 497 S.E.2d

484, 487 (1998), the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a warrantless

intrusion into an individual’s home may be supported by the community caretaker exception.

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Indeed, as Kyer accurately argues on appeal, we have likewise yet to decide if the community

caretaker doctrine may apply to validate a warrantless entry into a home.3 Nevertheless, we have

applied the exception to uphold warrantless searches in the context of a search of an automobile.

See Williams v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 731, 594 S.E.2d 305, 309 (2004); Barrett v.

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 773, 778, 447 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1994), reversed on other grounds,

250 Va. 243, 462 S.E.2d 109 (1995). We have also extended this doctrine to permit warrantless

searches of pedestrians or citizens that an officer reasonably believes are in distress or in need of

assistance. See Terry v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 87, 91, 474 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1996);

Commonwealth v. Waters, 20 Va. App. 285, 289-90, 456 S.E.2d 527, 529-30 (1995).

We find it of no moment, however, that we have yet to apply the community caretaker

exception in the context of a warrantless search of a home. Indeed, we find that in the context of

a warrantless entry and search, little distinction has been made between the circumstances

governing the application of the community caretaker doctrine and those governing the

application of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Compare Waters, 20

Va. App. at 288-91, 456 S.E.2d at 529-30, and Barrett, 18 Va. App. at 776-79, 447 S.E.2d at

245-46, with Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436-37, 388 S.E.2d at 663-64, and Shannon v.

3
The Commonwealth contends on appeal that Kyer failed to raise this particular
argument below and thus, that we are barred from considering this issue pursuant to Rule 5A:18.
However, as set forth above, Kyer clearly argued – albeit somewhat inartfully:

The other issue, Your Honor, that I think is important to consider is
that, you know, this is a residence. This isn’t a car. This isn’t
some sort of thing where we have a lesser expectation of privacy.
This is someone’s home.

We thus find that Kyer properly preserved the issue for purposes of appeal. See Lash v. County
of Henrico, 14 Va. App. 926, 929, 421 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1992) (en banc) (noting that Rule
5A:18, “does not prohibit reliance on statutes or cases not presented to the trial court to support,
on appeal, a position otherwise adequately presented at trial”).
-8-
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 31, 34-35, 441 S.E.2d 225, 226-27, aff’d on reh’g, 19 Va. App.

145, 449 S.E.2d 584 (1994).

In fact, the only true distinction between these two doctrines is whether the search at

issue related to a criminal investigation. In particular, as noted in Moss, the emergency doctrine

may apply independent of investigatory functions, or it may apply as a “complement to [such]

functions.” Moss, 963 F.2d at 678. When applied as a “complement” to investigatory functions

of the police, the emergency exception becomes subsumed within the doctrine of exigencies and

must therefore, satisfy the requirements of warrantless entry under those circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. Thornton, 24 Va. App. 478, 484, 483 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1997) (recognizing

that “[a]mong the circumstances accepted as providing ‘exigent circumstances’ for a warrantless

search are those where a true ‘emergency’ exists” (quoting Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436, 388

S.E.2d at 663)); see also Hill v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 1, 3, 441 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1994)

(“When probable cause exists, exigent circumstances excuse the requirement of obtaining a

warrant, but exigent circumstances do not excuse the requirement of probable cause.” (emphasis

added)).

However, when applied independently of police investigatory functions (in the

“non-exigent” context), the emergency exception becomes the functional equivalent of that

portion of the community caretaker doctrine recognizing that, independent from their duties of

investigating crimes, “police owe ‘duties to the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in

danger of physical harm, reducing the commission of crimes through patrol and other preventive

measures, and providing services on an emergency basis.’” Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436, 388

S.E.2d at 663 (quoting Washington v. Bakke, 723 P.2d 534, 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)).

Nevertheless, unlike the hybrid nature of the emergency exception, the community caretaker

exception may only apply to those circumstances “totally divorced from the detection,

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investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady,

413 U.S. at 441.4

For that reason, this Court has consistently required that any warrantless search, pursuant

to either the community caretaker exception or the “non-exigent” form of the emergency

exception, be factually unrelated to an intent to search for evidence of illegal activity. See

Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (applying the emergency exception and noting

that “[n]o evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the [officers’] entry into appellants’

house . . . was a pretext to search for contraband or illegal activity rather than to look for possible

victims and to secure the property,” and finding that the officers “act[ed] in good faith under the

circumstances and according to their responsibilities as law enforcement officers”); compare

Williams, 42 Va. App. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 309 (noting that a search, pursuant to impoundment

of a vehicle and corresponding community caretaking functions, “must not be a pretextual

surrogate for an improper investigatory motive”); King, 39 Va. App. at 310, 572 S.E.2d at 520;

Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 521, 371 S.E.2d 156, 163 (1988); compare also

Waters, 20 Va. App. at 290, 456 S.E.2d at 530 (applying the community caretaker exception in

the context of a police/pedestrian encounter and stating that “[t]he appropriateness of applying

the community caretaker doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by,” among other

things, “whether . . . the officer is not investigating criminal conduct under the pretext of

exercising his community caretaker function”).

Accordingly, we find that any distinction between the two exceptions has been

effectively eradicated in the Commonwealth. In fact, such eradication has erred on the side of

the sanctity of individuals’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights, by requiring, in every case, that

4
The trial court implicitly recognized the similarity between these two doctrines in its
ruling, “I do think that the community caretaker doctrine and/or exigent circumstances permitted
their entry into the residence.”
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police officers conducting warrantless searches pursuant to these exceptions do so independently

of their criminal investigatory functions. In light of this, we find no reason to conclude that both

doctrines, community caretaker and emergency, given the appropriate circumstances, should not

extend to warrantless searches of homes.

As indicated above, an understanding of the policy issues concerned further supports our

conclusion. The community caretaker doctrine, similar to the emergency exception to the

warrant requirement, is grounded in consideration of the fact that police officers owe “duties to

the public, such as rendering aid to individuals in danger of physical harm, reducing the

commission of crimes through patrol and other preventive measures, and providing services on

an emergency basis.” Barrett, 18 Va. App. at 778, 447 S.E.2d at 246 (quoting Reynolds, 9

Va. App. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 663 (citation omitted)); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 33, 497

S.E.2d at 490 (Annunziata, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is far from illogical to expect that police

officers, as a necessary function of their profession, do much more than simply “investigate”

crimes or wrongs that have already occurred or that have unfolded in their presence. To the

contrary,

[p]olice have “complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to
identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal
offenses;” by design or default, the police are also expected to
“reduce the opportunities for the commission of some crimes
through preventive patrol and other measures,” “aid individuals
who are in danger of physical harm,” “assist those who cannot care
for themselves,” “resolve conflict,” “create and maintain a feeling
of security in the community,” and “provide other services on an
emergency basis.”

3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6, at 389-90 (1996); see also Wood, 27 Va. App. at 33, 497

S.E.2d at 490 (Annunziata, J., dissenting). Thus, “police [often] have occasion to enter premises

without a warrant for a variety of . . . purposes.” Id.

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 While we recognize that the factual circumstances supporting an application of the

community caretaking function “used to uphold a vehicle search, such as existed in Cady, may

not be sufficient to justify an intrusion into an individual’s home,” Wood, 27 Va. App. at 27, 497

S.E.2d at 487 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 439; and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367

(1976)) (noting the distinction in the privacy interests of a vehicle versus a residence) (emphases

added), it is fundamental that police will have occasion to enter many types of “premises” for the

purpose of carrying out their community caretaking duties and that such other premises will

necessarily include homes. In fact, under circumstances leading an officer to reasonably believe

that an individual inside a home was in immediate need of his or her assistance, the officer would

clearly be remiss if he or she refused to investigate the matter and/or offer that assistance, based

solely on the fact that the individual was located within a home, versus a car or a public

sidewalk. For these reasons, we hold that at least some form of the community caretaker

exception, in its narrowest sense, must logically extend to the warrantless entry of homes.

Our analysis, however, is not yet complete. We must now determine whether the

circumstances presented in the case at bar were sufficient to warrant application of the

community caretaker exception. The appropriateness of applying the community caretaker

doctrine to a given factual scenario is determined by whether, based upon the totality of the

circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to believe that his or her actions were necessary

for: “1) the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, 2) the

protection of police against claims or disputes concerning lost or stolen property, [or] 3)

protection of the public and the police from physical danger.” Williams, 42 Va. App. at 730, 594

S.E.2d at 309 (citing Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 1039, 265 S.E.2d 746, 749 (1980);

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373-76; and Cady, 413 U.S. at 442-48); see also Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at

437, 388 S.E.2d at 664 (“Police officers are not required to possess either the gift of prophecy or

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the infallible wisdom that comes with hindsight. Their conduct in making a warrantless search

must be judged by the circumstances confronting the officers at the time they act.”).

Specifically, factors to be considered are whether (1) the officer’s initial contact or investigation

is reasonable; (2) the intrusion is limited; and (3) the officer is not investigating criminal conduct

under the pretext of exercising his community caretaker function. Waters, 20 Va. App. at 290,

456 S.E.2d at 530.

In the case at bar, evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding that each of these

factors was satisfied. It is clear that Officer Davis and Detective Story were in the process of

investigating a burglary when they arrived at Kyer’s home. However, given the circumstances

presented at the time the officers approached Kyer’s front door, the officers’ warrantless entry

into the home was justified pursuant to the community caretaker exception. In particular, the

burglary that the officers were investigating had occurred only a few hours before they arrived at

Kyer’s home. The officers arrived there at 4:00 a.m., a time when conditions were dark and

rainy. Yet, the front door to Kyer’s home stood open – wide enough so that the officers could

walk through it without touching the door. No lights were on in the home, and no sounds were

heard by the officers. As Detective Story testified, the officers announced their presence loudly,

several times, and after receiving no answer they entered the home for the limited purpose of

determining whether anyone was in the home and whether those persons were in need of

assistance. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that these officers, under the

totality of the circumstances presented at the time, reasonably believed that persons in the home

might be in need of immediate assistance and that their limited entry was necessary.

Further, the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s factual determination that the

officers’ reason for entering the home was not pretextual and was unrelated to their initial

purpose of investigating the burglary. Indeed, upon entering the home, the officers limited their

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search for persons inside the home who might be in need of assistance. Once they determined

that no person was in need of assistance, they gathered in the living room with Kyer’s mother

and brother to explain the purpose for their presence. The officers did not proceed to search the

home. In fact, it was only after the officers explained their presence to Kyer’s mother that they

requested to search the home for the stolen items. And, it was only after Kyer’s mother granted

her consent that the officers proceeded to search the home for the items at issue. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“[A] search authorized by consent is

wholly valid.”).

Considering the totality of these circumstances - most importantly, the trial court’s

factual finding that the actions of the officers here were not pretextual - we find that the officers’

warrantless entry into the residence was constitutionally permissible pursuant to the community

caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. Because we have found the officers’ initial entry

into the home was lawful pursuant to the community caretaker exception, we need not address

Kyer’s alternative argument that his mother’s consent was “vitiated as a result of the illegal,

warrantless entry.”5 We, likewise, need not address the Commonwealth’s contention, made

5
Kyer’s Statement of The Questions Presented frames this issue as whether the “trial
court err[ed] in ruling that, even if the warrantless entry/search of the Appellant’s residence was
excepted under the community caretaking doctrine, the subsequent consent to search given by
Appellant’s mother was valid.” In keeping with this argument, Kyer contended below, “I think
another issue here, Judge, is whether or not under those circumstances a person can give a
voluntary, uncoerced kind of consent.” Nevertheless, in his brief on appeal, Kyer argued only
that Kyer’s mother’s consent was invalid as a result of the initial “illegal” entry by the police
officers. Kyer did not argue that the officers’ entry into the home, regardless of its legality,
necessarily affected the voluntary nature of his mother’s consent. Thus, given that Kyer now
argues on appeal only that the consent was the “fruit of the poisonous tree” of the “illegal” entry,
and having found that the entry was proper under the community caretaker doctrine, we need not
address the issue of the validity of the consent further.
- 14 -
during oral argument, that the trial court actually intended to base its holding on the “emergency

doctrine,” but mistakenly stated “community caretaker and/or exigent circumstances.”

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

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