Raja v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Humphreys and Kelsey
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JAMIL MOHAMMAD RAJA
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1036-02-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
JUNE 3, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Beverly W. Snukals, Judge

C. David Whaley (Morchower, Luxton & Whaley,
on brief), for appellant.
Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.

Jamil Mohammad Raja appeals his conviction, after a jury

trial, for stalking, in violation of Code § 18.2-60.3. Raja

presents four issues on appeal to this Court. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

I. Background
In accordance with settled rules of appellate review, we

state the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. Burns v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2001).

In the Spring of 1999, Raja approached the parents of

Sabahat Munir, and expressed his interest in "get[ting] to know"

Sabahat and potentially marrying her. Sabahat and Raja were

Pakastani citizens, living in Northern Virginia. According to

the Pakistani culture, the parents of an unmarried female arrange
a marriage for their daughter. However, in some cases, the

decision to marry is left to the discretion of the unmarried

female. Following this custom, Muhammad Munir, Sabahat's father,

conveyed Raja's expression of interest to Sabahat. Sabahat, who

was having problems with U.S. immigration at the time, agreed to

consider Raja as a potential spouse.

Sabahat and Raja began their relationship shortly

thereafter. Their courtship continued until approximately March

or April of 2000. During that time, the couple obtained a

marriage license. However, in the Spring of 2000, Sabahat

informed her father that she did not wish to marry Raja.
At that time, Mr. Munir informed Raja that his daughter did

not wish to marry him. Mr. Munir also asked Raja not to "bother"

his family any further, concerning the issue of marriage.

Despite his discussion with Mr. Munir, Raja continued to pursue

Sabahat. He called Mr. Munir "many times" at his place of

employment. He also called the family's home at night,

consistently asking Mr. Munir to reconsider. In addition, Raja

approached Mr. Munir in person. On one occasion, Raja told Mr.

Munir, "if you will not agree, then it will be harder for your

family." He further stated "it will not be good for your family

if you refuse this. I want your daughter to be married with

[sic] me at any cost." Mr. Munir again refused and asked Raja to

stop bothering his family, as his family was "very upset" and "in

a miserable condition," due to the situation. On still yet

another occasion, Raja spoke with Abida Munir, Sabahat's mother.

He told Mrs. Munir,

if you will not let [Sabahat] talk or let

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 her marry me, then I will destroy your
family and you [sic] have to pay for it and
I will take you to court and your family
and, you know, your reputation in society
will get bad and I will destroy her life.
And even if she gets married I will destroy
her husband's life too. And what I can do –
I can do – I can put something on her face
or something and destroy her face so she
will not be able to get married to anybody
else.

During that period of time, Mrs. Munir told Raja to stop calling

"like ten times." Sabahat also told Raja to stop calling and

contacting her.
Nevertheless, Raja continued to contact the home. He also

continued to pursue Sabahat. Raja left Sabahat several "weird

messages saying he was going to harm himself," "commit suicide,"

or "do something harmful if [she did] not return his calls." Raja

also followed Sabahat to work and showed up at her home. On

one occasion, in late April of 2000, Sabahat received a call from

a gentleman at her work. Because Sabahat's supervisor, Johanna

Lizardi, had received several reports of "crank calls" that were

being made by a man asking to speak to Sabahat, all such calls

were transferred to Lizardi. When Lizardi answered, the man

identified himself as "Jamil" and told Lizardi that he wanted to

speak with Sabahat. When Lizardi told him that Sabahat was not

available, the man told Lizardi he was the "man who was courting"

Sabahat and that he was having "issues about trying to get

married to her." He then made "disparaging remarks about

[Sabahat's] character." Lizardi asked the man to stop calling

and threatened to contact the police if he continued to call. At

that point, the man told Lizardi, "I can take care of her just as

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easily as I can take care of you." The man then apologized and

said he did not intend to threaten Lizardi. Nevertheless,

Lizardi contacted Sabahat and the police about the phone call.

After speaking with Lizardi and Sabahat, George Mason University

police contacted Raja and told him to have no further contact

with Sabahat.

Raja, nevertheless, continued to call Sabahat and pursue

her. On one occasion, after Sabahat told him she had made plans

to marry another man, Raja told her "I know you are getting

married and I am going to destroy – whatever it takes." Sabahat

spoke with George Mason University police, on more than one

occasion, about Raja's conduct and was "terrif[ied]" to learn

that the police could not "do much" for her.
Sabahat married Abdul S'Lam in July of 2000 and moved with

him to Richmond. S'Lam is a permanent resident alien.

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 Sabahat received no phone calls from Raja in June, July or

August of that year. However, on August 30, 2000, Sabahat and

her husband were driving to dinner when Sabahat saw Raja's car.

She became scared, but did not tell her husband about Raja

because she feared that it would have an adverse impact upon her

marriage.

On the evening of September 1, 2000, Raja went to the

Medical College of Virginia (MCV) hospital in Richmond, S'Lam's

place of employment, and asked to speak with him. The employee

he spoke with told him that S'Lam was not working that evening

and that he worked during the day shift.
The following afternoon, September 2, 2000, Sabahat was at

MCV, waiting for her husband to finish work. Shortly after she

arrived, she saw Raja. In an effort to seek "protection" she ran

to her husband and told him that there was someone there who had

been following her. S'Lam told his wife to "relax" and went out

into the hallway to speak with Raja. He asked Raja who he was,

but Raja refused to identify himself. Raja began to make

disparaging comments to Sabahat and asked her if S'Lam was her

husband. S'Lam became "scared" and asked a co-worker to call

police. Raja then began to argue with S'Lam and told him he

would "see [him] downstairs." When Raja attempted to leave by

getting on the elevator, S'Lam blocked the elevator doors with

his foot and the two began to shove each other. Raja stated, in

his native language, that he would "make sure that [S'Lam would

be] killed or I will kill you." Sabahat then became "scared

again" and called again for security. At that time, the police

arrived and diffused the situation.

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 Officer David Matteson, of the Virginia Commonwealth

University Police Department, spoke with each individual

separately. He told Raja that he could be charged with

trespassing and escorted him from the building. Raja told him

that he was in Richmond for a conference and that Sabahat had

invited him to MCV. Raja stated that Sabahat "still want[ed]

him," "in a relationship type way," and insisted on speaking

with S'Lam. Raja then showed Officer Matteson three e-mails

written to him by Sabahat, approximately one-and-one-half to two

years earlier, as "proof" that Sabahat "still want[ed] [him]."

Later that same evening, Raja called Sabahat's home in

Richmond several times and hung up. Both S'Lam and Sabahat

became scared. Shortly thereafter, they received another call.

S'Lam answered and "heard [Raja's] voice," "[h]e started right

away with [S'Lam's] date of birth," "then he said he [had

S'Lam's] social security as well." Sabahat immediately called

911 and waited for the police to arrive.
An arrest warrant was subsequently issued in the City of

Richmond for Raja's arrest, charging him with stalking, in

violation of Code § 18.2-60.3. The warrant stated, initially,

that the conduct for which he was charged, took place "on or

about 09/06/2000." On January 19, 2001, Raja was convicted on

the charge in general district court and sentenced to serve 12

months in jail, with ten months of the sentence suspended upon

certain conditions. Raja appealed his conviction to the circuit

court.

Prior to his arraignment and trial in circuit court, which

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took place on April 30, 2002, Raja filed a Motion for Bill of

Particulars contending that "separate occurrences of the

proscribed conduct on separate occasions are elements of the

offense which must be alleged in either the arrest warrant or an

indictment." Raja thus, sought a bill of particulars containing:

1. The exact time, date and place that the
prohibited conduct occurred.

2. A description of the prohibited conduct,
including acts and statements.

3. The name and relationship of the person
or persons who were placed in fear by the
conduct.

In response, the Commonwealth provided Raja with an affidavit

prepared by Sabahat, which had been filed in general district

court for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary protective

order. The affidavit generally detailed Raja's conduct,

including the phone calls made to Sabahat's home in April of

2000, Raja's discussion with Sabahat's father in "May or June" of

2000 regarding "a reason for the termination of the

relationship," and Raja's "threat[]" "to 'ruin the wedding'" and
"do 'whatever it took,'" made in "May or June" of 2000.

At the beginning of trial, Raja made three motions before
1
the circuit court. First, he made a motion in limine seeking to

bar the Commonwealth from producing evidence of acts committed by

Raja after the date of September 2, 2000, the date of the

1
Raja was also tried on a charge of assault and battery
based upon the incident at MCV involving S'Lam. However, the
jury found Raja not guilty on that charge.

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incident at MCV. 2 Second, Raja asked the court to declare the

warrant defective because the warrant was amended, sometime prior

to the trial de novo in circuit court, to read that the offense

date was "on or about 3/1/00 – 11/30/00." Raja contended that

the warrant was defective because "it was amended past the day

that someone had appeared before the magistrate and swore that

these things were true. So what you have is you have a

magistrate issuing a warrant for things that haven't occurred

when you expand it." Finally, Raja asked the court to bar the

Commonwealth from producing any evidence which did not relate to

the specific instances of conduct listed in the Commonwealth's

bill of particulars.
The circuit court overruled each of Raja's motions. With

regard to the first two motions, the circuit court noted that

there were two sets of initials near the amended portion of the

2
Raja later stated that any "violations of stalking"
occurring after "September 6, 2000," the date the "warrant was
sworn to," should be barred.
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arrest warrant, one set which appeared to be the initials of

Raja's prior defense attorney, who had represented him before the

general district court, "Jay Paluso." Thus, the court held as

follows:

Well, unless you give me something to hang
my hat on, I'm not going to find that the
warrant is defective, and the Court is going
forward based on the allegation that it is
March 1st through November 30th. So the
only issue is whether there is any evidence
that will be introduced after November 30th,
and that we will take care of at a bench
conference before any of the evidence is
introduced.

As to Raja's final argument, the circuit court held:

Well, I can't make a ruling on something
when I have no idea what may arise at trial.
What I would suggest you do is if you see
that it's coming and if you can ward it off
before it gets to the jury, then we will
take a bench conference and we will deal
with it at that time.

* * * * * * *

So I will overrule your motion at this time.

During the trial, Raja raised only one objection to evidence

elicited by the Commonwealth, on the basis that the evidence was

"beyond the Bill of Particulars." The objection was raised

during the testimony of Mr. Munir, when the Commonwealth asked

him whether Raja had threatened him. The circuit court overruled

the objection, and Mr. Munir testified that Raja had threatened

him in "April to June" of 2000, stating that "it will not be good

for your family if you will [sic] refuse this. I want your

daughter to be married with [sic] me at any cost."

After the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Raja

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made a motion to strike the evidence, contending that the

Commonwealth had failed to prove venue with regard to the

stalking charge, because the evidence of the incidents which took

place in Richmond was insufficient to establish the elements of

stalking. The circuit court overruled the motion.

The jury ultimately convicted Raja of the stalking charge.

He was sentenced to 12 months in jail and a fine of $2,500.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Raja presents four issues for our consideration.

He argues that the circuit court erred in 1) failing to rule that

the arrest warrant was defective; 2) failing to exclude evidence

presented by the Commonwealth which was not contained in the

Commonwealth's bill of particulars; 3) failing to sustain his

motion pertaining to venue; and, 4) finding the evidence

sufficient to support the conviction.
A.

Raja first contends that the arrest warrant was defective

because the warrant was amended, sometime prior to the trial de
novo in circuit court, to read that the offense date was "on or

about 3/1/00 – 11/30/00." Specifically, Raja argues the

amendment was not binding upon him for purposes of the circuit

court proceedings because it occurred prior to the trial de novo,

because his counsel for the circuit court proceeding did not

agree to it, and because "an attorney cannot agree to expand a

warrant to include conduct that occurred after the arrest warrant

was issued." We disagree.

The Supreme Court of Virginia has long recognized that "in

this jurisdiction the same particularity is not required in

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warrants of arrest as is required in formal indictments."

Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 399, 100 S.E.2d 1, 3

(1957). Nevertheless, warrants must be sufficient to "point out

the offense for which the defendant is to stand trial." Id.; see

also Williams v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 514, 516, 365 S.E.2d

340, 341 (1988) (noting that in describing the offense charged,

the "description must comply with Rule 3A:6(a), which provides

that an indictment must give an accused notice of the nature and

character of the offense charged against him"). The Supreme

Court of Virginia has also held that "the judge of the trial

court . . . ha[s] the power to amend [an arrest] warrant or, upon

good reason, to dismiss it and issue a new one, under his own

hand, properly charging a violation . . . ." Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 206 Va. 766, 769, 146 S.E.2d 197, 200 (1966).

Indeed, "the fullest provision is made for all amendments of the

original warrant 'in any respect in which it appears to be

defective.'" Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846, 853, 13

S.E.2d 319, 321 (1941) (quoting Collins v. City of Radford, 134

Va. 518, 525, 113 S.E. 735, 737 (1922)); see also Code
§ 16.1-137.

We first note that in the case at bar, there is no question

that the arrest warrant placed Raja on notice of the offense for

which he was to be tried - specifically, stalking, in violation

of Code § 18.2-60.3. Further, as Raja himself conceded before

the circuit court, there is no question that this particular

charge, by its very nature, involves multiple instances of

conduct, taking place on "expansive dates." In such cases,

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where the date of the offense is "not of the essence of the

offense," nor "shown to be significant," the Commonwealth is not

required to charge that it occurred on a specific date. Marlowe

v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 619, 622, 347 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1986)

(citing Code § 19.2-226(6); Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va.

475, 488, 124 S.E. 237, 242 (1924)). Indeed, the Commonwealth

may even prove that the offense occurred on a date "other than

that alleged in the charging instrument." Id.

The circuit court here noted that Raja, through counsel,

agreed to the amendment during the general district court

proceedings. Raja does not dispute this fact on appeal.

Instead, Raja contends that he was not bound by his prior

counsel's actions in the district court because his counsel

improperly agreed to "expand" the dates of the offense beyond the

date that the warrant was issued. Raja cites no authority for

his position in this regard.

We find no error in the circuit court's refusal to declare

the warrant defective. It is clear that the legislature has

granted both district courts and circuit courts broad discretion

in determining whether to amend an arrest warrant. See Code

§§ 16.1-129.2 and 16.1-137. Indeed, pursuant to Code

§§ 16.1-129.2 and 16.1-137, as long as the warrant is not so

defective as to fail to notify the defendant of the nature and

character of the offense charged, both courts have the power to

amend a warrant "in any respect in which it appears to be

defective," on its own motion and without the consent of the

parties. Thus, either court had the authority to amend the

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warrant without the consent of Raja's counsel.

Moreover, pursuant to Code § 16.1-137, the circuit court on

appeal could have accepted the warrant as amended by the general

district court, amended the warrant to conform to Raja's

objection concerning the dates set forth therein, or it could

have reissued the warrant under its "own hand." Thus, Raja's

argument that the amendment of the warrant to include dates

subsequent to the date the original warrant was issued clearly

fails. In fact, the circuit court could have reissued the

warrant on the date of the de novo proceeding, April 30, 2002,
and, according to Raja's own argument, included conduct occurring

on any date prior to that time. 3 The fact that neither the

general district court, nor the circuit court, took such a

drastic step, does not serve to vitiate the effectiveness of the

warrant. The amendment alone, which placed Raja on notice of the

dates at issue, was sufficient to remedy any defect in the

warrant with respect to the dates and was thus, not improper.

Accordingly, we find no error in the refusal of the circuit

court to declare the warrant, as amended in the general district

court, defective as a matter of law.

B.

Raja next argues that the circuit court erred in failing to

exclude certain evidence presented by the Commonwealth that was

not referenced in the Commonwealth's bill of particulars. We

disagree.

Code § 19.2-230 permits the circuit court to "direct the

3
Of course, in such a case, Raja would have had the
opportunity to request a continuance. See Code § 16.1-137.
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filing of a bill of particulars at any time before trial." "'The

purpose of a bill of particulars is to state sufficient facts

regarding the crime to inform an accused in advance of the

offense for which he is to be tried. He is entitled to no

more.'" Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 480, 506 S.E.2d

763, 768 (1998) (citations omitted). The bill is relief

available to an accused, at the discretion of the court, to

supplement a charging instrument which fails to "'fully and

clearly set forth all the material elements of the offense,'" but

not "to expand the scope of discovery in a criminal case." Sims

v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 611, 619-20, 507 S.E.2d 648, 652-53

(1998) (citations omitted).

Here, both the arrest warrant and the Commonwealth's

response to the bill of particulars sufficiently informed Raja as

to the general nature and character of the conduct for which he

was to be tried. Our jurisprudence requires no more. Indeed, a

bill of particulars is not a vehicle for a defendant's "fishing

expedition" into the Commonwealth's evidence. See Casper v. City
of Danville, 160 Va. 929, 933, 169 S.E. 734, 735 (1933) (noting

that "a prosecutor is not required to file a pleading laying bare

the entire case he intends to present," but merely a bill "fairly

particulariz[ing] the charge or charges he intends to

prosecute"); see also O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 682,

364 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1988) (recognizing that "a defendant has no

general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case").

Nevertheless, the circuit court did not completely dispose

of Raja's request to limit the Commonwealth's evidence to the

instances stated in its bill of particulars. Instead, the

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circuit court ordered Raja to raise any such objections at the

time the Commonwealth sought to produce the specific evidence to

which he objected. The record demonstrates that Raja only

objected in this manner on one occasion. He objected when the

Commonwealth asked Mr. Munir whether he had ever been threatened

by Raja. However, the bill of particulars set forth the phone

calls made to Sabahat's home in April of 2000, Raja's discussion

with Sabahat's father in "May or June" of 2000 regarding "a

reason for the termination of the relationship," and Raja's

"threat[]" "to 'ruin the wedding'" and "do 'whatever it took'"

made in "May or June" of 2000. Mr. Munir testified that the

threats he received from Raja occurred in "April to June" of

2000, after he had spoken to him both on the telephone and in

person, that Raja had questioned his daughter's reason for

refusing to marry him, had stated "it [would] not be good for

[Mr. Munir's] family" if he allowed Sabahat to refuse his

proposal, and that he wanted Sabahat to marry him "at any cost."

This evidence was clearly embraced within the arrest warrant and

the bill of particulars.
Accordingly, we find no error on the part of the circuit

court in refusing to sustain Raja's objection in this regard.

Moreover, Raja failed to raise a contemporaneous objection in the

circuit court to the remaining portions of the Commonwealth's

evidence to which he now objects on appeal. Neither did he

request an adjournment or continuance in order to remedy any

alleged prejudice. Therefore, we do not consider this issue

further. See Rule 5A:18; see also Harward v. Commonwealth, 5

Va. App. 468, 473, 364 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1988) ("To be timely, an

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objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made when the

occasion arises - that is, when the evidence is offered, the

statement made or the ruling given.").

C.

Raja next contends that the circuit court erred in failing

to sustain his motion pertaining to the Commonwealth's alleged

failure to establish venue. Raja contends, as he did at trial,

that the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence of an

incident or incidents that took place in the City of Richmond

which aver sufficient proof to establish stalking pursuant to
4
Code § 18.2-60.3(A). We, once again, disagree.

"Venue is reviewed to determine 'whether the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is

sufficient to support the [trial court's] venue findings.'"

Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 442, 477 S.E.2d

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 4
During oral argument, Raja contended, for the first time,
that his acquittal on the charge of assault and battery, arising
out of the same incident, necessarily required a finding that
the elements of stalking pursuant to Code § 18.2-60.3(A) were
not satisfied and that venue was, thus, not established as a
matter of law. Because the record demonstrates that Raja raised
no such argument below, we do not consider it for the first time
on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see also Walton v. Commonwealth, 24
Va. App. 757, 485 S.E.2d 641 (1997), aff'd, 255 Va. 422, 497
S.E.2d 869 (1998) (holding defendant was precluded from raising
an alternative argument for the first time on appeal); Southern
Sand and Gravel Co. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corp., 145 Va.
317, 328, 133 S.E. 812, 815 (1926) ("'That the action is tried
in a county other than that declared by statute the proper
county for its trial does not go to the jurisdiction, and does
not invalidate the judgment.'" (citation omitted)); cf. Garza v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 559, 565-66, 323 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1984)
(stating that "all circuit courts have jurisdiction over all
felonies committed in the Commonwealth"); Randall v.
Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182, 187, 31 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1944)
(recognizing that the question of venue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal).
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759, 765 (1996) (quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36,

393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)), aff'd, 254 Va. 168, 489 S.E.2d 687

(1997).

Ordinarily, a criminal case must be
prosecuted in the county or city in which
the offense was committed. Code § 19.2-244.
To prove venue, the Commonwealth must
produce evidence sufficient to give rise to
a "strong presumption" that the offense was
committed within the jurisdiction of the
court, and this may be accomplished by
either direct or circumstantial evidence.

Cheng, 240 Va. at 36, 393 S.E.2d at 605. However, Code

§ 18.2-60.3 contains a special provision for proof of venue when

a violation of that particular statute is at issue.

Specifically, Code § 18.2-60.3, as it read at the time of Raja's

trial, provides as follows:

A. Any person, who on more than one
occasion engages in conduct directed at
another person with the intent to place, or
when he knows or reasonably should know that
the conduct places that other person in
reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual
assault, or bodily injury to that other
person or to that other person's family or
household member is guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.

* * * * * * *

C. A person may be convicted under this
section irrespective of the jurisdiction or
jurisdictions within the Commonwealth
wherein the conduct described in subsection
A occurred, if the person engaged in that
conduct on at least one occasion in the
jurisdiction where the person is tried.
Evidence of any such conduct that occurred
outside the Commonwealth may be admissible,
if relevant, in any prosecution under this
section provided that the prosecution is

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 based upon conduct occurring within the
Commonwealth.

(Emphasis added).

Here, when considered in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the evidence established that Raja appeared in the

City of Richmond on August 30, 2000. Further, the evidence

proved that he went to MCV in Richmond, on September 2, 2000,

S'Lam's place of employment. When Raja arrived there, Sabahat

was present. Raja demanded to speak to S'Lam, made disparaging

comments to Sabahat, and engaged in a mutual "shoving match" with

S'Lam. Further, and perhaps more importantly, Raja stated that

he would "make sure that [S'Lam would be] killed or I will kill

you." Sabahat testified that this conduct "terrified" her.
Based on these facts, the circuit court judge was entitled

to conclude that Raja engaged in at least one event, in the City

of Richmond, in which he intended, or knew, that his conduct

would place Sabahat and/or S'Lam in reasonable fear of death,

criminal sexual assault, or bodily harm. See Fortune v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 225, 229, 416 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1992)
(noting that fact finders are "often allowed broad latitude in

determining the specific intent of the actor"); Parks v.

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980)

("[c]ircumstantial evidence is as acceptable to prove guilt as

direct evidence"); Webber v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 549, 565,

496 S.E.2d 83, 90 (1998) (stating that the trier of fact is

entitled to infer that a person intends the natural consequences

of his or her actions). Clearly, therefore, the evidence was

sufficient to give rise to a "strong presumption" that at least

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one incident proscribed by Code § 18.2-60.3(A) took place in the

City of Richmond.

Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court's refusal

to grant Raja's motion to strike the stalking charge, based upon

his allegation of improper venue.

D.

Raja finally argues that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction for

stalking. However, the record demonstrates that Raja raised no

motion in this regard below. Indeed, his only motion pertaining

to the sufficiency of the evidence on the stalking charge related

specifically to his claim of improper venue - a claim which

related only to the sufficiency of the incidents occurring in the

City of Richmond. Accordingly, because Raja failed to properly

preserve his assignment of error on this issue, we do not

consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see

also Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484,

488 (1998) ("The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument

on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.").

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 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the

circuit court.

Affirmed.

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