COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Agee
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
B. P.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2027-01-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
AUGUST 20, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY
Jeffrey W. Parker, Judge
Cindy Leigh Decker, Assistant Public Defender
(Office of the Public Defender, on brief),
for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
B.P., a juvenile, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Rappahannock County affirming the decision of the juvenile and
domestic relations district court (the JDR court) holding B.P. in
contempt for failing to obey an order requiring her to attend
school. B.P. was ordered to spend ten days in a juvenile
detention center for violating the order. On appeal, B.P.
contends the JDR court lacked authority to order her to attend
school. Therefore, she contends the court's order was void as a
matter of law and that she cannot be found in contempt of a void
order. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm the
decision of the circuit court.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2000, a petition was filed in the
Rappahannock County JDR court alleging B.P., age fourteen, was a
child in need of supervision because she was "habitually and
without justification absent from school." The JDR court
appointed a guardian ad litem for B.P. and an attorney to
represent her. In a hearing on March 23, 2000, B.P. entered a
"guilty plea."
The JDR court issued an order that day of "Found guilty
(Interim Disp)" and directed that a report on the child's needs
be compiled and filed with the court. The matter was continued
to May 11, 2000. The JDR court also included in the order the
requirement that B.P. "attend school unless medically excused."
On June 1, 2000, October 13, 2000, and January 5, 2001, show
cause summonses were issued by the JDR court, each alleging B.P.
had failed to attend school in dereliction of the March 23, 2000
JDR court order. The JDR court considered all three matters on
March 8, 2001, when B.P. admitted she had not attended school as
previously ordered by the court. The JDR court found her guilty
of violating its order on three separate occasions. B.P. was
sentenced to spend ten days in a juvenile detention center for
being in contempt of the order. B.P. appealed the JDR decision
to the circuit court.
In the circuit court, B.P. admitted she had not attended
school as the JDR court had ordered. She contended, however,
that the JDR court lacked authority on March 23, 2000, to order
her to attend school because no final disposition had been made
pursuant to Code § 16.1-278.5 regarding the original petition.
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She asserted the "interim disposition" order was void because the
Code of Virginia does not authorize the JDR court to so act.
The circuit court found Code §§ 16.1-227 and 16.1-241(A)
provide the JDR court with "interlocutory authority" to order a
juvenile to attend school prior to the entry of a final
disposition. The court also found Code § 16.1-292(A) provides
the presiding JDR court judge with the authority to enforce such
an order and place a juvenile in detention for violating that
order. The circuit court incorporated these findings into its
July 5, 2001 order, which affirmed the JDR court order and is now
the subject of this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
B.P. challenges the authority of the JDR court to issue and
enforce an interlocutory order, prior to a final disposition of
her case, requiring her attendance at school. She argues such an
order is not authorized because Code § 16.1-278.5 requires final
disposition to occur only after an agency report assessing her
needs has been filed. We disagree with B.P.'s contention that
the JDR court lacked authority to issue an interlocutory order
requiring her to attend school and that the court could not
enforce its order.
The purpose of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 of the Code, the
"Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law," is crime
prevention and juvenile rehabilitation. See Kiracofe v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957). To achieve this
purpose, JDR courts are vested with (1) jurisdiction over a
juvenile "who is alleged to be . . . in need of supervision," and
(2) "all necessary and incidental powers and authority, whether
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legal or equitable in their nature." Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(1),
16.1-227. Through these powers, the JDR courts are to act "to
reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior." Code
§ 16.1-227(4).
It is pursuant to this clear grant of statutory authority
that the JDR court lawfully issues an interlocutory order. Such
an order, as in this case requiring B.P. to comply with the
Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance requirement, can be
made while awaiting the preparation of an agency report before
final disposition in a proceeding for a child in need of
supervision. Nothing in the language of Code § 16.1-278.5 voids
the inherent powers of the court, granted under Code §§ 16.1-227
and 16.1-241(A)(1), to issue an interlocutory order.
To hold otherwise would require the JDR court to permit a
juvenile to be absent from school for an indeterminate period of
time in dereliction of Code § 22.1-254 1 while the court awaited
the generation of a report on how best to supervise the juvenile.
Such a result would permit a juvenile, already found to be
habitually absent from school, to continue to disregard the
Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance requirement at will.
We will not place a construction upon a statute which leads to an
absurd result or one plainly contrary to the expressed intent of
the General Assembly as set out in Code § 22.1-254. See Ragan v.
Woodcroft Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 325-26, 497 S.E.2d
740, 742 (1998) (a statute should never be construed so that it
leads to an absurd result); see also Owens v. Commonwealth, 129
1
Code § 22.1-254 requires children between the ages of five
years old and eighteen years old to attend school.
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Va. 757, 761, 105 S.E. 531, 532 (1921) (a statute should not be
construed to "enervate, impede and paralyze the administration of
the . . . laws of the state . . . unless the legislative intent
to produce such a result is clearly indicated").
Therefore, we hold the JDR court possessed authority to
issue an interlocutory order requiring B.P. to comply with the
law of the Commonwealth mandating her attendance at school. Code
§§ 16.1-227 and 16.1-241(A) provide such authority. We further
hold that as the interlocutory order to attend school was
2
properly issued, Code § 16.1-292(A) authorized the JDR court and
circuit court to enforce that order. This statute provides a
court with the authority to punish for contempt the violation of
its order. As the record clearly supports the circuit court's
finding that B.P. violated the school attendance order, Code
§ 16.1-292(A) specifically provides for the penalty adjudicated
in this case: "[C]onfinement . . . in a secure facility for
juveniles . . . not to exceed ten days . . . ."
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision that the
JDR court had authority to issue the interlocutory school
2
Code § 16.1-292(A) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided
herein, nothing in this chapter shall deprive
the court of its power to punish summarily
for contempt for such acts as set forth in §
18.2-456, or to punish for contempt after
notice and an opportunity for a hearing on
the contempt except that confinement in the
case of a juvenile shall be in a secure
facility for juveniles rather than in jail
and shall not exceed a period of ten days for
each offense.
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attendance order and to hold B.P. in contempt when she failed to
obey that order.
Affirmed.
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Benton, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.
The record establishes that the child properly came within
the purview of the juvenile court and was declared a "child in
need of supervision," as that term is defined in Code § 16.1-228.
I agree with the majority opinion that the juvenile court judge
had the authority pursuant to Code § 16.1-241 to order the child
to attend school pending final disposition of her status pursuant
to Code § 16.1-278.5. Thus, the order requiring her to do so was
not void.
I dissent because I do not believe the juvenile court judge
was authorized by statute to order the child to detention prior
to entry of a final disposition under Code § 16.1-278.5 for a
status offense. The circuit court judge found, however, that
"pursuant to . . . Code § 16.1-292(A), . . . the [juvenile court]
judge does have the authority to enforce its decree." The
Commonwealth contends on appeal that Code § 16.1-292(A)
authorizes this detention.
That portion of the statute provides as follows:
Any person violating an order of the
juvenile court entered pursuant to
§§ 16.1-278.2 through 16.1-278.19, including
a parent subject to an order issued pursuant
to subdivision 3 of § 16.1-278.8, may be
proceeded against (i) by an order requiring
the person to show cause why the order of
the court entered pursuant to §§ 16.1-278.2
through 16.1-278.19 has not been complied
with, (ii) for contempt of court pursuant to
§ 16.1-69.24 or as otherwise provided in
this section, or (iii) by both. Except as
otherwise expressly provided herein, nothing
in this chapter shall deprive the court of
its power to punish summarily for contempt
for such acts as set forth in § 18.2-456, or
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to punish for contempt after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the contempt
except that confinement in the case of a
juvenile shall be in a secure facility for
juveniles rather than in jail and shall not
exceed a period of ten days for each
offense. However, if the person violating
the order was a juvenile at the time of the
original act and is eighteen years of age or
older when the court enters a disposition
for violation of the order, the judge may
order confinement (i) in jail, or (ii) in a
secure facility for juveniles provided the
judge finds from the evidence that the
presence of the person in such a facility is
consistent with assuring the safety of the
children confined in the facility and the
staff of the facility and the finding is in
writing and included in the order.
Code § 16.1-292(A) (emphasis added). When three "criminal" show
cause summonses were issued by the juvenile court, no final
disposition had been entered under Code § 16.1-278.5. Moreover,
I see no language in Code §§ 16.1-278.5 or 16.1-292(A) permitting
detention of the child as an available sanction prior to
disposition.
Because the courts below acted pursuant to subsection (A),
they did not make any findings as would be required by
subsections (C), (D), and (E) of Code § 16.1-292. In any event,
those provisions of Code § 16.1-292, which read as follows, are
not applicable:
C. Notwithstanding the contempt power of
the court, the court shall be limited in the
actions it may take with respect to a child
violating the terms and conditions of an
order to those which the court could have
taken at the time of the court's original
disposition pursuant to §§ 16.1-278.2
through 16.1-278.10, except as hereinafter
provided. However, this limitation shall
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not be construed to deprive the court of its
power to (i) punish a child summarily for
contempt for acts set forth in § 18.2-456 or
(ii) punish a child for contempt for
violation of a dispositional order in a
delinquency proceeding after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing regarding such
contempt, including acts of disobedience of
the court's dispositional order which are
committed outside the presence of the court.
D. In the event a child in need of services
is found to have willfully and materially
violated for a second or subsequent time the
order of the court pursuant to § 16.1-278.4,
the dispositional alternatives specified in
subdivision 9 of § 16.1-278.8 shall be
available to the court.
E. In the event a child in need of
supervision is found to have willfully and
materially violated an order of the court
pursuant to § 16.1-278.5, the court may
enter any of the following orders of
disposition:
1. Suspend the child's motor vehicle
driver's license;
2. Order any such child fourteen years of
age or older to be (i) placed in a foster
home, group home or other nonsecure
residential facility, or, (ii) if the court
finds that such placement is not likely to
meet the child's needs, that all other
treatment options in the community have been
exhausted, and that secure placement is
necessary in order to meet the child's
service needs, detained in a secure facility
for a period of time not to exceed ten
consecutive days for violation of any order
of the court arising out of the same
petition. The court shall state in its
order for detention the basis for all
findings required by this section. When any
child is detained in a secure facility
pursuant to this section, the court shall
direct the agency evaluating the child
pursuant to § 16.1-278.5 to reconvene the
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interdisciplinary team participating in such
evaluation as promptly as possible to review
its evaluation, develop further treatment
plans as may be appropriate and submit its
report to the court for its determination as
to further treatment efforts either during
or following the period the child is in
secure detention. A juvenile may only be
detained pursuant to this section in a
detention home or other secure facility in
compliance with standards established by the
State Board. Any order issued pursuant to
this subsection is a final order and is
appealable to the circuit court as provided
by law.
By placing the child in detention after a "criminal" show
cause proceeding and before entry of a final disposition pursuant
to Code § 16.1-278.5, the order effectively reclassifies the
child as a delinquent. I believe it is contrary to the spirit of
the statutes to interpret the Code in this manner such that prior
to a final disposition, a child could be held in contempt and
sanctioned for the same type of conduct being addressed by the
underlying proceeding, but without the procedural safeguards
afforded to the child in the underlying proceeding. Nothing
within Code § 16.1-292(A), permits a juvenile court judge to
order the sanctions provided therein for authority exercised
pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-241 and 16.1-227. Indeed, Code
§ 16.1-292(F) specifically provides that "[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to reclassify a child in need of
services or in need of supervision as a delinquent." I would
hold that the juvenile court judge could, at most, order those
sanctions provided for under Code § 16.1-278.5.
For these reasons, I would reverse the portion of the order
that orders the child into detention, prior to the entry of a
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final disposition under Code § 16.1-278.5, for failure to attend
school.
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