COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ALBERT ROBDAU
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1793-00-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
MARCH 20, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. MAUREEN ROBDAU
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Frederick H. Creekmore, Judge
Douglas Fredericks for appellant.
Maryann Shea Bright, Special Counsel (Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Robert B.
Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special
Counsel; Beth J. Edwards, Regional Special
Counsel, on brief), for appellee.
Albert Robdau (appellant) appeals the decision of the trial
court finding it had jurisdiction to enforce a New York support
order. Although appellant's youngest daughter is entitled to
support under New York law, he contends she is over the age of
eighteen and not otherwise entitled to support under Code
§ 20-124.2 and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enforce the support order. Finding no error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are uncontroverted. Albert and
Maureen Robdau have three children, James Robdau, born July 2,
1975, Nicole Robdau, born August 16, 1979, and Jacqueline Robdau,
born July 10, 1981. James and Nicole are both over twenty-one
years of age. Jacqueline, who is nineteen years old, is not
emancipated and, thus, is a child eligible for support under New
1
York law until she reaches age twenty-one. Jacqueline graduated
from high school on or before June 30, 1999.
On September 15, 1999, a New York court entered an order
that established appellant's child support arrearage at
$15,017.20 as of May 28, 1999 and required him to pay $110 per
week in current support and $10 per week toward the arrearage.
The New York court entered a judgment in the amount of the
arrearage.
Because appellant lives in Virginia, the State of New York,
pursuant to Code § 20-88.32 et seq., the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA), requested that the Division of Child
Support Enforcement for the Commonwealth enforce the New York
child support order. The Division requested registration of the
New York order for enforcement in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court for the City of Chesapeake. The
juvenile court established the child support arrearage and
confirmed the registration of the New York order. Appellant
1
New York Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(b)(2)(2000
McKinney) states, "'Child support' shall mean a sum to be paid
pursuant to court order or decree by either or both parents or
pursuant to a valid agreement between the parties for care,
maintenance and education of any unemancipated child under the
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appealed the order to the Circuit Court for the City of
Chesapeake. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary
judgment challenging the court's jurisdiction.
The only issue before the trial court and this Court on
appeal is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
to enforce the child support arrearage that accrued after
appellant's youngest daughter reached age eighteen or graduated
from high school because Virginia law imposes no duty of support
under these circumstances. 2 The trial court held that, under
UIFSA, it had jurisdiction to enforce the current support
3
obligation and the entire child support arrearage.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant contends Virginia courts cannot enforce another
state's support order for payments beyond the time when the child
support obligation would terminate under Virginia law. Appellant
relies upon Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 261 S.E.2d 52
(1979), to support his position. 4
age of twenty-one years."
2
Code § 20-124.2(c).
3
Appellant does not contest the proper registration of the
New York order, the amount of the arrearage, or that New York
law obligates a parent to pay child support until a child who is
not emancipated reaches age twenty-one.
4
Appellant also submitted an unpublished opinion from this
Court, Parks v. Parks, Record No. 1892-97-4 (February 10, 1998),
in support of his position. "Unpublished memorandum opinions of
this Court are not to be cited or relied upon as precedent
except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel or
the law of the case." Grajales v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 1, 2
n.1, 353 S.E.2d 789, 790 n.1 (1987). Accordingly, we will not
consider the holding in resolving the instant case.
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Cutshaw was not a UIFSA case but involved the issue of
whether the trial court retained jurisdiction, after the child
attained majority, to enforce an order entered during the child's
infancy modifying a child support agreement incorporated into the
final decree of divorce. 220 Va. at 639, 261 S.E.2d at 53. In
Cutshaw, the parties' agreement provided for child support in the
amount of $25 per week until the children left the mother's home
or completed their undergraduate education. Id. at 639, 261
S.E.2d at 53. During the infancy of the youngest child, the
court increased the amount to $35 per week. Id. at 640, 261
S.E.2d at 53. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order, which found an arrearage based on $35 per week for each
week the father failed to pay after the youngest child reached
majority. In finding no jurisdiction to enforce the modified
order, the Supreme Court of Virginia wrote:
A parent has the legal obligation to
support his children only during their
minority. Va. Code § 20-61. Of course,
this obligation does not preclude the parent
from contracting to support the children
after their minority. However, where such
contracts are incorporated into support
decrees by a divorce court, they can only be
modified by that court to the extent of its
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a court to provide
for child support pursuant to a divorce is
purely statutory. Jackson v. Jackson, 211
Va. 718, 719, 180 S.E.2d 500 (1971). The
relevant statutes only deal with the court's
power to provide for support and maintenance
of minor children. See Va. Code §§ 20-103
through -109.1. Once the child reaches
majority, the jurisdiction of the divorce
court to provide for his support and
maintenance terminates unless otherwise
provided by agreement incorporated into the
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divorce decree. See Eaton v. Eaton, 215 Va.
824, 213 S.E.2d 789 (1975); Paul v. Paul, 214
Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974).
Id. at 641, 261 S.E.2d at 54.
The following analysis demonstrates that Cutshaw is
inapplicable to the enforcement of foreign state support orders
under UIFSA. Code § 20-88.69(A), a provision of UIFSA, states,
"[t]he law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent,
amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of
support and the payment of arrearages under the order." UIFSA
further recognizes the Commonwealth may be called upon to enforce
another state's order for support of an individual over the age
of majority. Code § 20-88.32 states, in part:
"Child" means an individual, whether
over or under the age of majority, who is or
is alleged to be owed a duty of support by
the individual's parent or who is or is
alleged to be the beneficiary of a support
order directed to the parent.
"Child support order" means a support
order for a child, including a child who has
attained the age of majority under the law of
the issuing state.
The statutory language is clear, and we must give the words
their plain meaning. "Where a statute is unambiguous, the plain
meaning is to be accepted without resort to the rules of
statutory interpretation." Last v. Virginia State Bd. of Med.,
14 Va. App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992) (citing Virginia
Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 99,
353 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1987)). "The manifest intention of the
legislature, clearly disclosed by its language, must be applied."
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841
(1944).
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To accept appellant's contention would encourage parents
obligated to pay support to avoid one state's child support order
by moving to another state that has a lower age requirement for
support. Through such "forum shopping," the parent would be able
to control the duration of child support. Such a result
undermines the very purpose of UIFSA. See Commonwealth v.
Chamberlain, 31 Va. App. 533, 536-37, 525 S.E.2d 19, 21 (2000)
("The UIFSA is a model uniform law that has been enacted in all
fifty states. See Code § 20-88.32 et seq. [The UIFSA] provides
a comprehensive statutory scheme to establish and enforce support
obligations in proceedings involving two or more states.").
Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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