COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Lemons
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
YOLANDA RAMOS WILSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2781-98-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
FEBRUARY 15, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY
William H. Shaw, III, Judge
Matthew G. Krumtum (Stone & Associates, P.C.,
on brief), for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Yolanda Ramos Wilson (appellant) appeals from her bench
trial conviction for the neglect or abuse of her child, "J.",
pursuant to Code § 40.1-103. On appeal, she contends (1) the
trial court abused its discretion and violated her
constitutional rights by permitting the Commonwealth to amend
the indictment and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support
her conviction where the trial court said no single event
justified a guilty verdict. We hold that the amendment to the
indictment did not constitute reversible error and that the
evidence was sufficient to prove appellant willfully caused J.
to be injured and cruelly treated. Therefore, we affirm her
conviction.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT
By indictment returned May 4, 1998, the Gloucester County
grand jury charged that, on or about February 11 to 13, 1998,
appellant
did unlawfully and feloniously, while having
custody, willfully and negligently, cause or
permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to
be injured, or willfully or negligently,
cause him to be placed in a situation that
his life or health was endangered, or cause
or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly
treated.
This indictment roughly paralleled the language of a portion of
Code § 40.1-103 but alleged the child's "life or health was
endangered," whereas the statute used the language "may be
endangered." 1 (Emphasis added).
1
The statute provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person
employing or having the custody of any child
willfully or negligently to cause or permit
the life of such child to be endangered or
the health of such child to be injured, or
willfully or negligently to cause or permit
such child to be placed in a situation that
its life, health or morals may be
endangered, or to cause or permit such child
to be overworked, tortured, tormented,
mutilated, beaten or cruelly treated.
Code § 40.1-103.
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Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that it contained an invalid attempt to rewrite a portion of the
statute which this Court declared unconstitutional in Carter v.
Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995). She
asserted that Carter declared unconstitutionally vague the
portion of the statute which read "or willfully to cause or
permit such child to be placed in a situation that his life,
health or morals may be endangered." (Emphasis added).
The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss the
indictment and amended it to remove the portion declared
unconstitutional in Carter. Following this amendment, the
indictment charged that appellant "did unlawfully and
feloniously, while having custody, willfully and negligently,
cause or permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to be
injured, or cause or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly
treated."
Appellant continued to object, maintaining that the
language removed required only appellant's passive involvement,
whereas the remaining portions required more active involvement,
and that the court could not be certain the grand jury would
have issued the indictment if the indictment had included only
the amended language. Appellant declined a continuance, arguing
instead that the indictment should be dismissed.
The trial court held that the amendment of the indictment
was permissible because it did not change the nature of the
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offense. It then arraigned appellant on the amended indictment,
still drafted in the disjunctive but omitting the language
tracking the portion of the statute previously declared
unconstitutional. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
B.
THE OFFENSE
The evidence admitted at trial established the following:
On the morning of February 13, 1998, Kelly Wilson, father of the
three-year-old victim, "J.", a learning disabled child, dropped
J. off at "handicap preschool," putting him directly into the
arms of Cynthia Finley, J.'s teacher's assistant. A few minutes
later, when Finley rolled up J.'s sleeves prior to breakfast as
she did every school morning, she saw two roughly two-inch-long
parallel bruises running lengthwise on J.'s left forearm.
Finley had not noticed any injuries on J.'s arms when she rolled
up his sleeves the previous day. Subsequent examination of J.
in the school nurse's office indicated that, in addition to the
bruises on J.'s left forearm, J.'s right elbow was swollen, was
tender to the touch and had scratches on it and he had scratches
on his back. Nurse Becky McDaniel described the bruises on J.'s
left forearm as red and opined, based on their color, that they
had been incurred within the previous twenty-four hours.
The guidance counselor called social services, and social
worker Joe Wayland responded to J.'s school to begin an
investigation. In addition to the bruises on J.'s left forearm
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and his swollen right elbow, Wayland observed a purple mark on
one of J.'s upper arms, which was about two to three inches
long, a large purple mark on J.'s upper back, and scratches
across J.'s back. The scratches were in various stages of
healing, and three were "very fresh." Wayland observed "some
marks on J.'s forehead and on his face" and described several
marks on J.'s leg which also were in various stages of healing.
Wayland took photographs of J.'s injuries.
When Wayland questioned appellant about J.'s injuries,
appellant "was very certain" J. had sustained the injuries in a
fall from the jungle gym at school. When Wayland told her that
J. could not have injured himself on the jungle gym at school
because it had been removed from his classroom, appellant said
J. could have fallen between the slats of a bunk bed at home.
When Wayland asked appellant if she had noticed any injuries on
the child, she said the child had no injuries when she bathed
him the night before. Mr. Wilson told Wayland he had helped
appellant bathe J. the night before and that he cleaned J. up
and dressed him for school on the morning of February 13. Mr.
Wilson said there were no marks on J. at either of those times.
Other evidence established that appellant may previously
have abused J. and had been investigated by social services on
several occasions. In October 1996, one-year-old J. was treated
for a broken left femur, which required a cast. When Wayland
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questioned them, appellant and Mr. Wilson reported that J. broke
his femur stepping off a four-to-six-inch step.
Deann Dixon testified that she visited the Wilson home
sometime in 1996. The Wilsons had just learned that J. had a
learning disability, and Dixon heard appellant tell J. that he
was stupid and was going to ride the "stupid bus." Dixon also
observed appellant repeatedly pick J. up by his feet and swing
him around in circles as J., screaming and crying, asked her to
stop. While spinning him, appellant "came very close a lot of
times to hitting his head on the coffee table." Dixon made an
anonymous report to social services.
In February 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Darryl Tyler, and
his family were living with Mr. Wilson and appellant. Mr.
Tyler, his wife Robin, and their ten-year-old son Christopher
Brown all observed appellant "pluck" J.'s penis, which made him
cry, and "smack him in the head." Mrs. Tyler testified that, on
one occasion, appellant beat J. with a wooden spoon for about
twenty minutes as he lay crying on the kitchen floor in a fetal
position. Mr. Tyler also observed appellant use her foot to
pick J. up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt," which
appellant said J. did not like. Deann Dixon confirmed the
"smacking" incident and said appellant told her that she hated
J.
On July 5, 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Felissa Leisure,
changed J.'s diaper at a family reunion. While she was doing
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so, J. "seemed to wince and say, 'ow, ow, ow,'" which prompted
Leisure, the daughter of a former social services worker, to
examine J. more carefully. Leisure saw marks "all over" J.'s
arms, legs, back and face. Some were dark marks two to three
inches long, some were "fresh wounds with scabs," and some were
healed. She also observed, on J.'s upper left back, a bite mark
which appeared to have been caused by an adult. When Leisure
asked appellant about the bite marks, appellant laughed and said
her younger daughter, Edy, who was about two years old, had done
it. Leisure reported her observations to social services.
When social worker Wayland investigated Leisure's report on
July 7, 1997, he observed and photographed two sets of bite
marks on J.'s back. When Wayland questioned appellant, she said
J.'s cousin, Asia, had bitten him a year earlier.
Dr. Robin Foster, the director of the pediatrics emergency
room and child protective team at the Medical College of
Virginia, examined the photos of J.'s injuries from February 13,
1998, and photos of earlier injuries also investigated by social
services. She also examined J. on April 16, 1998. Foster
testified extensively about the marks she observed in the
photographs, stating that they were "purplish in color" and were
"consistent with bruises." She explained that bruises usually
are "blue and purple through anywhere from 48 to 72 hours out to
two weeks in the healing process." She testified that the
location of the bruises and their shape and number caused her to
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be "concern[ed] that they were not accidental injur[ies]."
Marks on J.'s back, right leg and thigh were linear, and on the
leg, there were "some looped marks visible," which were
"consistent with whip marks." Foster testified that J.'s left
and right arm bruises were consistent with a non-accidental
injury caused when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the
person's hand actually" causes the injury.
Regarding J.'s 1996 broken femur, Foster testified that the
femur is a very large bone in the body and not easily fractured
in children because a child's bones are less brittle than an
adult's.
Foster also examined the July 7, 1997 photos taken of the
bite marks on J.'s back. She testified that the nature of the
bite on J.'s left shoulder was consistent with the dental
pattern of an adult and inconsistent with the dental pattern of
a child.
The Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Investigator
Vance Richards, who took a statement from Mr. Wilson upon his
arrest on March 4, 1998. Wilson said that on the evening of
February 12, 1998,
[J.] disobeyed my verbal commands to quit
packing the toilet with toilet paper after
several times. I then grabbed his arm and
spanked him on his butt being upset for the
water and feces on the floor. In reference
to the picture where there is swelling from
the left ear is where I had grabbed him by
the ear numerous times because he tends to
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walk away when I'm verbally disciplining
him.
In appellant's case-in-chief, she offered the testimony of
Mr. Wilson, who also had been charged under Code § 40.1-103 but
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for dismissal of
the greater charge. Mr. Wilson, a convicted felon, repeated the
statement he had given to Investigator Richards, saying he had
punished J. on the evening of February 12, 1998, when J. caused
the toilet to overflow. Mr. Wilson said, "I pretty much just
grabbed him and smacked him on his butt." He did not think he
grabbed or hit J. hard enough to bruise him. He said appellant
did not see him administer the spanking and that he did not tell
her about it. Mr. Wilson said that when he dressed J. for
school the following morning, J. did not have any marks, bruises
or scratches and that he did not know where the marks came from.
He denied ever seeing appellant "do anything inappropriate" to
J. and testified that he knew she would not abuse him.
In convicting appellant, the trial court commented
extensively on the evidence:
[W]e start in '96 with a broken femur
. . . . [I]t's unusual. But I don't draw
really any conclusion from that.
The next incident we hear about, the
incidents in February [1997], I suspect that
they happened, but not to the extent that
Darrell Tyler and his wife say. . . . I
think [appellant] flicked [J.'s] penis. I
think she slapped him on the head. Again,
but not to the extent that the testimony led
to.
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We come to the bite . . . marks . . . .
And what Dr. Foster was saying, that these
bite marks, the ones that she looked at show
adult bite marks. And what bothers me is
that [appellant] comes up with that the
child was bitten by two different people,
both children[,] at two different times.
So when we get to February of '98 we
have a history, or certainly a suggestion of
a history of abuse. And it takes it beyond
that parent overdoing it on one occasion, or
even two occasions. . . .
Now, Mr. Wilson testified that he
grabbed [J.'s] . . . left arm, but even he
said it wasn't enough to cause the bruising.
But the doctor is also describing what
appear like whip marks on the . . . back of
the legs. And we know they exist and we
have heard no explanation for that.
The parties, especially [appellant],
gave inconsistent stories as to how these
got there. So the conclusion that I'm
drawing from this is that [J.] is an abused
child. I don't know why [appellant] does
what she does. . . .
* * * * * * *
. . . I think there is sufficient
evidence to find her guilty based on all the
evidence, and I understand why the
Commonwealth presented the background that
it did. It set up the attitude, the feeling
that [appellant] had for the child. I think
she has no one incident. I don't think
there is any one incident that I heard that
would give rise in and of itself to a
conviction.
But I think all of these things that
occurred around February 13th[, 1998,] are
too overwhelming, especially given the
history of her attitude toward the child in
matters of discipline.
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II.
ANALYSIS
A.
AMENDMENT OF THE INDICTMENT
An accused has a constitutional right, under both the
United States and Virginia Constitutions, to be informed of the
"cause and nature of the accusation against him." Hairston v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 213, 343 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1986)
(citing Va. Const. art. I, § 8); Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia
Criminal Procedure § 13.1 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that Due Process
Clause of United States Constitution also requires accused be
given clear notification of offense charged). However, one
accused of a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth has no
constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury. 2 See
Farewell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 475, 484, 189 S.E. 321, 325
(1937) (noting that Virginia's constitution does not mention
grand jury). Code § 19.2-217 provides that "no person shall be
put upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or
presentment shall have first been found or made by a grand jury
2
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. Const. amend. V. However,
the United States Constitution's grand jury requirement has not
been made applicable to the states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 4 n.2, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1491 n.2, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)
(citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28
L. Ed. 232 (1884)).
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in a court of competent jurisdiction or unless such person"
waives, in writing, the right to indictment or presentment.
"[T]he requirement for indictment is not jurisdictional and
constitutionally imposed but is only statutory and procedural."
Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649, 650-51, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17
(1972).
Although the complete absence of an indictment, where not
waived, may be reversible error, see id. at 650-51, 186 S.E.2d
at 16-17 (decided under Code § 19.1-162, predecessor to Code
§ 19.2-217), the legislature has provided for liberal amendment
of indictments once returned by a grand jury, see Code
§ 19.2-231.
If there be any defect in form in any
indictment, presentment or information,
. . . the court may permit amendment . . .
at any time before the jury returns a
verdict or the court finds the accused
guilty or not guilty, provided the amendment
does not change the nature and character of
the offense charged. . . . [I]f the court
finds that such amendment operates as a
surprise to the accused, he shall be
entitled, upon request, to a continuance of
the case for a reasonable time.
Id. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-231, therefore, the indictment to
which an accused is entitled under Code § 19.2-217 "includes an
indictment which has been properly amended by the court."
Farewell, 167 Va. at 485, 189 S.E. at 325 (decided under
predecessors to Code §§ 19.2-217 and 19.2-231, § 4866 of the
Code of 1887 and § 4877, enacted in 1919).
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"'If a statute . . . makes it a crime to do this, or that,
or that,' mentioning several things disjunctively, 'the
indictment may . . . embrace the whole in a single count; but it
must use the conjunctive "and" where "or" occurs in the statute
. . . .'" Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 551, 127 S.E.
368, 372 (1925) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 334).
Code § 19.2-231 permits amendment of an indictment which
includes various intents improperly drafted in the disjunctive.
See Slusher v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 440, 83 S.E.2d 719 (1954)
(decided under Code § 19-151, predecessor to Code § 19.2-231).
In Slusher, the indictment alleged that the accused did
"'attempt to maliciously, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
cut and wound . . . with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable
or kill.'" Id. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (emphasis added). When
the accused objected during trial to this disjunctive drafting,
the Court applied former Code § 19-151 to uphold the trial
court's actions in amending the indictment to charge in the
conjunctive, rearraigning the accused, and allowing him to enter
a new plea. See 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722.
Implicit in this conclusion is that the disjunctive
drafting of the intents was merely a "defect in form" subject to
remedy by amendment and that amending the indictment to charge
these intents in the conjunctive did not change the nature or
character of the offense. Therefore, the fact that the grand
jury may have indicted the accused for having acted with one
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intent did not preclude his conviction for violating the statute
with a different intent, also included in the indictment.
Although the disjunctive drafting of multiple criminal
intents in Slusher is not identical to the disjunctive drafting
of the multiple criminal acts in appellant's case, we hold that
the facts in Slusher are sufficiently analogous to be
controlling. In Slusher, the grand jury found probable cause to
believe appellant committed the charged criminal act with at
least one of four enumerated criminal intents. In appellant's
case, the grand jury found probable cause to believe appellant
committed at least one of the three criminal acts listed in Code
§ 40.1-103. The fact that the trial court may have convicted
Slusher for acting with a different one of the four enumerated
criminal intents or appellant for committing a different one of
the three enumerated criminal acts is not dispositive. 3 Our
analysis is not altered simply because, prior to trial, the
trial court struck from the indictment one of the three acts
3
Here, the trial court amended the indictment to strike the
portion of the statute declared unconstitutional. Unlike in
Slusher, it did not amend the indictment to charge the two
remaining acts in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive.
However, appellant did not specifically object to the
indictment's disjunctive language, focusing instead on the
argument that the indictment, as amended, could not be said to
have been found a true bill by the grand jury because it was
drafted in the disjunctive and one of the three alternative
grounds, upon which the grand jury could have relied, had been
struck. Other than arguing the entire indictment should be
dismissed, appellant did not object to proceeding to trial based
on the fact that the remaining language was drafted in the
disjunctive.
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appellant was alleged to have committed, based on the
unconstitutionality of that portion of the statute.
Appellant contends that the amendment changed the nature
and character of the offense charged. We disagree.
Appellant was aware, upon the return of the indictment by
the grand jury, that she was charged with serious acts of child
abuse under Code § 40.1-103. Under the indictment as originally
drafted, appellant was charged with having violated the statute
in any of three different ways: by willfully and/or negligently
(1) causing or permitting the health of the victim to be
injured; (2) causing the victim to be placed in a situation in
which his life or health was endangered; or (3) causing or
permitting the victim to be tortured or cruelly treated. 4
Appellant was on notice that she could be convicted of violating
the statute based on having committed any of the three
categories of enumerated acts; that she did not know under which
clause or clauses the grand jury returned a true bill is not
material to the issue on appeal. Cf. Buchanan v. Commonwealth,
238 Va. 389, 397-98, 384 S.E.2d 757, 762-63 (1989) (upholding
indictment drafted in the disjunctive under which accused "was
on notice that he had to defend against seven possible groupings
of murder victims, any one of which was sufficient to constitute
4
We note, under the facts of this case, that whether the
indictment was drafted in the disjunctive or conjunctive is not
relevant to whether it provided appellant with notice of the
nature or character of the offense.
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capital murder" and that, under that indictment, "there's no way
[the accused did not] know what [he was] charged with");
Slusher, 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (holding implicitly
that amending indictment alleging four intents in the
disjunctive to charge those same four intents in the conjunctive
did not change the nature or character of the offense). We hold
that when the trial court struck the second clause as
unconstitutional, this amendment merely narrowed the scope of
the indictment. It did not change the nature or character of
the offense charged in the indictment. Further, appellant made
no claim that the amendment operated as a surprise and declined
the court's offer of a continuance.
Appellant contends that, by eliminating the possibility of
conviction under clause (2), the amendment changed the nature of
the offense from passive to active, thereby changing the nature
and character of the offense. Again, we disagree. As set out
above, appellant could originally have been convicted of
violating the statute in any of three ways. However, after the
amendment, if the trier of fact found that appellant violated
the second clause of the statute, it could not convict her at
all; it could convict her only if her actions violated the first
or third clauses of the statute. Thus, the amendment narrowed
the scope of the indictment and did not change its nature or
character.
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For these reasons, we hold that the trial court's refusal
to dismiss the indictment was not error.
B.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The
credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and
the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely
for the fact finder's determination. See Long v. Commonwealth,
8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment
of the court will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or
without supporting evidence. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.
App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
The indictment alleges that appellant violated Code
§ 40.1-103 by willfully or negligently causing or permitting the
health of J. to be injured or willfully or negligently causing
or permitting him to be tortured or cruelly treated. The trial
court, in saying, "I don't know why [appellant] does what she
does," implicitly found that appellant caused the injuries to J.
and did not simply permit someone else to inflict them. The
evidence supports a finding that she did so willfully.
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"Willful, when used in a criminal statute, 'generally means
an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse
. . . . The word is also employed to characterize a thing done
without ground for believing it is lawful.'" Richardson v.
Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 93, 99, 462 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1995)
(quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 643, 646, 400 S.E.2d
806, 807 (1991)). "'[T]he correct application [of willfully] in
a particular case will generally depend upon the character of
the act involved and the attending circumstances.' . . . In the
absence of direct evidence of intent, willfulness must be
established through circumstances." Lambert v. Commonwealth, 6
Va. App. 360, 363, 367 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1988) (quoting Lynch
v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 766, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921)).
"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to
as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently
convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d
864, 876 (1983). However, "the Commonwealth need only exclude
reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence,
not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant."
Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27,
29 (1993).
Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that, on or about
February 11 to 13, 1998, appellant willfully caused J.'s health
to be injured and willfully caused him to be cruelly treated.
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence established that J. displayed multiple fresh bruises on
his arms, back and legs when he arrived for pre-school on
February 13, 1998. During that period of time, J. resided with
appellant and his father. No evidence established that anyone
else had care or custody of J. during that time other than his
teachers at pre-school, and no evidence established that J.
sustained any injuries at school during that period of time.
Mr. Wilson said he had disciplined J. on the evening of
February 12, 1998, by grabbing his arm and spanking his bottom,
but Wilson denied that his actions could have caused the
bruising. The medical testimony indicated that on February 13,
1998, J. had extensive linear bruising on his arms, shoulder,
back, buttocks and right leg. The bruises were purplish in
color, which indicated they were fresh, and some of them bore
loop marks, which were consistent with J.'s having been whipped
and inconsistent with accidental injury. The bruises on J.'s
arms, which were circumferential, were inconsistent with an
accidental injury and consistent with a non-accidental injury
occurring when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the person's
hand actually" causes the injury. The only reasonable
hypothesis flowing from this evidence is that appellant
inflicted J.'s injuries.
Other evidence established that appellant acted willfully.
Appellant previously had said she "hated" J., who was learning
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disabled, and she had abused him on several occasions during the
previous year. She "pluck[ed]" his penis, making him cry, on at
least one occasion while changing his diaper and "smack[ed] him
in the head" on another. On a third occasion, she used her foot
to pick him up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt."
On a fourth occasion, she beat him with a wooden spoon for about
twenty minutes as he lay in a fetal position, crying, on the
kitchen floor. On several of these occasions, social services
conducted an investigation. Although these prior incidents do
not constitute direct evidence that appellant was responsible
for J.'s extensive bruises on February 13, 1998, they were
relevant to establish appellant's feelings toward J. and her
intent in that she knew her actions were unlawful and likely to
produce injury and she engaged in them anyway. See 1 Charles E.
Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 12-15 (4th ed. 1993).
Further, despite appellant's contentions, the trial court's
statement that no single incident alone would give rise to a
conviction does not compel the conclusion that the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction. "While no single piece
of evidence may be sufficient, the 'combined force of many
concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in
itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a
conclusion.'" Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 273, 257
S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va.
758, 764, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919)). As long as those
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circumstances exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence
flowing from the evidence, they are sufficient to support a
criminal conviction. The circumstantial evidence here meets
that standard.
For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in
refusing to dismiss the indictment or in holding the evidence
was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Therefore, we
affirm.
Affirmed.
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