Wilson v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Lemons
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

YOLANDA RAMOS WILSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2781-98-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
FEBRUARY 15, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY
William H. Shaw, III, Judge

Matthew G. Krumtum (Stone & Associates, P.C.,
on brief), for appellant.

Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.

Yolanda Ramos Wilson (appellant) appeals from her bench

trial conviction for the neglect or abuse of her child, "J.",

pursuant to Code § 40.1-103. On appeal, she contends (1) the

trial court abused its discretion and violated her

constitutional rights by permitting the Commonwealth to amend

the indictment and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support

her conviction where the trial court said no single event

justified a guilty verdict. We hold that the amendment to the

indictment did not constitute reversible error and that the

evidence was sufficient to prove appellant willfully caused J.

to be injured and cruelly treated. Therefore, we affirm her

conviction.
 I.

BACKGROUND

A.

MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

By indictment returned May 4, 1998, the Gloucester County

grand jury charged that, on or about February 11 to 13, 1998,

appellant

did unlawfully and feloniously, while having
custody, willfully and negligently, cause or
permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to
be injured, or willfully or negligently,
cause him to be placed in a situation that
his life or health was endangered, or cause
or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly
treated.

This indictment roughly paralleled the language of a portion of

Code § 40.1-103 but alleged the child's "life or health was

endangered," whereas the statute used the language "may be

endangered." 1 (Emphasis added).

1
The statute provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person
employing or having the custody of any child
willfully or negligently to cause or permit
the life of such child to be endangered or
the health of such child to be injured, or
willfully or negligently to cause or permit
such child to be placed in a situation that
its life, health or morals may be
endangered, or to cause or permit such child
to be overworked, tortured, tormented,
mutilated, beaten or cruelly treated.

Code § 40.1-103.

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 Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground

that it contained an invalid attempt to rewrite a portion of the

statute which this Court declared unconstitutional in Carter v.

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995). She

asserted that Carter declared unconstitutionally vague the

portion of the statute which read "or willfully to cause or

permit such child to be placed in a situation that his life,

health or morals may be endangered." (Emphasis added).

The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss the

indictment and amended it to remove the portion declared

unconstitutional in Carter. Following this amendment, the

indictment charged that appellant "did unlawfully and

feloniously, while having custody, willfully and negligently,

cause or permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to be

injured, or cause or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly

treated."

Appellant continued to object, maintaining that the

language removed required only appellant's passive involvement,

whereas the remaining portions required more active involvement,

and that the court could not be certain the grand jury would

have issued the indictment if the indictment had included only

the amended language. Appellant declined a continuance, arguing

instead that the indictment should be dismissed.

The trial court held that the amendment of the indictment

was permissible because it did not change the nature of the

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offense. It then arraigned appellant on the amended indictment,

still drafted in the disjunctive but omitting the language

tracking the portion of the statute previously declared

unconstitutional. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

B.

THE OFFENSE

The evidence admitted at trial established the following:

On the morning of February 13, 1998, Kelly Wilson, father of the

three-year-old victim, "J.", a learning disabled child, dropped

J. off at "handicap preschool," putting him directly into the

arms of Cynthia Finley, J.'s teacher's assistant. A few minutes

later, when Finley rolled up J.'s sleeves prior to breakfast as

she did every school morning, she saw two roughly two-inch-long

parallel bruises running lengthwise on J.'s left forearm.

Finley had not noticed any injuries on J.'s arms when she rolled

up his sleeves the previous day. Subsequent examination of J.

in the school nurse's office indicated that, in addition to the

bruises on J.'s left forearm, J.'s right elbow was swollen, was

tender to the touch and had scratches on it and he had scratches

on his back. Nurse Becky McDaniel described the bruises on J.'s

left forearm as red and opined, based on their color, that they

had been incurred within the previous twenty-four hours.

The guidance counselor called social services, and social

worker Joe Wayland responded to J.'s school to begin an

investigation. In addition to the bruises on J.'s left forearm

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and his swollen right elbow, Wayland observed a purple mark on

one of J.'s upper arms, which was about two to three inches

long, a large purple mark on J.'s upper back, and scratches

across J.'s back. The scratches were in various stages of

healing, and three were "very fresh." Wayland observed "some

marks on J.'s forehead and on his face" and described several

marks on J.'s leg which also were in various stages of healing.

Wayland took photographs of J.'s injuries.

When Wayland questioned appellant about J.'s injuries,

appellant "was very certain" J. had sustained the injuries in a

fall from the jungle gym at school. When Wayland told her that

J. could not have injured himself on the jungle gym at school

because it had been removed from his classroom, appellant said

J. could have fallen between the slats of a bunk bed at home.

When Wayland asked appellant if she had noticed any injuries on

the child, she said the child had no injuries when she bathed

him the night before. Mr. Wilson told Wayland he had helped

appellant bathe J. the night before and that he cleaned J. up

and dressed him for school on the morning of February 13. Mr.

Wilson said there were no marks on J. at either of those times.

Other evidence established that appellant may previously

have abused J. and had been investigated by social services on

several occasions. In October 1996, one-year-old J. was treated

for a broken left femur, which required a cast. When Wayland

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questioned them, appellant and Mr. Wilson reported that J. broke

his femur stepping off a four-to-six-inch step.

Deann Dixon testified that she visited the Wilson home

sometime in 1996. The Wilsons had just learned that J. had a

learning disability, and Dixon heard appellant tell J. that he

was stupid and was going to ride the "stupid bus." Dixon also

observed appellant repeatedly pick J. up by his feet and swing

him around in circles as J., screaming and crying, asked her to

stop. While spinning him, appellant "came very close a lot of

times to hitting his head on the coffee table." Dixon made an

anonymous report to social services.

In February 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Darryl Tyler, and

his family were living with Mr. Wilson and appellant. Mr.

Tyler, his wife Robin, and their ten-year-old son Christopher

Brown all observed appellant "pluck" J.'s penis, which made him

cry, and "smack him in the head." Mrs. Tyler testified that, on

one occasion, appellant beat J. with a wooden spoon for about

twenty minutes as he lay crying on the kitchen floor in a fetal

position. Mr. Tyler also observed appellant use her foot to

pick J. up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt," which

appellant said J. did not like. Deann Dixon confirmed the

"smacking" incident and said appellant told her that she hated

J.

On July 5, 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Felissa Leisure,

changed J.'s diaper at a family reunion. While she was doing

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so, J. "seemed to wince and say, 'ow, ow, ow,'" which prompted

Leisure, the daughter of a former social services worker, to

examine J. more carefully. Leisure saw marks "all over" J.'s

arms, legs, back and face. Some were dark marks two to three

inches long, some were "fresh wounds with scabs," and some were

healed. She also observed, on J.'s upper left back, a bite mark

which appeared to have been caused by an adult. When Leisure

asked appellant about the bite marks, appellant laughed and said

her younger daughter, Edy, who was about two years old, had done

it. Leisure reported her observations to social services.

When social worker Wayland investigated Leisure's report on

July 7, 1997, he observed and photographed two sets of bite

marks on J.'s back. When Wayland questioned appellant, she said

J.'s cousin, Asia, had bitten him a year earlier.

Dr. Robin Foster, the director of the pediatrics emergency

room and child protective team at the Medical College of

Virginia, examined the photos of J.'s injuries from February 13,

1998, and photos of earlier injuries also investigated by social

services. She also examined J. on April 16, 1998. Foster

testified extensively about the marks she observed in the

photographs, stating that they were "purplish in color" and were

"consistent with bruises." She explained that bruises usually

are "blue and purple through anywhere from 48 to 72 hours out to

two weeks in the healing process." She testified that the

location of the bruises and their shape and number caused her to

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be "concern[ed] that they were not accidental injur[ies]."

Marks on J.'s back, right leg and thigh were linear, and on the

leg, there were "some looped marks visible," which were

"consistent with whip marks." Foster testified that J.'s left

and right arm bruises were consistent with a non-accidental

injury caused when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the

person's hand actually" causes the injury.

Regarding J.'s 1996 broken femur, Foster testified that the

femur is a very large bone in the body and not easily fractured

in children because a child's bones are less brittle than an

adult's.

Foster also examined the July 7, 1997 photos taken of the

bite marks on J.'s back. She testified that the nature of the

bite on J.'s left shoulder was consistent with the dental

pattern of an adult and inconsistent with the dental pattern of

a child.

The Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Investigator

Vance Richards, who took a statement from Mr. Wilson upon his

arrest on March 4, 1998. Wilson said that on the evening of

February 12, 1998,

[J.] disobeyed my verbal commands to quit
packing the toilet with toilet paper after
several times. I then grabbed his arm and
spanked him on his butt being upset for the
water and feces on the floor. In reference
to the picture where there is swelling from
the left ear is where I had grabbed him by
the ear numerous times because he tends to

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 walk away when I'm verbally disciplining
him.

In appellant's case-in-chief, she offered the testimony of

Mr. Wilson, who also had been charged under Code § 40.1-103 but

pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for dismissal of

the greater charge. Mr. Wilson, a convicted felon, repeated the

statement he had given to Investigator Richards, saying he had

punished J. on the evening of February 12, 1998, when J. caused

the toilet to overflow. Mr. Wilson said, "I pretty much just

grabbed him and smacked him on his butt." He did not think he

grabbed or hit J. hard enough to bruise him. He said appellant

did not see him administer the spanking and that he did not tell

her about it. Mr. Wilson said that when he dressed J. for

school the following morning, J. did not have any marks, bruises

or scratches and that he did not know where the marks came from.

He denied ever seeing appellant "do anything inappropriate" to

J. and testified that he knew she would not abuse him.

In convicting appellant, the trial court commented

extensively on the evidence:

[W]e start in '96 with a broken femur
. . . . [I]t's unusual. But I don't draw
really any conclusion from that.
The next incident we hear about, the
incidents in February [1997], I suspect that
they happened, but not to the extent that
Darrell Tyler and his wife say. . . . I
think [appellant] flicked [J.'s] penis. I
think she slapped him on the head. Again,
but not to the extent that the testimony led
to.

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 We come to the bite . . . marks . . . .
And what Dr. Foster was saying, that these
bite marks, the ones that she looked at show
adult bite marks. And what bothers me is
that [appellant] comes up with that the
child was bitten by two different people,
both children[,] at two different times.
So when we get to February of '98 we
have a history, or certainly a suggestion of
a history of abuse. And it takes it beyond
that parent overdoing it on one occasion, or
even two occasions. . . .
Now, Mr. Wilson testified that he
grabbed [J.'s] . . . left arm, but even he
said it wasn't enough to cause the bruising.
But the doctor is also describing what
appear like whip marks on the . . . back of
the legs. And we know they exist and we
have heard no explanation for that.
The parties, especially [appellant],
gave inconsistent stories as to how these
got there. So the conclusion that I'm
drawing from this is that [J.] is an abused
child. I don't know why [appellant] does
what she does. . . .

* * * * * * *

. . . I think there is sufficient
evidence to find her guilty based on all the
evidence, and I understand why the
Commonwealth presented the background that
it did. It set up the attitude, the feeling
that [appellant] had for the child. I think
she has no one incident. I don't think
there is any one incident that I heard that
would give rise in and of itself to a
conviction.
But I think all of these things that
occurred around February 13th[, 1998,] are
too overwhelming, especially given the
history of her attitude toward the child in
matters of discipline.

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 II.

ANALYSIS

A.

AMENDMENT OF THE INDICTMENT

An accused has a constitutional right, under both the

United States and Virginia Constitutions, to be informed of the

"cause and nature of the accusation against him." Hairston v.

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 213, 343 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1986)

(citing Va. Const. art. I, § 8); Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia

Criminal Procedure § 13.1 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that Due Process

Clause of United States Constitution also requires accused be

given clear notification of offense charged). However, one

accused of a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth has no

constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury. 2 See

Farewell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 475, 484, 189 S.E. 321, 325

(1937) (noting that Virginia's constitution does not mention

grand jury). Code § 19.2-217 provides that "no person shall be

put upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or

presentment shall have first been found or made by a grand jury

2
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. Const. amend. V. However,
the United States Constitution's grand jury requirement has not
been made applicable to the states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 4 n.2, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1491 n.2, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)
(citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28
L. Ed. 232 (1884)).

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in a court of competent jurisdiction or unless such person"

waives, in writing, the right to indictment or presentment.

"[T]he requirement for indictment is not jurisdictional and

constitutionally imposed but is only statutory and procedural."

Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649, 650-51, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17

(1972).

Although the complete absence of an indictment, where not

waived, may be reversible error, see id. at 650-51, 186 S.E.2d

at 16-17 (decided under Code § 19.1-162, predecessor to Code

§ 19.2-217), the legislature has provided for liberal amendment

of indictments once returned by a grand jury, see Code

§ 19.2-231.

If there be any defect in form in any
indictment, presentment or information,
. . . the court may permit amendment . . .
at any time before the jury returns a
verdict or the court finds the accused
guilty or not guilty, provided the amendment
does not change the nature and character of
the offense charged. . . . [I]f the court
finds that such amendment operates as a
surprise to the accused, he shall be
entitled, upon request, to a continuance of
the case for a reasonable time.

Id. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-231, therefore, the indictment to

which an accused is entitled under Code § 19.2-217 "includes an

indictment which has been properly amended by the court."

Farewell, 167 Va. at 485, 189 S.E. at 325 (decided under

predecessors to Code §§ 19.2-217 and 19.2-231, § 4866 of the

Code of 1887 and § 4877, enacted in 1919).

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 "'If a statute . . . makes it a crime to do this, or that,

or that,' mentioning several things disjunctively, 'the

indictment may . . . embrace the whole in a single count; but it

must use the conjunctive "and" where "or" occurs in the statute

. . . .'" Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 551, 127 S.E.

368, 372 (1925) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 334).

Code § 19.2-231 permits amendment of an indictment which

includes various intents improperly drafted in the disjunctive.

See Slusher v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 440, 83 S.E.2d 719 (1954)

(decided under Code § 19-151, predecessor to Code § 19.2-231).

In Slusher, the indictment alleged that the accused did

"'attempt to maliciously, unlawfully and feloniously assault,

cut and wound . . . with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable

or kill.'" Id. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (emphasis added). When

the accused objected during trial to this disjunctive drafting,

the Court applied former Code § 19-151 to uphold the trial

court's actions in amending the indictment to charge in the

conjunctive, rearraigning the accused, and allowing him to enter

a new plea. See 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722.

Implicit in this conclusion is that the disjunctive

drafting of the intents was merely a "defect in form" subject to

remedy by amendment and that amending the indictment to charge

these intents in the conjunctive did not change the nature or

character of the offense. Therefore, the fact that the grand

jury may have indicted the accused for having acted with one

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intent did not preclude his conviction for violating the statute

with a different intent, also included in the indictment.

Although the disjunctive drafting of multiple criminal

intents in Slusher is not identical to the disjunctive drafting

of the multiple criminal acts in appellant's case, we hold that

the facts in Slusher are sufficiently analogous to be

controlling. In Slusher, the grand jury found probable cause to

believe appellant committed the charged criminal act with at

least one of four enumerated criminal intents. In appellant's

case, the grand jury found probable cause to believe appellant

committed at least one of the three criminal acts listed in Code

§ 40.1-103. The fact that the trial court may have convicted

Slusher for acting with a different one of the four enumerated

criminal intents or appellant for committing a different one of

the three enumerated criminal acts is not dispositive. 3 Our

analysis is not altered simply because, prior to trial, the

trial court struck from the indictment one of the three acts

3
Here, the trial court amended the indictment to strike the
portion of the statute declared unconstitutional. Unlike in
Slusher, it did not amend the indictment to charge the two
remaining acts in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive.
However, appellant did not specifically object to the
indictment's disjunctive language, focusing instead on the
argument that the indictment, as amended, could not be said to
have been found a true bill by the grand jury because it was
drafted in the disjunctive and one of the three alternative
grounds, upon which the grand jury could have relied, had been
struck. Other than arguing the entire indictment should be
dismissed, appellant did not object to proceeding to trial based
on the fact that the remaining language was drafted in the
disjunctive.

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appellant was alleged to have committed, based on the

unconstitutionality of that portion of the statute.

Appellant contends that the amendment changed the nature

and character of the offense charged. We disagree.

Appellant was aware, upon the return of the indictment by

the grand jury, that she was charged with serious acts of child

abuse under Code § 40.1-103. Under the indictment as originally

drafted, appellant was charged with having violated the statute

in any of three different ways: by willfully and/or negligently

(1) causing or permitting the health of the victim to be

injured; (2) causing the victim to be placed in a situation in

which his life or health was endangered; or (3) causing or

permitting the victim to be tortured or cruelly treated. 4

Appellant was on notice that she could be convicted of violating

the statute based on having committed any of the three

categories of enumerated acts; that she did not know under which

clause or clauses the grand jury returned a true bill is not

material to the issue on appeal. Cf. Buchanan v. Commonwealth,

238 Va. 389, 397-98, 384 S.E.2d 757, 762-63 (1989) (upholding

indictment drafted in the disjunctive under which accused "was

on notice that he had to defend against seven possible groupings

of murder victims, any one of which was sufficient to constitute

4
We note, under the facts of this case, that whether the
indictment was drafted in the disjunctive or conjunctive is not
relevant to whether it provided appellant with notice of the
nature or character of the offense.

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capital murder" and that, under that indictment, "there's no way

[the accused did not] know what [he was] charged with");

Slusher, 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (holding implicitly

that amending indictment alleging four intents in the

disjunctive to charge those same four intents in the conjunctive

did not change the nature or character of the offense). We hold

that when the trial court struck the second clause as

unconstitutional, this amendment merely narrowed the scope of

the indictment. It did not change the nature or character of

the offense charged in the indictment. Further, appellant made

no claim that the amendment operated as a surprise and declined

the court's offer of a continuance.

Appellant contends that, by eliminating the possibility of

conviction under clause (2), the amendment changed the nature of

the offense from passive to active, thereby changing the nature

and character of the offense. Again, we disagree. As set out

above, appellant could originally have been convicted of

violating the statute in any of three ways. However, after the

amendment, if the trier of fact found that appellant violated

the second clause of the statute, it could not convict her at

all; it could convict her only if her actions violated the first

or third clauses of the statute. Thus, the amendment narrowed

the scope of the indictment and did not change its nature or

character.

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 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court's refusal

to dismiss the indictment was not error.

B.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal

in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The

credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely

for the fact finder's determination. See Long v. Commonwealth,

8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment

of the court will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or

without supporting evidence. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.

App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).

The indictment alleges that appellant violated Code

§ 40.1-103 by willfully or negligently causing or permitting the

health of J. to be injured or willfully or negligently causing

or permitting him to be tortured or cruelly treated. The trial

court, in saying, "I don't know why [appellant] does what she

does," implicitly found that appellant caused the injuries to J.

and did not simply permit someone else to inflict them. The

evidence supports a finding that she did so willfully.

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 "Willful, when used in a criminal statute, 'generally means

an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse

. . . . The word is also employed to characterize a thing done

without ground for believing it is lawful.'" Richardson v.

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 93, 99, 462 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1995)

(quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 643, 646, 400 S.E.2d

806, 807 (1991)). "'[T]he correct application [of willfully] in

a particular case will generally depend upon the character of

the act involved and the attending circumstances.' . . . In the

absence of direct evidence of intent, willfulness must be

established through circumstances." Lambert v. Commonwealth, 6

Va. App. 360, 363, 367 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1988) (quoting Lynch

v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 766, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921)).

"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to

as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d

864, 876 (1983). However, "the Commonwealth need only exclude

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence,

not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant."

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27,

29 (1993).

Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that, on or about

February 11 to 13, 1998, appellant willfully caused J.'s health

to be injured and willfully caused him to be cruelly treated.

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Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

evidence established that J. displayed multiple fresh bruises on

his arms, back and legs when he arrived for pre-school on

February 13, 1998. During that period of time, J. resided with

appellant and his father. No evidence established that anyone

else had care or custody of J. during that time other than his

teachers at pre-school, and no evidence established that J.

sustained any injuries at school during that period of time.

Mr. Wilson said he had disciplined J. on the evening of

February 12, 1998, by grabbing his arm and spanking his bottom,

but Wilson denied that his actions could have caused the

bruising. The medical testimony indicated that on February 13,

1998, J. had extensive linear bruising on his arms, shoulder,

back, buttocks and right leg. The bruises were purplish in

color, which indicated they were fresh, and some of them bore

loop marks, which were consistent with J.'s having been whipped

and inconsistent with accidental injury. The bruises on J.'s

arms, which were circumferential, were inconsistent with an

accidental injury and consistent with a non-accidental injury

occurring when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the person's

hand actually" causes the injury. The only reasonable

hypothesis flowing from this evidence is that appellant

inflicted J.'s injuries.

Other evidence established that appellant acted willfully.

Appellant previously had said she "hated" J., who was learning

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disabled, and she had abused him on several occasions during the

previous year. She "pluck[ed]" his penis, making him cry, on at

least one occasion while changing his diaper and "smack[ed] him

in the head" on another. On a third occasion, she used her foot

to pick him up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt."

On a fourth occasion, she beat him with a wooden spoon for about

twenty minutes as he lay in a fetal position, crying, on the

kitchen floor. On several of these occasions, social services

conducted an investigation. Although these prior incidents do

not constitute direct evidence that appellant was responsible

for J.'s extensive bruises on February 13, 1998, they were

relevant to establish appellant's feelings toward J. and her

intent in that she knew her actions were unlawful and likely to

produce injury and she engaged in them anyway. See 1 Charles E.

Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 12-15 (4th ed. 1993).

Further, despite appellant's contentions, the trial court's

statement that no single incident alone would give rise to a

conviction does not compel the conclusion that the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction. "While no single piece

of evidence may be sufficient, the 'combined force of many

concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in

itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a

conclusion.'" Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 273, 257

S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va.

758, 764, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919)). As long as those

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circumstances exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence

flowing from the evidence, they are sufficient to support a

criminal conviction. The circumstantial evidence here meets

that standard.

For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in

refusing to dismiss the indictment or in holding the evidence

was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Therefore, we

affirm.

Affirmed.

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