Bass v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

KAWASKI BASS, S/K/A
KAWASKI LAJUNE BASS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2554-98-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
JANUARY 27, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge

Lyn M. Simmons for appellant.

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.

Kawaski Bass appeals from his convictions of robbery and

use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He contends on

appeal 1) that the trial court erred in admitting statements of

his two codefendants as evidence in the guilt phase of the

prosecution, and 2) that without those statements the evidence

offered against him at trial was insufficient to sustain his

convictions. We agree that the statements of Bass' codefendants

should not have been admitted against him at trial, but we find

that the admission of his codefendants' statements was harmless

error. We therefore affirm his convictions.
 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the late evening of February 1, 1998, Bass and two

friends, Maurice Sirls and Julius Scott, drove in Scott's

mother's car from Hampton, Virginia to a shopping center in

Newport News. According to the statements of Bass and his

codefendants, the three planned to rob customers as they exited

a Food Lion grocery store located in the shopping center. Sirls

had a .25 caliber chrome handgun with six bullets in it, and

Scott had an unloaded Smith & Wesson. The three men entered the

grocery store and identified their intended victims, Robert

Randolph and his friend, Jacqueline James, who were shopping at

the store shortly after midnight. Randolph bumped into Bass

while in the store, triggering a short, innocuous exchange of

words. When Randolph exited the store and walked toward his

car, he saw Bass, Sirls, and Scott exit the store from another

door. One of the three asked Randolph which way he was going.

The men then moved in different directions, Sirls coming toward

Randolph while Scott, and possibly Bass, approached from the

other side of the car. As Randolph unlocked his car door, he

heard someone behind him. Sirls pointed the small chrome

handgun at Randolph and "instructed [him] to cooperate,"

threatening to shoot or kill him. Randolph told Sirls his money

was in the top left pocket of his shirt. Sirls took $8 from

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Randolph and a "handful of lollipops" from his pants pocket and

ran from the scene with Scott and Bass.

At trial, Randolph identified all three suspects, but could

not testify as to Bass' presence during the robbery. James

could not identify any of the three assailants; she heard the

men but did not see them. However, she saw a gun aimed at

Randolph and felt something "hard" at the back of her head.

After checking her pockets, one of the men took the bag of

groceries from her hand before leaving the scene.

Officer Larry Rilee of the Newport News Police Department

interviewed Bass and Sirls on April 21, 1998 at the Hanover

County jail, where they had been detained. He interviewed Scott

on April 28, 1998, at a detention center in James City County.

Each of them made lengthy statements to Rilee recounting the

events of the evening in question and providing an account of

the robbery that took place.

Bass stated that on the evening in question he drove

himself, Sirls and Scott in Scott's mother's car to the parking

lot of a 7-Eleven store just across the street from a Food Lion

grocery store located on Warwick Boulevard. Bass admitted that

he drove his companions there knowing that they were armed and

intended to commit a robbery. When asked by the police whether

he, Sirls and Scott discussed committing a robbery while en

route to the Food Lion, Bass replied, "Yeah." In response to

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further questioning as to why Sirls and Scott had guns with

them, Bass answered, "I guess they was going in to do a

robbery. . . ." He stated that he and his two associates walked

to the Food Lion and that on the way Sirls "cocked his .25 gun

back," but Scott "didn't have no bullets in his gun." Bass

stated that the three men browsed around in the store until they

saw Randolph and James and that he, Sirls and Scott exited the

store when they identified Randolph and James as their victims.

According to Bass, Sirls at this point said to him, "Yo, let's

get down," which Bass understood to be an invitation to

participate in robbing Randolph and James. Bass replied, "Naw,

uh-uh, I'm leaving," and, "Man, I'm turning around." Bass

described the robbery that took place, however, stating that he

was "away from the scene" of the robbery, having walked to "the

end of the street," but admitting he could see tears running

down James' cheeks when Scott told her to put her hands behind

her head. Bass further stated that he could still see "the

tears rolling down [James'] eyes" as the three fled. Bass also

admitted that he helped Sirls and Scott effect their escape by

driving them from the scene. In addition, he accurately

described the clothes worn by Sirls and Scott on the evening in

question.

Sirls stated that he went to the Food Lion in company with

Bass and Scott and that Bass drove them to the 7-Eleven parking

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lot in Scott's mother's car. According to Rilee's testimony,

Sirls also stated that while driving to the store "they planned

to do a robbery," in which they intended "just to pick a target

at some point." He admitted that he and Scott were armed, and

stated that Bass was unarmed. Sirls stated that he carried a

.22 or .25 chrome handgun and that Scott was armed with a

"wooden" or "antique" gun. Sirls described the robbery,

indicating that once Randolph and James exited the Food Lion,

Sirls approached Randolph, produced the chrome handgun, and

robbed Randolph while Scott held a gun on James and checked her

pockets for cash. He also accurately described the clothes worn

by Bass and Scott. When asked where Bass was positioned during

the robbery, Sirls stated that he "could have reached and

touched [Bass], that's how close he was."

In his statement, Scott likewise stated that Bass drove the

three defendants to the 7-Eleven parking lot, from which they

walked to the Food Lion, and that while en route they discussed

committing a robbery. He also stated that Bass alone of the

three was unarmed, that Sirls carried a chrome handgun, and that

he was armed with an old, "wooden" gun. He recounted how Sirls

robbed Randolph while he robbed James, taking a bag of groceries

from her, and that Bass fled the scene with him and Sirls. He

finally noted that once they returned to the car they ate some

of the groceries stolen from James.

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 Bass, Sirls and Scott were tried together, and none of them

testified at trial. The Commonwealth offered the statements of

all three men made in response to police questioning as evidence

against Bass, introducing the statements through the testimony

of Officer Rilee, and through a transcript of Bass' statement.

Bass' objection to admitting the statements of his codefendants

against him was overruled, in reliance upon our decision in

Randolph v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 345, 353, 482 S.E.2d 101,

104-05 (1997) (codefendant's hearsay statement admissible as a

declaration against penal interest, a "'firmly rooted'" hearsay

exception (quoting Raia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546, 552,

478 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1996))); see also Chandler v. Commonwealth,

249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995);

Morris v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 145, 147, 326 S.E.2d 693, 694

(1985); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 5, 8, 441 S.E.2d 47,

49 (1994); Scaggs v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 1, 4-5, 359 S.E.2d

830, 832 (1987). The court also denied Bass' motion to strike

the evidence on the ground the Commonwealth had failed to

present evidence connecting him with the offense.

HEARSAY ANALYSIS

Whether evidence is admissible falls within the broad

discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not

be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Blain

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988).

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By definition, when the trial court makes an error of law, an

abuse of discretion occurs. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28

Va. App. 1, 9, 502 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1998) (en banc).

An accomplice's custodial confession that incriminates a

codefendant is presumptively unreliable in the context of an

alleged Confrontation Clause violation. See Lilly v. Virginia,

119 S. Ct. 1887, 1900 (1999) (plurality opinion); Lee v.

Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541-43 (1986) ("[A] codefendant's

confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages

detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those

passages may well be the product of the codefendant's desire to

shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert

attention to another."). "[A] confession by an accomplice which

incriminates a criminal defendant" should be considered a

distinct category of hearsay for the purpose of determining its

admissibility under the Sixth Amendment, Lee, 476 U.S. at 544

n.5, and this category of statements is not a "firmly rooted

exception" to the hearsay rule. 1 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1897

(plurality opinion).

1 The Supreme Court noted in Lilly that hearsay statements
against the penal interest of the declarant are recognized as
constituting "a firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule in
Virginia. See 119 S. Ct. at 1894. The Court emphasized,
however, that it does not regard accomplices' custodial
confessions as falling within that exception in determining
admissibility of such statements under the Confrontation Clause.
See id.

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 The presumption of unreliability attaching to an

accomplice's confession implicating a defendant may be rebutted, 2

although the bar for rebuttal of the presumption is set very

high. 3 See id. at 1900; Lee, 476 U.S. at 543. The confession

must be "supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.'" Id. at 543 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448

U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness necessary to rebut the presumption of

unreliability must "be drawn from the totality of circumstances

2 In Lilly, the Supreme Court observed:

This [opinion] does not mean . . . that the
[Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause
imposes a "blanket ban on the government's
use of [nontestifying] accomplice statements
that incriminate a defendant." Rather, it
simply means that the Government must
satisfy the second prong of the Ohio v.
Roberts[, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),] test in order
to introduce such statements.

119 S. Ct. at 1899 n.5.

3 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion states:

It is highly unlikely that the presumptive
unreliability that attaches to accomplices'
confessions that shift or spread blame can
be effectively rebutted when the statements
are given under conditions that implicate
the core concerns of the old ex parte
affidavit practice – that is, when the
government is involved in the statements'
production, and when the statements describe
past events and have not been subjected to
adversarial testing.

Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900.

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that surround the making of the statement and that render the

declarant particularly worthy of belief." Idaho v. Wright, 497

U.S. 805, 820 (1990). Evidence admitted based upon the

existence of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must

be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to

its reliability. See id. at 821.

Circumstances surrounding an accomplice's confession that

weigh in favor of finding reliability include: (1) lack of

knowledge on the part of the accomplice that he or she has

already been implicated in a crime by a codefendant, (2) making

the confession to authorities who were not aware of the

confessor's role in the crime confessed, and (3) the exercise of

any contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel or its

equivalent. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 544.

In Wright, the Supreme Court held that evidence which

corroborates the truth of an accomplice's confession is

irrelevant to the determination of the confession's reliability.

See 497 U.S. at 822 ("To be admissible under the Confrontation

Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must

possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent

trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.").

The use of corroborating evidence to establish a statement's

reliability is "no substitute for cross-examination of the

declarant at trial" and would allow the admission of

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presumptively unreliable statements by bootstrapping on the

trustworthiness of other evidence admitted at trial. Wright,

497 U.S. at 822-23. However, the Supreme Court in Wright did

not reject the use of the interlocking character of codefendant

confessions as probative of their reliability, but merely

"declined to rely on corroborative physical evidence" in

applying Lee's analysis. Id. at 824 (emphasis added); see

Washington v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 n.5 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)

(observing that Wright rejected only physical evidence as

corroborative of a codefendant's "interlocking" confession, not

the interlocking nature of the confessions themselves). Thus,

under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lee and Wright, where

codefendants' statements "are identical in all material

respects," such evidence may be considered because "the

likelihood that they are accurate is significantly increased."

476 U.S. at 545. Such statements are considered to

substantially "interlock," in that they "recite[ ] essentially

the same facts as those of . . . nontestifying codefendants."

Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1987).

The degree to which such confessions must "interlock" to be

admissible was defined in Lee as follows:

If those portions of the codefendant's
purportedly "interlocking" statement which
bear to any significant degree on the
defendant's participation in the crime are
not thoroughly substantiated by the
defendant's own confession, the admission of

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 the statement poses too serious a threat to
the accuracy of the verdict to be
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In
other words, when the discrepancies between
the statements are not insignificant, the
codefendant's confession may not be
admitted.

476 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). Conversely, an accomplice's

statement that does not "interlock" with the defendant's

statement may be admitted against the defendant if the areas of

disagreement are irrelevant or trivial. See id. at 545. Before

an accomplice's confession may be admitted, the court must be

able to conclude that the declarant's truthfulness is so clear

from the surrounding circumstances that cross-examination would

be of "marginal utility." Wright, 497 U.S. at 823.

Finally, although a violation of the Confrontation Clause

results when a court admits against a defendant an accomplice's

interlocking confession that differs in substantial ways from

the defendant's confession, if the admission of the accomplice's

statement is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the error

does not require reversal of the conviction. See Cruz, 481 U.S.

at 193-94. In examining the record for harmless error,

corroborating physical evidence may be considered, although it

is an improper basis upon which to determine the reliability of

the accomplice's statement. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 823-24.

Applying these principles to the issue before us, we find

Bass met his burden to show that the trial court's decision was

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erroneous. See Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265

S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the party prevailing below. See Williams v.

Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 378, 381, 517 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1999).

All three defendants gave tape-recorded confessions to the

police in response to questioning. The accomplices' statements

admitted against Bass came into evidence through the testimony

of Officer Rilee. They were unsworn and were not subject to

cross-examination. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 544. Furthermore,

Sirls and Scott were aware at the time they made the statements

that they were facing charges of robbery, and the police were

aware of the declarants' roles in the crime under investigation.

See id. at 544, cited in Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.

Finally, the confessions of the three defendants were not

substantially interlocking. Sirls and Scott both said in their

confessions that Bass was present during the robbery of the two

victims. Sirls offered an indicator of Bass' proximity, stating

that while he held a gun to the chin of Robert Randolph, Bass

stood close enough that Sirls "could have reached and touched

him, that's how close he was." Bass disagreed on this point.

While admitting that he was close enough to see the "tears in

the eyes" of the female victim, Jacqueline James, Bass described

his location relative to the robbery as being "away from the

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scene . . . at the end of the street," but close enough to see

Sirls and Scott committing the robbery in the parking lot. He

replied to Sirls' invitation to participate in the robbery in

the parking lot by saying, "Naw, uh-uh, I'm leaving. . . ."

When police asked Bass why he thought his companions were armed,

he replied, "Because I guess they was going in to do a robbery."

(Emphasis added).

Under Lee, the defendant's confession must "thoroughly

substantiate[ ]" those portions of his accomplices' confessions

which bear upon the defendant's guilt to render their statements

admissible against him. See 476 U.S. at 545. Here, the

confessions do not thoroughly substantiate each other. In his

statement, Bass denied having participated in the robbery,

claimed he was not in the parking lot when it occurred, and

further stated he "was leaving" when Sirls and Scott made clear

their plans to rob the two victims. Sirls and Scott, however,

placed Bass immediately at the scene, close enough that Sirls

"could have . . . touched him." This discrepancy is neither

"irrelevant" nor "trivial," see Lee, 476 U.S. at 545, because

the statements go to whether Bass' conduct was such that it

supports his conviction as a principal in the second degree or

as an accessory before the fact. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 15

Va. App. 384, 387, 424 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1992) (an accused's mere

presence and consent to the crime will not suffice to convict as

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an accomplice (citing Underwood v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045,

1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978))). Furthermore, because Bass'

statement did not thoroughly substantiate those of Sirls and

Scott, and because the discrepancies in the confessions taken

from Sirls and Scott gave rise to the need for probative

cross-examination, we cannot say that cross-examination of the

declarants would have been only marginally useful. See Wright,

497 U.S. at 823.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court

erroneously admitted the statements of Sirls and Scott into

evidence against Bass. We now examine whether this error was

harmless or whether it requires reversal of Bass' convictions.

HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS

Where constitutional error occurs, the court must assess

whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1901 (citing Chapman v. California, 386

U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Confrontation Clause error is a federal

constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis. See

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). "'[B]efore a

federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court

must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.'" Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551,

___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).

"This standard requires a determination of 'whether there is a

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reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might

have contributed to the conviction.'" Id. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at

___ (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).

In making [a] determination [of such
reasonable possibility], the reviewing court
is to consider a host of factors, including
the importance of the tainted evidence in
the prosecution's case, whether that
evidence was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the tainted evidence on
material points, and the overall strength of
the prosecution's case.

Id. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___.

In determining whether an erroneously admitted codefendant

statement incriminating a defendant constituted harmless error,

the interlocking nature of the codefendant's and defendant's

statements may also be considered in assessing whether the error

contributed to the defendant's conviction. See Cruz, 481 U.S.

at 190-91 (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253

(1969)); Preston v. Florida, 641 So.2d 169, 171 n.7 (Fla. 1994)

(observing Cruz noted that interlocking confessions may be

considered for purposes other than reliability of the

statements, including harmlessness of error). Where the

defendant makes no attempt to disclaim his own confession which

closely interlocks with the confession of non-testifying

accomplices, the error may be deemed harmless. See Cruz, 481

U.S. at 193-94.

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 It is well established that an accused cannot be convicted

solely on his or her uncorroborated extrajudicial confession.

See Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 210-11, 116 S.E.2d

282, 284-85 (1960). Rather, the corpus delicti of an offense

must be established by such substantial corroborative

circumstances as will, when taken in connection with the

confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable

doubt. See id. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285. The corpus delicti

of an offense is the fact that the crime charged has been

actually perpetrated, meaning "'objective proof or substantial

fact that a crime has been committed.'" Claxton v. City of

Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 152, 154, 421 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992)

(citation omitted).

"To show an accused guilty of a crime as a principal in the

second degree, the Commonwealth must show that the accused was

present, aiding and abetting, and intended his or her words,

gestures, signals, or actions to in some way encourage, advise,

urge, or in some way help the person committing the crime to

commit it." McGill v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 728, 733, 485

S.E.2d 173, 175 (1997) (citing Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2

Va. App. 265, 269, 343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986)). A person

accused as an accomplice is accountable for all crimes committed

by his or her confederates in furtherance of the criminal

enterprise, even though the accomplice may never have intended

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that a particular crime would be committed. See Jones, 15

Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565 (citing Boggs v.

Commonwealth, 153 Va. 828, 836, 149 S.E. 445, 447 (1929))

(additional citation omitted).

"[E]vidence [that] establishes that the accomplice was

. . . present . . . at a convenient distance" is sufficient to

establish the accomplice's presence at the crime scene. McGhee

v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 425 n.2, 270 S.E.2d 729, 731 n.2

(1980). However, the accused's mere presence and consent to the

crime will not suffice to convict as an accomplice. See Jones,

15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565 (citing Underwood v.

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978)).

The accused "'must share the criminal intent of the party who

actually committed the [crime] or be guilty of some overt act in

furtherance thereof.'" Jones, 15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at

565 (quoting Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306

S.E.2d 886, 889 (1983)).

Applying the law to the facts of this case, we find the

trial court's error in admitting the accomplices' statements to

be harmless. Bass' statement to the police admitted that he

accompanied Sirls and Scott to the Food Lion store on the

evening in question and that he drove them there knowing that

they were armed and intended to commit a robbery. He stated

that he and his cohorts walked around in the store until they

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saw Randolph and James and that he exited the store with Sirls

and Scott when they identified Randolph and James as their

victims. He further admitted that, despite declining Sirls'

invitation to assist in the robbery, he stood close by until his

cohorts completed their crime, then fled with them, helping

Sirls and Scott effect their escape by driving them from the

scene. He also accurately described the clothes worn by Sirls

and Scott on the evening in question. The only significant

difference between his account and that of Sirls was in respect

to Bass' proximity to the robbery.

The accounts given by Sirls and Scott match Bass' statement

in their material respects. All three individuals agreed that

they went to the Food Lion store together, that Bass drove them

in Scott's mother's car, and that discussion of the robbery took

place on the way. The three accounts were also consistent

concerning the manner in which Sirls and Scott were armed, in

reporting that Bass was unarmed, and in describing how Sirls

robbed Randolph while Scott held a gun on James and checked her

pockets for cash. Sirls and Bass also accurately described the

clothes worn by each codefendant, though no statement by Scott

was offered into evidence on this point. The only material

respect in which Sirls' account differed from Bass' was in

Sirls' assertion that Bass stood so close to him during the

robbery that Sirls could have touched him. Scott's statement

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differed from Bass' only in his statement that once the three

returned to the car, he, Bass and Sirls ate some of the

groceries taken from James. In short, the only respects in

which the accounts of Sirls and Scott differ from that of Bass

are Bass' proximity to the robbery as it occurred, and whether

Bass ate any of the groceries taken from James.

Although the confessions were not sufficiently interlocking

to permit their admission under the principles of Lee, 476 U.S.

at 545-46, their substantially interlocking nature, when

considered together with the other evidence in the case,

establishes the foundation for finding harmless error. Bass'

own statement, taken in conjunction with the testimony of the

two crime victims, beyond any reasonable doubt places him at the

scene of the robbery in question, aiding and abetting Sirls and

Scott and acting in furtherance of their crime. The testimony

of the two victims established they were robbed, and they

identified all three codefendants as being present at the Food

Lion store just prior to the robbery. Randolph also identified

Sirls and Scott as the robbers, and stated that Bass was present

while Sirls and Scott committed the crime. More importantly,

Bass admitted that he drove Sirls and Scott to the Food Lion

store on the evening in question, that he knew of the plan to

commit a robbery, that he knew his confederates were armed, and

that he knew they brought their weapons into the store in order

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to commit a robbery. Although Bass stated he declined to

participate directly in the robbery of the two victims when

invited to do so, he admitted that while Sirls and Scott robbed

the two victims, he waited at a distance close enough to the

crime scene to see the female victim crying. Bass further

admitted that after the robbery was completed, he fled with

Sirls and Scott, and that he drove them away from the scene of

the robbery. The evidence thus establishes that Bass aided

Sirls and Scott in a criminal enterprise, by driving them to the

Food Lion store, knowing their intent to commit a robbery, and

by helping them escape after the robbery was completed. These

admissions evidence his participation in a common criminal

enterprise with Sirls and Scott, and fully support his

conviction of robbery as a principal in the second degree. See

Jones, 15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565.

According the accomplices' statements their full

prejudicial value, see Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432

(1972), we find that the accounts of Sirls and Scott add nothing

significant to the other evidence in the case, particularly the

picture painted by Bass' own statement depicting himself as a

principal in the second degree. Under the accomplice theory

which underlies his conviction, it matters not whether Bass

stood shoulder to shoulder with Sirls as the latter held a gun

to Randolph or whether he ate any of the stolen groceries

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afterward. The evidence provided by Bass himself unquestionably

revealed that he was aware of his companions' criminal purpose

and that he acted in furtherance of that purpose by driving them

to the store, waiting while they perpetrated the robbery, and

driving them from the scene. Thus, even viewing the erroneously

admitted accomplice confessions with an eye toward their full

damaging potential to Bass' defense, the remaining evidence of

Bass' guilt is overwhelming, see id., and establishes no

"'reasonable possibility that the [improperly admitted] evidence

. . . contributed to the conviction,'" or that a different

verdict might have been reached but for the admission of the

accomplice statements. Lilly, 258 Va. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___

(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23); see Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432

(whether improperly admitted testimony required reversal of

conviction depended upon whether the evidence was sufficiently

prejudicial to defendant; if there was no "reasonable

possibility" that the evidence contributed to the conviction,

reversal was not required); Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254. It is

thus clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the

accomplice confessions was harmless error. See Schneble, 405

U.S. at 432; Lilly, 258 Va. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___.

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 Because we find that the admission of Sirls' and Scott's

statements inculpating Bass was harmless error, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

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