Russell Stover Candies v. Alexander

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

RUSSELL STOVER CANDIES AND
TIG PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0402-99-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
OCTOBER 26, 1999
SARAH R. ALEXANDER

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

S. Vernon Priddy, III (Patsy L. Mundy; Sands,
Anderson, Marks & Miller, on briefs), for
appellants.

Nora J. Miller (Watson & Nelson, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.

Russell Stover Candies and TIG Premier Insurance Company

(collectively employer) appeal a decision of the Workers'

Compensation Commission (commission) awarding disability

compensation and medical benefits to Sarah R. Alexander

(claimant) for an injury by accident which occurred on March 18,

1996. On appeal, employer contends the commission erred (1) in

interpreting Commission Rule 3.2 as directory rather than

mandatory and, therefore, in not dismissing claimant's appeal

when she failed to file a written statement; and (2) in holding

that credible evidence established that claimant experienced a

compensable injury by accident which prevented her from
returning to work for employer. For the reasons that follow, we

disagree and affirm the commission's award.

I.

FACTS

On March 18, 1996, while working on an assembly line in

employer's chocolate manufacturing plant, claimant smelled the

strong odor of bleach and experienced a "real bad asthma attack"

for which she sought immediate medical treatment. Claimant

reported to the employer's nurse, Amanda Snead, that she was

experiencing shortness of breath and tightness in her chest due

to the strong bleach smell. Snead ultimately sent claimant to

the emergency room, where she was diagnosed as having an acute

asthma attack. She received multiple medications and was told

to remain home from work the following day.

Claimant said she had smelled bleach in the plant on other

occasions during her six-year employment there but that it had

not been as strong as it was on March 18, 1996. Other witnesses

confirmed smelling bleach that day. Nurse Snead smelled bleach

in the plant that day. Claimant's co-worker, Brenda Chambers,

also smelled the strong odor of bleach and had a headache as a

result of the smell. Claimant complained to her supervisor,

Nora Small, who determined that the smell was emanating from a

nearby trash compactor being cleaned with bleach.

Prior to March 18, 1996, claimant had mild asthma for which

she used an inhaler about once a year. She had not sought

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medical treatment for her asthma for about ten years. Following

the March 18 incident, claimant saw her personal physician; on

March 22, 1996, employer sent claimant to Dr. Earle Moore, the

company doctor. Moore returned claimant to work, but she

experienced a total of about twelve additional asthma attacks of

increasing severity which were triggered by bleach, smoke or

other inhalants. Dr. Moore referred her to a pulmonologist, Dr.

Terrence Truitt. Dr. Truitt diagnosed her as having "[e]pisodic

bronchospastic symptoms consistent with occupational induced

asthma in a patient with mild underlying asthma." He also noted

claimant's report that cleaning solutions and dust from plant

construction continued to bother her at work but that "for the

most part she is fine when she is out of the work environment."

He recommended that she try to wear a mask at work "to help cut

down on the exposure intensity" and that she use her inhaler

before entering the workplace each day. Claimant said the mask

caused her to have more asthma attacks.

When exposed to bleach on the night of April 30 to May 1,

1996, claimant again went to the emergency room where she was

diagnosed with reactive airway disease and told to see a

specialist.

On May 16, 1996, claimant had another asthma attack at

work, and Dr. Moore excused her from work on May 17. On May 20,

she was moved from "the choker pad" to the back room, where she

worked for two days, but she continued to have problems. On May

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22, 1996, claimant had another bad asthma attack and was placed

on medical leave. On May 28, 1996, Dr. Moore opined that

claimant's asthma was triggered by some inhalant in the plant

and that, effective May 26, 1996, she could not work in an

environment containing fumes, smoke or other irritants.

Dr. Truitt, who examined claimant again on February 3,

1997, opined that her pre-existing asthma was benign until her

March 1996 exposure at work. He also opined that, although her

subsequent symptoms were "fairly well-controlled with aggressive

bronchodilator and inhaled steroid therapy," she was disabled

from returning to her pre-injury work environment and had been

so disabled since her symptoms developed in the spring of 1996.

Claimant testified that exposure to "any smoke, anything, will

trigger [her asthma] now" and that, as a result, she "can't do

nothing but stay at home." At the time of the hearing claimant

was earning $80 per week by baby-sitting in her home.

Employer offered the written opinion of Dr. John Catlett,

an allergist, who reviewed claimant's records but did not

examine her. Catlett opined that claimant suffered from

allergic asthma and allergic rhinitis and that "her main problem

is allergic." He also opined that, while "[o]dors at work may

make her wheeze more[, they] are not the cause of her asthma."

Finally, he noted that claimant had normal pulmonary function

tests following her March 1996 attack and that her condition

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seemed to have worsened after she stopped working at employer's

plant.

The deputy commissioner held that claimant failed to prove

her asthma was an occupational disease rather than an ordinary

disease of life and that it could not be an injury by accident

because the commission previously had held that asthma, by its

very nature, results from cumulative trauma.

Claimant timely filed a request for review by the full

commission. The commission ordered claimant to file a written

statement in support of her request, but she failed timely to do

so. Employer moved to dismiss claimant's request for review

based on her failure to file a written statement pursuant to

Commission Rule 3.2. Alternatively, employer argued that the

deputy commissioner's decision should be affirmed and should

provide the basis for the commission's decision. Subsequently,

without mentioning employer's motion, the commission considered

the appeal on the merits. It affirmed the deputy's ruling that

claimant failed to prove an occupational disease but held that

claimant established an injury by accident which occurred

"'immediately' upon [her] smelling bleach that was stronger than

usual." As a result, it entered an award for the requested

benefits.

Employer appealed to this Court, contending that the

commission erred in failing to rule on employer's motion to

dismiss. Claimant contended that the commission's failure to

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address the motion to dismiss constituted a ruling that Rule 3.2

is "directory, not mandatory." However, in a memorandum

opinion, we noted that "the commission seems to have adopted an

opposite interpretation in previous cases . . . [holding that]

issues not addressed in the written statements are waived and

abandoned." See Russell Stover Candies v. Alexander, No.

0045-98-2, 1998 WL 463454, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1998).

Based on the principle that the commission should "have the

first opportunity to construe its own rules," we remanded to the

commission "with instructions to clarify its treatment of

employer's motion to dismiss and its interpretation of Rule

3.2." Id.

On remand, the commission denied employer's motion and

observed the following:

As the Court [of Appeals] noted, the
Commission may construe its own rules. The
Commission's rules regarding post-hearing
procedures are contained in Rules 3.1 – 3.4.
Rule 3.1 addresses the requirement that
parties assign specific errors in request
for Review. The rule states:

Failure of a party to assign any
specific error in its request for
review may be deemed by the
Commission to be a waiver of the
party's right to consideration of
that error. The Commission may
however, on its own motion,
address any error and correct any
decision on review if such action
is considered to be necessary for
just determination of the issues.

[emphasis added].

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 Rule 3.2 states that written statements
submitted by the parties "shall address the
errors assigned."

The Commission reads Rule 3.2 in
conjunction with Rule 3.1, and we conclude
that while we have the authority to deem
waived any assignment of error not
specifically identified in the Request for
Review or specifically addressed in a
written statement, we retain the right to,
on our own motion, "address any error and
correct any decision" if necessary for a
just determination of the issues. Thus, the
waiving of assignments of error is not
automatic but is within the Commission's
discretion.

The Commission's construction of Rule 3
is such that parties are not required to
file written statements on review. The
provision in Rule 3.2 stating that these
statements shall address all errors assigned
is directory, not mandatory. If a party
requesting review does not file a written
statement, the appellee may nonetheless file
a written brief in support of its position.

The Commission is not bound by formal
rules of evidence and procedure, but
conducts its proceedings in a summary manner
in order to most efficiently administer the
Act and do justice for all parties.

II.

ANALYSIS

A.

NECESSITY OF WRITTEN STATEMENT UNDER COMMISSION RULE 3.2

Employer contends the commission erred in interpreting Rule

3.2 to allow claimant's appeal to the full commission to proceed

despite her failure to file a written statement supporting her

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position. It contends that the commission applies Rule 3.2 to

favor claimants and that employers "face[] the strictest

application of the rule," which violates the due process clauses

of the United States and Virginia Constitutions. We disagree.

The commission's rules provide, in relevant part, as

follows:

3.1 Request for Review

* * * * * * *

A request for review should assign as
error specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Failure of a party to
assign any specific error in its request for
review may be deemed by the Commission to be
a waiver of the party's right to
consideration of that error. The Commission
may, however, on its own motion, address any
error and correct any decision on review if
such action is considered to be necessary
for just determination of the issues.

* * * * * * *

3.2 Written Statements

The Commission will advise the parties
of the schedule for filing brief written
statements supporting their respective
positions. The statements shall address all
errors assigned, with particular reference
to those portions of the record which
support a party's position.

Virginia Workers' Comp. Comm'n Rules 3.1, 3.2 (emphasis added),

reprinted in Virginia Court Rules and Procedure: 1994, at

984-85 (West 1993). The commission revised and renumbered its

rules in 1994. The quoted portion of Rule 3.1 derives from

former Rule 2(A); Rule 3.2 was added in 1994. See Rule 2(A)

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(effective October 1, 1991), reprinted in Virginia Court Rules

and Procedure: 1993, at 948 (West 1992); Rules 3.1, 3.2

(effective January 1, 1994), reprinted in Virginia Court Rules

and Procedure: 1994, at 984-85 (West 1993).

We previously have held, in keeping with the commission's

interpretation here, that "Rule [3.1] does not create an

absolute requirement that parties specify [in their requests for

review] each determination of fact or law to which exception is

taken." Seneca Falls Greenhouse & Nursery v. Layton, 9 Va. App.

482, 484, 389 S.E.2d 184, 185-86 (1990). We also have noted

that

the rule must be applied equally to all
parties irrespective of whether they be
claimant or employer/insurer. The
Fourteenth Amendment declares that all
persons, including corporations,
irrespective of status, are entitled to
equal protection of laws. Thus, if the
. . . Commission imposes sanctions for the
failure to follow the specific provisions of
Rule [3.1] dealing with specification of
exceptions, the sanctions may not be applied
arbitrarily to parties based upon their
position in the case or whether they are
represented by counsel.

Id. at 484-85, 389 S.E.2d at 186 (citation omitted). However,

we further held in Seneca Falls that

[i]f the specificity requirement of Rule
[3.1] has not been applied consistently to
all persons in the past, irrespective of
their position, be they claimant or
employer/insurer, the rule, nevertheless,
should not be applied to bar Mr. Layton's
appeal since we agree with the . . .
Commission that the provisions of Rule [3.1]

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 at issue in this case do not require
specification in all cases. In other words,
these appellants were not aggrieved by the
ruling of the commission.

Id. at 485, 389 S.E.2d at 186.

We conclude that the commission's construction of Rule 3.2

in conjunction with Rule 3.1's provisions permitting the

commission to address and correct, sua sponte, any errors of the

deputy commissioner is reasonable and does not violate due

process or equal protection under the facts of this case. 1 Rule

3.2 contains no express requirement that the parties either

"shall" or "should" file written statements. Rather, it states

that the commission will notify the parties of the schedule for

filing such statements and that the statements "shall" address

all errors assigned. It does not, however, address the

ramifications of failing to file a written statement, and Rule

3.1 explicitly provides that the commission may correct any

errors "necessary for just determination of the issues."

1
Although employer bases its argument on "due process," it
relies on our holding in Seneca Falls, 9 Va. App. at 483-85, 389
S.E.2d at 185-86, which deals expressly only with equal
protection. We presume that employer is alleging a violation of
substantive due process, which requires, inter alia, that a
statute or rule be "'neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.'"
King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp.
Program, 242 Va. 404, 412, 410 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1991) (quoting
Duke v. County of Pulaski, 219 Va. 428, 437-38, 247 S.E.2d 824,
829 (1978)). For the reasons discussed in the text and
footnotes, infra, we hold that neither the challenged rules nor
the commission’s application of them in this case was arbitrary
or discriminatory.

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 Employer contends the commission applies this provision

arbitrarily, to the advantage of claimants and disadvantage of

employers. It cites two decisions of the commission as examples

of the supposed disparate treatment: Terry v. Coe, No.

171-49-16, 1996 WL 107645 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 30,

1996), which involved an employer's request for review, and

Quinones v. Guest Services, Inc., No. 176-82-89, 1997 WL 1080585

(Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Jan. 31, 1997), which involved a

claimant's request for review. We do not believe these

decisions are inconsistent. In both cases, the party requesting

review failed timely to file a written statement, and in both

cases the commission ruled that failure constituted a waiver and

abandonment of the petition for review. Finally, in both cases,

despite the party's waiver, the commission reviewed the record

and found no basis for reversing the deputy commissioner's

decision. 2 See Terry, 1996 WL 107645, at *1 ("On review, we find

2
Employer contends that Terry is distinguishable because it
also involved a request for review filed by the Uninsured
Employer's Fund, which timely filed a written statement
supporting its request. However, the Fund challenged only the
admissibility and sufficiency of evidence to prove the claimant
was disabled during a particular period. Employer challenged
multiple additional issues, including whether the commission had
jurisdiction; whether claimant's injury resulted from willful
misconduct; and whether the employer had been misidentified in
claimant's pleadings. Before outlining the Fund's argument, the
commission noted, despite employer's failure to file a written
statement, "that the Deputy Commissioner's findings and
conclusions are justified and supported by the record" and that
it observed "no error that would warrant reversal." Finally,
after making these findings, the commission specifically
addressed employer's misidentification argument, holding that,

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that the Deputy Commissioner's findings and conclusions are

justified and supported by the record, and we note no error that

would warrant reversal."); Quinones, 1997 WL 1080585, at *1 n.2

("We have, [despite waiver], independently reviewed the entire

record in the matter, and find no reason to reverse the opinion

of the Deputy Commissioner.").

We note further that the commission appears to have

interpreted Rule 3.2 consistently since its adoption in 1994.

In Stowers v. KVAT Food Stores, Inc., No. 168-39-76, 1994 WL

1038235 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Nov. 9, 1994), for example,

the commission held that although Rule 3.2 provides for the

if error occurred, it was harmless. Only after making clear
that it had considered employer's request for review on the
merits did it advance to the error assigned by the Fund.
Employer also contends that in Buck v. Virginia Design
Packaging Corp., No. 176-16-44, 1996 WL 1076346 (Va. Workers'
Comp. Comm'n Dec. 3, 1996), the commission treated a claimant
who failed to file a written statement more favorably because he
was unrepresented. In Buck, the commission held that Buck had
waived any error because he failed to assign specific error
under Rule 3.1 and failed to file a written statement. See id.
at *1. It did note that it "conducted a thorough review of the
record" because claimant was unrepresented. See id. Although
this statement may appear to favor unrepresented claimants, the
commission, in fact, followed this same procedure in Stowers v.
KVAT Food Stores, Inc., No. 168-39-76, 1994 WL 1038235, at *1
(Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Nov. 9, 1994) (denying claimant's
motion to dismiss and considering employer's request for review
on the merits), in which a represented employer failed to file a
written statement, and in Kuhn v. Battlefield Painters, Inc.,
No. 185-14-63, 1998 WL 1004174, at *1 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n
July 6, 1998) (where corporate officer, a non-lawyer, filed
written statement which was considered the unauthorized practice
of law and, therefore, could not be considered, commission
conducted "independent review of the record"), in which an
unrepresented employer failed to file a written statement.

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submission of written statements by the parties, "such

statements are not required. The Rule is directory in nature,

rather than mandatory." Id. at *1. As a result, the commission

"decline[d] to penalize the carrier with dismissal" for the late

filing of its written statement, and it reviewed the case on the

merits. Id.; see also Dixon v. Toano Middle Sch., No.

166-32-37, 1995 WL 1063947, at *1 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

Apr. 18, 1995) (holding, in case in which claimant filed no

written statement, that failure to file written statement

"should not serve as an independent basis to dismiss the review"

and reviewing the case on the merits). 3

3
As set out above, the commission may exercise its
discretion in determining whether to dismiss a request for
review based on failure to file a written statement as long as
it does not do so "arbitrarily . . . based upon [an improper
factor such as the parties'] position in the case or whether
they are represented by counsel." Seneca Falls, 9 Va. App. at
485, 389 S.E.2d at 186. The commission might well be justified,
for example, in dismissing a request for review based on a
party's failure to file a written statement on a particularly
difficult issue despite repeated orders from the commission to
do so. Despite an extended review of the commission's decisions
in cases in which one or both parties failed to file a written
statement, we are aware of no inconsistent or arbitrary action
on the part of the commission, and employer has cited no
decisions which we view as arbitrary or inconsistent. See
Higgins v. Stanley Martin Homes, No. 171-73-71, 1998 WL 1003529,
at *1 (Va. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Apr. 16, 1998) (involving pro
se claimant and represented employer, both of whom failed to
file written statements); Garner v. Schmidt Baking Co., No.
171-39-83, 1998 WL 1003571, at *1 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n
Apr. 23, 1998) (same but both parties represented); Jackson v.
Alexandria Transit Co., No. 178-87-12, 1997 WL 1081035, at *1
(Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Apr. 18, 1997) (same but both parties
represented). Similarly, and despite employer's claim to the
contrary, we detect no arbitrary inconsistency in the
commission's handling of cases in which a party files a written

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 Finally, even assuming the commission has applied Rule 3.2

inconsistently in the past, our holding in Seneca Falls makes

clear that inconsistent application of the rule does not require

dismissal of claimant's appeal to the commission. See 9 Va.

App. at 485, 389 S.E.2d at 186. As we held above, Rule 3.2 does

not mandate that a party appealing a deputy's ruling must file a

timely written statement or face dismissal. Rather, as we have

observed, once a request for review has been filed, the

commission may "address any error and correct any decision . . .

necessary for just determination of the issues," even if no

written statement has been filed. Rule 3.1. Here, because we

hold that credible evidence supports the commission's finding of

an ongoing disability causally related to claimant's compensable

injury by accident, see infra § II.B., Rules 3.1 and 3.2, read

in harmony, permitted the commission to address the deputy's

error to achieve a "just determination of the issues."

Therefore, here, as in Seneca Falls, the commission did not act

statement but does not discuss therein all errors previously
assigned in the request for review. See, e.g., Hale v. Roadway
Package Sys., No. 185-67-89, 1998 WL 1004045, at *2 (Va.
Workers' Comp. Comm’n Aug. 3, 1998) (represented claimant);
Staton v. Craver & Co., No. 173-66-34, 1998 WL 1002625, at *1
n.1 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Mar. 17, 1998) (represented
employer); Hazelwood v. Dan River, Inc., No. 180-74-36, 1998 WL
1003845, at *1 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n June 26, 1998)
(holding both represented parties abandoned issues mentioned in
request for review but not addressed in their written statements
and considering only those issues covered in written
statements).

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arbitrarily, and this employer was not aggrieved by the

commission's ruling. See 9 Va. App. at 485, 389 S.E.2d at 186.

B.

CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF INJURY BY ACCIDENT

Employer contends the commission erred in holding that

claimant is entitled to ongoing temporary disability benefits

because the evidence "solely established a contraindication to

[claimant's] returning to the workplace due to sensitivity to

unknown environmental conditions at the workplace rather than an

actual, ongoing disability to work." At most, it contends, she

suffered from a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing,

ordinary disease of life and is not entitled to additional

benefits. Again, we disagree.

Guided by well established principles, we construe the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing

below, claimant in this instance. See Crisp v. Brown's Tysons

Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App. 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916

(1986). "If there is evidence, or reasonable inferences can be

drawn from the evidence, to support the Commission's findings,

they will not be disturbed on review, even though there is

evidence in the record to support a contrary finding." Morris

v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348

S.E.2d 876, 877 (1986); see Code § 65.2-706. "The actual

determination of causation is a factual finding," Ingersoll-Rand

Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1989),

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and "[t]he testimony of a claimant may . . . be considered in

determining causation, especially where the medical testimony is

inconclusive," Dollar Gen. Store v. Cridlin, 22 Va. App. 171,

176-77, 468 S.E.2d 152, 154-55 (1996). Further, "[a] question

raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of fact."

Commonwealth v. Powell, 2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 532, 533

(1986) (citations omitted).

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

claimant, supports the commission's finding that her inhalation

of bleach fumes on March 18, 1996 constituted an injury by

accident, which employer appears to concede. See Aistrop v.

Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 294, 24 S.E.2d 546, 549

(1943) (where disability results from inhalation of gases "at a

particular time and on a particular occasion which can be fixed

with reasonable certainty," event is an "injury by accident").

Claimant, who had mild asthma which bothered her only once a

year, experienced a "real bad asthma attack" immediately after

her exposure to the strong odor of bleach on March 18, 1996, an

odor which was strong enough to be noticed by co-workers and to

give one of them a headache. Claimant's attack was severe

enough to cause employer's nurse to send claimant for treatment

at a hospital emergency room. Although claimant's condition

improved, she was able to return to work only sporadically and

noted a significantly increased susceptibility to asthma

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resulting from exposure to various inhalants, including bleach,

dust and smoke.

Further, credible evidence supports a finding that

claimant's bleach exposure on March 18, 1996 aggravated her

"benign" pre-existing asthma and that this work-related exposure

has caused an ongoing disability preventing claimant from

returning to her pre-injury employment. See Ohio Valley Constr.

Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1985)

(holding that disability from industrial injury which

accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing condition is

compensable). One of claimant's treating physicians, Dr. Moore,

the "company doctor," stated expressly that claimant "can not

work in an environment where there are fumes, smoke or other

particulate matter in the air," and he opined that she was

disabled from May 26, 1996, forward. That Dr. Moore may

elsewhere have termed his work restriction a "recommendation" is

not dispositive. In addition, Dr. Truitt, a pulmonologist who

treated claimant on referral from Dr. Moore, opined that

"certainly there was a precipitating element in the work

environment at Russell Stover Candies that exacerbated

[claimant's] previously quiescent asthma," and he "strongly

advised [claimant] to avoid any and all exposure to what has

previously been documented to cause significant bronchospasm."

That the record may contain contrary evidence from employer's

physician, Dr. Catlett, also is not dispositive.

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 Employer contends that claimant's case is governed by the

reasoning in Castle v. Westvaco Container Division, No.

139-64-20, 1990 WL 752231, at *6 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Apr.

23, 1990), in which the commission held that "compensation

benefits cannot be continued based on a personal susceptibility

to a possible subsequent respiratory reaction if the [employee]

returns to the work environment." Although we are not bound by

decisions of the commission, the facts in Castle nevertheless

are distinguishable from those here. In Castle, which involved

an occupational disease resulting from exposure to an industrial

chemical, the commission found that the employee was

asymptomatic and that his pulmonary function had returned to

normal." Id. In claimant's case, by contrast, the record

contains evidence that claimant's asthma has not returned to the

"benign" status it occupied before her injury by accident on

March 18, 1996. Claimant had an average of one attack a year

prior to her injury by accident; within ten weeks following that

injury, she had twelve asthma attacks of increasing severity at

work and required ongoing "aggressive bronchodilator and inhaled

steroid therapy" to control her symptoms even outside the

workplace. Claimant testified that, prior to March 18, she was

able to endure exposure to cigarette smoke and other inhalants

without significant difficulty but that exposure to "any smoke,

anything, will trigger [her asthma] now" such that she "can't do

nothing but stay at home." Finally, both "the company doctor"

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and the pulmonologist to whom he referred the claimant opined

that claimant is disabled from returning to her pre-injury work

environment. These facts provide sufficient credible evidence

to support the commission's award.

For these reasons, we affirm the commission's award of

disability compensation and medical benefits.

Affirmed.

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