COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER LYANCE CHATMAN
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0980-98-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
SEPTEMBER 14, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY
James A. Luke, Judge
C. Gilbert Hudson, Jr. (Law Offices of C.
Gilbert Hudson, Jr., on brief), for
appellant.
John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Christopher Lyance Chatman (appellant), a juvenile, was
charged with delinquency by a petition alleging that he had
committed malicious wounding. A juvenile and domestic relations
district court (JDR) judge found appellant guilty of the
delinquency charge of unlawful wounding. Appellant appealed to
the circuit court. In a bench trial, the circuit court found
appellant guilty of the delinquency charge of unlawful wounding
and committed appellant to the Department of Juvenile Justice. 1
On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to assert
a defense of insanity in the circuit court adjudication of
delinquency. He contends the circuit court prevented him from
1
The circuit court's order refers to the Department of
Juvenile Justice by its former name, the Department of Youth and
Family Services.
presenting this defense by denying his motion for a psychiatric
evaluation at state expense. Finding that the trial court
erred, we reverse appellant's adjudication of delinquency and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Appellant and Lamont Waller were students in a public
school special education program in Greensville County. Both
appellant and Waller were transported to their homes after
school in the same school station wagon.
On January 22, 1997, appellant and Waller exchanged angry
words at school. After school, both appellant and Waller rode
home in the school station wagon. The vehicle stopped at
appellant's home. Appellant got out of the vehicle. Although
he had been warned not to do so, Waller got out of the station
wagon to fight appellant. Appellant pulled out a knife and cut
Waller in the shoulder. The two exchanged more blows with their
fists. Eventually, Waller got back into the station wagon,
which left the scene. Waller later received medical treatment
for his injury. Appellant was thirteen years old at the time of
the incident. 2
In his appeal to the circuit court of the JDR court finding
of delinquency, appellant filed a motion for a psychiatric
2
Because appellant was not fourteen years of age or older
at the time of the offense, he could not have been tried as an
adult in circuit court. See Code § 16.1-269.1.
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evaluation to determine his sanity at the time of the offense.
In his brief in support of his motion, appellant asserted that,
on the day of the offense, Dr. C.R. Amara found appellant to
have homicidal ideations requiring inpatient psychiatric
treatment. Appellant was diagnosed with a schizophrenic
disorder two days after the incident involving Waller. The
evaluator also concluded that appellant exhibited
inappropriately aggressive and violent behavior which appeared
to be a function of serious psychiatric difficulties. 3 The
circuit court denied appellant's motion, citing the
opportunities for mental health treatment provided under
Virginia law in the event appellant was found to be delinquent.
ANALYSIS
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law,
contained in Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 of the Code of Virginia,
governs the procedure through which a juvenile is held
accountable for his or her actions that would be criminal if
committed by an adult. See Code § 16.1-226. Pursuant to these
statutes, a juvenile who is less than fourteen years of age may
appeal to the circuit court a JDR court finding of delinquency.
See Code § 16.1-296(C). A jury trial may then occur upon motion
of the juvenile, the prosecutor, or the circuit court judge.
See id. When the circuit court renders its final judgment in
3
Other than appellant's own assertions, the record does not
contain the findings of appellant's mental health evaluators.
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the appeal, a copy of the judgment is filed with the JDR court
and becomes the judgment of the JDR court. See Code § 16.1-297.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law does
not expressly provide for or prohibit an insanity defense at
either an adjudicatory hearing in the JDR court or in an appeal
to the circuit court upon a finding of delinquency. The
Commonwealth contends that because the statutes pertaining to
juvenile delinquency make no reference to an insanity defense,
the insanity defense is unavailable to juveniles under the age
of fourteen. 4
The defense of insanity as found in M'Naghten's Case, 10
Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843), had been
recognized as the law in Virginia since 1871. See Price v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 459, 323 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1984);
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 261, 277, 511 S.E.2d 439,
446-47 (1999). To establish an insanity defense in Virginia,
the accused must show that "he did not know the difference
between right and wrong or that he did not understand the nature
and consequences of his acts." Price, 228 Va. at 456, 323
S.E.2d at 108. "The defendant must prove to the satisfaction of
the [trier of fact] that he was insane at the time of the
offense. He has the burden of affirmatively raising the issue
4
The question of whether juveniles fourteen years of age or
older are entitled to assert an insanity defense is not before
us, and we do not consider it.
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of insanity and proving his mental disease or defect by a
preponderance of the evidence." McCulloch v. Commonwealth, 29
Va. App. 769, 775, 514 S.E.2d 797, 800 (1999).
Virginia statutes provide the mechanism for a criminal
defendant to raise and prove an insanity defense. Code
§ 19.2-168 states that "in any case in which a person charged
with a crime intends (i) to put in issue his sanity at the time
of the crime charged and (ii) to present testimony of an expert
to support his claim on this issue at trial," he or she must
provide written notice to the Commonwealth. Pursuant to Code
§ 19.2-169.5, where the court finds "probable cause to believe
that the defendant's sanity will be a significant factor in his
defense" and the defendant is indigent, the court must appoint
one or more mental health experts to evaluate the defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense and render assistance at the
defendant's trial. It is well settled that
[i]ndigent defendants are entitled to the
appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in
their defense, but this right is not
absolute. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
77 (1985). The defendant must demonstrate
"that his sanity at the time of the offense
is to be a significant factor at trial
. . . ." Id. at 83. A request
unaccompanied by a showing of reasonableness
is properly denied. . . .
* * * * * * *
. . . Determining whether the defendant
has made an adequate showing is a decision
that lies within the trial court's
discretion.
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McCulloch, 29 Va. App. at 773-74, 514 S.E.2d at 799. A
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is acquitted of
the charged offense but is subject to the disposition defined by
Virginia statutes. See Code §§ 19.2-182.2 to 19.2-182.16. See
also Williams v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 384, 389, 444 S.E.2d
16, 18 (1994) (noting that "under Virginia law an insanity
acquittee has not been convicted of a criminal offense"); Harris
v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1982) (describing
commitment procedure applicable to insanity acquittees under
prior Virginia law).
Courts charged with the duty of adjudicating juveniles "are
to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child
and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility,
guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than
prosecuting attorney and judge." Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
Despite this noble objective, an adjudication of
delinquency has wide and serious ramifications. For instance,
an adjudication of delinquency may be considered in the
preparation of the accused's future adult sentencing guideline
reports. See Code § 17-237(B). Furthermore,
[i]rrespective of what we call the juvenile
procedure, and no matter how benign and well
intended the judge who administers the
system, the juvenile procedures, to some
degree at least, smack of "crime and
punishment." . . . Despite all
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protestations to the contrary, the
adjudication of delinquency carries with it
a social stigma.
Winburn v. State, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Wis. 1966). The
Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that an adjudication of
delinquency
is a serious reflection upon [a juvenile's]
. . . character and habits. The stain
against him is not removed merely because
the statute says no judgment in this
particular proceeding shall be deemed a
conviction for crime or so considered. The
stigma of conviction will reflect upon him
for life. It hurts his self-respect. It
may, at some inopportune, unfortunate
moment, rear its ugly head to destroy his
opportunity for advancement, and blast his
ambition to build up a character and
reputation entitling him to the esteem and
respect of his fellow man.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-43, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447
(1946).
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court examined the aspects of due process applicable to
"proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a
juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on
his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a
state institution." The Court found that such proceedings "must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment"
as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 46-47. The Court concluded that, as elements
of constitutional due process, a juvenile at an adjudicatory
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delinquency hearing is entitled to proper notice of the charges
against him, the appointment of counsel, and the opportunity to
confront the evidence against him. See id. at 52, 70, and 99.
See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the "essentials of due
process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory
stage of a juvenile proceeding).
A number of states have found the right to assert an
insanity defense to be an essential of "due process and fair
treatment" that must be provided to a juvenile at the
adjudicatory stage of the proceeding. See, e.g., In re M.G.S.,
72 Cal. Rptr. 808, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Causey,
363 So. 2d 472, 473-74 (La. 1978); Matter of Two Minor Children,
592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979); Winburn, 145 N.W.2d at 184; see
also Matter of Stapelkemper, 562 P.2d 815, 816 (Mont. 1977)
(agreeing that due process includes allowing juveniles the right
to assert insanity defense at adjudication of delinquency, but
not in a pre-adjudicatory transfer proceeding). But cf., K.M.
v. State, 983 S.W.2d 93 (Ark. 1998) (concluding that because the
juvenile code did not expressly provide for an insanity defense,
a juvenile could not assert such defense at a delinquency
adjudication). Moreover, where the Commonwealth was seeking
transfer of a juvenile for trial as an adult in circuit court
and the circuit court had appointed a particular mental health
expert to examine the juvenile at the suggestion of the
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prosecutor, we have found that the juvenile was entitled to the
appointment of a mental health expert of the juvenile's own
choosing. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 226, 231,
421 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1992), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 17 Va. App.
192, 436 S.E.2d 625 (1993).
We find no reasonable basis for concluding that an insanity
defense is unavailable to a juvenile at a proceeding to
adjudicate him or her delinquent as it would be to an adult
defendant in a criminal trial. We agree that the right to
assert an insanity defense is an essential of "due process and
fair treatment" which is required at a juvenile delinquency
adjudication.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
remand the matter for a determination of whether, pursuant to
Code § 19.2-169.5, appellant is entitled to a mental health
evaluation at state expense, and for further proceedings if the
Commonwealth be so advised. 5
Reversed and remanded.
5
Any rulings concerning appellant's disposition in the
event he is found not guilty by reason of insanity would be
purely advisory. See Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 220,
504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998). We note, however, that Code
§ 16.1-278.11 provides: "In cases involving a person who is
adjudged mentally ill . . . disposition shall be in accordance
with the provisions of Chapters 1 (§ 37.1-1 et seq.) and 2
(§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of Title 37.1." Moreover, "[a] child shall
not be committed pursuant to §§ 16.1-278.2 through 16.1-278.8 or
the provisions of Title 37.1 to a maximum security unit within
any state mental hospital where adults determined to be
criminally insane reside."
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