COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Lemons
Argued at Salem, Virginia
MAJOR RIDLEY OWENS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2793-98-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
JUNE 15, 1999
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
George L. Townsend (Chandler, Franklin &
O’Bryan, on briefs), for appellant.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General;
Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Scott John Fitzgerald, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Appellee submitting on brief.
Major Ridley Owens appeals the Workers’ Compensation
Commission’s decision denying him benefits for the aggravation of
his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), allegedly caused by the
sound of a utility cover dropping behind him. The commission held
that Owens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the startling sound gave rise to a compensable psychological
injury by accident. According to the commission, the noise was
neither out of the ordinary for Owens’s workplace nor so dramatic
or frightening as to shock the conscience. Owens contends the
evidence was insufficient to support the commission’s finding. We
disagree and affirm the commission’s decision.
BACKGROUND
During the course of his employment with the Virginia
Department of Transportation, Owens was startled by the unexpected
crashing sound of a utility cover dropped close behind him.
Owens, who served three combat tours in Vietnam, had been
diagnosed with PTSD. Owens claimed that before the incident
involving the utility cover, his PTSD was under control. His last
treatment for PTSD had been eight months before this event that
triggered the PTSD. Owens testified that although his job
routinely exposed him to loud noises, this noise was particularly
extreme, close, and unanticipated. The noise came from behind him
and reminded him of gunfire he experienced in Vietnam.
Owens experienced no physical injury but was hospitalized for
twelve days with a diagnosis of “acute exacerbation of his
pre-existing PTSD.”
ANALYSIS
On appeal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, in this case, the employer. See R.G. Moore
Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d, 788, 788
(1990). We accept the commission’s factual findings when they are
supported by credible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel
Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
Unless this Court determines that, as a matter of law, Owens
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a
compensable injury, the commission’s contrary finding is binding
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and conclusive. See Tomko v. Michael’s Plastering Co., 210 Va.
697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
To qualify as a compensable injury by accident, a purely
psychological injury must be causally related to a physical injury
or to a sudden shock or fright arising in the course of
employment. See Chesterfield County Fire Dep’t v. Dunn, 9 Va.
App. 475, 477, 389 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1990) (citing Burlington Mills
Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 209-11, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293-94
(1941)).
The commission determined that because the sound of the
falling utility cover was neither out of the ordinary for Owens’s
routine working environment nor so dramatic or frightening to
shock the conscience, the sound did not qualify as the type of
sudden shock or fright from which a compensable injury may arise.
We accept those conclusions because they are supported by credible
and sufficient evidence. Owens admitted that he worked in an
environment that routinely exposed him to loud noises, and the
commission concluded that the sound of a falling utility cover was
an expected noise for a diesel mechanic.
The fact that Owens previously suffered from PTSD, and that
this incident only aggravated a pre-existing condition, is not
fatal to his claim. See Ohio Valley Constr. Co. v. Jackson, 230
Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1985). However, because the
aggravation was not causally related to (1) a physical injury or
(2) to an obvious sudden shock or fright in the employment, the
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commission did not err in finding that Owens’s reaction to the
sound was not a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing
condition.
Finding no error in the commission’s decision, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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