COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
ANTHONY FRANKLIN MOODY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1519-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
DECEMBER 22, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY
William Shore Robertson, Judge
Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Director
Capital/Appellate Services (Laura A. Cook,
Assistant Public Defender; Public Defender
Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
In this appeal, Anthony Franklin Moody (appellant)
challenges his conviction for attempted malicious wounding,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he acted with the intent to maim,
disfigure, disable, or kill as required by Code § 18.2-51.
Appellant contends the Commonwealth's evidence presents two
reasonable hypotheses, one consistent with his innocence and the
other with his guilt, and that the evidence fails to discount the
hypothesis of innocence. Corbett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 304,
307, 171 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1969); Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.
App. 562, 567, 458 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1995). We disagree and
affirm.
Whether a criminal conviction is supported by sufficient
evidence is not a question of fact, but one of law. Bridgeman v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986).
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, and grant to it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence
therefrom. Clifton v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 178, 180, 468
S.E.2d 155, 156 (1996). We will not reverse the trial court's
judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it. Code § 8.01-680. The relevant facts, stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, follow.
On May 9, 1996, David van de Graaff, a teacher at
Rappahannock County High School, heard the sound of breaking
glass from a nearby parking lot on the school's property.
Responding to this noise, van de Graaff arrived in the parking
lot moments later and witnessed appellant driving an Isuzu
Trooper toward the lot's only exit, which lay down a narrow lane
with cars parked on both sides.
While appellant's vehicle was still approximately thirty to
fifty feet away, van de Graaff stepped into its exit path and
motioned for appellant to stop. Rather than slowing or stopping,
appellant accelerated towards van de Graaff, motioning for him to
move out of the way. After ordering the appellant to stop for a
second time, van de Graaff was forced to jump out of the car's
path as it accelerated out of the parking lot and fish-tailed
around a turn on the gravel surface. At the moment van de Graaff
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jumped out of its way, appellant's vehicle was within ten to
fifteen feet of striking van de Graaff and was travelling at
approximately fifteen to twenty-five miles-per-hour in a five
mile-per-hour zone. No evidence was presented that appellant
decelerated or swerved to miss van de Graaff as he dove out of
the vehicle's path. Appellant continued to drive his vehicle
until apprehended by police later that day.
On May 10, 1996, when questioned by Deputy Richard MacWelch
regarding these events, appellant confessed to breaking into
several vehicles, including a car in the parking lot of the high
school. In response to a question regarding whether he had seen
anyone in the school parking lot attempting to stop his vehicle,
appellant replied, "Yes, I did. I waved him out of the way
because I was going out of there."
Code § 18.2-51 states that "[i]f any person maliciously
shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him
bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or
kill, he shall . . . be guilty of a Class 3 felony." An attempt
to commit this crime consists of (1) the specific intent to maim,
disfigure, disable or kill, and (2) an ineffectual act done
towards the crime's completion. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va.
653, 657, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935); Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.
App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991).
The requisite specific intent "may, like any other fact, be
shown by circumstances. Intent is a state of mind which can be
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evidenced only by the words or conduct of the person who is
claimed to have entertained it." Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196
Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954), quoted in Bell, 11 Va.
App. at 533, 399 S.E.2d at 452. When facts are equally
susceptible to more than one interpretation, one which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact
cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation. Corbett,
210 Va. at 307, 171 S.E.2d at 253. The fact finder, however, is
entitled to draw inferences from proved facts, so long as the
inferences are reasonable and justified. Webb v. Commonwealth,
204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963); Bell, 11 Va. App. at
533, 399 S.E.2d at 452. Furthermore, the fact finder may infer
that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary
consequences of his voluntary acts. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979); Stokes v. Warden, 226 Va. 111, 117, 306
S.E.2d 882, 885 (1983). Thus, when the fact finder draws such
inferences reasonably, not arbitrarily, they will be upheld.
In the present case, the evidence shows that appellant, who
saw van de Graaff blocking the only avenue of his escape,
deliberately chose to accelerate his car toward the pedestrian,
never decelerating, braking, or swerving to avoid him, even when
van de Graaff was only five to ten feet away from being struck.
Van de Graaff was spared certain injury only by jumping out of
the vehicle's path at the last moment. Although appellant warned
van de Graaff to move out of his way with a wave, this act does
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not negate the trial court's reasonable inference that appellant
had formed the specific intent to run over van de Graaff should
the pedestrian not move out of his way. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient for the trial court to reasonably infer that appellant
had the requisite specific intent to sustain a conviction of
attempted malicious wounding.
In support of his argument that the evidence of intent was
insufficient to find the necessary intent, appellant inoppositely
relies on Haywood, 20 Va. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 606. In that
case, Haywood, who had been drinking heavily, fled the scene of a
public altercation in his truck. On two separate occasions, a
police officer positioned his vehicle in the road so as to block
Haywood's path. On each of these occasions, however, Haywood
failed to slow down or change his course and, but for the
officers' last-minute evasive actions, would have struck the
police vehicles. Id. at 564-65, 458 S.E.2d at 607.
On Haywood's appeal from two convictions of attempted
capital murder of a police officer, we addressed the question of
"whether Haywood, while driving his truck, formed the specific
intent to use his vehicle as a weapon for the unequivocal purpose
of murdering the police officers." Id. at 566, 458 S.E.2d at
608. We reversed the convictions because the Commonwealth
presented no direct evidence that Haywood, by running the road
blocks, intended to kill the police officers and because the
circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis
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of innocence that Haywood only intended to avoid police
apprehension by driving through their vehicular roadblocks. Id.
at 567-68, 458 S.E.2d at 609.
The instant case, however, can be distinguished from
Haywood. Although we recognize that appellant plainly sought to
flee the parking lot, the evidence sufficiently proves his
further intent to run down van de Graaff in the process of doing
so. Unlike Haywood, appellant was not attempting to run through
an inanimate object; rather, the obstacle in his path consisted
exclusively of a pedestrian. Thus, it is not unreasonable to
infer that the direct consequences of appellant's actions would
have been the injury or death of van de Graaff had he not jumped
clear of the oncoming vehicle.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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