COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
GEORGE WILLIAM RICHARDSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2456-97-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
OCTOBER 6, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge
Elizabeth Virginia Killeen, Assistant Public
Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Richard Barton Campbell, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
George William Richardson contends that the trial court
erroneously dismissed as untimely his appeal from a juvenile
court's judgment in a commitment review hearing held pursuant to
Code § 16.1-289. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
remand the case to the trial court.
I.
BACKGROUND
Richardson, a juvenile, pleaded guilty in the Spotsylvania
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (juvenile
court) to two probation violations and was adjudicated delinquent
on May 29, 1997. On June 11, 1997, the juvenile court committed
him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He did not
appeal that order.
In the June 11, 1997 order, the juvenile court scheduled a
commitment review hearing for August 7, 1997, and stated:
[The] Court will strongly consider releasing
George from the commitment if he is in
compliance with all requirements of
Department of Juvenile Justice and is doing
well.
At the August 7, 1997 review hearing, the juvenile court declined
to rescind the commitment. On August 18, 1997, 1 Richardson
appealed that judgment to the Spotsylvania County Circuit Court
(trial court). On September 15, 1997, the trial court dismissed
the appeal as untimely, holding that the June 11, 1997 commitment
order, not the August 7 order, was the appealable order.
II.
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT
Richardson contends that the trial court erred in ruling
that a juvenile court's judgment in a commitment review hearing
is not appealable. We agree.
Code § 16.1-289, entitled "Review of order of commitment,"
provides:
The juvenile court or the circuit court, as
the case may be, of its own motion may reopen
any case and may modify or revoke its order.
The juvenile court or the circuit court
shall before modifying or revoking such order
grant a hearing after notice in writing to
the complainant, if any, and to the person or
agency having custody of the child; provided,
however, that this section shall not apply in
the case of a child committed to the
Department [of Juvenile Justice] after sixty
days from the date of the order of
commitment.
1
August 17, 1997 was a Sunday. See Code § 1-13.3:1.
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Code § 16.1-289 permits a trial court to review sua sponte
the commitment of a juvenile. The trial court, in its
discretion, may revoke, modify or continue the commitment. The
only statutory limitations on such proceedings are as follows:
(1) the trial court cannot revoke or modify a commitment after
sixty days from the date of the order of commitment; and (2) the
trial court must provide written notice of the hearing to the
complainant, if any, and to the person or agency having custody
of the child.
A commitment review is not a re-examination of the
underlying order of delinquency or commitment. The delinquency
or commitment order is a final order for purposes of appeal
pursuant to Code § 16.1-296. A commitment review permits the
trial court to evaluate the utility of continuing the commitment
in the light of post-commitment developments and circumstances.
Such an assessment is consistent with the juvenile law's
paramount concern with the welfare of the child and family, the
safety of the community, and protection of the rights of victims.
See Code § 16.1-227. A commitment review order revoking,
modifying or continuing the commitment is a final, appealable
order as to the decision whether to revoke, modify or continue
the commitment.
The right of appeal from a juvenile court is set forth in
Code § 16.1-296. See Walker v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 223 Va.
557, 562, 290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982). Code § 16.1-296(A)
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provides, in relevant part:
From any final order or judgment of the
juvenile court affecting the rights or
interests of any person coming within its
jurisdiction, an appeal may be taken within
ten days from the entry of a final judgment,
order or conviction.
This statutory language makes plain that the appellate
jurisdiction of the circuit court encompasses "any final order"
of the juvenile court. The juvenile court's August 7, 1997 order
was a final order.
An order determining whether to modify, revoke or continue a
juvenile's commitment following a review hearing pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-289, is final because it concludes that issue and "'leaves
nothing to be done by the court.'" Hairfield v. Commonwealth, 7
Va. App. 649, 655, 376 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1989) (citations omitted)
(juvenile transfer orders are "final"). See Alexander v. Morgan,
19 Va. App. 538, 540, 452 S.E.2d 370, 371-72 (1995). That issue
is separate and distinct from the issues determining the original
finding of delinquency and the commitment order.
The term "any" in Code § 16.1-296(A) is neither limited nor
qualified. Cox v. Cox, 16 Va. App. 146, 148, 428 S.E.2d 515, 516
(1993). We note that Code § 16.1-296(E) requires that an adult's
appeal from conviction of an offense within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile and domestic relations district court shall be
treated as an appeal from a general district court. See Code
§ 16.1-136. Code § 16.1-296(E) provides that the procedures for
appealing a charge of non-support are governed by Code § 20-61,
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et seq. Code § 16.1-285.2, governing release and review hearings
for serious offenders, states expressly that "[t]he order of the
court shall be final and not subject to appeal." Code
§ 16.1-285.2(D). By contrast, the language in Code §§ 16.1-289
and 16.1-296 neither limits a juvenile's right to appeal a
commitment review order nor states that such an order is not
appealable.
The Commonwealth misapprehends the basis for Richardson's
appeal, arguing that it was barred because Richardson did not
timely appeal the order of commitment. Richardson appealed the
juvenile court's August 7, 1997 decision to continue his
commitment. He did not, and could not on August 18, 1997, appeal
the June 11, 1997 order of commitment, because the statutory time
for appealing that order had run. See Code § 16.1-296(A).
Because the August 7, 1997 order was appealable, we reverse
and remand the case to the trial court to consider Richardson's
appeal with respect to the issues determined by that order.
Reversed and remanded.
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