COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
LINWOOD STEWART
v. Record No. 0482-95-2 OPINION BY
JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MARCH 19, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
Felipita Athanas for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Linwood Stewart was convicted in a bench trial of perjury,
in violation of Code § 18.2-434. Stewart contends that the
evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the
conviction. He argues that because only one witness testified
that he made a false statement under oath, no corroboration of
the alleged perjury was established. We hold that the evidence
was sufficient and affirm the conviction.
On December 28, 1993, Roger Goodman was involved in an
automobile accident with another vehicle in Chesterfield County.
As a result of the accident, habitual offender and reckless
driving charges were brought against Booker Williams, who was
alleged to have been driving the car that collided with Goodman's
automobile. At Williams' trial in general district court,
Stewart testified that he, not Booker Williams, was driving the
vehicle that collided with Roger Goodman's automobile. Stewart
was subsequently charged with perjury as a result of his
testimony at Williams' trial.
In the perjury trial, Roger Goodman testified that he was
present at Booker Williams' trial in general district court and
that he heard Stewart testify falsely under oath that on December
28, 1993, he, Stewart, was driving the car that struck Goodman's
automobile. Goodman testified, however, that the driver of the
vehicle that collided with his automobile identified himself at
the scene of the accident as "Booker Williams," and that Stewart
is "taller and he looks a lot younger [than Williams]," and that
his skin tone "may be a little darker." Goodman described
Williams as "approximately 5 feet tall, medium color skin, real
nervous individual, kind of stocky buil[d]." Additionally,
Goodman testified that at Williams' trial, Stewart could not
identify the automobile that he claimed he was driving.
Additionally, Goodman testified that Stewart did not know "the
address of the person who owned the car" that Stewart testified
he was driving, and could not remember that Goodman was wearing a
"full camouflage outfit" at the time of the accident. When
Goodman was asked whether there was any doubt in his mind that
Stewart was not the person driving the car that struck his,
Goodman responded, "[n]one whatsoever."
Officer Reid of the Chesterfield County Police Department
testified that he investigated the accident involving Roger
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Goodman and Booker Williams, and that as a result of the
investigation, Booker Williams was arrested on habitual offender
and reckless driving charges. Officer Reid was present at
Williams' trial and heard Stewart testify, under oath, that he
was operating the vehicle that collided with Roger Goodman's
automobile on December 28, 1993. Officer Reid testified that
there was a "distinct difference" in appearance between Stewart
and Booker Williams.
"[A] perjury conviction under Code § 18.2-434 requires proof
of falsity from the testimony of at least two witnesses or other
corroborating evidence of falsity in the event the case is
supported by the testimony of only one witness." Keffer v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 545, 549, 404 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1991).
Here, Roger Goodman was the only witness who testified that
Stewart was not the driver of the vehicle that collided with
Goodman's automobile. Therefore, unless other evidence
corroborates Goodman's testimony that Stewart testified falsely
about being the driver, Stewart's perjury conviction must be set
aside.
Although corroboration is required in order to prove
perjury, the "nature of the corroboration" necessary to
substantiate the testimony of a single witness in a perjury
prosecution has never been specifically delineated. See 7 John
H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2042, at 365 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). It is
important to note, however, that the corroborating evidence rule
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"is founded upon the idea that it is unsafe to convict in any
case where the oath of one man merely is to be weighed against
that of another." Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.)
1025, 1027 (1876). The purpose of requiring corroborating
evidence is "to confirm the single witness' testimony and to
induce the belief of it." 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2042, at 364.
Accordingly, we hold that although the corroborating evidence
"must be of a strong character, and not merely corroborative in
slight particulars," Schwartz, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 1027, it
need not be equal in weight to the testimony of a second witness.
Rather, the corroborating evidence must confirm the single
witness' testimony in a manner strong enough "to turn the scale
and overcome the oath of the [defendant] and the legal
presumption of his innocence." Keffer, 12 Va. App. at 548, 404
S.E.2d at 746-47 (quoting Schwartz, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 1027).
We need not decide whether Officer Reid's testimony was
sufficient, standing alone, to corroborate Roger Goodman's sworn
statement that Stewart testified falsely when he swore that he
was the driver of the car that collided with Goodman's
automobile. The trier of fact could infer from Officer Reid's
statement that he investigated the accident, that he did more
than take Goodman's statement and did not simply rely upon
Goodman's statement to identify Booker Williams as the driver.
Officer Reid arrested Booker Williams at the accident scene on
habitual offender and reckless driving charges as a result of a
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police investigation. Reid's actions support Goodman's
testimony. Officer Reid's testimony that there was a difference
in appearance between Stewart and Booker Williams confirms
Goodman's testimony, and also tends to prove that Goodman did not
mistakenly identify Booker Williams.
Most important, Stewart's testimony at Williams' trial
corroborates Goodman's testimony and tends to prove that Stewart
perjured himself when he testified that he was the driver of the
automobile. Cf. Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501, 512, 450
S.E.2d 146, 153 (1994) (holding that "an accomplice's testimony
can be corroborated by an accused's admissions") cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1826 (1995). Stewart testified that, although he was
driving the car, he could not remember that Goodman was wearing a
full camouflage outfit. Stewart also claimed he could not
remember the type of automobile he was driving when he had the
accident or the address of the automobile's owner. Stewart
testified at Williams' trial about three months after the
accident. He gave no plausible explanation why he did not know
these significant details about the accident in which he claimed
to have been involved.
Stewart's lack of knowledge about the basic details of the
accident and ownership of the automobile he claimed to have been
driving, facts that he necessarily would know or be able to
explain, corroborate Goodman's testimony that Stewart perjured
himself. The material and transparent deficiencies in Stewart's
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testimony and Officer Reid's testimony "turn the scale" in favor
of Roger Goodman and overcome the force of Stewart's oath.
Keffer, 12 Va. App. at 548, 404 S.E.2d at 746 (quoting Schwartz,
68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 1027). Therefore, the evidence is
sufficient, as a matter of law, to support Stewart's conviction
for perjury.
Affirmed.
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