COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Agee
Argued at Salem, Virginia
NEWTON BROWN TOWNSEND
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1083-00-3 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
APRIL 3, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge
James M. Dungan, Senior Assistant Public
Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
John H. McLees, Jr., Senior Assistant
Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Newton Brown Townsend was tried and convicted of a felony
in a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton
for driving after having been declared a habitual offender in a
manner that endangered the life, limb or property of another in
violation of Code § 46.2-357. Prior to trial, Townsend moved to
dismiss the charge on the ground that to try him on the charge
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. At trial, the
court heard argument on the constitutional issue, and
subsequently denied the motion. Townsend was then convicted and
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
sentenced to incarceration for one year. From that judgment,
Townsend now appeals averring the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we disagree
and affirm his conviction.
I.
The evidence at trial, the details of which are immaterial
to this appeal, established that on July 14, 1999, Townsend,
while driving a motor vehicle, collided with another automobile
and left the scene of the accident prior to the arrival of
police. At the time of the accident, Townsend was a habitual
offender by virtue of an adjudication of that status in 1995,
which was followed in 1996 with a conviction for driving as a
habitual offender.
II.
In 1999 the Virginia General Assembly repealed Code
§§ 46.2-351 through 46.2-355 which governed the civil
declaration of habitual offenders. Townsend contends that the
repeal of these laws creates classifications of (1) drivers
whose third predicate offenses under former Code § 46.2-351 et
seq. were committed before the repeal of these laws, and thus
led to their being declared habitual offenders and subject to
the penalties of Code § 46.2-357, and (2) those whose third
predicate offenses occurred after that repeal, and who are not
similarly declared habitual offenders and, therefore, not
subject to the same penalties. Townsend further contends that
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because the penalty for driving after being declared a habitual
offender involves loss of freedom, and personal freedom is a
fundamental right, the classification scheme created by the
legislature must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny to
determine whether it in fact violates equal protection
principles. We, however, find that minimal judicial scrutiny
applies. Under such an analysis any classification disparity,
if any exists, does not violate the equal protection clause.
"[W]hen . . . [a statutory] classification 'involves a
fundamental constitutional right, a suspect classification (such
as race or national origin), or the characteristics of alienage,
sex or legitimacy, [it is] subject to close judicial scrutiny.'"
Commonwealth v. Ramey, 19 Va. App. 300, 302, 450 S.E.2d 775, 776
(1994) (quoting Salama v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 320, 322-23,
380 S.E.2d 433, 435 (1989)). Where, as here, classification
does not involve such factors, all that is required is minimum
rationality. See McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 330, 191
S.E.2d 791 (1972); Salama, 8 Va. App. 320, 380 S.E.2d 433.
Under minimum rationality, "classifications will survive an
equal protection challenge if they bear a 'reasonable' relation
to a 'legitimate' governmental objective." Salama, 8 Va. App.
at 323, 380 S.E.2d at 434-35 (citation omitted).
Here, the General Assembly's 1999 actions were not to
abolish the existing habitual offender status, but rather to
abolish future civil declaration of that status.
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Under the new process, the law provides for virtually the
same indefinite revocation of driving privileges by the
convicting courts for most of the same offenses which would,
before the repeals to the Habitual Offender Act, have served as
the final requirement before civil habitual offender proceedings
could be instituted. Code §§ 18.2-36.1, 18.2-54 and 18.2-271
provide for penalties for driving during such periods of
revocation which are comparable to the penalties faced by
Townsend and others prosecuted under Code § 46.2-357.
The new process therefore allows the courts to more swiftly
recognize new habitual offenders and punish them accordingly,
while also punishing those who continue to violate the motor
vehicle laws of the Commonwealth after previously being declared
habitual offenders under the old process. The classifications
reasonably promote judicial economy and safe roads.
As judicial economy and efficiency promoting traffic safety
are legitimate goals of the Commonwealth, the classifications
created are reasonable.
If the classification has some "reasonable
basis," it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification "is not
with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality."
"The problems of government are practical
ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations -- illogical,
it may be, and unscientific." "A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."
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Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citations
omitted). We therefore find there is no equal protection
violation.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss was correct, and we affirm Townsend's conviction.
Affirmed.
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