COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ALVIN L. RICKS, SR., S/K/A
ALVIN LEROY RICKS, SR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0419-00-1 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
APRIL 3, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY
Westbrook J. Parker, Judge
Michael D. Eberhardt for appellant.
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Alvin L. Ricks, Sr., appellant, appeals from a decision of
the trial court finding him guilty of second degree murder,
shooting into an occupied vehicle, and the use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony. On appeal, he argues the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of statements he
gave to the police. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
FACTS
On November 29, 1998, an altercation occurred between
appellant's son, the victim, and several other men. Later that
night, the victim was shot and killed. Lieutenant J.B. Stutts was
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
assigned to assist in the investigation of the victim's homicide.
Stutts testified that he and five other officers went to
appellant's residence at about 3:10 a.m. on November 30, 1998 in
order to interview appellant as a suspect in the case. Stutts
stated that, before he went to appellant's residence, he knew that
there had been an altercation between the victim and appellant's
son earlier that night. He also knew that appellant had gone to
the sheriff's office to report the incident and that appellant was
upset about the altercation. Stutts had information that
appellant owned a truck that was similar in appearance to a truck
that was seen near the area where the shot was fired, and he knew
that appellant had been looking for the victim at the Oak Trail
Apartments on the night the victim was shot. Stutts also had
information that the police had interviewed a witness who had seen
appellant at the Oak Trail Apartments and who had possibly heard
appellant make a statement about the shooting.
Detective Susan Story testified she interviewed Shenequa King
in the early morning hours of November 30, 1998. King told Story
that she believed appellant was involved in the shooting based on
a statement another man heard appellant say. King said she heard
that appellant said that he "got one" because he heard someone
yell, "Ow." Story relayed this information to the officers before
they went to appellant's residence. Story also testified that,
prior to going to appellant's residence, the officers knew that a
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dispatcher at the sheriff's office had heard appellant say he
would take care of the matter himself.
The officers transported appellant to the sheriff's office
where he gave several statements. Appellant made a motion to
suppress the statements on the ground that the police arrested him
without a warrant and without probable cause. The trial court
ruled that appellant was not arrested at his residence and that,
even if he was arrested at that time, the police had probable
cause to arrest him. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress the statements.
ANALYSIS
Appellant contends he was arrested at his home on November
30, 1998 without a warrant and without probable cause.
The burden is on appellant to show that the trial court's
ruling constituted reversible error. See McGee v. Commonwealth,
25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). In
considering the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the party prevailing below. Greene v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1994).
Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause involve questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de
novo on appeal. McGee, 25 Va. App. at 197, 487 S.E.2d at 261.
We recognize, however, "'that a police officer may draw
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inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether
probable cause exists'" and that we "'should give due weight to
a trial court's finding that [an] officer was credible and [his
or her] inference was reasonable.'" James v. Commonwealth, 22
Va. App. 740, 743-44, 473 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1996) (citation
omitted).
"A police officer may seize a person by an arrest only when
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person seized
has committed or is committing a crime." Ewell v. Commonwealth,
254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997). "'Probable cause
exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an
offense has been or is being committed.'" Jefferson v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 1, 12, 497 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1998)
(citations omitted). The arresting officer is permitted to act
based on probabilities, and is not required to rely upon "hard
certainties." Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497, 502, 404
S.E.2d 919, 922, aff'd on reh'g en banc, 13 Va. App. 280, 410
S.E.2d 412 (1991), aff'd, 244 Va. 293, 421 S.E.2d 415 (1992).
The officers had probable cause to believe appellant was
criminally involved in the victim's murder when they went to
appellant's residence. The officers knew appellant's son had
been involved in an earlier altercation with the victim. They
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knew that appellant had been very upset at the sheriff's office
earlier that night and that he had indicated he would take care
of the matter himself. A truck similar to one owned by
appellant had been seen near the site of the shooting, and a
witness had told an officer that she had heard that appellant
said he "got one" because he heard the exclamation, "Ow."
Clearly, this information was sufficient to cause the
officers to believe appellant had been involved in the shooting.
In addition, the information relied on by the officers was
trustworthy because it was based on information provided by a
police dispatcher and a police interview with a disinterested
witness, rather than a paid informant. See Guzewicz v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730, 735, 187 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1972)
("[W]e will not apply to citizen informers the same standard of
reliability as is applicable when police act on tips from
professional informers or those who seek immunity for themselves
. . . ."); Polston v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 738, 745, 485
S.E.2d 632, 635 (1997), aff'd, 255 Va. 500, 498 S.E.2d 924
(1998) (if informer is a disinterested citizen or eyewitness of
a crime, it is permissible to infer that reasonable information
obtained from the citizen is reliable).
Because the reliable information known by the officers
prior to the arrest was sufficient to provide probable cause to
believe appellant was involved in the crimes, the statements
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appellant gave to the officers were properly admitted against
him at trial. Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
Affirmed.
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