COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Willis and
Senior Judge Overton
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1756-00-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
DECEMBER 5, 2000
DAVID RAY WILLIAMS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Robert W. Curran, Judge
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
James A. Segall (Krinick, Segall, Moody &
Lewis, on brief), for appellee.
The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erroneously
suppressed the heroin discovered when Williams was stopped for
investigation. We reverse the trial court's suppression order
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression
motion, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party prevailing below, in this case Williams. See
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
47, 48 (1991). We will not disturb the trial court's ruling
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660, 460 S.E.2d
261, 262 (1995). The burden is upon the Commonwealth to show
that the trial court's decision was erroneous. See id.
So viewed, the evidence established that on December 6,
1999, Detective James Wilson and Detective St. Pierre of the
Newport News Police Department were patrolling the area of
Chestnut Avenue and 23rd Street looking for "wanted" suspects.
This is a high crime area, known for frequent illegal drug
transactions. The officers were in an unmarked police car and
were dressed in street clothes.
As the police car proceeded west on 23rd Street, a narrow
one-way street, and approached the intersection with Chestnut
Avenue, Detective Wilson saw Williams "coming from the corner,
up towards [the officer's] direction," heading east. The
sidewalk was elevated about six inches above the street.
Williams had been "talking to people on the corner." He left
the corner heading in the direction of the officers.
Detective Wilson was driving slowly. As Williams passed
the police car, he was "smiling." He had his "hands out" in a
manner demonstrated to the court by Detective Wilson and was
"looking down at an object in his hands." Detective Wilson saw
in Williams' hands "a small, white square . . . like waxed paper
or something." The paper was closed with a "pharmaceutical
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fold" used frequently "to put heroin in." Detective Wilson had
worked in the narcotics unit for over three years and had made
about one hundred arrests for heroin-related offenses.
Detective Wilson was asked, "you saw [the man] with what
you believed to be [, or] suspected [to be] what?" The
detective responded, "Heroin. The package looked like a package
of heroin."
Detective Wilson testified that, as Williams passed by the
unmarked police car, he trotted over to a parked sport utility
vehicle. The detective described the "trot" as something
between walking and running.
Once Williams entered the driver's side of the vehicle,
Detective Wilson backed his car up approximately "ten, twelve
feet," and blocked Williams' vehicle. He then identified
himself as a police officer. After doing so, he saw Williams
"reach down to his right side." Not knowing what this move
signified, Detective Wilson drew his firearm and ordered
Williams out of his vehicle. When Williams exited his vehicle,
Detective Wilson saw "a folded piece of wax type paper with a
spider emblem on it, sitting on the seat right where [Williams]
. . . reach[ed]."
Detective Wilson testified that the package on the vehicle
seat "was like a wax type paper folded in [a] pharmaceutical
fold," which is a special fold made in paper so that items
inside will not fall out. He described the package as similar
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to those containing "Goodies powder," except a "little bit
smaller." The package bore a spider web design, which Detective
Wilson had not seen before, but which he had been informed was
being seen on packages of heroin being distributed in the area.
Based on these observations and believing the package contained
heroin, Detective Wilson arrested Williams for possession of
heroin.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial
court granted Williams' motion. It ruled as follows:
[B]ased on this evidence that I have seen, I
do not believe that there was sufficient
information for the officer to make the
arrest. . . . He sees the person under the
circumstances here. That is why I wasn't
worried about the gun issue because I didn't
think there is any question that he stopped
the person and didn't go up and ask him some
questions. I think this was a different
type of arrest. So I am going to grant this
defendant's motion with regard to [the
heroin].
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-398(2), the Commonwealth appealed
the trial court's ruling.
II. ANALYSIS
In arriving at its decision to suppress the heroin, the
trial court made two erroneous holdings of law and one erroneous
finding of fact.
1. The trial court held:
It cannot be reasonably inferred from the
mere presence of the defendant at the street
intersection, and the street's reputation as
a place for trafficking drugs, that the
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defendant was engaged in the illegal
activity of drug distribution over a period
of time the defendant was observed by
detectives.
While it is true that mere presence alone in a high crime area
does not give rise to probable cause or to reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity supporting an investigative stop,
"'presence in a high crime area' is a factor which may be
considered in determining whether an investigatory stop is
appropriate." Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 32, 502
S.E.2d 122, 126 (1998) (en banc) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth,
15 Va. App. 232, 234 n.1, 421 S.E.2d 911, 912 n.1 (1992)).
2. The trial court considered the evidence in the context
of its sufficiency to support an arrest. Williams was not
arrested until after he had been removed from his vehicle and
Detective Wilson had seen the package bearing the spider emblem;
thus, giving him probable cause to believe the package contained
heroin. At issue with respect to the suppression motion was the
evidentiary context at the time Detective Wilson approached
Williams and required him to exit his vehicle. At this point,
Detective Wilson did not effect an arrest, but merely detained
Williams for investigation. This required only that he
entertain a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
Williams was engaged in criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Phillips v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App.
27, 30, 434 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1993).
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3. In considering a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review de novo the ultimate questions of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. See Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996). However, we "review findings of
historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight
to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
local law enforcement officers." Id.
Considering the package in question, the trial court held,
"I don't think anybody could see this as clearly as you would
have to before you could come out and make an arrest." Nothing
in the evidence or in the character of the packet itself
supports the foregoing conclusion as a finding of fact. Indeed,
the conclusion is contrary to the detailed and uncontradicted
evidence.
Detective Wilson described in detail the package that he
saw in Williams' hands. He described its color and the material
of which it was made. He described the peculiar "pharmaceutical
fold" into which it was formed. He described the purpose of
that fold and the meaning of such a package to him in the
context of his experience as a police officer experienced in
illegal drug trafficking. His assertion that he saw the package
and his description of it were unchallenged. There can be no
question that he saw what he described.
"If a police officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion
that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in, criminal
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activity, the officer may detain the suspect to conduct a brief
investigation without violating the person's Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." McGee
v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 202, 487 S.E.2d 259, 263
(1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is
"'a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the
person stopped of criminal activity." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696
(citation omitted).
Detective Wilson articulated abundantly the facts upon
which his suspicion was premised. The reasonableness of his
suspicion must be judged in the context of his experience as a
police officer. See Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612,
616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 270-71 (1989). Within the context of his
experience, his suspicion that Williams possessed heroin was
well founded upon the facts that he articulated and was thus
reasonable.
Detective Wilson's stop of Williams for investigation was
lawful. His removal of Williams from his vehicle for reasons of
personal safety was a reasonable and proper adjunct of that
investigation. The heroin package, with its peculiar spider
emblem, was then in plain view, providing probable cause that
Williams possessed heroin, supporting its seizure and his
arrest. Therefore, the heroin should not have been suppressed.
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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