COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
HOME BENEFICIAL CORPORATION AND
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1155-99-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
MAY 30, 2000
MARGARET M. JACKSON
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Jennifer Marwitz (William F. Karn; Law
Offices of Roya Palmer Ewing, on brief), for
appellants.
No brief or argument for appellee.
Home Beneficial Corporation and Continental Insurance
Company (appellants) contend the Workers' Compensation
Commission (commission) erred in finding that appellants are
equitably estopped from asserting the two-year limitations
period contained in Code § 65.2-601. We disagree and affirm the
commission's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Margaret M. Jackson (claimant) sustained a compensable
right knee injury on January 4, 1996. She filed her claim for
benefits on March 13, 1998, more than two years after the date
of the accident. She testified that not too long after her
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
accident, she received papers, including an informational
pamphlet ("Blue Letter"), from the commission. She took those
papers to one of her supervisors, either Gary Pope or Joseph
Padgett, and asked what she should do with the papers.
According to claimant, Pope responded that she did not have to
do anything because "everything had been taken care of."
Claimant stated that when she received papers, including
medical bills, she took them to one of her supervisors. The
supervisors always told her that everything had been done.
Therefore, she "didn't do anything."
Claimant admitted that she never read the "Blue Letter"
sent by the commission. She did not remember whether her
supervisor looked at the papers from the commission, but did not
believe that he read those documents.
Gary Pope, one of the supervisors, testified that he did
not recall the specifics of any conversation with claimant. He
testified that she did bring in some forms. He stated, "But as
far as the statement that everything was taken care of, that was
on behalf of the company's part of it." Pope later indicated
that he did not recall having any conversations with claimant
when she brought in the workers' compensation forms, but did
recall her bringing in medical bills. He did not recall telling
claimant that she did not have to do anything.
The other supervisor, Joseph Padgett, did not recall
claimant bringing in any workers' compensation papers.
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The commission concluded:
Based upon the evidence presented, the
Deputy Commissioner impliedly found the
claimant's testimony to be credible. We
have carefully reviewed the record, and
agree with this credibility determination.
Pope as much as admitted that he had told
the claimant that everything had been taken
care of, although he indicated that he was
referring merely to the employer's
processing of the claim. We conclude that
the conversation took place as asserted by
the claimant.
The commission held that appellants were estopped from
asserting the two-year statute of limitations.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellants do not dispute the commission's finding of fact
as to their representation to claimant. Instead, appellants
contend since claimant received the commission's "Blue Letter,"
which fully advised her of her rights and responsibilities under
the Act, she is not entitled to a finding of equitable estoppel.
The findings of the commission, if based upon credible
evidence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court. See Code
§ 65.2-706; Falls Church Constr. Co. v. Laidler, 254 Va. 474,
478-79, 493 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1997) (citations omitted); Southern
Express v. Green, 26 Va. App. 439, 445, 495 S.E.2d 500, 503
(1998) (citation omitted).
To prove estoppel, a claimant must show by "clear, precise
and unequivocal evidence" that he or she relied to his or her
detriment upon an act or statement of the employer or its agent
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to refrain from filing a claim within the statutory period.
Rose v. Red's Hitch & Trailer Servs., Inc., 11 Va. App. 55,
59-60, 396 S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (1990) (citing Brown v. Lawson
Transportation Corp., 7 Va. App. 679, 681, 377 S.E.2d 136, 137
(1989)). Estoppel "does not require proof that the
representation be false or that the employer intend to induce
reliance. The employee's case is made if the 'representation
. . . did in fact induce the [employee] to refrain from
filing.'" Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319,
325, 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992) (quoting Stuart Circle Hosp. v.
Alderson, 223 Va. 205, 208, 288 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1982)).
"[P]roof of a representation, reliance, change of position, and
detriment is sufficient to establish equitable estoppel." Id.
at 324, 416 S.E.2d at 711 (citations omitted).
Appellants cite Cibula for the underlying importance of
receipt of the commission's "Blue Letter" in the context of
equitable estoppel. We find appellants' reliance on Cibula
misplaced.
In Cibula, the commission found that when the claimant
asked the employer's agent what he needed to do, the agent
informed the claimant that he needed to do nothing except turn
in his expense statements. See id. at 321, 416 S.E.2d at 709.
There was a further finding that the employer's agent told the
claimant that "the claim had been turned in to the . . .
Commission." Id. The commission further found that claimant
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never received the "Blue Letter" from the commission, which
would have provided the claimant with the statutory notice
concerning the filing procedure. See id. at 321-22, 416 S.E.2d
at 709-10. This Court found that the uncontroverted evidence
supported the claimant's contentions that he had no reason to
know that he had to take other action on his claim and that he
relied upon the agent's representation. See id. at 325, 416
S.E.2d at 711-12. In reversing the commission, this Court found
that the claimant need not prove that the representation be
false or that the employer intended to induce reliance. See id.
Appellants, however, rely on dicta in Cibula in support of
their position. They contend that equitable estoppel should not
apply in the instant case since claimant received the "Blue
Letter," which, had claimant read it, would have informed her
that she had to take other actions on her claim. The issue in
Cibula was the commission's ruling that the claimant "was
required to prove 'a false representation or concealment of
material facts' or an 'intent [by Allied] to have [Cibula] act
upon the misrepresentation or concealment.'" Id. at 324, 416
S.E.2d at 711. The discussion of the "Blue Letter" was not
central to the ratio decidendi and was, therefore, dicta. We
are not bound by dicta. See Harmon v. Peery, 145 Va. 578,
583-84, 134 S.E. 701, 703 (1926).
Further, in Cheski v. Arlington County Public Schools, 16
Va. App. 936, 434 S.E.2d 353 (1993), decided after Cibula, we
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again addressed equitable estoppel in the context of the "Blue
Letter." In Cheski, the claimant received the "Blue Letter" but
did not file her claim within the two-year limitation period.
See id. at 938, 434 S.E.2d at 354. The claimant maintained that
"the employer's 'course of conduct' induced her to not [timely]
file a claim with the commission." Id. at 939, 434 S.E.2d at
355. This Court analyzed the facts to determine if there was
such an inducement. See id. at 939-40, 434 S.E.2d at 355-56.
If, as appellants assert, Cibula stands for the proposition that
the receipt of the "Blue Letter" in itself bars equitable
estoppel, the Cheski Court would not have needed to determine
whether the employer's "course of conduct" induced claimant not
to file her claim.
We are persuaded that whether or not claimant received the
"Blue Letter" is not a factor in an analysis of equitable
estoppel as long as the claimant proves the elements of
equitable estoppel. 1
1
Code § 65.2-601 only requires that the claim be filed with
the commission within two years. The Code and the Rules of the
Commission do not require that the claimant, himself, file the
claim.
In this case, even if claimant had read the commission's
"Blue Letter," she still could reasonably rely on her
supervisor's representation that the employer would file the
appropriate claim on her behalf.
This opinion is limited to situations where equitable
estoppel is used in a statute of limitations context.
We do not address the implication of a claimant receiving
the "Blue Letter" when "tolling" of the statute of limitations
under Code § 65.2-602 is the issue.
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The commission found that claimant met her burden. In its
opinion, the commission stated:
We find that the claimant has met her burden
of proving equitable estoppel. Her
testimony establishes clear, concise and
unequivocal evidence that she reasonably
relied upon the statements of her supervisor
and therefore did not file her claim.
Although the employer did not have
fraudulent intent to mislead the claimant,
we find that Pope's statements did, in fact,
induce the claimant to understand that she
needed to take no further action in order to
perfect her claim. Through its actions, the
employer lulled the claimant into a belief
that her claim was accepted and that she did
not have to take any further actions to
protect her rights.
We agree with the commission and affirm its decision.
Affirmed.
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