COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
THEODORE LEE HALL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1265-99-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
APRIL 18, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
William R. Shelton, Judge
(Margaret Ann Englisby; Englisby & Englisby,
on brief), for appellant. Appellant
submitting on brief.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Leah A.
Darron, Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
brief.
On appeal from his conviction of forging a public record,
in violation of Code § 18.2-168, Theodore Lee Hall contends that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 1 He
argues (1) that the trial court erred in finding that a
confirmation of insurance document was a public record under
Code § 42.1-77 and (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove he
had the requisite intent to defraud. Finding no error, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Hall was also convicted of operating a motor vehicle after
having been declared an habitual offender, in violation of Code
§ 46.2-357. That conviction is not at issue in this appeal.
I. Facts
On appeal, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The
judgment of a trial court sitting without a
jury is entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict and will not be set aside
unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987).
On the evening of April 4, 1998, Chesterfield County Police
Officer Walter Judkins stopped a vehicle driven by Hall on
suspicion that Hall was driving while under the influence of
alcohol. Because Hall had no identification, Officer Judkins
attempted to ascertain his identity. In response to Officer
Judkins' inquiry, Hall stated that his name was "Teddy Leroy
Hall, Jr.," that his birth date was July 1, 1942, that he was
headed to an apartment complex where his passenger resided, and
that he lived on Goolsby Avenue. Teddy Leroy Hall, Jr., whose
date of birth is July 1, 1942, and who lives on Goolsby Avenue,
is Hall's half-brother. The birth date and address are
incorrect for Hall.
With this information, Officer Judkins ascertained that
Teddy Leroy Hall, Jr., held a valid driver's license and that
the vehicle was registered to Teddy Lane Journeyman. Officer
Judkins used this information to complete a DMV confirmation of
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liability insurance form. He explained to Hall that the form
should be completed by his insurance company and mailed to the
DMV. Hall signed the document "Teddy Hall," a name that he
frequently used. Officer Judkins gave Hall the original of the
form to have his insurance company complete and mail to the DMV,
to verify that the vehicle was insured. The form provides that
failure to complete the form properly and timely would result in
a suspension of driver's and vehicle licenses.
Officer Judkins kept a duplicate original of the form
signed by Hall. He testified that he did so for his file, so
that he could follow up on the form's status, if necessary.
Officer Judkins then arrested Hall for driving while under
the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, Teddy Leroy Hall, Jr.,
contacted Officer Judkins, because he received documentation
relating to Hall's DUI offense. Teddy Leroy Hall, Jr.,
testified that Hall was the driver of the vehicle, that the two
men were half-brothers, that the identifying information given
by Hall to Officer Judkins was actually Teddy Leroy Hall, Jr.'s,
identity, and that he had not given Hall permission to use his
identity.
The trial court convicted Hall of forging a public
document, in violation of Code § 18.2-168.
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II. Public Record
Code § 18.2-168 states that:
If any person forge a public record, or
certificate, return, or attestation, of any
public officer or public employee, in
relation to any matter wherein such
certificate, return, or attestation may be
received as legal proof, or utter, or
attempt to employ as true, such forged
record, certificate, return, or attestation,
knowing the same to be forged, he shall be
guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Id.
Hall contends that the DMV confirmation of insurance form
is not a public record.
"'Public Records' means, but is not
limited to, all written books, papers,
letters, documents, photographs, tapes,
microfiche, microfilm, photostats, sound
recordings, maps, other documentary
materials or information in any recording
medium regardless of physical form or
characteristics, including electronically
recorded data, made or received in pursuance
of law or in connection with the transaction
of public business by any agency or employee
of state government or its political
subdivisions."
Reid v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 470, 431 S.E.2d 63, 64
(1993) (citation omitted).
The DMV form was a public record. It was completed in part
by Officer Judkins and was used by the police and the DMV, as
agents of the Commonwealth, to ascertain whether the vehicle was
properly insured as required by state law. Officer Judkins kept
a duplicate original for a governmental and public purpose. The
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fact that Hall failed to have the form fully completed and
returned to the DMV does not alter the form's character as a
public record. See Reid, 16 Va. App. at 471, 431 S.E.2d at
64-65 (fingerprint card completed by police and signed by
appellant was a forged public document under Code § 18.2-168).
III. Intent to Defraud
Hall contends that the Commonwealth did not prove that he
acted with the intent to defraud. He argues that the
misinformation was simply a misunderstanding, that he never
supplied Officer Judkins with his half-brother's birth date,
social security number, or address. He argues further that he
simply did not pay enough attention to the form and so did not
correct the error. Finally, he argues that the name he signed,
"Teddy Hall," is a name that he frequently uses and by which he
is commonly known.
"Intent is the purpose formed in a person's mind which may,
and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in
a particular case." Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836,
252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979). Whether or not Hall supplied the
erroneous information to Officer Judkins was a matter of
credibility for the trial court. The trial court believed that
he did. "[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight
accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who
has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is
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presented." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455
S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). Further, the trial court was not
required to believe Hall's explanation as to why he did not
correct the misinformation. "In its role of judging witness
credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the
self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the
accused is lying to conceal his guilt." Marable v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235
(1998).
Hall argues that he is known as "Teddy" and that by signing
the confirmation of liability insurance form, "Teddy Hall," he
signed a name by which he is frequently and commonly known and
thus provided no false information. However, this signature
tied directly into the false identity given by him to Officer
Judkins and was thus a ratification and statement of the false
information on the form.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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