COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
HAROLD JACKSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0648-99-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
DECEMBER 28, 1999
RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge
Karen Minter Matthews (Law Offices of
Thomas O. Bondurant, Jr., on briefs), for
appellant.
Alexandra Silva, Assistant City Attorney;
Robin M. Morgan, Guardian ad litem for the
minor child (Office of the City Attorney, on
brief), for appellee.
Harold Jackson appeals from a decision terminating his
parental rights of his daughter, Ruth Jackson. On appeal, Harold
Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to meet the
clear and convincing standard required for termination of parental
rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). We disagree and affirm the
trial court's ruling terminating his residual parental rights.
BACKGROUND
In January 1995, approximately a week after her birth, Ruth
Jackson was removed from her parents' custody, due to concerns
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
raised by hospital personnel. Several days later, Ruth was placed
back in her parents' custody, with legal custody remaining with
the Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS) until March 1995.
In July 1995, Ruth was removed from her parents' custody because
of allegations that she was abused and neglected. At that time,
Harold Jackson was hospitalized for a gunshot wound received
during a drive-by shooting. Mary Jackson had been hospitalized
several times for mental health problems. The juvenile and
domestic relations district court subsequently returned Ruth to
her parents' custody, but ordered stabilization services to
prevent future removals from the home. In the ensuing months,
Harold and Mary Jackson would occasionally live together at
friends' homes or hotels, but occasionally, Harold Jackson would
live in shelters.
On April 24, 1996, Ruth was removed from the Jacksons'
custody because of allegations that Mary Jackson was unable to
care for Ruth. When Ruth was placed in foster care in April 1996,
she was dirty, had head lice, and was withdrawn. At the time,
Harold Jackson was being detained on charges of raping Mary
Jackson and threatening to burn down the house in which Mary and
Ruth Jackson were living.
In May 1996, Janet Kramer, foster care worker for Ruth,
counseled Harold Jackson on various things he should do in order
to regain custody of his daughter. Kramer recommended that he
establish a stable residence, obtain full-time employment, and
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obtain a psychological evaluation. Harold Jackson had difficulty
finding and keeping employment in Virginia. While living in
Virginia, the Jacksons lived at twelve different locations.
Despite being advised to move to Richmond where services could be
provided and where the Jacksons would have access to the Richmond
Mental Health facility, Harold Jackson indicated that he preferred
to live in Chesterfield County. In June 1997, the couple moved to
Pennsylvania.
From April 1996 until June 1998, Harold Jackson had
supervised visits with Ruth. Until the Jacksons moved to
Pennsylvania in June 1997, Harold Jackson visited Ruth at least
once per month; however, after moving, he visited her once in
September 1997, once in October 1997, once in February 1998, and
once in May 1998. The Jacksons frequently telephoned Ruth at her
foster parents' home to check on her and to talk with her.
Howard Rosen, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a
psychological evaluation of Harold Jackson. Dr. Rosen
characterized Harold Jackson as demanding, aggressive, and a
"rough" person, who was insecure and who had limited and impaired
judgment. Harold Jackson was previously diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, but he refuses to acknowledge that he has a mental
health problem. Harold Jackson was observed with his infant son,
whom he handled roughly, awkwardly, and unsafely. Harold Jackson
was diagnosed with alcohol dependence and antisocial personality
disorder.
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Since being placed in foster care, Ruth has been diagnosed
with having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). She
is a very active child, and is more difficult to care for than the
average child. She attends a special needs school and is enrolled
in an early childhood development program.
ANALYSIS
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Where the trial court hears the
evidence ore tenus, its decision is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. See Lowe v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
231 Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986).
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a
child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests
of the child and that:
[t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in
foster care to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to or required
continuation of the child's foster care
placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to such end. Proof that the parent
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. . . without good cause, [has] failed or
been unable to make substantial progress
towards elimination of the conditions which
led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement in accordance
with their obligations under and within the
time limits or goals set forth in a foster
care plan filed with the court . . . shall
constitute prima facie evidence of this
condition.
"'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are
to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of
the child.'" Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658,
661 (1979) (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 400, 192
S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)). The termination of parental rights is a
grave, drastic, and irreversible action. When a court orders
termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and
child are severed forever and the parent becomes "'a legal
stranger to the child.'" Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72
(quoting Shank v. Department of Soc. Servs., 217 Va. 506, 509, 230
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1976)).
The trial court found that Harold Jackson suffers from mental
health problems which are exacerbated by his refusal to recognize
that he has a problem. The court noted Harold Jackson's refusal
for years to obtain a mental health evaluation despite DSS's
attempt to persuade him to obtain one. Moreover, the court noted
that Harold Jackson was "physical" with his wife when he was
unable to control her behavior. Finally, the court remarked about
Harold Jackson's unwavering determination to remain with Mary
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Jackson if custody of Ruth is returned to him, stating that it was
not in Ruth's best interest to be "returned to that environment."
Harold Jackson, relying on Weaver v. Roanoke Department of
Human Resources, 220 Va. 921, 265 S.E.2d 692 (1980), argues that
DSS failed to assist him in remedying the conditions which led to
Ruth's placement in foster care. In Weaver, Kenneth Weaver
petitioned the court to be relieved of custody of his two children
because he was financially unable to care for them. The children
were placed in foster care, and during the next three years,
Weaver did not financially support the children. He changed
residences frequently and visited the children sporadically. The
record did not contain any evidence indicating what, if any,
measures were taken by rehabilitative agencies to assist Weaver in
remedying his financial situation. We held that "in the absence
of evidence indicating that reasonable and appropriate efforts
were taken by social agencies to remedy the conditions leading to
foster care, residual parental rights cannot be terminated." 220
Va. at 928-29, 265 S.E.2d at 696-97.
Here, despite the social services provided, Harold Jackson
did not follow through with the recommendations of the social
worker. Kramer advised Harold Jackson to obtain a psychological
evaluation and scheduled an appointment in November 1996, which
Harold Jackson did not keep. He finally obtained an evaluation in
April 1998. Kramer advised him to apply for public housing in
Richmond, but Harold Jackson chose to live in Chesterfield County
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and in June 1997 relocated to Pennsylvania. Moreover, he is
unwilling to admit that he suffers from mental health problems;
therefore, he has been unsuccessful in obtaining treatment. His
ability to safely parent his child is poor in view of his history
of bipolar and antisocial personality disorder. DSS's attempt to
render stabilization services to assist Harold Jackson in
remedying the conditions which led to Ruth's placement in foster
care was thwarted by his constant moving, his relocation to
Pennsylvania, and his unwillingness and inability to seek help
with his mental health problems.
The record indicates that Ruth Jackson is doing well in
foster care where she has been since April 1996. She is being
treated for ADHD and is attending a special needs school. Ruth's
foster parents actively seek community services to assist her.
She is receiving medical treatment for mood liability,
distractibility, and impulsiveness.
Ruth was in foster care for nearly four years, while Harold
Jackson was unwilling or unable to cooperate with the agencies
seeking to assist him. He has not demonstrated that he is willing
or able to remedy within twelve months the conditions that led to
Ruth being placed in foster care or shown good cause for his
failure or inability to do so. "It is clearly not in the best
interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
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his responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
The trial court's finding that the termination of Harold
Jackson's residual parental rights was in the child's best
interest and that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence to
meet the requirement of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) was supported by the
record. Accordingly, we affirm the decision.
Affirmed.
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