COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
GAYE LYNN CLINE
v. Record No. 0504-99-3
BOBBY GORDON CLINE
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
BOBBY GORDON CLINE PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 21, 1999
v. Record No. 0580-99-3
GAYE LYNN CLINE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WYTHE COUNTY
J. Colin Campbell, Judge
(David S. Saliba; Saliba & Company, P.C., on
briefs), for Gaye Lynn Cline.
(Michael E. Untiedt, on briefs), for Bobby
Gordon Cline.
Gaye Lynn Cline (wife) and Bobby Gordon Cline (husband)
appeal the equitable distribution decision of the circuit court.
In her appeal, wife contends that the trial court erred by
increasing husband's equity in the marital residence by crediting
him for post-separation mortgage payments. Specifically, wife
contends that the trial court erred because (1) husband's mortgage
payments were, in fact, spousal support payments made pursuant to
the pendente lite spousal support order; and (2) awarding husband
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the entire post-separation equity retroactively modified the
pendente lite support order. Husband contends that the trial
court erred by dividing the marital estate equally between the
parties. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we
conclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Record No. 0504-99-3
Wife contends that the trial court erred by crediting husband
with post-separation contributions towards the mortgage on the
marital farm. We find no error in the trial court's decision and
affirm.
Under the pendente lite order entered August 16, 1995, nunc
pro tunc February 18, 1995, the trial court ordered husband to
pay, among other things, certain costs and attorney's fees; $900
in monthly spousal support for wife; health insurance for wife;
and the mortgage, insurance and expenses for maintenance of the
marital farm. See Code § 20-103. Wife did not object to the
order. In the equitable distribution decision set out in the
decree of divorce, the trial court found that the marital farm
had an outstanding debt of $75,788.75 as of the date of
separation, but that husband had "made payments of principal and
interest which have reduced the indebtedness." The court then
ordered that "[a]ny equity between what is now owed and the
amount owed [shown above] at the date of separation shall be the
- 2 -
sole property of Husband and shall be paid to him at the closing
of the sale of the real estate pursuant to this order."
Based upon certain comments made by the trial court in its
pendente lite ruling from the bench, and in the August 21, 1998
opinion letter, wife characterizes the post-separation mortgage
payments as additional spousal support. However, the trial
court's pendente lite order listed husband's responsibility for
the mortgage payments separately from his responsibility for
"spousal support." "A court speaks only through its orders."
Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 773
(1964). We "'presume that the order, as the final pronouncement
on the subject, rather than a transcript that may be flawed by
omissions, accurately reflects what transpired.'" Kern v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 84, 88, 341 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1986)
(citation omitted). Therefore, we do not agree with wife's
characterization.
Moreover, even if we agreed with wife that the trial court
intended the mortgage payments to be characterized as additional
spousal support, that classification would not preclude the
trial court from crediting husband for these payments. See Code
§ 20-103(E) ("An order entered pursuant to this section shall
have no presumptive effect and shall not be determinative when
adjudicating the underlying cause."). Under the pendente lite
order, husband bore the burden of preserving the marital estate
until resolution of the matter by making these post-separation
- 3 -
payments out of his separate funds. See Code § 20-103(A);
§ 20-107.3(A)(2). The trial court was authorized "to apportion
and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or either of
them, that are incurred prior to the dissolution of the
marriage, based upon the factors listed in subsection E." Code
§ 20-107.3(G). We cannot say that the trial court erred in
crediting husband with the value by which his post-separation
mortgage payments reduced the parties' joint debt.
For the reasons set out above, we also find no merit in
wife's argument that the trial court's decision amounted to a
retroactive modification of the spousal support awarded in the
pendente lite order. See Code § 20-103(E).
Record No. 0580-99-3
Husband contends that the trial court erred when it divided
the marital assets equally between the parties because he made
the greater monetary contributions during and after the
marriage. We disagree.
"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be set
aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d
675, 678 (1990). "Unless it appears from the record that the
trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the
statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal."
Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630
- 4 -
(1989). There is no presumption of equal distribution under the
Virginia equitable distribution statute. See Papuchis v.
Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830 (1986).
Here, the trial court considered the evidence and the
statutory factors. While husband earned more throughout the
marriage, there was also evidence that wife provided bookkeeping
services to husband's business and the marital farm. We cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion when weighing the
evidence. Therefore, we find no grounds to reverse the trial
court's distribution decision.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 5 -