COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Baker
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
RANDY M. KING
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2619-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
DECEMBER 8, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge
(LeeAnn Bierowicz, Assistant Public Defender,
on brief), for appellant. Appellant
submitting on brief.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Randy M. King (defendant) was convicted by a jury for
operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an habitual
offender, a second offense. On appeal, defendant complains that
the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence his
inculpatory statement to police. We disagree and affirm the
conviction.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to
disposition of the appeal.
Upon review from a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va.
App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991).
The record discloses that a vehicle operated by defendant
collided with one driven by Molly Baines. Immediately following
the accident, Baines approached the car occupied by defendant and
found him "lying in the street." Defendant "apologized" and
explained that he was experiencing "chest pains and . . . trying
to get to the emergency room" of a nearby hospital. Portsmouth
Police Officer Patrick Hudgens arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter, an ambulance was summoned, and defendant was
transported to the hospital. Both Baines and Hudgens detected an
odor of alcohol about defendant and noted his "bloodshot eyes."
Pursuing his investigation of the accident, Officer Hudgens
followed defendant to the hospital and, en route, ascertained
through a "DMV check" that he had been adjudicated an habitual
offender. While in the emergency room, Hudgens was allowed
access to defendant, then still "behind a white curtain," and
inquired "why [defendant] was operating the vehicle on a revoked
license." Defendant responded "that he was only driving because
he thought he was having a heart attack and he needed to get to
the hospital." Defendant was released from the hospital after
"about an hour."
In a pretrial motion and, again, during trial, defendant
moved the court to suppress his statement, contending that it was
the product of a custodial interrogation unattended by the
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requisite Miranda warnings, and, therefore, inadmissible into
evidence. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
trial court, however, denied the motions, and the instant
conviction and appeal followed.
It is well established that the safeguards of Miranda
pertain only to "custodial interrogation." See Pruett v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 271, 351 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). In determining whether a suspect is
"in custody" for Miranda purposes, "'the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement" of the degree associated with formal arrest.'"
Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 262
(1998) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(citation omitted)). Resolution of this issue "presents a mixed
question of law and fact qualifying for independent review" on
appeal. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995). However,
"[w]e review the trial court's findings of historical fact only
for 'clear error.'" Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 702, 712,
492 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1997) (citations omitted). To prevail,
defendant must "show that the trial court's decision constituted
reversible error." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the statement in issue was prompted by a single
question, posed by one police officer to an unrestrained
defendant, in a neutral hospital setting, incidental to the
routine investigation of a traffic accident. Clearly, such
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circumstances did not create the "'sort of coercive environment
to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which
it is limited.'" 1 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450
S.E.2d 124, 129 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995)
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see
Bottenfield v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316, 329, 487 S.E.2d
883, 889 (1997) (citation omitted) ("Miranda does not apply to a
police officer's general questioning in the course of the
fact-finding process.").
Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted the statement
into evidence, and we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
1
"Any interview of one suspected of a crime by
a police officer will have coercive aspects
to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement
system which may ultimately cause the suspect
to be charged with a crime. But police
officers are not requested to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question. Nor is the requirement of warnings
to be imposed simply . . . because the
questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in
custody.'"
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 604-05, 450 S.E.2d 124, 129
(1994) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
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