COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Bray and Bumgardner
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
LAMONT V. EVANS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1963-97-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
JULY 14, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
Oliver A. Pollard, Jr., Judge
Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
The defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that the police
stopped for not having a valid inspection sticker. There were
four occupants in the car. Two officers had the driver and
Evans, the front seat passenger, get out of the car. One officer
had Evans place his hands on the roof of the car after the other
officer had an altercation with the driver. The officer with
Evans knew him by name and, pursuant to departmental policy,
called headquarters to determine whether there were outstanding
warrants for him. Within two minutes, the officer learned that
there was an outstanding felony warrant for Evans, and the
officer arrested him. An officer transported Evans to the jail,
and after he exited the police cruiser, the officer found drugs
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
beside the vehicle.
Evans was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. Evans did not make a motion in accordance with Code
§ 19.2-266.2 to suppress the evidence before trial. At his bench
trial he did not object to the admission of the drugs into
evidence. The defendant raised the issue that the evidence was
illegally obtained while arguing his motion to strike after the
Commonwealth had rested. The trial court allowed the defendant
to argue suppression of the evidence, and the court ruled that
the evidence was not illegally seized. We assume that the trial
court found the defendant had good cause for not complying with
Code § 19.2-266.2 and that it was in the interest of justice to
allow him to proceed. The trial court denied the motion to
strike thus ruling that the evidence was admissible. The trial
court convicted the defendant. Finding that the evidence was
properly admitted, we affirm the conviction.
When the police lawfully stopped the vehicle in which the
defendant was riding, they were allowed to order passengers out
of the car. See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
They were also permitted to restrict the conduct of the
passenger after he had gotten out of the vehicle. See Lansdown v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 212, 308 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984); Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 487, 491, 419 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1992). After one officer had
an altercation with the driver, the other officer acted
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reasonably and in the interest of officer safety by ordering the
defendant to put his hands on the car. During this period of
lawful detention, the officer was entitled to radio to his
headquarters and determine if the defendant was wanted for any
charges. Once he learned of the outstanding warrant, he could,
indeed it was his duty to, arrest the defendant. At no point was
the defendant detained or seized illegally. Consequently, the
evidence found after the police removed the defendant from their
vehicle was admissible. We affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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