COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DELLA SMALL WILSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0118-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MARCH 3, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Robert W. Duling, Judge
Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Della Small Wilson (appellant) appeals her conviction of
attempted murder of a police officer with the intent of
interfering with the performance of his official duties. She
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction. She argues that the evidence failed to support the
trial court's conclusion that she specifically intended (1) to
"kill" Officer Carnes or (2) to interfere with the performance of
his official duties when she threw a large butcher knife at him.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
"On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). This Court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. See
Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220
(1992). Instead, the trial court's judgment will not be set
aside unless it appears that it is plainly wrong or without
supporting evidence. Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87,
99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc).
"'An attempt to commit a crime is composed of two elements:
(1) The intent to commit it; and (2) a direct, ineffectual act
done towards its commission.'" Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.
App. 562, 565, 458 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (1995) (quoting Merritt v.
Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 657, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935)). Code
§ 18.2-31(6) states that the crime of capital murder includes the
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a
law-enforcement officer . . . for the purpose of interfering with
the performance of his official duties."
"The intent required to be proven in an attempted crime is
the specific intent in the person's mind to commit the particular
crime for which the attempt is charged." Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5
Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987); see also Merritt,
164 Va. at 660-61, 180 S.E. at 398-99 (stating that "while a
person may be guilty of murder though there was no actual intent
to kill, he cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit murder
unless he has a specific intent to kill"). "Intent is the
2
purpose formed in a person's mind and may be, and frequently is,
shown by circumstances. It is a state of mind which may be
proved by a person's conduct or by his statements." Barrett v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 153, 156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969); see
also Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808,
810 (1977). "[A] person is presumed to intend the immediate,
direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary act."
Nobles, 218 Va. at 551, 238 S.E.2d at 810.
"[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a
question for the trier of fact." Id. "The inferences to be
drawn from proved facts are within the province of the [trier of
fact], so long as the inferences are reasonable and justified."
Barrett, 210 Va. at 156, 169 S.E.2d at 451. Where, as here, the
Commonwealth relies solely on circumstantial evidence to prove
the intent of the accused, the evidence must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Coffey v. Commonwealth,
202 Va. 185, 188, 116 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1960).
All necessary circumstances proved must be
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence. It is not sufficient that the
evidence create a suspicion of guilt, however
strong, or even a probability of guilt, but
must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save
that of guilt.
Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963).
Appellant's intent to kill Officer Carnes could be
reasonably inferred from her conduct during the confrontation in
her bedroom on June 7. The record established that, after
3
appellant retrieved the eleven-inch-long knife from the right
side of her bed, she waved it angrily in the air and appeared
"angry" and "hysterical." Officer Carnes was standing about
eight feet from where appellant was sitting in her bed. When
Officer Carnes ordered her to put down the knife, appellant
refused to comply. Instead, she told Officer Carnes that she
"would let him have it" and threw the knife at the officer's
chest. She threw the knife by extending her arm "straight out"
while holding the handle of the knife. The manner in which
appellant released the knife caused the blade and the handle to
flip "end-over-end" as it traveled through the air toward Officer
Carnes. The knife struck Officer Carnes in the left side of his
chest with the blade pointing toward the officer. Officer Carnes
was not harmed by the impact of the knife as it hit the strap of
his bullet-proof vest. The dangerous manner in which appellant
released the knife, her decision to aim her throw at the left
side of Officer Carnes' chest while sitting about eight feet away
from the officer, and the nature of the object she chose to throw
-- a large knife with a six-and-a-half-inch blade -- support the
trial court's conclusion that she specifically intended to kill
Officer Carnes. This evidence likewise excludes as a reasonable
hypothesis the theory that appellant's sole intent when she threw
the knife at Officer Carnes was merely to commit an assault and
battery upon the officer.
We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that
4
appellant intended to interfere with the exercise of Officer
Carnes' official duties. The record established that Officer
Carnes was on duty and in uniform when he entered appellant's
bedroom in response to an earlier call from her apartment.
Appellant threw the knife at Officer Carnes' chest after he
ordered her to put it down. The trial court could have
reasonably inferred from appellant's actions that her attempt to
kill Officer Carnes was also an attempt to thwart his effort to
neutralize the dangerous confrontation between herself and the
others in the bedroom.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction
of attempted capital murder.
Affirmed.
5