COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
JOHN ANGE, SANDRA ANGE, MICHAEL ANGE,
KAREN ANGE AND BARBARA WILLIAMS 1
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0676-97-1 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 3, 1998
CHESAPEAKE DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
E. Preston Grissom, Judge
(Peter J. Jankell, on brief), for appellant
John Ange.
(John Oliver, Deputy City Attorney, on
brief), for appellee.
John Ange appeals the decision of the circuit court
terminating his parental rights to his daughter. Ange contends
that the trial court erred by failing to consider, or by
considering and rejecting, certain specific members of his family
as alternative placements for his daughter as required under Code
§ 16.1-283(A). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
1
All appellants noted an appeal of the trial court's March 4,
1997 order. However, as only John Ange pursued the appeal by
filing a brief, this opinion addresses only those issues raised in
his brief.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).
"In matters of a child's welfare, trial
courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and
to foster a child's best interests." The
trial court's judgment, "when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it."
Id. (citations omitted).
The Chesapeake Department of Human Services (the Department)
presented evidence that Ange's daughter was taken into protective
custody in February 1992 when she was three years old and was
found wandering the street unattended. Further investigation
disclosed that the child was staying with her paternal
grandmother, Barbara Williams, in a home that lacked electricity
or water and had blankets and boards on the door and many of the
windows. The child was developmentally delayed, having almost no
intelligible speech nor the ability to use a fork. The child was
diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
arising from the neglect she suffered before coming into foster
care.
Ange acknowledged that he was unable to care for his
daughter without assistance. 2 He contends, however, that the
2
The mother's parental rights also were terminated, and she
2
Department failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to
investigate possible placement with his family members,
specifically his mother, Barbara Williams, or two of his sisters,
Tanya Davis and Barbara Tobias.
Code § 16.1-283(A) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any order terminating residual parental
rights shall be accompanied by an order
continuing or granting custody to a local
board of public welfare or social services
. . . or the granting of custody or
guardianship to a relative or other
interested individual. However, in such
cases the court shall give consideration to
granting custody to relatives of the child,
including grandparents.
This provision requires that
before the court grants custody of a child,
under the provisions of Code § 16.1-283(A)
the Department has a duty to produce
sufficient evidence so that the court may
properly determine whether there are
relatives willing and suitable to take
custody of the child, and to consider such
relatives in comparison to other placement
options.
Logan, 13 Va. App. at 131, 409 S.E.2d at 464.
The evidence produced by the Department at trial
demonstrated that it investigated whether there were any
relatives willing and suitable for possible placement of the
child. In fact, the record includes an order dated February 8,
1995, specifically requiring updated home studies of Williams and
Davis to assist the court in making its custody determination.
did not appeal that ruling.
3
The Department conducted or attempted home studies, psychological
interviews, and additional evaluations. The court found that
neither the grandmother, Barbara Williams, nor the aunt, Tanya
Davis, offered beneficial alternatives. Among other factors, the
evidence demonstrated that neither Williams nor Davis was willing
to work with the Department.
Williams had physical custody of the child when she was
first brought into foster care and was found to be partially
responsible for the child's neglect. Williams subsequently
refused to tell the Department where she was living and
threatened the child's foster mother.
Davis failed to safeguard the child prior to her foster care
placement, despite being in a position to protect the child.
Davis gave conflicting information concerning the extent of her
relationship with, and financial reliance upon, her estranged
husband. Evidence, including court records of prior proceedings,
demonstrated a history of domestic abuse between Davis and her
estranged husband. Moreover, prior to the presentation of
evidence at the final disposition hearing in November 1996, Davis
withdrew her petition for custody, indicating that she no longer
desired custody.
At the November 1996 hearing, Ange raised for the first time
the possibility of placing the child with his sister, Barbara
Tobias. The record indicates that Ange never disclosed Tobias'
whereabouts prior to the hearing. Ange testified that Tobias
4
became a possible placement only after Davis withdrew her
petition. However, the evidence showed that in 1987 Tobias
abducted her children from their father's custody and, with the
help of Williams, hid them for a period of weeks by moving them
from hotel to hotel.
According to the testimony of clinical psychologist
Dr. Brian Wald, neither Williams nor Davis had the emotional
resources to handle stress caused by the child's placement with
them, or to provide the care needed by the child. Davis had a
negative sense of self and was less sensitive to the needs of
others, in part due to a lack of social maturity. Williams also
was socially immature, was focused on herself, and was
emotionally needy. Neither woman ever acknowledged that the
child had been at risk at the time she was taken into foster
care.
The evidence demonstrated that the child's best interests
would not be served by placement with her paternal relatives. In
foster care, the child had progressed to the point where she no
longer needed special education. When placed in the care of
these relatives prior to her removal, the child was, at a
minimum, poorly supervised. The evidence also showed that the
child suffered an emotional and psychological relapse following
her temporary placement in Davis' home in June 1994. In fact,
the child suffered parental alienation syndrome resulting from
Davis' attempts to turn the child against her foster parents.
5
The child was emotionally fragile. Both Dr. Wald and Raymond
McCoy, a licensed clinical social worker, opined that removing
the child from her foster home could result in her regression and
mental decompensation to the point of psychosis.
While social worker Valerie Rowles found Davis' home to be
appropriate for the child's placement, Rowles acknowledged that
she did not know the extent of the domestic abuse Davis had
suffered at the hands of her estranged husband. The trial court
was entitled to weigh Rowles' recommendations in light of the
other evidence presented at the hearing.
The trial court found that the Department had proven, by
clear and convincing evidence, the elements of Code
§ 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). That finding is not plainly wrong and
is supported by the evidence. The evidence also demonstrated
conclusively that the Department actively considered,
interviewed, and evaluated possible placement with family
members, as required by Code § 16.1-283(A). We find no error in
the trial court's decision not to place the child with father's
relatives.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
6