COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
LYNDA L. GALLIGAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1406-97-4 PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 9, 1997
WILLIAM P. GALLIGAN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Richard B. Potter, Judge
(Lynda L. Galligan, pro se, on brief).
No brief for appellee.
In this domestic relations matter, Lynda L. Galligan appeals
from the decision of the circuit court on issues related to the
distribution of property. She contends that the trial judge
erred by (1) denying her motion to recover from William P.
Galligan, her husband, the rental value of the former marital
residence for the period after entry of the final decree of
divorce until foreclosure on the property; (2) ruling that the
April 23, 1996 decree of divorce was a final order; (3) failing
to value all marital assets; and (4) failing to find husband
guilty of contempt. Upon reviewing the record and opening brief,
we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule
5A:27.
The parties were divorced by decree entered April 23, 1996.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
The decree stated that neither party sought spousal support or a
share of retirement benefits, and the decree distributed the
parties' other property. The decree ordered wife to sell the
former marital residence and granted husband exclusive possession
of the residence with sole responsibility for the mortgage
payments. The decree further recited the following:
And this cause is continued for the purpose
of entering any additional orders necessary
to effectuate and enforce this order pursuant
to Section 20-107.3.K.
Both parties endorsed the decree without exceptions.
Fair Market Rent
Although the final decree of divorce awarded husband sole
possession of the residence, the final decree contained no
provision for the payment of rent. Cf. Gaynor v. Hird, 15 Va.
App. 379, 382, 424 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1992) (ruling that the wife
who shared mortgage expenses for former marital residence was due
rent from the husband who was in exclusive possession of
property). However, the husband was solely charged with paying
the mortgage. The wife noted no exceptions to the decree, and
the record does not support her contention on appeal that she
objected to the award. Because the husband was charged with the
financial obligation of the mortgage, we cannot say that the
trial judge erred in refusing to hold the husband liable to the
wife for the payment of rent.
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Final Decree
The wife contends that the trial judge erred in finding that
his April 23, 1996 decree was a final order. We disagree. The
wife noted no exceptions to the decree at the time it was entered
and did not seek to modify or appeal the decree. The trial judge
could modify the decree only within twenty-one days of its entry.
See Rule 1:1 ("[A]ll final judgments, orders, and decrees,
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of
the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated or suspended
for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.").
Although the trial judge retained authority pursuant to Code
§ 20-107.3(K) to enter further orders to implement the sale of
the marital residence, this authority did not affect the finality
of the decree as to matters resolved in the decree and to which
the parties preserved no objections.
Valuing Marital Assets
The wife also contends that the trial judge erred in his
April 23, 1996 decree by failing to value all of the marital
assets. The wife waived her right to challenge provisions of the
April 23, 1996 order by failing to preserve any objections at the
time the order was entered. See Rule 5A:18 ("[N]o ruling of the
trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal
unless the objection was stated together with the grounds
therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown
or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of
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justice."). Thus, the wife is barred from challenging on appeal
aspects of the equitable distribution decision to which she did
not object. Moreover, she has not demonstrated grounds
sufficient to justify review under either the good cause or ends
of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18.
Contempt
The wife contends that the trial judge erred by failing to
find the husband in contempt for his failure to pay the mortgage
prior to foreclosure. However, the wife made no argument
supporting this contention. "Statements unsupported by argument,
authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate
consideration. We will not search the record for errors in order
to interpret the appellant's contention and correct deficiencies
in a brief." Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415
S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Therefore, we do not address this issue.
Accordingly, the decision is summarily affirmed.
Affirmed.
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