COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
CAROLINE SJOBLOM
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0204-97-4 PER CURIAM
JULY 29, 1997
THOMAS SJOBLOM
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge
(Ilona Ely (Freedman) Grenadier; Benton S.
Duffett, III; Grenadier, Davis & Simpson, on
brief), for appellant.
(James Ray Cottrell; Christopher W.
Schinstock; Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, on
brief), for appellee.
Caroline Sjoblom (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit
court ordering Thomas Sjoblom (husband) to pay $50,000 in a lump
sum spousal support and $3,000 in attorney's fees. Wife contends
that the trial court erred by (1) failing to award permanent
periodic spousal support; (2) awarding only $50,000 in lump sum
support; (3) requiring wife to show a change in circumstances at
the expiration of the lump sum award to receive periodic spousal
support; and (4) awarding insufficient attorney's fees in light
of the parties' circumstances and conduct during litigation. By
way of cross-error, husband contends the trial court erred by
denying him the right to discover evidence of wife's prior
marriages and, possibly, prior deceptive practices. Upon
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that
this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm
the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
I.
Based upon the evidence presented by the parties, including
the parties' large accumulation of debt in the course of a
four-year marriage, the trial court ruled that the circumstances
warranted the award to wife of $50,000 in lump sum spousal
support, paid at the rate of $1,250 two times a month. The court
reviewed the statutory factors set out in Code § 20-107.1,
including the parties' financial needs, earning capacities,
health, and the inflated standard of living established during
the marriage.
In awarding spousal support, the chancellor
must consider the relative needs and
abilities of the parties. He is guided by
the nine factors that are set forth in Code
§ 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given
due consideration to these factors, his
determination will not be disturbed on appeal
except for a clear abuse of discretion.
Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829
(1986).
Based in part on wife's health problems and her expressed
desire to enter the design field despite her current lack of
training, the court determined that wife needed "an assured
source of financial support, not subject to modification." The
court adequately considered the statutory factors prior to
reaching this determination, which is supported by the evidence.
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We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's lump sum
spousal support award.
II.
Wife claims that the lump sum award is inadequate to meet
her immediate or foreseeable future needs and that the only
appropriate form of support for her is permanent periodic
payments. As noted above, the court did not err in awarding wife
a lump sum award assuring her undiminished payments for a set
period of time.
Moreover, we find no evidence that the awarded amount was
erroneous. The court balanced husband's ability to pay against
wife's needs. See Floyd v. Floyd, 1 Va. App. 42, 45, 333 S.E.2d
364, 366 (1985). Husband's gross monthly earnings were
approximately $7,977. The court stated that "[husband] has more
earning capacity [than wife] but he is not a bottomless well."
The trial court required husband to pay $16,585, or two-thirds,
of the parties' marital debt. Wife never held steady employment
during the marriage and had no employment at the time of the
hearing. Wife listed monthly expenses of $5,500. The court
noted that the parties spent wife's medical malpractice
settlement award of $263,000 in a little over a year, that both
parties spent money recklessly, and that wife "bears equal if not
more responsibility for the running up of debt." We cannot say
the trial court's award of $50,000, payable at the rate of $2,500
per month, was erroneous.
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III.
Wife also contends that the trial court erred in restricting
her right to receive additional support until the completion of
the lump sum payout and in requiring her to then show a change in
circumstances. The court's letter opinion provided that
"[b]ecause of the intrinsic elements of uncertainty in making a
lump sum award, the Court will also reserve the right of [wife]
to receive additional spousal support at the expiration of the
above award in the event of a change in circumstances." Thus,
the order is a reservation to wife of the right to additional
support if it is warranted after the final payment of the lump
sum support award. See Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676,
681, 406 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1991); Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1,
6, 389 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1990).
Wife herself argues that there is no way to know the period
for which she will need support. The court's award assures her a
steady stream of income for a set period of time, and provides
for the possibility she may receive additional support if needed
beyond that time. The lump sum also addresses husband's need for
stability as he establishes improved financial footing.
Therefore, we find no error.
IV.
An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va.
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App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper
award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the
circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277,
338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985).
Wife incurred $62,000 in attorney's fees and expenses, and
husband incurred at least $40,000. The court noted that "[b]oth
parties over-litigated this case," that wife "incurred some
[$]37,000.00 of expenses for a forensic accountant who did not
testify," and that both parties "share at least equal
responsibility for such remarkable attorneys fees." Recognizing
that husband had the greater ability to pay, the court ordered
him to pay $3,000 of wife's fees. We cannot say that the award
was unreasonable or that the trial judge abused his discretion in
making the award.
V.
We find no reversible error in the trial court's decision to
limit husband's discovery. The sole issues remaining at trial
were spousal support, equitable distribution and attorney's fees,
as the parties agreed to a one-year separation as the basis for
their divorce. The court allowed husband to introduce evidence
relevant to wife's credibility, including that wife had been
married at least six times but did not disclose the actual number
of her previous marriages to husband. The parties also
introduced financial information concerning the assets wife
brought into the marriage and her past work experience. Husband
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sought to explore wife's alleged wrongdoing in previous
marriages. We cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion when it required husband to limit his discovery to
matters relevant to the outstanding property-related issues of
the parties' marriage.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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