COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Salem, Virginia
JOHNNY WAYNE LAFORCE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1557-96-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
MAY 6, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKENSON COUNTY
Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge
Joe H. Short for appellant.
Thomas D. Bagwell, Senior Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Johnny Wayne LaForce (defendant) was convicted by a jury for
possession of a firearm by a felon and maliciously shooting at an
occupied vehicle. On appeal, defendant complains that the trial
court erroneously (1) permitted the Commonwealth to introduce
eight prior felony convictions as evidence of the single
conviction requisite to the possession offense, and (2) found the
evidence sufficient to support the malicious shooting charge. We
disagree and affirm the trial court.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
ADMISSIBILITY OF MORE THAN ONE PRIOR CONVICTION
A conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 requires
proof that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed a
firearm while a convicted felon. Although evidence of other
crimes generally is inadmissible in the guilt phase of a criminal
prosecution, such evidence is "properly received if it is
relevant and probative of an issue on trial, such as an element
of the offense charged." Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App.
33, 35, 434 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1993). Thus, defendant's prior
felony record was necessary and admissible evidence incidental to
prosecution of the instant possession offense.
In Pittman, the accused had been indicted for "a third or
subsequent offense" of larceny in violation of former Code
§ 18.2-104(b), and the Commonwealth was permitted to prove six
prior predicate convictions. 17 Va. App. at 34, 434 S.E.2d at
695. In approving such evidence, we noted that "the Commonwealth
was not obliged to have faith that the jury would be satisfied
with any particular one or more of the items of proof.
Therefore, it was entitled to utilize its entire arsenal," and
defendant could not "limit the Commonwealth's right to prove its
case" by a stipulation. Id. at 35-36, 434 S.E.2d at 696.
Defendant insists that Pittman is distinguishable because
the statute then at issue required proof of "a third[] or any
subsequent offense," id. at 34, 434 S.E.2d at 695, while the
instant statute necessitated proof only of a single prior
- 2 -
violation. However, when tested by our reasoning in Pittman,
this argument relies upon a distinction without a difference.
Defendant's contention that the bifurcated procedure in felony
trials precludes introduction of prior convictions in the guilt
phase is also without merit. See Berry v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.
App. 209, 213-14, 468 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1996); Farmer v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 175, 179-80, 390 S.E.2d 775, 776-77
(1990), aff'd on reh'g, 12 Va. App. 337, 404 S.E.2d 371 (1991)
(en banc).
The trial court, therefore, correctly allowed the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the multiple convictions as
proof of an element of the instant offense.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE CHARGE OF
SHOOTING AT AN OCCUPIED VEHICLE
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176,
366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). The jury's verdict will not be
disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
See id. The credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are
matters solely for the fact finder's determination. See Long v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
Here, defendant had repeatedly threatened to kill Teresa
Jessie and was angered when Jessie and Jeanette Neece refused to
- 3 -
stay overnight at his home. Later, while driving Jessie's car,
Neece observed defendant walking along the road, with a "gun down
by his side." She had seen defendant with a "black pistol"
earlier in the day and "just panicked" and stopped the car. When
defendant "pointed [the gun] . . . right between her eyes," she
"mash[ed] the gas . . . to the floor," sped away, and "shots went
to firing."
Neece proceeded directly to Trooper Jessee's nearby home.
Jessee had also heard gunshots and was "just leaving his home" to
investigate when he encountered the two women, "very frightened.
Distraught." Teresa Jessie "grabbed [Trooper Jessee] around
[his] legs at the ankle[s]" and said, "Help us! . . . [Johnny
LaForce is] going to kill us." Trooper Jessee's inspection of
the vehicle revealed a "perfectly circumferenced" indentation on
the rear bumper which he attributed to a bullet from a handgun.
Defendant denied involvement in the shooting, but admitted
subsequent flight and hiding from police, conduct suggestive of
guilt. See, e.g., Schlimme v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 15, 18,
427 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1993).
Thus, notwithstanding conflicts in the evidence, the fact
finder found sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the
offense, a conclusion with ample support in the record.
Accordingly, we affirm both convictions.
Affirmed.
- 4 -