IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE January 28, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
RHONDA G. GOLEY, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9809-CV-00293
)
Plaintiff-A ppellant, ) KNOX CIRCU IT
)
v. ) HON. DALE WORKMAN,
) JUDGE
AND REW J. B ROYL ES, II, )
) REVERSED AND
Defendant-Appellee. ) REMANDED
FARRELL A . LEVY, McDON ALD, LEVY & TAYLOR , Knoxville, for Plaintiff-
Appellan t.
JAMES S. MacDO NALD, DUN N, MacDONA LD & COL EMAN, P.C., Knoxville,
for Defendant-Appellee.
O P I N IO N
Franks, J.
This appeal arises from an automobile accident that occurred on October
8, 1996. Plaintiff Rhonda Goley filed suit against defendant Andrew Broyles on
Septemb er 23, 1997 . Process w as issued the next day. At th e time of the accident,
Goley had an insurance policy with defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance
Company that provided uninsured motorist coverage. Goley’s attorney mailed a copy
of the complaint to State Farm on September 22, 1997.
Goley later learned that Broyles was uninsured. A summons was issued
to State Farm on Jan uary 12, 1998, and served on January 21, 1998. S tate Farm
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the one-year statute of limitations barred
Goley’s claim. The Trial Judge agreed, and granted the motion. The Trial Court erred
in dismissing the action, because, in our view, plaintiff complied with T.C.A. §56-7-
1206( a).
State Farm contends it was not properly served with process, and that
the statute of limitations bars this claim, since the statute of limitations for personal
injuries is one year from the date of the injury. T.C.A. §28-3-104(a)(1). T.C.A.
§56-7-1206(a) addresses the procedure for claims against uninsured motorist carriers:
Any insured intending to rely on the cov erage requ ired by this part sh all,
if any action is instituted against the owner and operator of an uninsured
vehicle, serve a copy of the process upon the insurance company issuing
the policy in the manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance
compan y were a party de fendant.
Neither pa rty cites any reported Tenness ee case dire ctly addressing th is
issue, and our research has revealed none.1
The Virginia Supreme Court has faced the issue before us in Glenn
Falls Ins. Co. V. Stephenson, 367 S.E.2d 722 (Va. 1988). The Virginia Court relied
upon statutory language identical to T.C.A. §56-7-1206:
The phra se “in the m anner pres cribed by law ” modifie s the word s “shall
serve,” indicating a clear legislative intent to limit the requirement to the
manner of service of process, specifically described elsewhere in the
Code. Nowhere in the language of [the statute] do we find any mention
of a time period w ithin which service is to be m ade. If the legislature
had intend ed to create a limitation of tim e for such service, we think it
would have done so in explicit language . . . [A] plaintiff in a personal
injury case may not discover that the tortfeasor is uninsured or
underinsured (as in this case) until after the tortfeasor has been served
with process, which may occur at a time after the statute of limitations
has run.
Id. at 724.
This re asonin g is pers uasive . See also 7A Am.Jur.2d Autom obile
Insurance §589 (citing Glenn F alls and noting that the insured “need not serve the
1
The unreported case of Robbins v. City of Chattanooga, (Tenn. App. Filed Jan. 29, 1995,
Knoxville), determined that a plaintiff’s failure to serve process on the uninsured carrier within the
one-year statute of limitations was not fatal.
2
insurer before the expiration of the limitations period against the tortfeasor, provided
the tortfeasor was sued before the expiration of such limitations period.”)
We reverse the summary judgment in favor of State Farm and remand
with cost of the cause assessed to appellee.
__________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________
Don T. McM urray, J.
___________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
3