Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 14, 2005
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a Legally
Incapacitated Adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CORRIGAN, J.
In this case, we consider whether the no-fault act,
MCL 500.3101 et seq., requires defendant, a no-fault
insurer, to reimburse plaintiff for her incapacitated
husband’s food expenses. Because the food in this case is
neither “for accidental bodily injury” under MCL
500.3105(1) nor “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), we hold that the
expenses for it may not be recovered under those provisions
of the no-fault act. We thus reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 28, 1994, plaintiff’s sixty-three-year-old
husband, Douglas Griffith,1 suffered a severe brain injury
as a result of a motor vehicle accident. He received
treatment at in-patient facilities and hospitals until
August 1995, at which time he was transferred to a
residence where he received twenty-four-hour nursing and
attendant care. On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned home
with plaintiff. He remains confined to a wheelchair and
continues to require assistance with basic daily tasks such
as eating and bathing.
After the accident, defendant provided coverage as
Griffith’s no-fault insurer. Until the time that Griffith
returned home, the expenses that defendant covered included
food expenses. After Griffith returned home, defendant
denied plaintiff’s claim for Griffith’s food expenses, and
plaintiff sued to recoup those expenses.2 The trial court
ruled that Griffith’s food costs are an “allowable expense”
1
This opinion references Douglas Griffith as
“Griffith” and Phyllis Griffith as “plaintiff.”
2
Plaintiff’s complaint included claims for items other
than Griffith’s food, but those claims are not at issue in
this appeal.
2
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act and ordered
defendant to pay a per diem food charge.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.3 The Court relied on
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499
NW2d 22 (1993), which held that a person receiving at-home
care is entitled to room and board costs under MCL
500.3107(1)(a) to the same extent that such costs would
constitute an allowable expense if the injured person
received the same care in an institutional setting. Thus,
the panel concluded that, under Reed, Griffith’s food costs
are an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to
this Court, which this Court denied.4 Thereafter, this
Court granted defendant’s motion for reconsideration and
granted leave to appeal.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case requires us to determine whether an injured
person’s food costs constitute an “allowable expense” under
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued August 16, 2002 (Docket No. 232517).
4
468 Mich 946 (2003).
5
469 Mich 1020 (2004).
3
questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Jenkins
v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 NW2d 346 (2004).
III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the
legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the
statutory language itself. Sotelo v Grant Twp, 470 Mich
95, 100; 680 NW2d 381 (2004). When the language of a
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature’s intent is clear
and judicial construction is neither necessary nor
permitted. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304,
312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Because the role of the judiciary
is to interpret rather than write the law, courts lack
authority to venture beyond a statute’s unambiguous text.
Id. Further, we accord undefined statutory terms their
plain and ordinary meanings and may consult dictionary
definitions in such situations. Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich
572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Language and Legal Background
MCL 500.3105(1) provides:
Under personal protection insurance an
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter. [Emphasis added.]
4
According to the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1), a no
fault insurer is only required to pay benefits “for
accidental bodily injury” arising out of an automobile
accident. The no-fault act further restricts a no-fault
insurer’s liability by defining the limited types of
benefits that are payable “for accidental bodily injury
. . . .” MCL 500.3107(1)(a), the statutory provision at
the center of this case, states:
Except as provided in subsection (2),
personal protection insurance benefits are
payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all
reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, in addition to the requirement under MCL 500.3105(1)
that benefits be “for accidental bodily injury,” MCL
500.3107(1)(a) circumscribes benefits to those expenses
consisting only of items or services that are reasonably
necessary “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.”
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have
interpreted and applied the above statutes in cases
involving claims for food or “room and board” expenses. In
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 127 Mich
App 444, 448; 339 NW2d 205 (1983), rev’d 425 Mich 140
(1986), the plaintiffs’ minor son suffered severe head
5
trauma in an automobile accident. He resided with the
plaintiffs and received care from nurse’s aides. Id. at
449. The plaintiffs sued the defendant no-fault carrier,
seeking, among other things, reimbursement for his room and
board costs. Id. at 448-449. The defendant insurance
carrier argued that because the plaintiffs already had a
legal duty to care for their child, room and board costs
were not compensable. Id. at 451. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, largely on the basis of a worker’s
compensation case that distinguished between “ordinary
household tasks” such as cleaning and washing clothes and
nonordinary tasks such as “‘[s]erving meals in bed and
bathing, dressing, and escorting a disabled person
. . . .’” Id. at 452, quoting Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co,
394 Mich 69; 228 NW2d 205 (1975).
The panel concluded that the distinction between
ordinary and nonordinary tasks could be reconciled with the
language of MCL 500.3107(a), which then provided that
“products, services, and accommodations not reasonably
necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation are not ‘allowable expenses.’” 127 Mich App
at 453. The Court reasoned:
The necessity for the performance of
ordinary household tasks has nothing to do with
the injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation; such tasks must be performed
whether or not anyone is injured.
6
This reasoning supports a generalization
concerning the circumstances in which a product,
service, or accommodation can fall within the
definition of “allowable expense.” Products,
services, or accommodations which are as
necessary for an uninjured person as for an
injured person are not “allowable expenses.”
[Id. at 453-454 (emphasis added).]
The panel then opined that food “is as necessary for an
uninjured person as for an injured person” and thus would
not ordinarily constitute an “allowable expense” under MCL
500.3107 for an injured person cared for at home. 127 Mich
App at 454.
When Manley was appealed to this Court, we effectively
vacated the Court of Appeals room and board analysis.
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 425 Mich
140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986). We stated that the “question
whether food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other such
maintenance expenses are an allowable expense when the
injured person is cared for at home” had neither been
raised before the trial court nor argued in the Court of
Appeals. Id. at 152. Accordingly, this Court declined to
address the issue and stated that the Court of Appeals
analysis of the issue “shall not be regarded as of
precedential force or effect.” Id. at 153.
Justice Boyle issued a concurring and dissenting
opinion, asserting that the room and board issue was
properly before this Court because the Court of Appeals had
7
raised it sua sponte and discussed the issue in its
opinion. Id. at 168 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). She could find “no principled basis”
for distinguishing between food provided in an
institutional setting and food provided at home, and
concluded that the Court of Appeals “injured person vs.
uninjured person” test was not only “unwieldy and
unworkable” but that it effectively punished those who
choose to care for injured family members at home. Id. at
168-169. Justice Boyle opined that MCL 500.3107 imposes
three requirements for “allowable expenses”: “1) the charge
must be reasonable, 2) the expense must be reasonably
necessary, and 3) the expense must be incurred.” 425 Mich
at 169.
Thereafter, in Reed, the Court of Appeals adopted
Justice Boyle’s Manley analysis. The insured in Reed had
been severely injured in an auto accident. Reed, supra at
445. The plaintiff, the insured’s mother, filed various
claims against the defendant insurer and moved to amend her
complaint to include a claim for room and board expenses.
Id. at 445-446. The trial court denied the motion on the
basis that such expenses were not recoverable under the no
fault act. Id. at 446.
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:
8
We see no compelling reason not to afford
the same compensation under the act to family
members who provide room and board. Subsection
1(a) does not distinguish between accommodations
provided by family members and accommodations
provided by institutions, and we decline to read
such a distinction into the act. Moreover,
holding that accommodations provided by family
members is [sic] an “allowable expense” is in
accord with the policy of this state. Denying
compensation for family-provided accommodations
while allowing compensation in an institutional
setting would discourage home care that is
generally, we believe, less costly than
institutional care. Irrespective of cost
considerations, it can be stated without
hesitation that home care is more personal than
that given in a clinical setting. . . .
We hold that, where an injured person is
unable to care for himself and would be
institutionalized were a family member not
willing to provide home care, a no-fault insurer
is liable to pay the cost of maintenance in the
home. [Id. at 452-453 (citations omitted;
emphasis added).]
In addition to the above reasoning, the Court of Appeals
relied on the notion that because the no-fault act is
remedial in nature, it “must be liberally construed in
favor of persons intended to benefit thereby.” Id. at 451.
B. Interpretation of Statutory Language and
Application
As previously stated, MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL
500.3107(1)(a) impose two separate and distinct
requirements for “care, recovery, or rehabilitation”
expenses to be compensable under the no-fault act. First,
such expenses must be “for accidental bodily injury arising
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a
9
motor vehicle . . . .” MCL 500.3105(1) (emphasis added).
Second, these expenses must be “reasonably necessary . . .
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Defendant contends that MCL 500.3105(1) requires that
allowable expenses be causally connected to a person’s
injury. We agree. In fact, MCL 500.3105(1) imposes two
causation requirements for no-fault benefits.
First, an insurer is liable only if benefits are “for
accidental bodily injury . . . .” “[F]or” implies a causal
connection.6 “[A]ccidental bodily injury” therefore
triggers an insurer’s liability and defines the scope of
that liability. Accordingly, a no-fault insurer is liable
to pay benefits only to the extent that the claimed
benefits are causally connected to the accidental bodily
injury arising out of an automobile accident.
Second, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for
accidental bodily injury only if those injuries “aris[e]
out of” or are caused by “the ownership, operation,
6
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997)
defines “for,” when used as a preposition, as “with the
object or purpose of,” “intended to belong to or be used in
connection with,” or “suiting the purposes or needs of.”
The definition offered by Justice Kelly—“‘by reason of’”—
also implies a causal connection. See post at 5.
(Citation omitted.)
10
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . .” It is not
any bodily injury that triggers an insurer’s liability
under the no-fault act. Rather, it is only those injuries
that are caused by the insured’s use of a motor vehicle.
In this case, it is uncontested that the insured’s
injuries arose out of his use of an automobile. Therefore,
to the extent that the insured’s injuries stem from an
automobile accident, application of the second causal
element noted above does not bar plaintiff’s claim.
The first causal element, however, poses a problem for
plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim that her husband’s
diet is different from that of an uninjured person, that
his food expenses are part of his treatment plan, or that
these costs are related in any way to his injuries. She
claims instead that Griffith’s insurer is liable for
ordinary, everyday food expenses. As such, plaintiff has
not established that these expenses are “for accidental
bodily injury . . . .”7
7
Our dissenting colleagues fail to explain how they
avoid the causation requirement in MCL 500.3105(1). As we
will explain, because plaintiff is not on a special diet,
his food expenses are not “for accidental bodily injury,”
and those expenses therefore are not recoverable in this
case. It is therefore not surprising that our dissenting
colleagues avoid developing their analysis of MCL
500.3105(1), because their position is plainly inconsistent
with the unambiguous language of that provision.
11
Even if ordinary food expenses were compensable under
§ 3105, an insurer would be liable for those expenses only
if they were also “allowable expenses” under MCL
500.3107(1)(a). This section provides that benefits are
payable for “reasonably necessary products, services and
accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.” In other words, an insurer is liable only
for the cost of “products, services and accommodations”
“reasonably necessary” “for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.”8
There is no dispute that Griffith is an “injured
person.” Thus, the question is whether food is reasonably
necessary for his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” as an
injured person. It is not contended here that the food
expenses at issue are a part of the insured’s “recovery” or
“rehabilitation.” Indeed, plaintiff does not allege that
the food has special curative properties that might advance
Griffith's recovery or rehabilitation. The key issue,
8
In her concurring and dissenting opinion in Manley,
Justice Boyle read MCL 500.3107(1)(a) as imposing only
three requirements: “1) the charge must be reasonable, 2)
the expense must be reasonably necessary, and 3) the
expense must be incurred.” 425 Mich at 169 (Boyle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to
these requirements, however, the statute states that an
“allowable expense” must be “for” one of the following: (1)
an injured person’s care, (2) his recovery, or (3) his
rehabilitation.
12
therefore, is whether the food expenses are necessary for
Griffith’s “care.”
Because “care” can have several meanings depending on
the context in which it is used, the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis is helpful in discerning the meaning of that term in
this statute. This doctrine is premised on the notion that
“the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends
on context.” King v St Vincent’s Hosp, 502 US 215, 221;
112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed 2d 578 (1991).9 Thus, under the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “‘“a word or phrase is given
meaning by its context or setting.”’” Koontz, supra at 318
(citations omitted). As a general matter, “words and
clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and
those which follow.” Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342
Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d 757 (1955). When construing a
series of terms such as “care, recovery, or
rehabilitation,” we are guided by the principle “that words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning.” Third
Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432 US 312, 322;
97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
9
See Koontz, supra at 318, quoting Brown v Genesee Co
Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430, 437; 628 NW2d
471 (2001), quoting Tyler v Livonia Schools, 459 Mich 382,
390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999) (“‘Contextual understanding of
statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur
a sociis: “[i]t is known from its associates,” see Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060.’”).
13
Generally, “care” means “protection; charge,” and
“to make provision.” Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (2001). Thus, taken in isolation, the word
“care” can be broadly construed to encompass anything that
is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person’s
protection or charge. But we have consistently held that
“[c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and
clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would
render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich
142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). Therefore, we must neither
read “care” so broadly as to render nugatory “recovery and
rehabilitation” nor construe “care” so narrowly that the
term is mere surplusage.10 “Care” must have a meaning that
is related to, but distinct from, “recovery and
rehabilitation.”11
10
Our dissenting colleagues make the former error,
construing “care” so broadly that “recovery and
rehabilitation” are mere surplusage. If “care” means, as
Justice Kelly contends, “‘the provision of what is
necessary for the welfare and protection of someone,’” post
at 8, then “recovery and rehabilitation”—both of which are
certainly necessary for an injured person’s welfare—are
stripped of any meaning.
11
See Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed, 2000
rev), § 47.16, pp 265-267 (“[W]hen two or more words are
grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning,
but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be
limited and qualified by the special word.”
14
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the
statute does not require compensation for any item that is
reasonably necessary to a person’s care in general.
Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to
charges for products or services that are reasonably
necessary “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) This context suggests
that “care” must be related to the insured’s injuries.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
statute lists “care” together with “recovery” and
“rehabilitation.” “Recovery” is defined as “restoration or
return to any former and better condition, esp. to health
from sickness, injury, addiction, etc.” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). “Rehabilitate” is
defined as “to restore or bring to a condition of good
health, ability to work, or productive activity.” Id.
Both terms refer to restoring an injured person to the
condition he was in before sustaining his injuries.
Consequently, expenses for “recovery” or “rehabilitation”
are costs expended in order to bring an insured to a
condition of health or ability sufficient to resume his
preinjury life. Because “recovery” and “rehabilitation”
are necessary only when an insured has been injured, both
terms refer to products, services, and accommodations that
15
are necessary because of injuries sustained through the use
of a motor vehicle.
“Care” must have a meaning that is broader than
“recovery” and “rehabilitation” but is not so broad as to
render those terms nugatory. As noted above, both
“recovery” and “rehabilitation” refer to an underlying
injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an
“injured person.” It follows that the Legislature intended
to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those
products, services, or accommodations whose provision is
necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle
accident.12 “Care” is broader than “recovery” and
“rehabilitation” because it may encompass expenses for
products, services, and accommodations that are necessary
because of the accident but that may not restore a person
to his preinjury state.
12
For instance, the cost associated with setting a
broken leg would be compensable under the term “recovery”
because it is necessary to return a person to his post
injury health, and the cost of learning to walk on a
prosthetic leg would be recoverable under the term
“rehabilitation” because it is necessary to bring the
person back to a condition of productive activity.
Similarly, the cost of such items as a prosthetic leg or
special shoes would be recoverable under the term “care,”
even though the person will never recover or be
rehabilitated from the injuries, because the cost
associated with such products or accommodations stems from
the injury.
16
Griffith’s food costs here are not related to his
“care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” There has been no
evidence introduced that he now requires different food
than he did before sustaining his injuries as part of his
treatment plan. While such expenses are no doubt necessary
for his survival, they are not necessary for his recovery
or rehabilitation from the injuries suffered in the
accident, nor are they necessary for his care because of
the injuries he sustained in the accident. Unlike
prescription medications or nursing care, the food that
Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance
rather than a treatment for his “care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.” In fact, if Griffith had never sustained,
or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary
needs would be no different than they are now. We
conclude, therefore, that his food costs are completely
unrelated to his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” and
are not “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).13
13
Our dissenting colleagues do not pay sufficient
regard to the context in which the word “care” is used in
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). They do not give effect to the
Legislature’s choice to use the term “care” in conjunction
with the terms “recovery” and “rehabilitation.” They also
fail to give effect to the statute’s specific reference to
“an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
As we have explained, this contextual background aids our
effort to discern the meaning of the term “care” as used in
the statute.
Footnotes continued on following page.
17
The parties focus on the distinction between food
costs for hospital food and food costs for an insured
Our dissenting colleagues would instead read the word
“care” in a vacuum, thereby allowing them to impose their
preferred meaning without attempting to discern the context
in which the Legislature used the term. Our dissenting
colleagues’ failure to read the word “care” in context
renders the word devoid of any definitional limit. Let
there be no mistake—the implication of their interpretation
is that any expense that is necessary for a person’s
general “care” is recoverable, regardless of whether that
expense bears any causal relationship to an “accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle
. . . .” MCL 500.3105(1). Because they would allow a
plaintiff to recover expenses for normal, everyday food
consumed at home that does not differ from what an
uninjured person would eat, would they also allow recovery
of housing costs and expenses for clothing and toiletries,
where those expenses do not bear any causal relationship to
an accidental bodily injury? Justice Kelly seems to
concede that she would require no-fault insurers to pay for
an injured person’s “shelter” where that expense bears no
causal relation to the injuries. Post at 15.
It thus appears that Justice Kelly would essentially
invent a new entitlement system by converting our no-fault
law into a general welfare scheme. Her new scheme would
pay all expenses of everyday life, such as mortgage
payments and grocery bills, for anyone who has been injured
in a motor vehicle accident, even where those expenses do
not arise from injuries sustained in the accident. Justice
Kelly does not explain how she would pay for her newly
minted entitlement plan, but the effect of her position
would be to force Michigan citizens to make these general
welfare payments through increased mandatory insurance
premiums. Perhaps Justice Kelly sincerely believes that
our state’s citizens should bear this new financial burden,
but such a policy choice belongs to the legislative branch
of our government. In deciding the case before us, we must
honor the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the
current language of the no-fault act by applying the
causation requirement embodied in the provisions at issue.
18
receiving at-home care. Plaintiff contends that there is
no distinction between such costs. We disagree.
Food costs in an institutional setting are “benefits
for accidental bodily injury” and are “reasonably necessary
products, services and accommodations for an injured
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” That is, it
is “reasonably necessary” for an insured to consume
hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited
dining options available. Although an injured person would
need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would
not need to eat that particular food or bear the cost
associated with it. Thus, hospital food is analogous to a
type of special diet or select diet necessary for an
injured person’s recovery. Because an insured in an
institutional setting is required to eat “hospital food,”
such food costs are necessary for an insured’s “care,
recovery, or rehabilitation” while in such a setting. Once
an injured person leaves the institutional setting,
however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he
would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer
required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part
of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment.14
14
Our dissenting colleagues opine that the language of
the no-fault act does not distinguish between food expenses
Footnotes continued on following page.
19
This reasoning can be taken a step further when
considering the costs of items such as an injured person’s
clothing, toiletries, and even housing costs. Under
plaintiff’s reasoning, because a hospital provided Griffith
with clothing while he was institutionalized, defendant
incurred in a hospital and food expenses at home. As we
have explained, however, we believe this distinction arises
from the language in MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL
500.3107(1)(a). Food expenses in an institutional setting
are “benefits for accidental bodily injury,” and are
“reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation,”
given the limited dining options available in hospitals.
After all, an injured person is required to eat hospital
food precisely because his injuries require treatment in a
hospital. By contrast, a person who eats a normal diet at
home does not incur food expenses that meet the
requirements of MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Justice Kelly also asks whether the majority is
implying that hospital food expenses would be reimbursable
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), but not under MCL 500.3105(1).
We have stated clearly, however, that food costs in an
institutional setting are “benefits for accidental bodily
injury” and are “reasonably necessary products, services
and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery,
or rehabilitation.” See p 19 of this opinion. In other
words, we have quoted the language from both statutory
provisions in saying that such expenses are recoverable.
Finally, Justice Kelly expresses concerns about
allowing recovery for food expenses in a hospital but not
at home. It is the prerogative of the Legislature,
however, to determine whether the no-fault act should be
amended to allow recovery of food costs that are unrelated
to an accidental bodily injury, taking into account policy
concerns such as those expressed by Justice Kelly and
competing considerations such as the increased costs of
premiums for this mandatory form of insurance coverage.
This Court lacks both the institutional capacity to weigh
the competing policy considerations and the constitutional
authority to amend the no-fault act.
20
should continue to pay for Griffith’s clothing after he is
released. The same can be said of Griffith’s toiletry
necessities and housing costs. While Griffith was
institutionalized, defendant paid his housing costs.
Should defendant therefore be obligated to pay Griffith’s
housing payment now that he has been released when
Griffith’s housing needs have not been affected by his
injuries?
Under plaintiff’s reasoning, nothing would prevent no
fault insurers from being obligated to pay for any expenses
that an injured person would otherwise be provided in an
institutional setting as long as they are remotely related
to the person’s general care. Plaintiff’s interpretation
of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) stretches the language of the act too
far and, incidentally, would largely obliterate cost
containment for this mandatory coverage. We have always
been cognizant of this potential problem15 when interpreting
the no-fault act, and we are no less so today.
15
See, e.g., Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554,
607-611; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (“In choosing to make no-fault
insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has
made the registration and operation of a motor vehicle
inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is
available at fair and equitable rates.”); Cruz v State Farm
Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 597; 648 NW2d 591
(2002) (recognizing that, because no-fault coverage is
mandatory, the Legislature has continually sought to make
it more affordable); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins
Footnotes continued on following page.
21
Moreover, in seeking reimbursement for food and other
such quotidian expenses, plaintiff is essentially seeking a
wage-loss benefit. Reimbursement for the value of lost
wages, however, is specifically addressed elsewhere in the
no-fault act. See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).16 See also Popma v
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich 460, 463, 471; 521 NW2d 831
(1994). Plaintiff’s construction of § 3107(1)(a) is
strongly undermined by the Legislature’s express provision
for, and limitation on, wage-loss benefits in § 3107(1)(b).
Under MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a), defendant
is not required to reimburse plaintiff for the food
expenses at issue in this case. Such expenses are not
necessary “for accidental bodily injury” under MCL
500.3105. In addition, they are not “allowable expenses”
Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996) (“the no-fault
insurance system . . . is designed to provide victims with
assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the lowest
cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system”
[emphasis added]); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 404
Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (recognizing that the
Legislature had provided for setoffs in the no-fault act:
“Because the first-party insurance proposed by the act was
to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be
charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as
possible. Otherwise, the poor and the disadvantaged people
of the state might not be able to obtain the necessary
insurance.”).
16
This section provides, in part:
Work loss consisting of loss of income from
work an injured person would have performed
during the first 3 years after the date of the
accident if he or she had not been injured.
22
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because food is not necessary for
Griffith’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” under that
subsection. Because the rule announced in Reed, supra, is
contrary to the language of the above provisions, we
overrule the Court of Appeals decision in Reed.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that defendant is not required to
reimburse plaintiff for Griffith’s food costs under MCL
500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
23
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s holding that food
expenses for plaintiff’s incapacitated husband are not
“allowable expenses” for which plaintiff should be paid
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Rather, consistently with
Justice Boyle’s concurrence in Manley v Detroit Automobile
Inter-Ins Exch,1 and with the Court of Appeals opinion in
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America,2 I would conclude that
the reasonable charges incurred for plaintiff’s husband’s
food while he is cared for at home are recoverable as
1
425 Mich 140, 168-169; 388 NW2d 216 (1986)(Boyle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2
198 Mich App 443, 452-453; 499 NW2d 22 (1993).
“allowable expenses” under the statute. Therefore, I would
affirm the Court of Appeals decision in this case.
Under the statute, “allowable expenses” consist of
all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. [MCL 500.3107(1)(a).]
With this language, the Legislature provided a fairly broad
definition of “allowable expenses” to encompass all the
things that might reasonably be needed for an injured
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. As Justice
Kelly notes in her dissent, “[i]t is difficult to deny that
food is a product reasonably necessary for the care of an
invalid, however narrowly ‘care’ is defined. Without
nourishment, an injured person could not be restored to
health and could not properly be cared for.” Post at 9.
And, as stated by Justice Boyle, there is
no principled basis for deciding that food
provided to [the plaintiff’s husband] at home is
not as much an “allowable expense” as the food
provided in a licensed medical care facility.
Where a person who normally would require
institutional treatment is cared for at home in a
quasi-institutional setting made possible by the
love and dedication of the injured victim’s
family, the test for “allowable expenses” should
not differ from that set out in MCL 500.3107(a).
[Manley, supra at 168-169 (citations omitted).]
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the cost
of plaintiff’s husband’s food is recoverable as “allowable
2
expenses” under the no-fault act, and I would affirm the
Court of Appeals decision.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
3
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
Today the Court reaches the extraordinary conclusion
that food is not always necessary for an injured person's
care. The Court concludes that food is “completely
unrelated to [an injured person’s] ‘care, recovery, or
rehabilitation’” if provided in a home, although it is both
necessary and reimbursable if provided in an institution.
Ante at 8.
I disagree. The Court of Appeals decision that
reached the opposite conclusion twelve years ago, Reed v
Citizens Ins Co of America,1 was correct and should not be
1
198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993).
overturned. It is obvious to me that food should continue
to be an allowable expense under the no-fault act wherever
provided as long as reasonably necessary to an injured
person's care.
THE NO-FAULT ACT
We review issues of statutory construction de novo.
Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 696; 692 NW2d 376 (2004).
In construing statutes, our purpose is to determine and
implement the intent of the Legislature. Sanders v Delton
Kellogg Schools, 453 Mich 483, 487; 556 NW2d 467 (1996).
The act under review here was passed to provide
benefits for victims of motor vehicle accidents without
regard to who was at fault. Substituting for certain tort
remedies that it abolished, the act created a comprehensive
and expeditious benefit system through insurance. Shavers v
Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
This Court has determined that the Legislature intended the
no-fault act to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured.2 Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 28;
528 NW2d 681 (1995).
2
The majority’s decision today, taking food as it were
from the mouth of the injured insured convalescing at home,
is anything but a liberal construction in his favor.
2
MCL 500.3105(1)
In this case, Mr. Griffith was injured in an
automobile accident that rendered him unable to care for
himself. He remains injured. Therefore, without contest,
he satisfies the requirement of § 3105(1), and his insurer
must pay him benefits. The issue here involves the meaning
of “benefits.”
Section 3105(1) requires:
Under personal protection insurance an
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter.
On its face, this section requires an insurer to pay
benefits to its insured injured in a motor vehicle
accident. The Legislature took pains to define at a
different section of the statute what benefits must be
paid. MCL 500.3107(1)(a).3 As the majority observes, §
3
In pertinent part, MCL 500.3107 provides:
[P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are
payable for . . .
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all
reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services, and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. . . .
(b) Work loss . . . .
Footnotes continued on following page.
3
3107(1)(a) is “the statutory provision at the center of
this case.” Ante at 5. Because the Legislature defined
“benefits” in § 3107(1)(a), it seems contradictory that it
would have given “benefits” a different definition in §
3105(1).
Yet, the majority reads § 3105(1) to mean that the
only benefits that a no-fault insurer is liable to pay are
those “causally connected to the accidental bodily
injury . . . .” Ante at 10. It is not Mr. Griffith's
injury, it reasons, that occasioned his need for food.
Hence the cost of his food is not a covered expense.
The majority finds that § 3105 limits the benefits
made available in § 3107, despite the fact that the courts
have never before found such a limitation. The majority
defines “for” in the phrase “an insurer is liable to pay
benefits for accidental bodily injury” as meaning “‘with
the object or purpose of,’” “‘intended to belong to or be
used in connection with,’” and “‘suiting the purposes or
needs of.’” Ante at 10 n 6. (Citation omitted.) From that
it concludes that these definitions “imply” that the
benefit an injured party seeks must be directly caused by
(c) Expenses . . . reasonably incurred in
obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu
of those that, if he or she had not been injured,
an injured person would have performed . . . .
4
the injury. Not only is the majority’s reading of § 3105
novel and unprecedented, it flies in the face of our time
honored determination to liberally construe the no-fault
act for the benefit of the insured.
The word “for” in the English language has many
nuances in its meaning. I feel confident that the
Legislature added § 3107(1)(a) for the purpose of defining
“benefits” in § 3105. On the basis of that belief, I find
that the definition of “for” in § 3105 that best accords
with the Legislature’s intent is “by reason of.” Random
House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Hence, § 3105
should be read to mean that benefits are payable “by reason
of” accidental bodily injury.
Reading § 3105 in this way ensures that the only
limitations placed on “benefits” for an insured injured in
an auto accident are those clearly stated by the
Legislature in § 3107. My belief is that, if the
Legislature intended that the sole benefits payable for an
insured’s injury were those directly arising therefrom, it
would have said so. Also, it would not have required at §
3107 payment for so broad a category as “all reasonable
charges incurred for reasonably necessary products,
services and accommodations for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.”
5
Additionally, the majority’s reading of the act is
irrational. The majority believes that food provided in
the hospital qualifies as a benefit under the act.
However, under its reading of § 3105, food would be
excluded: the need for it does not arise from the injury.
The majority explains that, in an institution, one has
little choice what food is served. But it fails to explain
how that fact transforms hospital food into an expense
arising from an accident.
If the Legislature had intended, for example, that
ground beef be compensable only if no other entrée were
offered, it should have written something to make that
clear. The majority will search in vain for some
indication in the act that food, or any item, can qualify
for “benefits for an accidental bodily injury” if furnished
in the hospital but not at home. Absolutely nothing in
either § 3105 or § 3107 allows for that distinction.
The difficulty the majority has in providing a
convincing answer to this question illustrates the weakness
of its conclusion. Its reading of § 3105 is, at its
foundation, unsound. The majority criticizes my analysis
of § 3105(1) as inadequate and “undeveloped.” Ante at 12,
n 7. It would be inadequate only if I agreed with the
majority's choice to create two requirements where there is
6
only one in § 3105. I have taken my own analysis of §
3105(1) to its logical conclusion. It is not the same
analysis as the majority’s, but it is more faithful to the
text of the statute. Contrary to Justice Corrigan’s
belief, I have set forth a principled basis for my
analysis. It includes a plain-language reading of §§
3105(1) and 3107(1)(a).
MCL 500.3107(1)(a)
The majority finds that Douglas Griffith fails to
qualify not only under § 3105(1) but also under §
3107(1)(a). In construing § 3107(1)(a), first it goes to
the dictionary to interpret the meaning of “care.”
As is frequently the case, here a dictionary alone
does not clarify the Legislature's intent. “Care” has
several definitions. The majority chooses “protection” or
“charge” as the appropriate one. But the word can also be
defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the
welfare and protection of someone or something." Compact
Oxford English Dictionary.
It is clear that, when consulting a dictionary in
performance of the interpretative task, one is normally
required to make a choice among several definitions. It is
nothing less than a pretense to maintain that, in enforcing
7
a statute “as written,” a court does not make definitional
choices.
The language of § 3107(1)(a) is broad. Yet, the
majority ultimately limits the meaning of “care” to the
care needed for recovery and rehabilitation, ascribing to
it a restorative meaning. The logical consequence of using
this restrictive definition demonstrates that it is poorly
chosen. It reads “care” out of the sentence. Given that
“recovery and rehabilitation” are in the sentence with
“care,” the effect of the majority's choice of definitions
turns “care” into a mere redundancy. This approach
violates our obligation when interpreting statutes to try
to give every word meaning and treat no word as surplusage.
Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155
(1992).
My reading of the statute gives independent meaning to
the word “care.” Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
the meaning of questionable words may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of other words associated with it.
Applying this doctrine, “care” fits with “recovery” and
“rehabilitation” when “care” is interpreted broadly to mean
“the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and
protection of someone.” The Legislature intended that an
8
injured person’s needs be furnished (“care”) until
“recovery” has been accomplished through “rehabilitation.”
In some cases, such as where a motorist is
catastrophically injured, recovery and rehabilitation may
not be an achievable goal. In these cases, the Legislature
requires that the injured individual receive all products
and services reasonably necessary for his or her continuing
care. The act's comprehensive language demonstrates the
Legislature's intent to ensure that benefits are provided
in every instance where a motorist suffers injury.
THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO FOOD
It is difficult to deny that food is a product
reasonably necessary for the care of an invalid, however
narrowly “care” is defined. Without nourishment, an
injured person could not be restored to health and could
not properly be cared for. In fact, without it, a person's
physical well-being would be immediately threatened. A
finding that food is necessary for “care” accords with the
purpose of the no-fault act: to provide benefits needed by
someone injured in an automobile accident.
There is a limitation on those benefits in the act:
all benefits reasonably necessary. Given the wide variety
of circumstances under which injured parties seek no-fault
benefits, the act provides for wide latitude in determining
9
what benefits are reasonably necessary in a given
situation. Unfortunately, the majority limits the wide
latitude provided by the Legislature by restrictively
reading the word “care.”
It is noteworthy that the Legislature did not
expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases
to those that the injured person did not require before the
injury. It could have included, but did not, a clause such
as “benefits are payable except for those that were
reasonably necessary for the care of the person before the
injury.” It is the majority, not the Legislature, that
writes this limitation into the act.
The majority concludes that food is not necessary for
the care of Mr. Griffith because he requires food, injured
or not. It adds that food has nothing to do with an
injured party's “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” It
further reasons that food is not an allowable expense when
consumed in the home, although it is an allowable expense
in an institution.4
4
The majority claims a distinction exists where an
injured person is required to eat hospital food because his
or her injuries require treatment in a hospital. This
ignores the closely related situation presented in this
case. A catastrophically injured individual remains injured
and continues to require institutional treatment, but does
not necessarily require the treatment in a hospital or
long-term care facility.
10
This is not a reasonable construction of the statutory
language. Nothing in the language of the no-fault act
indicates that whether a home-based expense is allowable
depends on whether an uninjured person has the same
expense. The act’s language mandates that the appropriate
question is whether the injured person reasonably incurred
the questioned expense as part of his or her care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.
The logic in the majority’s reasoning is, charitably
speaking, illusory. If an automobile accident victim is
hospitalized, the reasonable cost of his or her food is a
covered expense under § 3107(1)(a). If another automobile
accident victim requires the same care, but receives it at
home, the reasonable cost of his or her food likewise
should be a covered expense under § 3107(1)(a).
I agree with Justice Boyle’s partial concurrence in
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch,5 and the Court
of Appeals decision in Reed: no principled distinction
justifies a holding that, where a patient is
institutionalized, food is a reasonably necessary expense,
but if he or she is home receiving the same care, it is
not. Moreover, the plain language of the no-fault act
makes no such distinction.
5
425 Mich 140, 168; 388 NW2d 216 (1986).
11
The majority claims that its ruling is necessary to
keep down the cost of no-fault insurance. However, the
record contains no evidence to support that claim. There
is nothing to indicate that no-fault insurance has become
unaffordable because of in-home food expenses that insurers
until now have been required to provide to catastrophically
injured policyholders.6
The facts of Mr. Griffith’s case illustrate the
complexity of the issue before us and why the Legislature
could not have intended the interpretation made by the
majority. Mr. Griffith is receiving one hundred percent
institutional care, albeit in a home setting. He resides
in his own home and is being cared for solely by medical
6
The majority claims that my interpretation of the
statute is based on policy considerations. But, in this
case, I base my interpretation on the language found in the
no-fault act. The Legislature has already made the policy
decision. My construction of the statute is in accordance
with that decision. Nonetheless, policy considerations are
frequently appropriate. Certainly, the decision in this
case has numerous policy implications. For example, the
majority appears concerned that no-fault costs be kept low.
This is a policy concern. In that regard, I fail to see
why my interpretation of the law, which has prevailed at
least since 1993, would increase current no-fault premiums.
One would expect that no-fault providers have been
factoring the potential for these costs into their premiums
for years. Perhaps this state’s drivers can expect that
their premiums will decrease in response to the majority’s
opinion today. After all, Michigan drivers will no longer
be entitled to the same level of benefits that they have
paid for in premiums during the past twelve years.
12
professionals, his wife having been placed in a nursing
home.
Thus, family members play no role in cooking for
Douglas Griffith or in providing his food. There is no
evidence that his meals differ in any respect from those he
earlier received in the hospital. Because food in both
settings is necessary for his care, both should be
compensable under the act.
The only distinction between Mr. Griffith’s hospital
care and his in-home care is the location at which he
receives it. The language of the no-fault act does not
limit expenses only to those incurred in a hospital
setting. This is a new rule created by the Court.
The majority attempts to buttress its interpretation
by asserting that it has discerned the policy choice made
by the Legislature. It insists that my reading is my own
policy choice that cannot be accurate unless the
Legislature amends the no-fault act. This is a logical
fallacy that assumes the majority’s conclusion as its
premise.
Also faulty is the majority’s assertion that my
reading of the statute “essentially invent[s] a new
entitlement system.” Ante at 19 n 13. To the contrary, my
13
reading of the statute conforms with the law as interpreted
for at least the past twelve years.
The Court of Appeals made the same application. While
the majority’s accusations and appeal to cost concerns
create a rhetorical flourish, it is the majority, and not
I, that advocates a drastic change in established law.
Let there be no mistake in this: motorists, required
to purchase no-fault insurance in order to drive in
Michigan, now have one less resource available to them
because of the majority’s restrictive reading of the no
fault act. The majority holds that food, as a matter of
law, is never reasonably necessary for one’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation outside a hospital.
A proper reading of the text belies the majority’s
conclusions. There is no need to require the Legislature
to amend its decision that all expenses should be covered
as long as reasonably necessary to an injured person’s
care, recovery, and rehabilitation.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY’S DECISION
The majority forces a harsh dilemma on insured
individuals injured in automobile accidents: remain in an
institution, if insurance coverage is available, or
convalesce at home where they or others are burdened with
the cost of their food. Unfortunately for impoverished
14
families, the only choice may be to remain in institutional
care.7
Reed has been the rule of law in Michigan for twelve
years. There are unacknowledged alarming implications in
overruling it. If we apply the majority’s reasoning about
in-home food, is shelter at home an allowable expense? An
uninjured person requires shelter. The majority
incentivizes no-fault insurers to refuse to reimburse these
and other expenses in the future, even though they are
without dispute reasonably necessary for an injured
person’s care.
The majority opines that reimbursement for in-home
food is a form of wage-loss benefits. However, it is
unable to substantiate that statement with a showing that
any legislation equates wage-loss benefits with payment for
care of the injured. Wage-loss benefits exist to replace
lost income, not as reimbursement for expenses incurred.
Furthermore, the no-fault act limits wage-loss
benefits to three years. But the insurer’s obligation to
provide for the care of an injured person can extend over
7
Interestingly, although the majority expresses its
concern that costs for insurers be minimized, its decision
arguably helps to increase those costs. In the future, the
care of patients who remain institutionalized during the
period they once might have returned home is likely to be
more expensive.
15
the person’s lifetime. Therefore, equating the provision
of food with wage loss is inaccurate. The Legislature
struck a very definite compromise on the duration of wage
loss benefits that stands in contrast to the lifetime care
to which an injured person is entitled.
The majority8 finds that §§ 3105 and 3107 “impose two
separate and distinct requirements” before expenses are
compensable under the act. It finds that Mr. Griffith’s
expenses for in-home food fail to satisfy the requirements
of both sections. They fail to satisfy § 3107 because they
were not necessary for his care. They fail to satisfy §
3105 because they were not caused by the accidental bodily
injury.
The majority informs us that Mr. Griffith’s food, when
provided in the hospital, did satisfy § 3107. Are we to
infer that the hospital food was nonetheless not a
reimbursable expense because it did not satisfy § 3105?9
8
Ante at 9.
9
After quoting both statutory provisions relevant to
the present analysis, the majority concludes that hospital
food remains a covered expense. But merely quoting the
statutory language does not resolve the question.
According to the majority, an injured person's food is
not “for” an accidental bodily injury because the need for
food was not caused by the automobile accident. By the
majority’s logic, even one who is hospitalized is not
entitled to food expenses because those expenses are as
Footnotes continued on following page.
16
Clearly, the food was not an expense caused by the
accidental bodily injury when furnished either in the
hospital or at home.
Finally, the majority makes no provision for those who
in the past have incurred ongoing expenses and assumed
ongoing burdens in reliance on the availability of
reimbursements for in-home food. Because its holding is
not limited to new cases, many whose caregivers are already
receiving reimbursement for in-home food may be forced to
return to institutional settings.
CONCLUSION
The majority’s conclusion is that food is unnecessary
to one’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” outside an
institution, although necessary inside an institution. It
makes a distinction without a difference. Not only is it
illogical, no statutory basis exists to distinguish the
necessary to an uninjured person as to an injured person.
This logic is equally applicable regardless of the injured
person’s physical location.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not express
policy concerns about allowing recovery for food expenses
in a hospital, but not for the same costs at home.
Rather, my concern is the lack of a logical basis for the
distinction the majority seeks to create. Instead of the
majority’s artificial distinction, I would apply the clear
language of § 3107(1)(a) and allow recovery for products
reasonably necessary to “an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” I would not decide, as the
majority does, that as a matter of law at-home food
expenses are never reasonably necessary to one’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.
17
reimbursability of the cost of institutional food from the
reimbursability of the cost of in-home food.
I would affirm the trial court and the Court of
Appeals decisions and leave Reed intact. Regardless of the
choice of meanings ascribed to the word “care,” the
Legislature’s intent had to be that food is an allowable
expense for injured automobile accident victims
convalescing at home.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
18