IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
November 25, 1998
MONROE E. DAVIS, )
) Cecil W. Crowson
Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appellate Court Clerk
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9712-CH-00755
VS. )
) Davidson Chancery
) No. 96-1310-I
COMMISSIONER DONAL )
CAMPBELL, ET AL., )
)
Respondents/Appellees. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE IRVIN H. KILCREASE, JR., CHANCELLOR
MONROE E. DAVIS, #130909
Middle Tennessee Correctional Complex-Annex
7466 Centennial Boulevard
Nashville, Tennessee 37209
Pro Se/Petitioner/Appellant
JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney General & Reporter
ABIGAIL TURNER
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488
Attorney for Respondents/Appellants
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
CAIN, J.
OPINION
An inmate who was disciplined for threatening a correctional officer filed
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, claiming that he was denied due process in the
disciplinary proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.
I.
Monroe E. Davis, an inmate in the Cold Creek Correctional Facility, was
temporarily housed in the Middle Tennessee Reception Center. On February 22,
1996, he allegedly directed a threatening statement at a correctional officer.
Apparently he and another inmate were discussing the violent death of a female
correctional officer which had been reported on the news that day, when he pointed
to officer Sheri Smith and said “They are going to find you killed in a van next.” He
allegedly repeated this statement several times.
That evening, a correctional officer delivered a disciplinary report to Mr.
Davis, stating that he was being charged with threatening an employee. The report
described the incident and named Correctional Officer Tate as a witness. Mr. Davis
refused to sign the report. The next day he was sent back to Cold Creek Correctional
Facility.
Another copy of the disciplinary charge was faxed to Cold Creek, with
a notice that the disciplinary hearing had been scheduled for February 28, 1996. Mr.
Davis acknowledges that the fax was delivered to him on the morning of February 26.
He was transported to the Middle Tennessee Reception Center for the hearing, which
was conducted by a board of three correctional employees. Mr. Davis was
represented by an inmate advisor. Mr. Davis testified, and admitted that he had been
discussing the death of a female officer, but denied that he had directed any threat
to Officer Smith. Officer Smith testified to the contrary, as did Officer Tate. Mr. Davis
did not call any witnesses on his behalf.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the board unanimously found Mr. Davis
to be guilty of threatening an employee, and sentenced him to fifteen days in
segregation, and another fifteen days to be served as sixty days suspended. All three
members of the board signed a hearing summary, which recited the board’s findings
of fact, and stated the evidence it relied upon in reaching those findings.
Mr. Davis appealed his disciplinary conviction to the warden, who
dismissed the appeal on March 4, 1996. He then filed an appeal to the Commissioner
of the Department of Correction on March 29, 1996, which was returned unanswered
because the fifteen day time limit for such appeals had expired.
On April 25, 1996, Mr. Davis filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the
Chancery Court of Davidson County, naming as respondents the Commissioner of the
Department of Correction, the Assistant Commissioner, the Warden, and four
correctional employees. The Department filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
which was granted on December 1, 1997. This appeal followed.
II.
A common law Writ of Certiorari will issue only when an inferior tribunal
has exceeded its jurisdiction, or when its proceedings are shown to be arbitrary, illegal
or fraudulent. Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. App.
1994). Mr. Davis alleges that he received inadequate notice of the proceedings
against him, and that he was denied the opportunity to present witnesses on his
behalf. He also alleges that the outcome of the disciplinary hearing was pre-
determined, because one of the respondents had told the hearing panel to find him
guilty. These allegations amount to a claim of denial of due process, and thus of
illegality on the part of the respondents.
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The United States Supreme Court has noted that the unique
requirements of prison life necessarily involve the retraction or withdrawal from
inmates of many rights and privileges that are routinely afforded to ordinary citizens.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In one case, the Court has held that those
who are incarcerated pursuant to a valid conviction of a crime are not entitled to
constitutional due process in regard to prison disciplinary procedures that can result
in brief periods of disciplinary segregation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Sandin v. Conner involved a disciplinary infraction that resulted in Mr.
Conner’s placement in punitive segregation for thirty days. The Court reasoned that
the possibility of such confinement was well within the conditions inherent in the
sentence of thirty years to life originally imposed upon him, and that its possible
application did not create a liberty interest that would entitle him to due process
protections. Such an interest would only arise if the prospective punishment involved
significant hardships, beyond the ordinary incidents of prison life. Mr. Davis has not
stated any reason why the punishment imposed in this case should be considered in
such a light.
But even if the punishment imposed upon Mr. Davis was so far beyond
the ordinary incidents of prison life as to require the Department to afford him due
process protections, the rights to which he would be entitled would still be limited. As
the Court said in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974): “[p]rison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due
a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”
The rights that do apply include advance written notice of the charges
at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing, a limited right to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence, an impartial decision maker, and a written statement
of the evidence relied upon, with the reasons stated for the action taken. After a
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thorough examination of the record, we conclude that despite Mr. Davis’ complaints
to the contrary, the process he received was consistent with the requirements of Wolff,
if indeed those requirements are even relevant.
In his affidavit, Mr. Davis denies that he was given a copy of the
disciplinary report on February 22. Even if the trial court considered his denial to be
true (as it was obligated to do when ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, see
Mike v. Po Group, 937 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1996), this would still not raise a
question of material fact for purposes of the motion, as Mr. Davis admitted receiving
notice of the charges and of the hearing more than twenty-four hours before the
hearing was scheduled. Further, Mr. Davis’ inmate advisor stated to the Board that
he had had enough time to prepare a defense.
Mr. Davis claims, however, that he did not have enough time to prepare
an adequate defense, though he does not specify what additional steps he would
have taken if he had been granted more time. Since he complains about his inability
to call witnesses, we presume that he would have wanted to contact those who might
have been willing or able to testify on his behalf.
But the Supreme Court has stated that the right of an inmate to obtain
the presence of witnesses in a disciplinary proceeding is limited by the “necessary
discretion” of prison officials, who must balance due process against the requirements
of institutional safety and valid correctional goals. Such goals include “the swift
punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional
program of the institution.” Wolff v. McDonnell at 566. The Court went on to rule that
prison administrators may tailor their procedures and policies to meet the individual
requirements of their own institutions.
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In Tennessee, the procedure for a prisoner who wishes to call witnesses
is to prepare and submit form CR-3511 at least twenty-four hours in advance, listing
the witnesses he wishes to call, and requesting their presence at his hearing. Prison
officials may then arrange for the witnesses to appear, if doing so does not interfere
with security considerations or with other legitimate concerns.
The record shows that Mr. Davis did not submit the required form. He
claims that he did not have time to prepare the form, and that the witnesses he wished
to call had all been transferred to other institutions. While it is clear that he did not
have the opportunity to interview prospective witnesses to find out in advance what
they would say, we do not believe that under the requirements of Wolff he would be
entitled to do so. He could, however, have listed those inmates and other individuals
who were present at the time of the alleged threat, and who could have testified as to
what really happened. We find it significant that nowhere in the pleadings, or in the
brief he has presented to this court, does he name a single person who he would
expect to testify on his behalf.
Finally, Mr. Davis claimed that one of the respondents, Sgt. Eric Qualls,
told him that the disciplinary board would find him guilty, and that he advised the
board to make a finding of guilt. The record shows that Sgt. Qualls was originally
named as the chairperson of the disciplinary board, but that Mr. Davis objected in
writing to his appointment, alleging that a close personal relationship between Sgt.
Qualls and Sheri Smith would prevent him from being impartial.
The warden honored Mr. Davis’ request and removed Sgt. Qualls from
the board, replacing him as chairperson with Angela Sledge, an administrative
assistant with the department. In her affidavit, Ms. Sledge denied that anyone had
told the board to find Mr. Davis guilty. We note, however, that even if Sgt. Qualls had
made the alleged statement (which would have been extremely unprofessional on his
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part), there is nothing in the record to indicate that the board was obligated or inclined
to take orders from him. We therefore cannot find, on the basis of the record before
us, that Mr. Davis was deprived of a hearing before an impartial decision-making
body.
III.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Remand this cause to the
Chancery Court of Davidson County for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.
_________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
_____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
_____________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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