RANDALL DEAN STANCLIFF, )
) Rutherford Chancery
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) No. 96DR-1280
)
VS.
PATRICIA SUSAN STANCLIFF,
)
)
)
Appeal No. FILED
01A01-9802-CH-00078
) October 16, 1998
Defendant/Appellant. )
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
APPEAL FROM THE RUTHERFORD CHANCERY
AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE
HONORABLE DON R. ASH, JUDGE
Roger Hudson, #7014
16 Public Square North
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
P. Edward Schell
136 Fourth Avenue South
Franklin, Tennessee 37064
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR IN THE RESULTS:
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
RANDALL DEAN STANCLIFF, )
) Rutherford Chancery
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) No. 96DR-1280
)
VS. )
) Appeal No.
PATRICIA SUSAN STANCLIFF, ) 01A01-9802-CH-00078
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
OPINION
In this divorce case, the defendant-wife has appealed from the judgment of the Trial
Court presenting the following issues:
I. Whether the Chancery Court erred in finding that
Appellant was not entitled to an award of rehabilitative
alimony.
II. Whether the Chancery Court erred in finding that
Appellant was entitled to the sum of Three Thousand Six
Hundred $3,600.00) Dollars as alimony in solido.
The plaintiff-husband presents an additional issue claiming attorney’s fee on appeal.
In contrast to the brevity of the issues, the facts, proceedings and disposition by the Trial
Court are rather lengthy and complicated.
The complaint, filed by the husband on October 10, 1996, alleged inappropriate marital
conduct and sought an absolute divorce pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-103.
The answer of the wife denied the relevant allegations of the complaint.
On July 17, 1997, the wife filed a counter-complaint alleging inappropriate marital
conduct seeking an absolute divorce, support and division of marital estate.
The answer of the husband was a denial of misconduct.
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The judgment of the Trial Court contains the following:
1. The Court finds each party has grounds for
divorce and therefore does hereby grant a divorce to the
parties and ORDERS the parties are divorced pursuant to
T.C.A. § 36-4-129.
2. As concerns the division of marital property,
the Joint Stipulation of the parties is adopted by the Court.
----
5. The Court hereby finds and ORDERS that the
real property of the parties, which property is described in the
deeds attached hereby as Exhibit “A” and Exhibit “B,”
including all improvements thereon is found to have a value
of $116,500.00. The total mortgage debt encumbering said
property is $14,180.20, such that there remains equity in said
property of $102,319.80. The Wife shall have thirty (30) days
from October 14, 1997 to pay to the Husband, in certified
funds, the sum of $51,159.90 for his ½ interest in the equity
of said property. If the Wife pays this money to the Husband,
said property shall be quit-claimed by the Husband to the
Wife to be hers absolute. If within said thirty (30) day period,
the Wife does not make the payment as referenced above, the
property shall immediately be placed for sale at auction to the
highest bidder with Bob Parks Realty & Auction and the
property shall be sold no less than 75 days from October 14,
1997. The parties shall own the property as tenants in
common pending the equity buy-out of the Wife or the sale of
the property as referenced herein.
The Wife shall be responsible for the mortgage debt
and all other debts associated with the real property until the
same is sold. If the property is sold at auction, then from the
equity proceeds of the property shall be subtracted the realtors
commission, expenses of the auction and the mortgage debt
to SunTrust to reach the net equity after sale. Each party
receive ½ of the net equity.
----
7. The Wife is awarded the IRA account in the
name of the Husband valued at $7,219.49 and shall be
responsible for any tax consequences that flow with the
ownership of this IRA in any form.
----
8. The Court finds and hereby ORDERS after full
consideration of the issue of alimony, including the factors set
forth in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), this is not an appropriate case
for rehabilitative alimony or long term alimony. The Court
does, however, find that it is a proper case for alimony in
solido and does hereby award alimony in solido in the amount
of $3,600.00 to the Wife. This amount shall be paid to the
Wife at the time she purchases the equity interest of the
Husband by subtracting $3,600.00 from his ½ portion of the
equity, or should the property be auctioned, then the
$3,600.00 alimony in solido awarded shall be paid to the Wife
at that time.
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10. The Wife’s request for assistance concerning
her health insurance has been considered by the court and
included within the alimony award and therefore this request
is denied.
11. Each party shall pay their own attorney’s fees
and their own discretionary costs incurred in this manner.
12. The court costs of this cause shall be equally
paid by the parties for which execution may issue if
necessary.
First Issue: Rehabilitive Alimony
The parties were married March 23, 1986, at which time the husband was 44 years old
and the wife was 39. They separated in September, 1996. The wife suffered from some health
problems, but was working at the time of the separation. She was earning $7.20 per hour at the
time of the trial. At the same time, the husband earned $9.31 per hour. During the marriage the
parties accumulated a considerable marital estate which was divided equally. The portion alloted
to the wife is substantial.
The factual determinations of a trial judge sitting without a jury are reviewed on appeal
de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TRAP
Rule 13(d).
Trial Courts have great latitude of discretion as to the award of alimony. Lancaster v.
Lancaster, Tenn. App. 1984, 671 S.W.2d 501. The award of alimony depends upon the unique
facts of each case.
T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) provides that a court may (not must) award rehabilitative alimony
to a disadvantaged spouse.
Appellant argues that she is economically disadvantaged because the husband makes
$2.11 more per hour than she makes. The statute does not require that spouses share equally
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their joint incomes after they are divorced. Moreover, the amount realized from the division of
marital estate is of considerable weight in determining the allowance of support to a
disadvantaged spouse.
The wife insists that her earning ability is impaired, but she admits that she is working
and offers no medical evidence of her present or probable future impairment.
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in denying rehabilitative alimony.
Second Issue: Alimony in solido
The wife insists that the $3,600.00 award of alimony in solido is inadequate and requests
this Court to increase it to $36,000. This would be in addition to the husband’s IRA acount of
$7,219.49 which was awarded to the wife.
This Court finds no error in the cash awards to the wife and affirms same.
Husband’s Issue: Attorney’s fees on appeal
This Court does not find the wife’s appeal to be frivolous, or any other ground for
awarding fees on appeal to either party.
The parties should be grateful that they emerged from their marriage in such favorable
financial condition.
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The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed equally. That
is, each party shall pay one-half of same. The cause is remanded to the Trial Court for necessary
further proceedings.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
_________________________________
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
____________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR IN THE RESULTS:
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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