COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Hodges
SUNNYSIDE PRESBYTERIAN HOME
AND
HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS GROUP SELF-INS. ASSOC.
v. Record No. 2284-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
PHYLLIS M. SHIFFLETT NOVEMBER 7, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on
briefs), for appellants.
(Terry L. Armentrout; Roger Ritchie & Partners, on
brief), for appellee.
Sunnyside Presbyterian Home and its insurer (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) Phyllis M.
Shifflett's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a
"disease" as required for awarding compensation for an
occupational disease; and (2) her carpal tunnel syndrome met the
requirements under Code § 65.2-401 for a compensable ordinary
disease of life. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule
5A:27.
I.
The facts are not in dispute. Shifflett worked for employer
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
as a certified nursing assistant for approximately nineteen
years. In her job, she lifted, turned, and washed patients. In
early 1991, she noticed symptoms of numbness in her hands and
fingers. She did not seek medical treatment until February 1993.
At that time, she was examined by Dr. Glenn E. Deputy, a
neurologist. On March 19, 1993, Dr. Deputy diagnosed bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. He referred Shifflett to Dr. Galen G.
Craun, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon. On April 27, 1993, Shifflett
underwent carpal tunnel release surgery. Drs. Deputy and Craun
opined that Shifflett's condition was caused by the repetitious
use of her hands required in her employment.
We recently held in Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21 Va.
App. 65, 69, 461 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1995), that the general medical
definition of carpal tunnel syndrome places it within the
definition of disease set forth in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17
Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993). As in Perdue,
Shifflett's condition did not present as an obvious, sudden,
mechanical or structural change in her body. Based upon our
holding in Perdue and upon the diagnoses of Drs. Deputy and
Craun, we conclude that credible evidence supports the
commission's finding that Shifflett's carpal tunnel syndrome is a
condition characterized as a "disease" within the meaning of the
Act.
II.
Furthermore, the commission did not err in treating
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Shifflett's disease as a compensable ordinary disease of life
under Code § 65.2-401. For an ordinary disease of life to be
treated as a compensable occupational disease, a claimant is
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the disease arose
out of and in the course of the employment; did not result from
causes outside of the employment; is characteristic of the
employment; and was caused by conditions peculiar to the
employment. Id.
"Whether a disease is causally related to the employment and
not causally related to other factors . . . is a finding of
fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365
S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). When there is credible evidence to
support it, such a finding is "conclusive and binding" on this
Court. Id. Moreover, "[a] question raised by conflicting
medical opinion is a question of fact." Commonwealth v. Powell,
2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1986).
The medical records and reports of Drs. Deputy and Craun,
the treating physicians, provide credible evidence to support the
commission's finding that Shifflett proved by clear and
convincing evidence that her disease met the requirements of Code
§ 65.2-401 for a compensable ordinary disease of life. In its
role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to accept the
opinions of Drs. Deputy and Craun, and to reject the opinions of
the three physicians who reviewed Shifflett's records at
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employer's request, but who did not examine Shifflett. In cases
of conflicting medical evidence, "[t]he general rule is that when
an attending physician is positive in his diagnosis . . . , great
weight will be given by the courts to his opinion." Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 439, 339 S.E.2d
570, 572 (1986).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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