IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
August 19, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
KENNETH RAY MAYFIELD, SR. ) BRADLEY CIRCUIT
)
Plaintiff/Appellee ) NO. 03A01-9803-CV-00112
)
v. ) HON. JOHN B. HAGLER, JR.
) JUDGE
NANCY PRECELLA MAYFIELD, )
)
Defendant/Appellant )
ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR OR RECONSIDER
Appellant seeks rehearing or reconsideration of the memorandum opinion
filed by this Court on July 30, 1998, and for cause avers that “no marital
dissolution agreement was ever signed or entered by the parties. The parties
simply appeared before the court and announced an agreement to the court.”
Further, that “wife, nor her counsel, had no time to retract the agreement at that
time, as it was not learned by counsel, until the next day, that the verbal agreement
which Wife stated before the court had actually been coerced by Husband under
duress.”
The record contains no transcript of the proceedings before the trial judge.
Counsel for appellant provided in his appellate brief the following version of the
events at trial which, for the purpose of considering this petition, we shall adopt
as true:
“Both parties and their counsel appeared before the Court on the
morning of September 5, 1997. Counsel for Wife explained to the
Court they had agreed to a divorce based on stipulated grounds. The
parties had very few items of personal property and no real property.
Basically, the agreement granted Wife a divorce on the grounds of
inappropriate martial [sic] conduct. It further provided Husband
would pay the parties’ debts, would provide Wife with a vehicle,
would reimburse a portion of Wife’s attorneys fees and would pay
rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years. The agreement also
provided for reasonable step-parent visitation. Counsel for Wife
announced to the Court that it had been Wife’s intention to non-suit
her counter-complaint and proceed to defending herself against the
divorce, on the basis he had no grounds for divorce. The Court
placed both parties under oath and they agreed this was their
agreement.”
Upon reconsideration, we find that Appellant was at all times represented
by able counsel, and that although she may have chosen not to fully apprise him
of the facts, she had ample opportunity to notify him or the trial judge of any
unusual circumstances surrounding the parties’ agreement.1 This she failed to do,
or she has simply changed her mind. The Petition for Rehearing is accordingly
denied with costs assessed to the petitioner.
_______________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
Herschel P. Franks, Judge
_______________________________
Don T. McMurray, Judge
1
Indeed the terms of the agreement as described by the appellant indicate
that she successfully negotiated in her own behalf.
2