IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
July 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
KENNETH RAY MAYFIELD, SR. ) BRADLEY CIRCUIT
)
Plaintiff/Appellee ) NO. 03A01-9803-CV-00112
)
v. ) HON. JOHN B. HAGLER, JR.
) JUDGE
NANCY PRECELLA MAYFIELD, )
)
Defendant/Appellant ) AFFIRMED
D. Mitchell Bryant, Cleveland, for the Appellant.
Appellee filed no brief and made no appearance.
MEMORANDUM O P I N I O N 1
INMAN, Senior Judge
Nancy Precella Mayfield [“Wife”] appeals from the judgment of the trial
court granting her a divorce based upon the inappropriate marital conduct of
Kenneth Ray Mayfield, Sr. [ “Husband”]. She contends on appeal that the
settlement agreement was obtained through threats and coercion.
Wife appeared before the court with counsel on June 2, 1997 for a
hearing on a motion for temporary support. She again appeared on September
5, 1997 with counsel and, under oath, testified that she and Husband had
reached a settlement agreement.
On October 7, 1997, Wife filed a “Motion to Set Aside Previously
Announced Agreement” in which she alleged that Husband had coerced her into
agreeing to the settlement of September 5, 1997.
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Affirm ance W ithout O pinion - M emor andum Opinio n. (b) The Court, w ith the con currenc e of all
judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum
opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum
opinion it shall be designated “MEMORA NDUM OPINION ,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or
relied on fo r any reas on in a su bseque nt unrelate d case. [A s amen ded by order filed April 22 , 1992.]
On October 27, 1997, the trial court entered a Final Decree of divorce
which adopted and incorporated the terms of the marital dissolution agreement.
On appeal, Wife asks this Court to set aside the final decree and alleges
that Husband, on the evening of September 4, 1997, coerced her to appear in
court the following morning and agree to the terms of the divorce.
As stated, at the time of the hearing, the trial judge placed both parties
under oath and each testified that the marital dissolution agreement was their
agreement. Wife and her counsel had ample opportunity at that time to retract
her agreement and complain that it had been obtained through duress. She
testified otherwise under oath, and will not be heard now to refute her own
testimony. See, Meadows v. Meadows, slip op., No. 1102 (Tenn. App. May 13,
1987).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.
_______________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
Herschel P. Franks, Judge
_______________________________
Don T. McMurray, Judge
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