IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
W. J. GRAY, JR., ) From the Tennessee Claims
) Commission
Claimant/Appellant, )
) Hon. Martha B. Brasfield, Commissioner
vs. )
) Claims Commission No. 404782
) Appeal No. 02A01-9703-BC-00055
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Respondent/Appellee.
)
)
)
AFFIRMED
FILED
) W. J. Gray, Jr., pro se September 15, 1997
) Jackson, Tennessee
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) John Knox Walkup Appellate C ourt Clerk
) Attorney General & Reporter
) Heather C. Ross
) Assistant Attorney General
) Attorneys for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
HIGHERS, J.
Plaintiff, W. J. Gray, Jr., filed a claim with the Tennessee Division of Claims
Administration seeking damages for the State’s failure to hold a preliminary hearing after
Plaintiff had been arrested and charged with armed robbery and for the State’s prolonged
detention of the Plaintiff pending trial. The State filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim,
and the Tennessee Claims Commission (the “Commission”) granted the State’s motion to
dismiss. Plaintiff appealed the Commission’s order dismissing his claim and sought an en
banc hearing of the Commission. The Commission granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiff’s motion for an en banc hearing. The Commission granted an en banc hearing to
determine the following issues: (1) whether the Commission had jurisdiction to hear a
claim for the negligent deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) whether Plaintiff’s claim
was timely filed. After an en banc hearing before the Commission, the Commission held
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Rule 10 (C ourt o f Appea ls). Mem orandum Opinion. -- (b) The Court, with the concurrence of all
judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum
opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by memorandum
opinion it shall be designated “MEMO RAND UM O PINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or
relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.
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that Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed because it was not filed within the time allowed by
the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals from the order of the Commission dismissing
his claim and argues that the statute of limitations does not bar his claim. For the reasons
stated hereafter, we affirm the order of the Commission.
FACTS
In 1984, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with armed robbery in Madison County,
Tennessee. A preliminary hearing was not held. Plaintiff allegedly remained in jail for ten
months until his criminal trial was held. After a trial by jury, Plaintiff was found not guilty
and released.
On May 12, 1995, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Division of Claims Administration.2
In his claim, Plaintiff alleged that his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when he was denied a preliminary hearing and when he was held in
jail for ten months pending trial. Alternatively, Plaintiff premises his claim on the alleged
negligence and professional malpractice of the judge who presided over his criminal trial.
LAW
T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1980 & 1996 Supp.) provides as follows:
The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the
cause of action accrued:
(1) Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, breach of marriage promise;
(2) Actions and suits against attorneys or licensed public accountants or
certified public accountants for malpractice, whether the actions are
grounded or based in contract or tort;
(3) Civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought
under the federal civil rights statutes; and
(4) Actions for statutory penalties.
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Because the Division of Claim s A dm inistration was unable to ac t on P laintiff’s claim within ninety
days, Plaintiff’s claim was transferred to the Claims C omm ission for resolution pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8 -
402(c).
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Under Tennessee law, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers in actuality
a legally-cognizable wrong and thus acquires the right to bring suit for redress. Shell v.
State, 893 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Tenn. 1995). In the present case, Plaintiff’s alleged cause
of action accrued in 1984 when Plaintiff was denied a preliminary hearing and was held in
jail for ten months pending trial. Because Plaintiff filed his claim with the Division of Claims
Administration on May 12, 1995, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a).
Plaintiff argues that his claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because he
filed suit on February 26, 1985 against the City of Jackson, the State of Tennessee and
other defendants in United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
Because the District Court did not enter a final order until October 18, 1994, Plaintiff claims
that his claim, which was filed with the Division of Claims Administration on May 12, 1995,
falls within the appropriate limitations period. (TR 122) As support for his argument,
Plaintiff cites T.C.A. § 9-8-307(i)(1)(1992 & Supp. 1996) which provides as follows:
Claims that were timely filed with a court of competent
jurisdiction and that fall within the jurisdiction of the claims
commission found in subsection (a) may be transferred to the
division of claims administration by agreement of the parties
and the consent of the attorney general and reporter and, upon
such transfer, shall be considered timely filed with the division
of claims administration. Such transfer shall be effected by
filing with the division of claims administration the parties'
agreement and the complaint which is the subject of the
agreement. Such claims shall be considered by the division of
claims administration and the claims commission, as provided
by law, even if the court retains jurisdiction over the claim.
Because there is no proof in the record indicating that the parties to the action in the United
States District Court agreed to a transfer of the case to the Division of Claims
Administration or that the attorney general and reporter agreed to a transfer of the case,
Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. Thus, Plaintiff’s filing of a suit in the United States
District Court on February 26, 1985 does not serve to toll the running of the statute of
limitations in the present action. See Locust v. State, 912 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995). For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s action is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a).
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The order of the Commission is hereby affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the
Appellant for which execution may issue if necessary.
HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
FARMER, J.
LILLARD, J.
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